This paper explores how felt subjection – the vivid awareness of subordination to another in a power hierarchy – undermines relational equality by eroding egalitarian regard, the disposition to conceive of oneself and others as equals. While relational egalitarians often focus on objective or structural social conditions, I argue that the subjective experience of power matters to relational egalitarian justice in a way which has been undertheorized. To this end, I define egalitarian regard and clarify its role in relational equality, (...) identify properties of power’s expression which tend to evoke felt subjection, and summarize empirical evidence linking it to inegalitarian regard. Finally, I present a moral-psychological mechanism to explain this connection, showing it as a reasonable outcome of human psychology. I conclude by applying the insights of this paper to the case of the workplace, showing how the framework developed provides relational egalitarians with new tools for analyzing institutions and the relations that constitute them. (shrink)

In this chapter, we consider the question of how to attribute—and distribute—responsibility for work and its effects, focusing especially on cases when work has bad effects and there is not obviously a single person to blame. This chapter assess answers provided by collective or group agency views and individualist views, in part by showing how a subtle understanding of the relationship among responsibility, blameworthiness, and liability can help resolve apparently recalcitrant collective cases. Drawing insights from each view, the chapter introduces (...) and assesses an individualist account according to which each agent is responsible and blameworthy in virtue of what they do given their opportunities, where the focus is on the ex-ante assessment of the possible consequences of agents’ contributions in light of situational factors, including the actions and omissions of others. The chapter then highlight the distinctiveness of work by exploring the difference between moral and other kinds of responsibility for work and the hierarchical structure characteristic of work in collective contexts. (shrink)

Most people believe that animal agriculture for food production is permissible. At the same time, bestiality enjoys neither widespread social endorsement nor practice. It would be surprising, then, if it turned out that a commitment to the permissibility of one implied the permissibility of the other. This is the case that I make in this paper. Given the truth of some very plausible moral premises, I show that in a wide range of possible instantiations, if a social practice of raising (...) animals for food is permissible, then so too is a social practice of raising animals for sex. While I don’t explicitly argue for this, my hope is that this compels readers to reject the permissibility of animal agriculture rather than endorse the social practice of bestiality. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether a relational egalitarian defense of democracy at the state level can ground a parallel case argument for workplace democracy. I argue that it can in two ways. First, I evaluate the arguments of a prominent relational egalitarian (Niko Kolodny) who believes it cannot and show that his arguments are mistaken in ways that lead him to underestimate the strength of the parallel case. Second, I develop a positive model of the connection between relational equality and democracy (...) – the proportionality model – that clearly and strongly supports the case for democracy at the state and workplace levels. (shrink)

BackgroundThe U.S. Food and Drug Administration traditionally has kept confidential significant amounts of information relevant to the approval or non-approval of specific drugs, devices, and biologics and about the regulatory status of such medical products in FDA’s pipeline.ObjectiveTo develop practical recommendations for FDA to improve its transparency to the public that FDA could implement by rulemaking or other regulatory processes without further congressional authorization. These recommendations would build on the work of FDA’s Transparency Task Force in 2010.MethodsIn 2016-2017, we convened (...) a team of academic faculty from Harvard Medical School, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Yale Medical School, Yale Law School, and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health to develop recommendations through an iterative process of reviewing FDA’s practices, considering the legal and policy constraints on FDA in expanding transparency, and obtaining insights from independent observers of FDA.ResultsThe team developed 18 specific recommendations for improving FDA’s transparency to the public. FDA could adopt all these recommendations without further congressional action.FundingThe development of the Blueprint for Transparency at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration was funded by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. (shrink)

