Epistemic pluralism is a form of pluralism whose object is knowledge, a sub- stantial component or prerequisite of knowledge, or a process of knowledge acquisition. It assumes that this target notion can be realised in not one, but many ways, and that this plurality is non-trivial.

Within the literature on emotion and behavioral action, studies on approach-avoidance take up a prominent place. Several experimental paradigms feature successful conceptual replications but many original studies have not yet been replicated directly. We present such a direct replication attempt of two seminal experiments originally conducted by Chen and Bargh (1999). In their first experiment, participants affectively evaluated attitude objects by pulling or pushing a lever. Participants who had to pull the lever with positively valenced attitude objects and push the (...) lever with negatively valenced attitude objects (i.e., congruent instruction) did so faster than participants who had to follow the reverse (i.e., incongruent) instruction. In Chen and Bargh's second experiment, the explicit evaluative instructions were absent and participants merely responded to the attitude objects by either always pushing or always pulling the lever. Similar results were obtained as in Experiment 1. Based on these findings, Chen and Bargh concluded that (1) attitude objects are evaluated automatically; and (2) attitude objects automatically trigger a behavioral tendency to approach or avoid. We attempted to replicate both experiments and failed to find the effects reported by Chen and Bargh as indicated by our pre-registered Bayesian data analyses; nevertheless, the evidence in favor of the null hypotheses was only anecdotal, and definitive conclusions await further study. (shrink)

Scientific research increasingly involves large, multidisciplinary teams networked across multiple institutions to develop new technologies. Despite the rise of complex research networks and big team science, there has been too little analysis to date of the ethical challenges facing these networks. The extensive literature on the ethical issues confronting individual researchers and small teams (the microlevel) and on the larger societal challenges flowing from research and new technology (the macrolevel) leaves a troubling gap in between, at the mesolevel of the (...) research network involved in big team science. Yet the ability of complex networks to conduct research ethically—which is essential if the results are to be deemed reliable and trustworthy—depends on recognizing the ethical issues that emerge at this intermediate network level, identifying the values that should guide networks in addressing those issues, and equipping research leaders to build a culture supporting the ethical conduct of research across the laboratories and institutions that comprise the network. This paper calls out the problem, analyzing the gap and recommending next steps. (shrink)

In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness in a system. I raise a series of questions about the central explanatory target, the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness. I suggest it is not at all clear what scientists and philosophers are talking about when they talk about consciousness as gradable. This point is developed in more detail in my paper "What Is the Integrated (...) Information Theory of Consciousness?"Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):1-2 (2019) . (shrink)

Adam Smith (c. 1723–1790) was a White Scottish philosopher and economist. This chapter is a selection from lectures that he delivered in 1763 but did not publish in his lifetime. In the selection, Smith analyzes the master-slave relation and its economic dimensions, arguing that slavery is generally unprofitable. He also explores the origins of slavery and contends that it will never be abolished in its entirety, even though it is economically unprofitable. Smith’s economic argument against slavery was enormously influential, (...) though his claims were contested by many proponents of slavery. Smith makes similar arguments, though less detailed, in his 1776 magnum opus An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, typically referred to simply as The Wealth of Nations. (shrink)

A new edition of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, an important text in the history of moral and political thought.

A philosopher and historian, Adam Ferguson occupies a unique place within eighteenth-century Scottish thought. Distinguished by a moral and historical bent, his work is framed within a teleological outlook that upholds the importance of action and virtue.

Now complete in seven titles/eight volumes, this series is the first uniform collection of Adam Smith's writings. The Glasgow edition is published in hardcover by Oxford University Press. The paperback edition is published by Liberty Fund.

