This theoretical expose explores the complex notion of argumentative style, which has so far been largely neglected in argumentation theory. After an introduction of the problems involved, the theoretical tools for identifying the properties of the discourse in which an argumentative style manifests itself are explained from a pragma-dialectical perspective and a theoretical definition of argumentative style is provided that does full justice to its role in argumentative discourse. The article concludes with a short reflection upon (...) the next steps that need to be taken in argumentation theory in further substantiating the notion of argumentative style. (shrink)

This theoretical expose explores the complex notion of argumentative style, which has so far been largely neglected in argumentation theory. After an introduction of the problems involved, the theoretical tools for identifying the properties of the discourse in which an argumentative style manifests itself are explained from a pragma-dialectical perspective and a theoretical definition of argumentative style is provided that does full justice to its role in argumentative discourse. The article concludes with a short reflection upon (...) the next steps that need to be taken in argumentation theory in further substantiating the notion of argumentative style. (shrink)

The practice of justifying scientific explanations generates argumentative patterns in which several types of arguments may play a role. This paper is aimed at identifying these patterns on the basis of an exploration of the institutional conventions regarding the nature, the shape and the quality of scientific explanations as reflected in the writings of influential philosophers of science. First, a basic pattern for justifying scientific explanations is described. Then, two types of extensions of this pattern are presented. These extensions (...) are derived from philosophical accounts of requirements for the quality of explanations and the choice of the best explanation from a number of candidate explanations respectively. The description of the second extension will make clear how pragmatic argumentation plays a role in argumentative patterns within the scientific domain. (shrink)

We argue that the appraisal of models in social epistemology requires conceiving of them as argumentative devices, taking into account the argumentative context and adopting a family-of-models perspective. We draw up such an account and show how it makes it easier to see the value and limits of the use of models in social epistemology. To illustrate our points, we document and explicate the argumentative role of epistemic landscape models in social epistemology and highlight their limitations. We (...) also claim that our account could be fruitfully used in appraising other models in philosophy and science. (shrink)

In this paper, close attention is paid to the argumentative patterns resulting from combining pragmatic argumentation in which a recommendation is made with arguments in which the majority is invoked. I focus on such argumentative patterns as employed by European parliamentary committees of inquiry conducting inquiries into the activity of the Equitable Life Assurance Society. By incorporating legal and political insights about the activity of these parliamentary committees of inquiry into a pragma-dialectical argumentative approach, an analysis will (...) be given of the selected argumentative pattern. This analysis will reveal which standpoints are supported by which arguments and how these arguments relate to each other to increase the acceptability of the recommendation made. In addition, the analysis will explain the arguer’s argumentative choices in the pattern employed. (shrink)

​This book describes argumentative tools and strategies that can be used to guide policy decisions under conditions of great uncertainty. Contributing authors explore methods from philosophical analysis and in particular argumentation analysis, showing how it can be used to systematize discussions about policy issues involving great uncertainty. The first part of the work explores how to deal in a systematic way with decision-making when there may be plural perspectives on the decision problem, along with unknown consequences of what we (...) do. Readers will see how argumentation tools can be used for prioritizing among uncertain dangers, for determining how decisions should be framed, for choosing a suitable time frame for a decision, and for systematically choosing among different decision options. Case studies are presented in the second part of the book, showing argumentation in practice in the areas of climate geoengineering, water governance, synthetic biology, nuclear waste, and financial markets. In one example, argumentation analysis is applied to proposals to solve the climate problem with various technological manipulations of the natural climate system, such as massive dispersion of reflective aerosols into the stratosphere. Even after a thorough investigation of such a proposal, doubt remains as to whether all the potential risks have been identified. In such discussions, conventional risk analysis does not have much to contribute since it presupposes that the risks have been identified, whereas the argumentative approach to uncertainty management can be used to systematize discussions. (shrink)

Reasoning, defined as the production and evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mechanism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, reasoning systematically searches for reasons that support the reasoner’s initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons cursorily. By contrast, (...) reasoners are well able to evaluate others’ reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments to convince others and to change one’s mind when confronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, however, is often described as being at odds with such an argumentative mechanisms: scientists are supposed to reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In this article, we review evidence showing that scientists, when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay people while being able to change their mind when confronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argumentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of scientists’ reasoning and that differences in the way scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional framework of science. (shrink)

This essay has two connected theses. First, that given the contrastivity of reasons, a form of dialectical adversariality of argument follows. This dialectical adversariality accounts for a broad variety of both argumentative virtues and vices. Second, in light of this contrastivist view of reasons, the primary objection to argumentative adversarialism, the winners-and-losers problem, can be answered.