Peter Singer argues that when some fail to do their part in alleviating suffering, the rest of us must take up their slack. In response, L. J. Cohen, Liam Murphy, and David Miller argue that such a requirement would be unfair. No one, they contend, should be required to contribute more than she would be required to under full compliance. I argue against Cohen, Murphy, and Miller that we are obligated to take up slack left by noncontributors, but (...) agree that we are thereby treated unfairly. Drawing on the literatures on group causation and moral responsibility, I argue that noncontributors wrong those they fail to help and those who take up their slack. I refer to the latter kind of wrong as “burden dumping.” Furthermore, I argue that my account applies whether we conceive of rescue duties as discretionary or nondiscretionary. One might think that if my duties to rescue do not require me to contribute to any particular rescue effort, I do not dump burdens on anyone when I do nothing. In reply, I argue that when I have a nondiscretionary duty to contribute to a particular rescue effort, I unfairly dump burdens on those contributing to that effort when I fail to do my part. Similarly, when my duty to rescue is discretionary and I do nothing, I unfairly dump burdens on everyone whose rescue efforts I might have contributed to. Using this apparatus, we can account for the force of arguments such as Singer’s as well as the idea that those who dump burdens are blameworthy for treating other rescuers unfairly. (shrink)

Launched in 1971, _Adolescent Psychiatry,_ in the words of founding coeditors Sherman C. Feinstein, Peter L. Giovacchinni, and Arthur A. Miller, promised "to explore adolescence as a process... to enter challenging and exciting areas that may have profound effects on our basic concepts." Further, they promised "a series that will provide a forum for the expression of ideas and problems that plague and excite so many of us working in this enigmatic but fascinating field." For over two decades, Adolescent (...) Psychiatry has fulfilled this promise. The repository of a wealth of original studies by preeminent clinicians, developmental researchers, and social scientists specializing in this stage of life, the series has become an essential resource for all mental health practitioners working with youth. With volume 22, the editorship of _Adolescent Psychiatry_ passes to Aaron E. Esman, a distinguished clinician and educator whose wide-ranging sensibilities gain expression in a collection rich in clinical, developmental, and scholarly insight. Encompassing developmental topics (adolescent daydreams) timely clinical issues (eating disorders, impulse control disorders, narcissistic and antisocial pathology), historical commentaries (Shakespeare's adolescents, Nietzsche's romantic construction of adolescence, Freud's Dora as an adolescent), and a special section on "ambient genocide and adolescence," volume 22 ably meets the needs of professional and scholarly readers interested in this vitally important stage of life. (shrink)