The English Franciscan philosopher and theologian, Adam of Wodeham (d. 1358), was a disciple and friend of William of Ockham; he was also a student of Walther Chatton. Nevertheless, he was an independent thinker who did not hesitate to criticize his former teachers - Ockham sporadically and benevolently, Chatton, frequently and aggressively. Since W odeham developed his own doctrinal position by a thorough critical examination of current opinions, the first part of this introduc tion briefly outlines the positions of (...) the chief figures in the English controversy over indivisibles. The second part of the introduction pre sents a summary of Wodeham's views in the Tractatus de indivisibilibus, lists the contents of the treatise, and considers the question of its date and its chronological position in the context of Wodeham's other works. In the third part, the editorial procedures used here are set forth. 1. THE INDIVISIBILIST CONTROVERSY In the literature of the 13th and 14th centuries, the term 'indivisible' refers to a simple, un extended entity. Consequently, these indivisibles are not physical atoms but either mathematical points, temporal instants or indivisibles of motion, usually called mutata esse. I THOMAS BRADWARDINE (d. 1349), roughly contemporary with Wodeham, classified the positions it was possible to take regarding indivisibles. He described his own view as the common view, that of "Aristotle, A verroes, and most of the moderns," according to which a "continuum was not composed of atoms (athomis) but of parts divisible without end. (shrink)