The present paper analyses discursive representations and standpoint-arguments pairs, realized in articles of four mainstream Italian newspapers that report on migrants’ and refugees’ mobilization at the perceived peak of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. We draw on the scholarly agenda of Critical Discourse Studies, employing tools from corpus linguistic perspectives, which allow us to generalize over the way in which the relevant minorities are represented in our corpus. Then, focusing on a smaller sample of negative representations, we outline a methodological synthesis (...) in order to scrutinize instances of representational meaning in newspapers articles and trace what is argumentatively inferred in discursive representations. To that end we exploit tools from systemic functional and cognitive linguistics as well as the Argumentum Model of Topics for the analysis of inference. In this sense, we demonstrate how discriminatory representations do not only portray migrants and refugees in a negative light but also justify discrimination through the argumentative dynamic they develop. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. Assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit. Here, I propose the concept of argumentative bullshit and show how a speech acts account of bullshit assertions can be generalised to bullshit arguments. Argumentative bullshit, on this account, would be the production of an argument without a concern for the supporting relation between reasons and claim.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Argumentative Structure of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations Of Natural ScienceEric Watkinsone of kant’s most fundamental aims is to justify Newtonian science. However, providing a detailed explanation of even the main structure of his argument (not to mention the specific arguments that fill out this structure) is not a trivial enterprise. While it is clear that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781), his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), (...) and his unpublished (and incomplete) Opus postumum should in some way constitute the core of this justification, it is less clear how each of these works does so in detail. In this paper I shall first argue that the standard view of the relationship between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (hereafter simply Metaphysical Foundations) is mistaken. I shall then present my own interpretation of how the Metaphysical Foundations contributes to the justification of Newtonian science. Finally, I shall conclude by considering an important interpretation of the argument of the Metaphysical Foundations developed by Michael Friedman. However, it is first necessary to present briefly Kant’s conception of science (in particular what conditions a body of knowledge must satisfy for Kant in order to be considered science proper) as well as Kant’s own understanding of the relevant differences between his projects in the first Critique, the Metaphysical Foundations, and the Opus postumum.Kant’s conception of science is rather strict if measured by contemporary standards. For in the preface to the Metaphysical Foundations Kant establishes three substantive conditions that a body of knowledge must satisfy in order to be considered science proper.1 (1) It must not consist in empirical principles, [End Page 567] but rather must be obtained solely from pure, a priori principles;2 (2) It must be apodictically certain;3 (3)4 It must be a systematically ordered whole (which means that its various propositions must be related as, for example, antecedents and consequents).5 After stating these conditions, Kant then argues that all natural science proper requires a pure part upon which its apodictic certainty is based. In other words, satisfaction of the first condition immediately implies satisfaction of the second condition as well.6 Accordingly, these three conditions (and the first one in particular) imply that natural science proper requires (or rather presupposes) a justification by something distinct from it that Kant calls a metaphysics of nature.7 But what exactly does a metaphysics of nature encompass? Kant distinguishes two different parts of the metaphysics of nature: a transcendental part and a special part. A metaphysics of nature [End Page 568] is transcendental insofar as it concerns “the laws that make the concept of nature in general possible, even without relation to any determinate object of experience, and [insofar as it is] thus indeterminate with respect to the nature of this or that thing in the sensible world,” whereas a metaphysics of nature is special to the extent that “it is concerned with a special nature of this or that kind of thing of which an empirical concept is given, but so that except for what lies in this concept no other empirical principle is used for knowledge thereof.”8 In short, a transcendental metaphysics, revealing how experience in general is possible, is not supposed to presuppose an empirical concept, whereas a special metaphysics does make such an assumption insofar as it is concerned with the special natures of things.How do the three works cited above relate to Kant’s distinction between a transcendental and a special metaphysics of nature? In the preface to the Metaphysical Foundations Kant clearly indicates that he intends the Metaphysical Foundations to constitute the special metaphysics of nature. Although he does not explicitly refer to the first Critique in the preface, it is also relatively clear that he sees it (or at least the ‘System of Pure Reason’ that Kant foresees as following upon it and as incorporating its fundamental results)9 as constituting [End Page 569] the transcendental part of a metaphysics of nature.10 The Principles of Pure Understanding (‘Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes’) in the Transcendental Analytic argue for what could naturally be described as “laws... (shrink)

A macroscope is proposed and tested here for the discovery of the unique argumentative footprint that characterizes how a collective manages differences and pursues disagreement through argument in a polylogue. The macroscope addresses broader analytic problems posed by various conceptualizations of large-scale argument, such as fields, spheres, communities, and institutions. The design incorporates a two-tier methodology for detecting argument patterns of the arguments performed in arguing by an interactive collective that produces views, or topographies, of the ways that issues (...) are generated in the making and defending of standpoints. The design premises for the macroscope build on insights about argument patterns from pragma-dialectical theory by incorporating research and theory on disagreement management and the Argumentum Model of Topics. The design reconceptualizes prototypical and stereotypical argument patterns for characterizing large-scale argumentation. A prototype of the macroscope is tested on data drawn from six threads about oil-drilling and fracking from the subreddit Changemyview. The implementation suggests the efficacy of the macroscope’s design and potential for identifying what communities make controversial and how the disagreement space in a polylogue is managed through stereotypical argument patterns in terms of claims/premises, inferential relations, and presentational devices. (shrink)