Improving Character will help students to appreciate reasons to develop moral virtue, understand what some moral virtues are like, offer strategies they can try out to improve their character, and consider challenging questions about moral virtue and character improvement. It includes 45 newly commissioned essays that are concise, engaging, and mostly jargon-free. It is written for undergraduate students in their first semester. The book has four sections and an appendix. -/- PART I: CONCEPTS AND REASONS 1. Moral virtue: The basics (...) (Heather Battaly, University of Connecticut) 2. The need for character improvement (Liezl van Zyl, University of Waikato) 3. Reasons to improve your character traits (Robert J. Hartman, Ohio Northern University) PART II: PRACTICAL WISDOM AND MORAL VIRTUES 4. Practical wisdom (Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, University of Genoa) 5. Courage (Adam C. Pelser, United States Air Force Academy) 6. Patience (Anne Jeffrey, Baylor University) 7. Perseverance (Timothy J. Pawl, University of St. Thomas) 8. Hope (Aaron D. Cobb, Wake Forest University) 9. Temperance (Alan T. Wilson, University of Bristol) 10. Honesty (Christian B. Miller, Wake Forest University) 11. Humility (Robert C. Roberts, Baylor University) 12. Mildness (Kevin Timpe, Calvin University) 13. Justice (Mark LeBar, Florida State University) 14. Gratitude (Tony Manela, Siena College) 15. Generosity (Andrew Pinsent, University of Oxford) 16. Loyalty (John Kleinig, John Jay College CUNY) 17. Integrity (Jennifer A. Herdt, Yale University) 18. Love (Eric J. Silverman, Christopher Newport University) 19. Hospitality (Brandon Warmke, University of Florida) -/- PART III: STRATEGIES 20. Habituation and scripts to cultivate honesty (Howard J. Curzer, Texas Tech University) 21. Friendship to cultivate practical wisdom (Kristján Kristjánsson, University of Birmingham) 22. Imitating role models to cultivate courage (Eric Yang, Santa Clara University) 23. Nudging to cultivate generosity (Bart Engelen & Alfred Archer, Tilburg University) 24. Selecting circumstances to cultivate digital temperance (Dylan F. Brown, Duke University & Michael Lamb, Wake Forest University) 25. Internalizing Stoic aphorisms to cultivate mildness (Brittany Polat, Stoicare) 26. Journaling to cultivate gratitude (Philip C. Watkins, Eastern Washington University) 27. Understanding surprising human tendencies to cultivate integrity (Marcella Linn, Loyola University Chicago) 28. Anarchist calisthenics, radical honesty, and creating social norms to cultivate justice (Jason Brennan, Georgetown University) 29. Manners to cultivate civility (David McPherson, University of Florida) 30. Running to cultivate perseverance (Sabrina B. Little, Christopher Newport University) 31. Experiencing nature to cultivate patience (Silvia Caprioglio Panizza, University of Tübingen) 32. Meatless meals to cultivate temperance (Elizabeth Foreman, Missouri State University) 33. Twelve steps in Alcoholics Anonymous to cultivate humility (Michael W. Austin, Eastern Kentucky University) 34. Christian rituals to cultivate hope (Ryan West, Grove City College) 35. Reading literature to cultivate love (Kirsten M. K. Welch, Baylor University) PART IV: QUESTIONS 36. How do we know which character traits are moral virtues? (Rebecca Stangl, University of Virginia) 37. How can you know if you have successfully cultivated virtue? (Jennifer Cole Wright, College of Charleston) 38. Is character education in the university objectionably paternalistic? (Jennifer Rothschild, Wake Forest University) 39. Is virtue signaling consonant with moral virtue? (Neil Levy, University of Oxford/Macquarie University) 40. Is suffering good when it is essential to exercising a moral virtue? (Michael S. Brady, University of Glasgow) 41. Are there serious costs to being morally virtuous? (Denise Vigani, Seton Hall University) 42. What is the relationship between luck, virtue, and flourishing? (Lorraine Besser, Middlebury College) 43. Can bad luck prevent some people from developing moral virtue? (Alexandra T. Romanyshyn, Seattle University) 44. Does character luck rule out free will and moral responsibility? (Robert J. Hartman, Ohio Northern University) 45. Can the choice to radically change your character be rational? (Marcela Herdova, Florida State University) APPENDIX A Christmas Carol (Charles Dickens) . (shrink)

Like Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, we now have both an A- and a substantially revised B-edition of Henry Allison's commentary to and defence of that work: Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. Unlike Kant's Critique, however, Allison's first edition is unlikely to persist as an occasional rival to the second, since reviewers rightly consider the second to have superseded the landmark scholarship of the first. Nevertheless, before Allison's first edition is entirely supplanted, I would like to save a (...) neglected insight from its treatment of the B-deduction that is not retained in the second edition. (shrink)

This paper examines Hermann Cohen's idiosyncratic construction of a medieval Jewish philosophical tradition, focusing primarily, though not exclusively, on his Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis . This construction, not unlike modern accounts, is filtered through the central place of Maimonides. For Cohen, however, Maimonides' centrality is defined not by his systematization of Aristotelianism, but by his elevation of ethics over metaphysics. The ethical and pantheistic concerns of Maimonides' precursors, according to this reading, anticipate his uniqueness. Whereas Shlomo ibn Gabirol's pantheistic doctrine (...) of emanation, for example, assigned little weight to ethics, Abraham ibn Daud rebelled against such a doctrine. Ibn Daud—much like Bahya ibn Paquda and Abraham ibn Ezra—becomes part of a Jewish philosophical tradition that culminates in Maimonides' rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics. In particular, this paper examines the way in which Cohen envisaged the pre-Maimonidean philosophical tradition, putting his highly critical reading of Shlomo ibn Gabirol and his pantheistic obsession with prime matter in counterpoint with his more favorable readings of Abraham ibn Daud and Bahya ibn Paquda. (shrink)