Humans can consolidate and carry out habits other animals cannot. This statement is mainly sustained by the fact that humans have a unique cognitive control of their actions: we can let our attention fade away to perform automatic tasks more efficiently, we can detect if there has been an unexpected problem in their implementation, and we can regain conscious control of the action if necessary. We tend to dichotomize this cognitive process into two “systems”, namely goal-directed versus habitual (Dickinson, 1985), (...) conscious versus unconscious (Crick and Koch, 1998), or slow versus fast (Kahneman, 2011). If we just put it in those terms, these two ways of tackling the challenges of a changing environment seem to be present in non-human animals. However, all dichotomies imply a difficulty to deal with: the regulation of the transition between the two systems. Is this carried out by a third element, or regulated by one of the systems? Could it be more convenient to view it as a continuum, rather than a dichotomy? In any case, we believe this transition has a level of complexity in humans that makes it qualitatively different from its analogue in animals. In fact, this ‘cognitive bridge’ might be a major feature to characterize a reliable behavior, since a particular task or problem is more efficiently tackled when the transition between the two systems is more adequate. Moreover, the integrity of this link could be an indicator to detect prodromal psychiatric conditions, as it has been suggested for slips-of-action (Gillan et al., 2011). In order to justify these ideas, we will focus first on Kahneman’s distinction between systems 1 and 2 (Kahneman, 2011). On the one hand, System 1 is responsible for making decisions rapidly. The purpose of this system is to give us an assessment of the environment around us as quickly as possible so that we are able to respond as fast as possible. To perform this task, System 1 follows general rules or guidelines (heuristics). In all, System 1 is intended to help us make decisions more quickly, and is very useful (let’s say ‘just fine’) in most cases. However, one of the characteristics of these decisions is the lack of voluntary control, what is a problem considering this system is responsible of many of the decisions and judgments we make. Given to its “automatic” nature, System 1 also has biases and systematic errors that are likely to happen in some situations.On the other hand, System 2 acts when a problem which System 1 has no solution for arises. System 2, apparently, can take control of the whole process at any time. It is somewhat triggered by some external or internal alarm that draws its attention and makes it take “conscious” control of the situation. One of the problems of this system is that it is lazy and can be easily exhausted. Therefore, it usually accepts the decisions of System 1 without monitoring them. One proof of System 2’s negligence is what Kahneman calls WYSIATI ("What You See Is All There Is"), a general rule that “facilitates the achievement of coherence and of the cognitive ease that causes us to accept a statement as true”. System 1 easily gets that coherence, and System 2 usually allows it to jump to conclusions and act. In different sets of experiments, Kahneman demonstrates that humans are not good at all with statistics or handling mathematics; in his opinion, this is because humans simplify judgments to make them more understandable and deal with them just through heuristics that System 1 can handle. This general view of humans as poor rational decision-makers is also supported by other authors (see, for example, Ariely, 2008).In our opinion, this division of human cognition into two systems fits well with the usual opposition between goal-directed versus habitual systems (Dickinson, 1985). In general, goal-directed actions are viewed as conscious, flexible, and sensitive to outcome devaluation, whereas habits are mainly unconscious, rigid and insensitive to changes in the value of the outcome. The features of goal-directed and habit systems were mainly drawn from studies in animals. The typical experiment about this subject consists on teaching the contingency between an instrumental action (for example, a lever press) and a reward to the animal (Adams and Dickinson, 1981). At the beginning, the animal’s behavior is goal directed, and it performs the action to obtain the reward. However, this behavior becomes “habitual” (in this context, a motor routine) after many repetitions. When that happens, the value of the reward is transferred to the lever press itself: even though the outcome is devalued (gets the animal sick) or the animal is sated, it keeps pressing the lever. This is why habits have been opposed to goal-directed behavior.A quick look suggests that habits and goal-directed actions are intimately related to Systems 1 and 2, respectively. This is also supported by the identification of the goal-directed system with a model-based reinforcement learning scheme, since it can be viewed “in terms of sophisticated, computationally demanding, prospective planning, in which a decision tree of possible future states and actions is built using a learned internal model of the environment” (Dolan and Dayan, 2013). The habitual system, on the other hand, follows a model-free scheme, which “is computationally efficient, since it replaces computation (i.e., the burdensome simulation of future states) with memory (i.e., stored discounted values of expected future reward); however, the forward-looking nature of the prediction error makes it statistically inefficient” (Dolan and Dayan, 2013). Following these analogies between systems, we can assume that some actions that at the beginning fall under the domain of System 2 might be transferred to System 1 through learning, like goal-directed actions become habits through experience.Concerning the neural bases of these systems, the striatum and its cortical afferents and –indirect– target areas in the cortex play a major role. It is widely accepted that the cognitive part of the striatum –caudate nucleus and anterior putamen– are involved in the planning and execution of goal-directed actions, together with the prefrontal cortex (Balleine et al., 2007). On the other hand, the sensorimotor striatal aspects –mainly the posterior putamen– and the supplementary motor area of the cortex are particularly active when the agent is performing a well-learned action (Ashby et al., 2010; Miyachi et al., 2002). Furthermore, the activity of the neurons in these areas follows a “chunked” pattern: they are mainly active at certain stages of the motor routine (for example at the beginning and the end of the sequence, when a particular switch or turn is needed, etc), and this activity is reduced in the rest of the motor sequence (Graybiel, 1998). Although some authors question a sharp neuroanatomical basis of Kahneman’s Systems 1 and 2 (Gold and Shadlen, 2007), our train of thought in this manuscript suggests that the more reflective System 2 should be based in the prefrontal cortex –both dorsal and ventral–, and the cognitive regions of the basal ganglia. Likewise, the more automatic System 1 would lie on motor and premotor cortical regions, as well as on the sensorimotor aspects of those subcortical nuclei.This neuroscientific framework identifies the habit system with automaticity, rigidity and unconsciousness; however, we are intending to challenge this view in past and forthcoming contributions (Bernacer et al., 2014; Bernacer and Gimenez-Amaya, 2013). In a nutshell, we propose to view the phenomenon of action from the point of view of the agent as a whole, and not from an isolated movement. Hence, it could be more convenient to understand System 1 –or habits– as a resource of System 2, rather than as opposed systems in competition. Whereas a motor routine (i.e., what is commonly called “habit” in neuroscience) implies the sequential and unconscious performance of movements, they usually pursue the goal set by the agent. In fact, the more engrained the routine is, the easier for the agent to achieve that goal. Furthermore, the agent can consciously stop or correct the movement at any point, since the habit releases the higher cognitive regions of the brain to improve the performance of the action. A very simple example of this is a tennis service, which should be “goal directed” to place the ball wherever the player wants. It involves a set of movements such as throwing the ball upwards, moving the feet, putting the arm back, etc. Only when these motor routines are learned correctly, the player is able to concentrate on other aspects of the service such as the speed, spin, or exploiting the weaknesses of the receiver. This can be also exemplified with other kinds of habits such as driving, playing an instrument, tackling a mathematical problem, and so on. They all suggest that “automatic” routines are governed by higher cognitive functions to better achieve a particular goal.Kahneman’s Systems 1 and 2 allow as well this release of consciousness from everyday decisions to focus on more complicated situations. As Kahneman himself and other authors defend (Ariely, 2008), the problem arises when System 2 is rarely used or either system is applied to inadequate situations. However, we believe that the most effective agent does not exclusively rely on System 2, but efficiently uses all resources of ‘each system’ in the right situation and, more importantly, carries out an appropriate transition between them. That is, in our opinion, a ‘rational’ agent. This could be also said about goal-directed and habitual systems. Moreover, we believe that this transition between systems is subject to learning, and it can be performed more effectively through experience.If we understand these fragmentations of cognition as independent systems in competition, we encounter an important problem: is there an additional mechanism in charge of the transition between systems, or is this regulated by one of the systems itself? If the first option were true, we would find the difficulty of defining the nature –both conceptually and anatomically– of a “third system” qualitatively different than the other two. This would lead us to an ad infinitum process –the need of a fourth element to regulate the activity of the third, and so on–, and therefore we believe this hypothesis should be rejected. Considering the second option, it seems that only the highly cognitive System 2 could be in charge of leading the transition between systems, which in turn dissolves a rigorous separation in two systems. The role of System 2 in leading the transition is clear when the agent decides to regain conscious control of a task generally performed in an unconscious manner. In this sense, the interaction of the orbitofrontal cortex with either the cognitive or sensorimotor aspects of the striatum plays a central role in shifting between goal-directed actions and motor routines (Gremel and Costa, 2013). In other situations, an external cue such as an error may set the alarm for System 2 to retake control of the action. Regarding this, the anterior cingulate cortex has been reported to be active in highly-conflictive decision making situations (Goñi et al., 2011); for that reason, some authors relate this cortical area with error monitoring (Carter, 1998; Botvinick et al., 2004). A recent report suggests a new model of reinforcement learning and conflict monitoring, which involves a wide network including different areas of the cortex (posterior parietal, precentral, anterior cingulate and prefrontal) and the basal ganglia (Zendehrouh et al., 2013).To sum up, this opinion article suggests viewing Kahneman’s systems as analogous to the goal-directed/habits dichotomy in order to improve the understanding of some aspects of human cognition. Further, we believe a strict separation between systems in competition is problematic, since System 2 is always in charge of governing the interplay between systems: therefore, System 1 –or habits– should be understood as a resource of System 2. This view could shed some light on the understanding of habits as a source of learning, plasticity and freedom for the agent. Finally, an inappropriate cognitive control of habits could be an indicator of certain psychiatric conditions. (shrink)

