The papers in this volume reflect much of the current unease of a world that perceives itself once more at the edge of chaos. The authors present different vistas of that experience and their inherent dialectic, expressed in numerous and ceaseless conflicts between ordering and disordering processes. They can be read as comments on the ongoing processes that lead toward greater complexity.

This paper extends the temporal concept of Sequential Time Theory (STT) to the problem of metrology in the quantum domain. In STT, a time interval Δt is constructed by a counter n representing the number of realizations of a standard displacement ΔQ_unit, while time t serves as a coordinate label assigned to this sequence. STT explicitly posits that "time is a scaling of physical change" and that "time is constructed solely by clock phenomena subject to (...) the same conditions within a local system." Consequently, in regimes where ΔQ is indistinguishable, time does not "cease to exist" but becomes "unconstructible (undefined)." Based on these definitions and axioms, this paper (i) organizes criteria for distinguishing between science and metaphysics, (ii) identifies conceptual confusions arising from the implicit assumption of an external classical clock in quantum theory, and (iii) proposes a relativity principle regarding differences in observation scale (e.g., macroscopic observation of microscopic systems). We demonstrate that issues such as measurement, classicality, and tunneling time can be unifiedly organized as problems of "choice of clock (ΔQ)" and "recording (event-token) protocols.". (shrink)

This thesis focuses on two related though different topics: first, the metaphysics of dispositions; second, the relation between dispositionalism and time. For this reason, the thesis is divided in two main parts: the first part concerns the first topic, and the second part concerns the second. The aim of the project is to argue that dispositionalism faces two different problems: first, there is no viable metaphysics for dispositional properties; second, there is no viable theory of time that can (...) fit in a dispositional framework. (shrink)

An existential threat to humanity is that we might never be able to travel intergalactically and will eventually go extinct from some inevitable disaster in our own galaxy. In the short paper, dressed as a type of constructive dilemma, I argue that we can use stationary time travel into the far past as a means of intergalactic travel. I also consider non-stationary time travel into the past, but conclude this type of time travel is extremely limited. The (...) means for intergalactic travel—stationary time travel to the far past—that I'm proposing is far-fetched, even fanciful. But we must first propose the right question before we can get the right answer. And I take the question proposed to be a worthy question to ponder, about a problem that many consider to have no answer. (shrink)

In this chapter, I discuss time in nonrelativistic quantum theories. Within an instrumentalist theory like von Neumann’s axiomatic quantum mechanics, I focus on the meaning of time as an observable quantity, on the idea of time quantization, and whether the wavefunction collapse suggests that there is a preferred temporal direction. I explore this last issue within realist quantum theories as well, focusing on time reversal symmetry, and I analyze whether some theories are more hospitable for (...) class='Hi'>time travel than others. (shrink)

The visual imagination is one of our most powerful tools in helping us think through abstract problems in physics and it plays an especially prominent role in spacetime physics, but it is also behind some of the most trenchant misunderstandings about what physics tells us about the nature of time. This chapter is about the images of time coming out of physics and the philosophical confusions to which they give rise. By casting the viewer in the position of (...) an imaginary point of view outside of time and portraying time as (one dimension of) a static block of events, these images lead to people to say that the relativistic conception of time has eliminated much of what is essential to time as we know it. I argue that this is a matter of being misled by the logic of an image. Where, in this picture, do we find change? Where is the passage of time? Where is the familiar flux of everyday life and the surge of process? I suggest that we find them on the _inside_. We recover the familiar flowing time of everyday sense by seeing how things look from the point of view of an inhabitant of the Universe whose life is extended in time. (shrink)

The present volume contains primarily the invited papers of the 28th Inter-national Wittgenstein Symposium that was held in Kirchberg am Wech-sel (Lower Austria) in August 2005. It was dedicated to the topic Time and History (Zeit und Geschichte) in an interdisciplinary perspective, ranging from the philosophy of time, in the narrower sense, the approaches of the single scientific disciplines, in so far as they are informed by foundational and philosophical issues, to culture and art. As usual, the contributed (...) papers (Beitr age) were already published prior to the symposium. While the latter volume contains, in a special section, papers dedicated to all aspects of Wittgenstein's work, the present volume focuses on his views about time. The editors are well aware that both time and history are prominently discussed within the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions in philosophy. This was well reflected in the contributed papers, as can be seen in the Beitr age volume, and in some papers dealing with time and history from a cultural perspective. For reasons of thematic coherence and as a consequence of the general orientation of this book series, however, the editors have given priority to philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition in the broad sense. The editors nonetheless hope to have succeeded in presenting an equally focused and comprehensive picture of the contemporary debate. (shrink)