Many corporate managers are increasingly looking to the covenant model for inspiration, guidance, and most of all, practical business wisdom. While some managers seemingly exploit the religiously inspired language of covenant for purely self-interested reasons, other managers and executives like Tom Chappell of Tom''s of Maine, Max De Pree of Herman Miller, Aaron Feurstein of Malden Mills, and C. William Pollard of ServiceMaster, express an authentic attachment to the idea. While these executives have been the most articulate and (...) the most extreme spokesmen for the application of the covenant model for business, other companies have attempted to benefit from the concept, albeit in less explicitly religious terms.Our research suggests that the most fundamental answer to the question of what makes a "business covenant" work is – covenantal leadership. Simply put, but easily forgotten, the one thesis which emerges over and over again in our research is that covenantal organizations require covenantal leadership. (shrink)

Aaron Hill (1685–1750) was a White English writer who edited the periodical The Prompter. This chapter is a selection from an untitled editorial that he published in The Prompter in January 1735. In this text, he first examines the human tendency to be biased and hypocritical. He then argues that Europeans are hypocritical when they criticize enslaved Black people for revolting or attempting to self-liberate. At the end, he mentions that he has been sent a speech by a formerly (...) enslaved Black man who is the leader of a Maroon community in an American colony. Hill promises to print this speech in a later issue of his periodical, which he did (see the next chapter). Hill’s text is significant in part as a source of information about this speech. In addition, both texts contain intriguing reflections about the morality of slave rebellions. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungPaul Silas Petersons Versuch, in zwei jüngeren Artikeln den Jesuiten und zwischenkriegszeitlichen Kulturphilosoph Erich Przywara als „katholischen Faschisten“ und Antisemiten zu charakterisieren, versagt aus mehreren Gründen. Peterson errichtet eine Kategorie antiliberalen Denkens, die er als „katholischer Faschismus“ bezeichnet, versäumt es jedoch, wichtige, dringend erforderliche interne Differenzierungen innerhalb dieser Kategorie vorzunehmen. Auf diese Weise verweigert er Przywara jegliche geistige Unabhängigkeit von dessen kulturellem Milieu. Dieser Artikel stellt die Unzulänglichkeit dieser Hermeneutik auf zwei Weisen heraus. Er argumentiert auf negative Weise, um die (...) Ambivalenz der vorgeblich faschistischen Tropen aufzuzeigen, die Peterson als Beispiele anführt. Auf positive Weise argumentiert er, dass Przywaras 1933 geschriebenen Aufsätze, „Reich und Kreuz“ und „Nation, Staat, Kirche“, die vor dem Hintergrund von Przywaras Religionsphilosophie ausgelegt werden, sich als Aufrufe verstehen, die NS-Ideologie von „Blut und Boden“ aufzugeben. Darauf folgt ein ähnliches Argument, welches Przywara vom Vorwurf des Antisemitismus freizusprechen sucht. Es demonstriert die Doppeldeutigkeit der vermeintlich antisemitischen Motive in Przywaras Aufsatz „Judentum und Christentum“ und weist darauf hin, dass seine Behandlung des Judentums in dessen geschichtlichem Zusammenhang vielmehr als Aufforderung zu lesen ist, den rassisch motivierten und rechtlich diskriminierenden Antisemitismus abzuschaffen. (shrink)

This letter responds to the letter by Jan te Nijenhuis, Bryan J. Pesta, and John G. R. Fuerst in the May‐June 2025 issue of the Hastings Center Report.

Extract from Hofstadter's revew in Bulletin of American Mathematical Society : http://www.ams.org/journals/bull/1980-02-02/S0273-0979-1980-14752-7/S0273-0979-1980-14752-7.pdf -/- "Aaron Sloman is a man who is convinced that most philosophers and many other students of mind are in dire need of being convinced that there has been a revolution in that field happening right under their noses, and that they had better quickly inform themselves. The revolution is called "Artificial Intelligence" (Al)-and Sloman attempts to impart to others the "enlighten- ment" which he clearly regrets not (...) having experienced earlier himself. Being somewhat of a convert, Sloman is a zealous campaigner for his point of view. Now a Reader in Cognitive Science at Sussex, he began his academic career in more orthodox philosophy and, by exposure to linguistics and AI, came to feel that all approaches to mind which ignore AI are missing the boat. I agree with him, and I am glad that he has written this provocative book. The tone of Sloman's book can be gotten across by this quotation (p. 5): "I am prepared to go so far as to say that within a few years, if there remain any philosophers who are not familiar with some of the main developments in artificial intelligence, it will be fair to accuse them of professional incom- petence, and that to teach courses in philosophy of mind, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, ethics, metaphysics, and other main areas of philosophy, without discussing the relevant aspects of artificial intelligence will be as irresponsible as giving a degree course in physics which includes no quantum theory." -/- (The author now regrets the extreme polemical tone of the book.). (shrink)