The author is a student of the renowned German medievalist, Josef Koch. Having himself worked for more than ten years on medieval commentaries on Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics, Zimmermann wishes to make the result of his researches available to others. To reduce his mass of material to tractable dimensions, he follows the pattern of F. Stegmüller's Repertorium of commentaries on Lombard's Sentences, giving first a description of the manuscripts examined, then a transliteration of the titles of all questions treated (...) in the respective commentaries, together with the folio at which each question begins, and grouping the works of identified authors before the anonymous works in each category. The first volume is limited to manuscripts contained in collections at Munich, Innsbruck, Cambridge, Oxford, London, Paris, and Cambrai; a second volume, with wider coverage, is promised shortly. The majority of the authors reported on in the first volume are anonymous, but those identified include Adam of Bocfeld, Augustine Triumphus of Ancona, Boethius of Dacia, Geoffrey of Aspall, John of Wacfeld, Peter of Alvernia, Radulfus Brito, Siger of Brabant, Simon of Faversham, William Bonkys, William of Chelvestun, and William of Clifford. This, like Stegmüller's, is clearly a reference work for scholars, and its principal merit lies in that it provides an accurate list of physical and metaphysical topics being discussed at centers of learning in England and on the Continent from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth centuries. It was during this period, of course, that Aristotle was having his greatest impact on Latin Christendom. The questions listed by Zimmermann have their intrinsic interest, but even more they provide historians of science and of philosophy with considerable material for investigation, for analysis, and, hopefully, for the dating and identification of the works listed as anonymous. Zimmermann makes no attempt at completeness of reference, supplying only a few citations in his notes; on Geoffrey of Aspall, for instance, he refers only to Emden's Biographical Register, missing Enya MacRae's Geoffrey of Aspall's Commentaries on Aristotle, Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6. Regrettably the volume has neither a subject index nor a register of names, deficiencies that seriously impair its usefulness--W. A. W. (shrink)