This chapter examines the Buddhist version of the eternalism-presentism dispute. While all Buddhists hold that no existing thing is eternal, some did claim that past and future things are existent in the same sense in which presently existing things are, while other Buddhists denied that past and future things may be said to exist. The chapter begins by discussing the question of whether time is itself a real entity, examining an argument developed by Nāgārjuna against the view that (...) class='Hi'>time serves as the container that makes temporal relations possible. The bulk of the chapter is given over to a prolonged examination of the arguments given for and against eternalism. A major difficulty for the eternalist is to reconcile their view with the Buddhist orthodoxy that all is impermanent. The presentist is faced with the problem of explaining just what the present is if there is no past or future. (shrink)

This chapter first addresses the necessity of space or time. It then deals with the particular model world to derive time. It is seen that in this particular model world, the protagonist cannot change his mind about a judgement, and so it is for him as if he gets all his judgements correct. His position in this respect is analogous to the case of a protagonist who never makes a mistake. A feature emerged which it is clear could (...) not be possessed by an atemporal world. It is also examined whether this feature can be derived from the other features of any comprehensible world. It does seem reasonable to presume that Wittgenstein held that the hierarchy of laws is finite. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that even if the doctrine that justification comes to an end is accepted, it does not spoil the argument of the first part of the chapter which shows that the first premiss involved a potentially infinite number of reasons being available to the protagonist of a comprehensible world. In addition, the chapter illustrates that the majority of judgements are correct. It evaluates atemporal and temporal worlds, and the state of the inquiry. (shrink)

Suppose you were to walk through a door and come out on the other side the day before; that would be travel backwards in time, as these chapters explain. However, is it at all possible? Chapter 12 addresses the question within the laws of physics, explaining that some laws prohibit it, some allow it in special circumstances, and others quite generally. Simple examples are considered, including a world of ‘cellular automata’, to explain what our best theory of space and (...) time, general relativity says. Chapter 13 addresses the paradoxical nature of time travel: if you travelled back a day when you stepped through the door you cannot then stop yourself from doing so, whatever you try! By considering what we mean by saying something can or cannot be done, and what it means to have free will, the chapter explains why there is no real paradox. (shrink)

The nonexistence of the dead is a consequence of the fact that people are objects in time, and something’s position in time determines whether or not it exists. This is known as presentism. Objects like the dead, which belong exclusively to the past, are nonexistent. At least, this is true of time in the intuitive sense. Relativity theory, however, appears to contradict intuitive time, as was argued by Gödel. A defense is offered of Gödel’s argument, based (...) on how Einstein himself understood special relativity, but arguments are also considered which reject the conventional understanding of relativity. Quantum mechanics also conflicts, here, with relativity. The conclusion is that there appears to be no decisive reason to reject intuitive time based on the inconclusive and divided deliverances of physical science, and thus no decisive reason to reject the view that the dead are nonexistent. (shrink)

This chapter is an account of the particularity of spatial and temporal regions as they appear within our experience. It argues that the spatial and temporal relations of these regions are sufficient to individuate them, despite standard objections. This involves a kind of moderate substantivalism about space. The chapter also explores some of the complex modal structure of the spatial relations in question, relevant for instance to geometric truth and the way in which things seem to reverse in mirrors. The (...) eternalist view of time presumed by this account is defended against alternative conceptions of time such as presentism and the moving spotlight theory. (shrink)

This chapter examines the differences between space and time. Some seemingly obvious differences disappear on closer inspection. The chapter starts by outlining the similarities and dissimilarities between time and space. It then elaborates the measurement of time, and the frozen universe problem. A simple universe is described, whose history is said to be repeated at 15-unit intervals. The questions of temporal topology are presented. It has been shown how similar time is to space in many ways, (...) to the point where many philosophical problems about time have their counterpart in problems about space. (shrink)