Aaron Zimmerman presents a new pragmatist account of belief, in terms of information poised to guide our more attentive, controlled actions. And he explores the consequences of this account for our understanding of the relation between psychology and philosophy, the mind and brain, the nature of delusion, faith, pretence, racism, and more.

As is usually the case with what I work on, I read some stuff I liked. I 1 read an article on comics by Greg Hayman and Henry Pratt and some work on 2 videogames,GrantTavinor’sreallyexcellentworkonthattopic. Ifoundthematerial interesting and I thought I had something to say about it. That’s what usually motivates me and that’s what did in these cases. With comics, my interest in the medium played a big role. I was a child collector of Marvel. I got turned on (...) to independent and alternative comics about ten years ago by a good friend who’s a successful comics artist and that played a role in my writing about comics. (shrink)

Aaron Ridley explores Nietzsche's mature ethical thought as expressed in his masterpiece On the Genealogy of Morals. Taking seriously the use that Nietzsche makes of human types, Ridley arranges his book thematically around the six characters who loom largest in that work—the slave, the priest, the philosopher, the artist, the scientist, and the noble. By elucidating what the Genealogy says about these figures, he achieves a persuasive new assessment of Nietzsche's ethics. Ridley's intellectually supple interpretation reveals Nietzsche's ethical position (...) to be deeper and more interesting than is often supposed: the relation, for instance, between Nietzsche's ideal of the noble and the ascetic or priestly conscience does not emerge as a stark opposition but as a rich interplay between the tensions inherent in each. Equally, he shows that certain under-appreciated confusions in Nietzsche's thought reveal much about the positive aspects of the philosopher's moral vision. The only book devoted entirely to the Genealogy, Nietzsche's Conscience offers a sympathetic but tough-minded critical reading of the philosopher's most important work. Delivered in clear and vigorous language and employing a broadly analytical approach, Ridley's commentary makes Nietzsche's reflections on morality more accessible than they have been hitherto. (shrink)

This volume is a direct result of a conference held at Princeton University to honor George A. Miller, an extraordinary psychologist. A distinguished panel of speakers from various disciplines -- psychology, philosophy, neuroscience and artificial intelligence -- were challenged to respond to Dr. Miller's query: "What has happened to cognition? In other words, what has the past 30 years contributed to our understanding of the mind? Do we really know anything that wasn't already clear to William James?" Each (...) participant tried to stand back a little from his or her most recent work, but to address the general question from his or her particular standpoint. The chapters in the present volume derive from that occasion. (shrink)

Introduction: occupation -- Impossibilities -- Irreconcilability -- Kaddish -- Authoritarianism: a case study -- Rosenzweig's patient -- Beyond.

One of the most profound interactions that can occur between people, apologies have the power to heal humiliations, free the mind from deep-seated guilt, remove the desire for vengeance, and ultimately restore broken relationships. With On Apology, Aaron Lazare offers an eye-opening analysis of this vital interaction, illuminating an often hidden corner of the human heart. He discusses the importance of shame, guilt, and humiliation, the initial reluctance to apologize, the simplicity of the act of apologizing, the spontaneous generosity (...) and forgiveness on the part of the offended, the transfer of power and respect between two parties, and much more. Readers will not only find a wealth of insight that they can apply to their own lives, but also a deeper understanding of national and international conflicts and how we might resolve them. The act of apologizing is quite simply immensely fulfilling. On Apology opens a window onto this common occurrence to reveal the feelings and actions at the heart of this profound interaction. (shrink)

The Deed is Everything offers an engaging new interpretation of Nietzsche as committed to an 'expressivist' conception of agency. Aaron Ridley shows that Nietzsche develops highly distinctive accounts of freedom, morality, and selfhood, with a robust commitment to the value of human excellence in all of its forms.