Để xem bóng đá và phát sóng video trực tiếp tốc độ cao, Xoilac là trang web lý tưởng. Đặc biệt, Xoilac không có bất cứ quảng cáo nào, vì vậy người xem vẫn thoải mái thưởng thức trận bóng đá mà không lo bị phân tâm vì bất cứ vấn đề gì. Ngoài ra, Xoilac có đội ngũ dày dặn chuyên môn, luôn đưa ra những nhận định chuẩn xác cho từng trận đấu bóng đá. Với đồ hoạ sinh (...) động, âm thanh lôi cuốn và sống động, Xoilac sẽ lưu lại dấu ấn sâu đậm trong tâm trí người xem bóng đá. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explain some of the basics of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation which was introduced in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984). First, we make a comparison between dialectical analysis and rhetorical analysis, which is probably more familiar to most readers. Then, we sketch an ideal model of a critical discussion that can serve as a point of departure for dialectically analyzing argumentative discourse. In this model, we distinguish the various stages through which the resolution of a (...) difference of opinion should pass and mention the types of speech acts that can play a constructive role in each of these stages. Finally, we show what kind of pragma-dialectical transformations are to be carried out in a reconstruction of argumentative discourse which starts from this ideal model and leads to an analytic overview of the aspects of the discourse that are crucial for its evaluation. (shrink)

In trying to control various aspects concerning utterance production in multi-party human–computer dialogue, argumentative considerations play an important part, particularly in choosing appropriate lexical units so that we fine-tune the degree of persuasion that each utterance has. A preliminary step in this endeavor is the ability to place an ordering relation between semantic forms (that are due to be realized as utterances, by the machine), concerning their persuasion strength, with respect to certain (explicit or implicit) conclusions. Thus, in this (...) article, we propose a mechanism for assessing utterances, in terms of their argumentative force. The framework designed conflates insights from Asher and Lascarides’ SDRT (“Segmented Discourse Representation Theory”), and from Anscombre and Ducrot’s AT (“Argumentation Theory”). These mechanisms are included in a language generation component of a multi-party dialogue system for book reservation applications (i.e., a “virtual librarian”), and thus evaluated via typical human–machine conversations. (shrink)

Sometimes we are faced with discussions in which we might think that one or more of our interlocutors should not be partaking in the argument. Sometimes we are faced with discussions where we are unfairly denied participation, or we recognise that some arguers are denied participation. This paper develops an account and typology of ‘argumentative exclusion’. We understand ‘argumentative exclusion’ as the denial of participation in a discussion because of different phenomena. In this paper, we distinguish between (...) class='Hi'>argumentative exclusions that are unwarranted and argumentative exclusions that are in service of justice and resistance to social oppression. Online argumentation and online hate speech form the core examples of this work. (shrink)

The extended pragma-dialectical argumentation theory assumes that people engaged in argumentative discourse manoeuvre strategically. In argumentative reality, the strategic manoeuvring is often carried out according to an argumentative strategy. Language users make an effort to present their strategic manoeuvres in a specific way and the analysis of the stylistic choices in actual argumentative discourse is the most important basis for identification and analysis of argumentative strategies. In this article, it is shown what requirements must be (...) satisfied by a systematic stylistic analysis of argumentative discourse, and the results of such an analysis are illustrated by means of a case study. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question whether some morally normative content is grounded in the dialogical practice that both Apel and Habermas call argumentative discourse, and if so how to demonstrate that it is so grounded. Apel (unlike Habermas) claims that discourse has rationally necessary conceptual presuppositions; that morally normative content is part of such presuppositions; and that this can be ascertained in transcendendal reflection, i.e. by a kind of transcendental argument. I argue that these claims can be charitably (...) interpreted but require clarifications of their key concepts, i.e. “discourse”, “validity claims”, “performative self-contradiction”, and “community of communication”. I argue that discourse as a practice of reason-sensitive agents who are communicatively connected via argumentation can be explained by its normatively constitutive aim, namely fixing the true values of our reasons; that the primary level of validity claims are claims concerning good reasons; that performative self-contradictions are pragmatic-cum-logical inconsistencies that we can know apriori to be incompatible with discourse’s constitutive aim; and finally, that competent discourse participants can know apriori that they would be performatively inconsistent if they flouted a moral kernel that is intrinsic in discourse. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question how to analyze multimodal public discourse in such a way that the resulting reconstruction of the rhetor’s accountability either obliges the rhetor to acknowledge the argumentative reconstruction as valid or to refute its validity in a meta-discussion. This is a challenge for discourse theory as well as for argument theory because multimodal discourse seems far removed from the ‘standard’ propositional format of an argument. We argue that multimodal discourse should be analyzed as a coherent (...) and relevant discourse, assuming the possibility of instant interactions between all modes. We introduce a method that allows us to account for an argumentative reconstruction in a systematic way. We illustrate our method by analyzing the ABC news item titled Hu Jintao Visit: Economics and Panda Bears of January 20, 2011, holding ABC news as a rhetor accountable for several far reaching standpoints that are implied in the multimodal format. (shrink)