This chapter examines the criteria which medieval thinkers used to determine whether a particular should be located in time, and the terminology and phrases used to suggest that particulars were _outside_, _beyond_, or existing _alongside_ time. There were at least nine factors which 13th century thinkers were inclined to identify as implying temporality, factors which actually identified two broadly different kinds of time. There was time in its most general sense as simply a duration in which (...) particulars undergo successive states and experience decay, and then there was a more precise or more proper sense of time in which the changing states of particulars were thought to be measured by the metric determined by the _Primum Mobile_. When 13th century figures spoke of particulars as existing _outside_, _above_, or _with_ time, they were intending to exclude such particulars from the scope of ‘time’, but were not always clear about which account of time they were referring to. (shrink)

Sequential Time Theory (STT) defines time as a metrological quantity realized by operational procedures (record, count, resolution), distinct from the coordinate time parameter in spacetime geometry. Starting from the primitive definition Δτ(n)=n k ΔQ_unit, STT internalizes time metrology (L2) and treats spacetime geometry (L1) as a representation of protocol constraints, rendering block-universe interpretations optional rather than required for physical derivations. Physics is reframed as STT-Core + Bridge axioms + Θ_sys, where Θ_sys is an explicit, auditable bundle (...) of system-specific auxiliary assumptions. Within this scheme, SR and GR kinematics arise as representation theorems for defect-free and defect-bearing clock networks; GR curvature is interpreted as a measurable holonomy defect density. Quantum interference is treated as U(1) phase holonomy in sequential update, and a Gaussian diffusion kernel is derived from minimal sequentiality assumptions. The framework is used to compare candidate quantum-gravity routes via Θ-auditing. (shrink)

Our engagement with time is a ubiquitous feature of our lives. We are aware of time on many scales, from the briefest flicker of change to the way our lives unfold over many years. But to what extent does this encounter reveal the true nature of temporal reality? To the extent that temporal reality is as it seems, how do we come to be aware of it? And to the extent that temporal reality is not as it seems, (...) why does it seem that way? These are the central questions addressed by Simon Prosser in Experiencing Time. He defends the B-theory of time, according to which the apparently dynamic quality of change, the special status of the present, and even the passage of time are all illusions. Prosser goes on to explore solutions to certain puzzles raised by experiences of temporal features such as changes, rates, and durations, and in doing so sheds light on broader issues in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Sequential Time Theory (STT) is developed as a metrological reconstruction of physical time grounded in the operational act of counting distinguishable events. The theory argues that time is not an ontological dimension but a constructed variable derived from event generation. This framework dissolves long-standing paradoxes concerning the Arrow of Time, the reversibility of physical laws, and the Block Universe by distinguishing the logical sequential index from physical state evolution. STT interprets relativistic time dilation as a (...) delay in event completion and quantum measurement as the generator of temporal advancement. The resulting theory offers a parsimonious alternative to entropy-based, cosmological, or multiverse explanations of temporal asymmetry. (shrink)

This monograph presents Sequential Time Theory (STT), an operational reconstruction of physical time based on the counting of discrete, distinguishable events. The framework resolves classical paradoxes surrounding the arrow of time, relativistic time dilation, and quantum measurement by treating time as a constructed variable rather than an ontological dimension. STT argues that irreversibility arises logically from event accumulation, that relativistic effects reflect delays in event generation, and that quantum collapse represents the registration of discrete physical (...) changes. The theory offers a parsimonious alternative to entropy-based, cosmological, and multiverse explanations of temporal asymmetry. (shrink)

Michael Tooley presents a major new philosophical theory of the nature of time, offering a powerful alternative to the traditional "tensed" and recent "tenseless" accounts of time. He argues for a dynamic conception of the universe, in which past, present, and future are not merely subjective features of experience. He claims that the past and the present are real, while the future is not. Tooley's approach accounts for time in terms of causation. He therefore claims that the (...) key to understanding the dynamic nature of the universe is to understand the nature of causation. Time, Tense, and Causation is a landmark treatment of one of the oldest and most perplexing intellectual problems, and will be fascinating reading for anyone interested in the character of time. (shrink)