This paper introduces the Fiat-Credit Allocation Theorem (FCAT), developed by Aaron Black. Since the collapse of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s, advanced economies have operated under a distinct monetary and financial regime characterized by pure fiat currencies, elastic bank credit creation, and widespread securitization of cash flows. The Fiat–Credit Allocation Theorem (FCAT) is a structural law governing credit allocation in this post-1971 era. In a fiat system with low-friction securitization, credit endogenously expands into securitizable assets whenever their perceived (...) risk-adjusted expected returns exceed the system-wide required return on risky capital (r ˉ), and contracts when returns fall below this hurdle rate. In equilibrium, risk-adjusted returns on funded securitized cash flows converge to r ˉ, creating a yield-arbitrage mechanism that drives sustained asset-price inflation, financialization, rentier dominance, and recurrent credit-driven booms and busts. The theorem formalizes this process in a minimal continuous-time framework, proves convergence under mild assumptions, and interprets key post-Bretton Woods phenomena—decoupled capital returns from wage growth, persistent r>gdynamics, and leverage cycles—as equilibrium outcomes rather than anomalies. Empirical proxies, including yield convergence across securitized asset classes post-1971, support the model's predictions. FCAT provides a unified micro-founded explanation for the regime shift from production-constrained credit to yield-chasing credit, with implications for inequality, affordability in essential sectors, and the limits of supply-side reforms. (shrink)

Aaron Alexander Zubia argues that the Epicurean roots of David Hume's philosophy gave rise to liberalism's unrelenting grip on the modern political imagination.

Most philosophers since Sidgwick have thought that the various forms of pleasure differ so radically that one cannot find a common, distinctive feeling among them. This is known as the heterogeneity problem. To get around this problem, the motivational theory of pleasure suggests that what makes an experience one of pleasure is our reaction to it, not something internal to the experience. I argue that the motivational theory is wrong, and not only wrong, but backwards. The heterogeneity problem is the (...) principal source of motivation for this, otherwise, highly counterintuitive theory. I intend to show that the heterogeneity problem is not a genuine problem and that a more straightforward theory of pleasure is forthcoming. I argue that the various experiences that we call pleasures all feel good. (shrink)

Why do people seemingly want to be scared by movies and feel pity for fictional characters when they avoid situations in real life that arouse these same negative emotions? Although the domain of relevant artworks encompasses far more than just tragedy, the general problem is typically called the paradox of tragedy. The paradox boils down to a simple question: If people avoid pain then why do people want to experience art that is painful? I discuss six popular solutions to the (...) paradox: conversion, control, compensatory, meta-response, catharsis, and rich experience theories. (shrink)

The thesis that aesthetic testimony cannot provide aesthetic justification or knowledge is widely accepted--even by realists about aesthetic properties and values. This Kantian position is mistaken. Some testimony about beauty and artistic value can provide a degree of aesthetic justification and, perhaps, even knowledge. That is, there are cases in which one can be justified in making an aesthetic judgment purely on the basis of someone else's testimony. But widespread aesthetic unreliability creates a problem for much aesthetic testimony. Hence, most (...) testimony about art does not have much epistemic value. The situation is somewhat different with respect to aesthetic testimony about nature, proofs, and theories. (shrink)

Readers of Spinoza's philosophy have often been daunted, and sometimes been enchanted, by the geometrical method which he employs in his philosophical masterpiece the Ethics. In Meaning in Spinoza's Method Aaron Garrett examines this method and suggests that its purpose, in Spinoza's view, was not just to present claims and propositions but also in some sense to change the readers and allow them to look at themselves and the world in a different way. His discussion draws not only on (...) Spinoza's works but also on those of the philosophers who influenced Spinoza most strongly, including Hobbes, Descartes, Maimonides and Gersonides. This controversial book will be of interest to historians of philosophy and to anyone interested in the relation between form and content in philosophical works. (shrink)