In "The Quest for Consciousness," Caltech neuroscientist Christof Koch explores the biological basis of consciousness.

In which a scientist searches for an empirical explanation for phenomenal experience, spurred by his instinctual belief that life is meaningful. What links conscious experience of pain, joy, color, and smell to bioelectrical activity in the brain? How can anything physical give rise to nonphysical, subjective, conscious states? Christof Koch has devoted much of his career to bridging the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the physics of the brain and phenomenal experience. This engaging book--part scientific overview, part memoir, part futurist (...) speculation--describes Koch's search for an empirical explanation for consciousness. Koch recounts not only the birth of the modern science of consciousness but also the subterranean motivation for his quest--his instinctual belief that life is meaningful. Koch describes his own groundbreaking work with Francis Crick in the 1990s and 2000s and the gradual emergence of consciousness as a legitimate topic for scientific investigation. Present at this paradigm shift were Koch and a handful of colleagues, including Ned Block, David Chalmers, Stanislas Dehaene, Giulio Tononi, Wolf Singer, and others. Aiding and abetting it were new techniques to listen in on the activity of individual nerve cells, clinical studies, and brain-imaging technologies that allowed safe and noninvasive study of the human brain in action. Koch gives us stories from the front lines of modern research into the neurobiology of consciousness as well as his own reflections on a variety of topics, including the distinction between attention and awareness, the unconscious, how neurons respond to Homer Simpson, the physics and biology of free will, dogs, Der Ring des Nibelungen, sentient machines, the loss of his belief in a personal God, and sadness. All of them are signposts in the pursuit of his life's work--to uncover the roots of consciousness. (shrink)

The article surveys German-language ayurvedic cooking and nutrition books from 1990 until today. The semantic analysis reveals a market diversification that corresponds to the following categories: health, diet, spirituality, and individualism. These are main attractors of Ayurveda along with its promises of holistic balance and cosmological integration. Because this development can be interpreted as a reaction to the Western scientific formation of "Ayurveda" within popular life advice literature, this essay uses the concept of reflexive nutrition as derived from M. Stausberg's (...) reflexive ritualization. Furthermore, the success of these books indicates an absence of Christian dietetics in Germany's religion landscape. (shrink)

In den Aufsätzen dieses Bandes präsentiert Anton Friedrich Koch Hegels theoretische Philosophie als diejenige Nichtstandard-Metaphysik, in der sich die Metaphysik, nicht aber die Philosophie vollendet. Jenseits von Hegels Evolutionstheorie des Absoluten gilt es von einem Standpunkt der Endlichkeit aus neu zu philosophieren.

Christof Koch explores the only thing we directly experience: consciousness. At the book's heart is integrated-information theory, the idea that the essence of consciousness is the ability to exert causal power over itself, to be an agent of change. Koch investigates the physical origins of consciousness in the brain and how this knowledge can be used to measure consciousness in natural and artificial systems.

