Affectivism about intuitions

Synthese 200 (4):1-24 (2022)
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Abstract

This article provides an account of intuitions: Affectivism. Affectivism states that intuitions are emotional experiences. The article proceeds as follows: first, the features that intuitions are typically taken to have are introduced. Then some issues with extant theories are outlined. After that, emotional experiences and their central features are brought into view. This is followed by a comparison of intuitions and emotional experiences, yielding the result that emotional experiences fit and elucidate the feature profile of intuitions. Finally, it is specified what kind of emotional experiences intuitions are: intuitions are typically mild emotional experiences that belong to the subclass of epistemic feelings.

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Slawa Loev
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

References found in this work

Philosophy without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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