Arthur Miller is one of the most important and enduring playwrights of the last fifty years. This new edition of The Theater Essays has been expanded by nearly fifty percent to include his most significant articles and interviews since the book's initial publication in 1978. Within these pages Miller discusses the roots of modern drama, the nature of tragedy, and the state of contemporary theater; offers illuminating observations on Ibsen, Strindberg, Chekhov, O'Neill, and Williams; probes the different approaches (...) and attitudes toward theater in Russia, China, and at home; and, of course, provides valuable insights into his own vast dramatic corpus. For this edition the literary chronology and cast and production information have been updated, and an extensive new bibliography has been added. The Theater Essays confirms Arthur Miller's standing as a brilliant, eloquent commentator on drama and culture. No one interested in theater should be without this definitive collection. (shrink)

Abstract: Philosophers interested in Kant's relevance to contemporary debates over the nature of mental content—notably Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais—have argued that Kant ought to be credited with being the original proponent of the existence of ‘nonconceptual content’. However, I think the ‘nonconceptualist’ interpretations that Hanna and Allais give do not show that Kant allowed for nonconceptual content as they construe it. I argue, on the basis of an analysis of certain sections of the A and B editions of the (...) Transcendental Deduction, for a ‘conceptualist’ reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. My contention is that since Kant's notion of empirical intuition makes essential reference to the categories, it must be true for him that no empirical intuition can be given in sensibility independently of the understanding and its categories. (shrink)

From the bestselling author of Assholes: A Theory, a book that--in the tradition of Shopclass as Soulcraft, Barbarian Days and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance--uses the experience and the ethos of surfing to explore key concepts in philosophy. The existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre once declared "the ideal limit of aquatic sports...is waterskiing." The avid surfer and lavishly credentialed academic philosopher Aaron James vigorously disagrees, and in Surfing with Sartre he intends to expound the thinking surfer's view of (...) the matter, in the process elucidating such philosophical categories as freedom, being, phenomenology, morality, epistemology, and even the emerging values of what he terms "leisure capitalism." In developing his unique surfer-philosophical worldview, he draws from his own experience of surfing and from surf culture and lingo, and includes many relevant details from the lives of the philosophers, from Aristotle to Wittgenstein, with whose thought he engages. In the process, he'll speak to readers in search of personal and social meaning in our current anxious moment, by way of doing real, authentic philosophy. (shrink)

How do we know right from wrong? Do we even have moral knowledge? Moral epistemology studies these and related questions about our understanding of virtue and vice. It is one of philosophy’s perennial problems, reaching back to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Hume and Kant, and has recently been the subject of intense debate as a result of findings in developmental and social psychology. Throughout the book Zimmerman argues that our belief in moral knowledge can survive sceptical challenges. He also draws (...) on a rich range of examples from Plato’s Meno and Dickens’ David Copperfield to Bernard Madoff and Saddam Hussein. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's essays about the 1957 crisis over efforts of a group of youth, the “Little Rock Nine,” to desegregate a high school in Little Rock, Arkansas, reveal a tension in her vision of the “public.” In this article Aaron Schutz and Marie Sandy look closely at the experiences of the youth desegregating the school, especially those of Elizabeth Eckford, drawing upon them to trace a continuum of forms of public engagement in Arendt's work. This ranges from arenas of (...) “deliberative friendship,” where unique individuals collaborate on common efforts, to a more conflictual “public stage,” where groups act in solidarity to change aspects of the public world. While Arendt famously asserted in her essay “The Crisis in Education” that political capacities should not be taught in schools, it makes more sense to see this argument as focused on what she sometimes called the conflictual “public stage,” reflecting the experience of the Little Rock Nine. In contrast, Schutz and Sandy argue that Arendt's own work implies that “deliberative friendship,” as described in her essay “Philosophy and Politics” and elsewhere, should be part of everyday practices in classrooms and schools. (shrink)

Although I reject his argument, I defend Bernard Williams’s claim that we would lose reason to go on if we were to live forever. Through a consideration of Borges’s story "The Immortal," I argue that immortality would be motivationally devastating, since our decisions would carry little weight, our achievements would be hollow victories of mere diligence, and the prospect of eternal frustration would haunt our every effort. An immortal life for those of limited ability will inevitably result in endless frustration, (...) since the number of significant projects that one is capable of completing is finite, but the span of time is infinite. (shrink)