Bioethics claimed to offer a set of generally applicable, universally accepted guidelines that would simplify complex situations. In Thieves of Virtue, Tom Koch argues that bioethics has failed to deliver on its promises.

This book originated at a small and informal workshop held in December of 1992 in Idyllwild, a relatively secluded resort village situated amid forests in the ...

English summary: In this work, Anton Friedrich Koch develops a hermeneutical realism using methods of analytic philosophy, i.e. the thesis that although the real is independent from individual beliefs and perceptions, it is, however, not independent of there being beliefs and perceptions at all. We, the finite spatiotemporally embodied subjects, are therefore not a 'cosmic coincidence' but rather necessary for the existence of the material system of space-time, which, on the other hand, encompasses us and is in no way (...) a fiction or construction (subjectivity thesis). This brand of realism is hermeneutical because it treats knowing as a special case of reading and translating - of things into spoken language - (readability thesis), and in giving room to the discovery that completeness and consistency, as in mathematics, are likewise incompatible in the description of the world (antinomy thesis). German description: Anton Friedrich Koch begrundet und entwickelt in diesem Werk mit Mitteln der analytischen Philosophie einen hermeneutischen Realismus: die philosophische Lehre, dass das Reale zwar von einzelnen Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen unabhangig ist, nicht aber davon, dass es uberhaupt Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen gibt. Wir, die endlichen, raumzeitlich verkorperten Subjekte, sind also kein Zufall, sondern notwendig fur die Existenz des materiellen Raum-Zeit-Systems, das uns andererseits weitraumig umgibt und keineswegs unsere Konstruktion oder Fiktion ist (Subjektivitatsthese). Hermeneutisch ist dieser Realismus, weil er das Erkennen als einen Sonderfall des Lesens und Ubersetzens - der Dinge in Wortsprache - begreift (Lesbarkeitsthese) und weil er der Entdeckung Raum gibt, dass Vollstandigkeit und Widerspruchsfreiheit, wie in der Mathematik, so auch in der Weltbeschreibung unvertraglich sind (Antinomiethese). (shrink)

Transhumanists advance a "posthuman" condition in which technological and genetic enhancements will transform humankind. They are joined in this goal by bioethicists arguing for genetic selection as a means of "enhancing evolution," improving if not also the species then at least the potential lives of future individuals. The argument of both, this paper argues, is a new riff on the old eugenics tune. As ever, it is done in the name of science and its presumed knowledge base. As ever, the (...) result is destructive rather than instructive, bad faith promoted as high ideal. The paper concludes with the argument that species advancement is possible but in a manner thoroughly distinct from that advanced by either of these groups. (shrink)

The world of disability theory is currently divided between those who insist it reflects a physical fact affecting life quality and those who believe disability is defined by social prejudice. Despite a dialogue spanning bioethical, medical and social scientific literatures the differences between opposing views remains persistent. The result is similar to a figure-ground paradox in which one can see only part of a picture at any moment. This paper attempts to find areas of commonality between the opposing camps, and (...) thus to rearrange the figures of the paradox at a fundamental level. The purpose is first to identify areas in which common ground can be achieved, and secondarily, to clarify the areas in which disagreement continues. While a general and unified theory of physical difference/disability is beyond the scope of this paper the result may advance that general goal. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band umfasst Beitrage zu einem zentralen Thema bei Platon: 'Physis' kann bei Platon im naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne als physische, biologische, materielle Natur oder im ubertragenen Sinne als eigenes Wesen, etwa hinsichtlich Seele, Kosmos oder Gottlichem, verstanden werden. So werden in diesem Band medizinische, biologische und kosmologische Ansatze ebenso wie ontologische, epistemologische und padagogische Themen zu Platons 'Physis'-Konzept fokussiert. Die zeitgenossische Nomos-Physis-Diskussion Platons mit den Sophisten sowie seine sprach- und kulturphilosophischen Uberlegungen spielen hier eine wichtige Rolle. Die anspruchsvolle literarische Gestaltung (...) der Platonischen Dialoge ist fur die genannten Fragestellungen hochst relevant, ebenso die Auseinandersetzung spaterer platonischer Philosophen mit Platons Physis-Konzept. Mit Beitragen von:Michele Abbate, Christian Brockmann, Ramon Cornavaca, Diego De Brasi, Pantelis Golitsis, Julia Knauss, Dietmar Koch, Mai Oki-Suga, Irmgard Mannlein-Robert, Oliver Primavesi, Mario Regali, Carlos Steel, Angela Ulacco. (shrink)

Den Ausgangspunkt des Aufsatzes bildet Dieter Henrichs These, daß die Negation in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik selbstreferentiell und autonomisiert vorkommt. Sie wird als exegetische These an dem daseinslogischen Sachverhalt des Anderen seiner selbst sowie am Übergang von der Seins- zur Wesenslogik bewährt und wie folgt differenziert: In der Seinslogik erscheint die Selbstbeziehung der Negation als mit Unmittelbarem kontaminiert, erst in der Wesenslogik trifft sie autonomisiert hervor. Mittel der Differenzierung ist der mengentheoretische Begriff der Unfundiertheit, der es ferner erlaubt, die These (...) von der Selbstbeziehung der Negation auch der Sache nach zu verteidigen und sie für eine Nichtstandarddiagnose der Lügnerantinomie fruchtbar zu machen. (shrink)

From fertilization to approximately the sixteenth day of development, human embryonic cells are said to have the capacities of totipotency and monozygotic twinning, both of which are problematic to a theory of ensoulment at fertilization. In this article I will address the problems which these capacities pose to such a theory and present an interpretation of the biological data which renders ensoulment at fertilization more plausible. I will then argue that not only is an ensoulment theory consistent with current biological (...) data on the human embryo, but it may offer an explanation for the phenomencon of monozygotic twinning. (shrink)

For all its apparent debate bioethical discourse is in fact very narrow. The discussion that occurs is typically within limited parameters, rarely fundamental. Nor does it accommodate divergent perspectives with ease. The reason lies in its ideology and the political and economic perspectives that ideology promotes. Here the ideology of bioethics' fundamental axioms is critiqued as arbitrary and exclusive rather than necessary and inclusive. The result unpacks the ideological and political underpinnings of bioethical thinking and suggests new avenues for a (...) broader debate over fundamentals, and a different approach to bioethical debate. (shrink)

ArgumentThe recent development of molecular genetics has created concern that society may experience a new eugenics. Notions about eugenics and what took place in the 1930s and 1940s are actively shaping questions about which uses of the new genetics should be considered illegitimate. Drawing upon a body of historiographical literature on Scandinavian eugenics, this paper argues that the dominant view of eugenics as morally and scientifically illegitimate is not tenable when it comes to the uses of compulsion, political motivation, and (...) scientific acceptability. In spite of a general condemnation of eugenics, health authorities today are trying to prevent individuals with deviant behavior from reproducing or at least from rearing children. This may not be argued with reference to the risk of transmitting defective genes, but rather the risk of producing undesirable social problems. Drawing on a Foucauldian approach, the paper concludes that eugenics and new genetics should be seen as two historically specific forms of biopower. (shrink)

Miss Koch probes the essential meaning of Madison's political philosophy to locate his distinctive angle of vision. She considers three controlling themes in his political thought--liberty, justice, and union--and presents a profile of his mind and heart. The material in the book was originally presented as the Whig-Clio Bicentennial Lectures at Princeton University. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University (...) Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Two rival paradigms permeate bioethics. One generally favors eugenics, euthanasia, assisted suicide and other methods for those with severely restricting physical and cognitive attributes. The other typically opposes these and favors instead ample support for "persons of difference" and their caring families or loved ones. In an attempt to understand the relation between these two paradigms, this article analyzes a publicly reported debate between proponents of both paradigms, bioethicist Peter Singer and lawyer Harriet McBryde Johnson. At issue, the article concludes, (...) are two distinct axiomatic sets of values resulting in not simply different styles of rhetoric but different vocabularies, in effect two different languages of ethics. (shrink)

In his chapter, William Koch argues that many of the central themes of Lars von Trier’s films can be understood in light of the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan and Lee Edelman’s extension of those ideas. Specifically, the theme of the death or sacrifice of the child can be interpreted in light of the contrast between fantasy and the Death Drive. This allows for a reading of the Depression Trilogy and most of the Golden Heart Trilogy that hinges on the (...) response of the main characters to the death or life of the child who forms the hidden central spoke of the plot. (shrink)

Body feedback is the proprioceptive feedback that denominates the afferent information from position and movement of the body to the central nervous system. It is crucial in experiencing emotions, in forming attitudes and in regulating emotions and behavior. This paper investigates effects of dynamic body feedback on affect and attitudes, focusing on the impact of movement rhythms with smooth vs. sharp reversals as one basic category of movement qualities. It relates those qualities to already explored effects of approach vs. avoidance (...) motor behavior as one basic category of movement shape. Studies 1 and 2 tested the effects of one of two basic movement qualities (smooth vs. sharp rhythms) on affect and cognition. The third study tested those movement qualities in combination with movement shape (approach vs. avoidance motor behavior) and the effects of those combinations on affect and attitudes toward initially valence-free stimuli. Results suggest that movement rhythms influence affect (studies 1 and 2), and attitudes (study 3), and moderate the impact of approach and avoidance motor behavior on attitudes (study 3). Extending static body feedback research with a dynamic account, findings indicate that movement qualities – next to movement shape – play an important role, when movement of the lived body is an independent variable. (shrink)

This essay identifies two different methodological strategies used by the proponents of anarchism. In what is termed the "ontological" approach, the rationale for anarchism depends on a particular representation of human nature. That characterization of "being" determines the relation between the individual and the structures of social life. In the alternative approach, the epistemological status of "representation" is challenged, leaving human subjects without stable identities. Without the possibility of stable human representations, the foundations underlying the exercise of institutional power can (...) be challenged. This epistemological discussion is traced from Max Stirner to the twentieth-century movement known as poststructuralism. (shrink)

Donald F. Koch supplies the only extant complete transcription of the annual three-course sequence on ethics Dewey gave at the University of Chicago from 1894 to 1904. Koch argues that these lectures offer the best systematic, overall introduction to Dewey’s approach to moral philosophy and are the only account showing the unity of his views in nearly all phases of ethical inquiry. These lectures are the only work by Dewey to set forth a complete theory of moral language. (...) They offer a clear illustration of the central methodological questions in the development of a pragmatic instrumentalist ethic and the actual working out of the instrumentalist approach as distinct from simply presenting it as a conclusion. (shrink)

Carl Henrik Koch har i denne bog samlet en række af sine artikler om fremtrædende danske filosoffer. Med start ved Holberg i 1700-tallet arbejder Koch sig op gennem den danske filosofihistorie og strejfer blandt andre Eilchov, Sibbern, A.P. Adler, Brøchner og naturligvis mastodonterne Søren Kierkegaard og Georg Brandes. Bogen giver en hurtig, men spændende indførsel i en vigtig del af den danske kulturhistorie, som gennem de sidste 250 år har haft stor indflydelse både herhjemme og i udlandet.

There has been no informed or honest debate in North America over the issue of liberalized euthanasia. Despite thousands of newspaper stories, scores of learned academic articles, a handful of closely analyzed legal decisions, and hours of broadcast news and talk show imagery, a full discussion is yet to begin.

While the therapeutic effect of post-classical philosophy in antiquity has recently been recognized, Cicero and his oeuvre have been mostly ignored in that respect, because he was deemed too compilatory and eclectic. However, the Tusculanae Disputationes are just that - a philosophical therapy for the soul that pervades all five books of this work - as is brought to light in this new interpretation. German text.