This study analyzed the argumentative writing behavior of Iranian graduate learners of English as Foreign Language in their English essays. Further, the correlations between the use of argument elements and overall writing quality as well as soundness of produced arguments were investigated. To this end, 150 essays were analyzed. The sample essays were found to be predominantly deductive in terms of rhetorical pattern. Moreover, they mainly utilized ‘data’ and ‘claim’ most frequently with secondary elements of argument as the least (...) produced elements. Overall writing quality co-varied significantly positively with the uses of claims, data, counterargument claims, counterargument data, rebuttal claims, and rebuttal data. Essays rated high in terms of overall writing quality were further rated for soundness and relevance of the arguments. The results demonstrate that even for advanced language learners good surface structure cannot necessarily guarantee well thought-out logical structure. The pedagogical implications for writing instruction and research are discussed. (shrink)

Argumentative indicators of discourse relations constitute crucial cues for the mining of arguments. However, a comprehensive lexicon of these linguistic devices is so far lacking due to the scarcity of corpora argumentatively annotated and the absence of an empirically validated analytic methodology. Recent studies have shown that modals, that express that things might be otherwise, and evidentials, that point to the presence of information sources, are good candidates to work as argumentative indicators. On these grounds, we propose a (...) systematic, non-language specific corpus-based procedure to identify indicators of argumentative discourse relations. We test the design of a multi-level annotation through the analysis of the English and Italian epistential adverbs evidently and evidentemente in comparable corpora of newspaper articles. We show that the annotation guidelines achieve consistent analytical results with expert annotators. Data analysis reveals that the two adverbs work as argumentative indicator both at the structural and at the inferential level: besides pointing to the presence of premises-conclusion relations, they recurrently pattern with causal argument schemes from the effect to the cause. The Italian adverb evidentemente is less polysemous and more frequent, thus working as a more reliable indicator. (shrink)

It is argued that argumentative deliberation, which involves the interpersonal exchange and evaluation of reasons and counter-reasons, is crucial for the generation of epistemic goods given that it helps us eradicate errors and neutralise biases. However, to reap argumentative deliberation’s epistemic benefits, the deliberators need to instantiate a certain intellectual character: in particular, they need to be intellectually humble and autonomous. Given that, it is argued that the educational system should foster the development of the intellectual virtues of (...) humility and autonomy. Moreover, some pedagogical strategies and practices as to how this can be achieved in the classroom are offered. (shrink)

The received picture of rationality, nowadays in trouble, is contrasted with the "argumentative" conception, inspired by Paul Grice's proposal to define rationality as an agent's desire that his or her moves are supported by reasons and a capacity to satisfy that desire at least to some extent. Some implications of the argumentative conception of rationality are unfolded: it involves a first-person perspective, requires criteria for the attribution of the capacity to justify one's moves, and allows for failures to (...) behave or think rationally. Attribution of argumentative rationality to a human being does not follow from final evidence, but , coincides with the acknowledgement of personhood, which in turn, being at least to some extent a matter of choice, is revealed to be an ethical task. So the argumentative conception of rationality may help us see why it still make sense to think of man as a rational being. (shrink)

We argue that there are three norms of critical discussion in stark relief in Republic I. The first we see in the exchange with Cephalus---that we interpret each other and contribute to discussions in a maximally argumentative fashion. The second we seein the exchange with Polemarchus---that in order to cooperate in dialectic, interlocutors must maintain a distance between themselves and the theses they espouse. This way they can subject the views to serious scrutiny without the risk of personal loss. (...) Third, and finally, from Socrates’ exchange with Thrasymachus, it is clear that uncooperative discussants must be handled in a fashion that reinforces the goals of dialectic. So Thrasymachus is refuted and silenced not just for the sake of correcting his definition of justice, but also for the sake of those listening. (shrink)

We present an interdisciplinary approach to argumentation combining logical, probabilistic, and psychological perspectives. We investigate logical attack principles which relate attacks among claims with logical form. For example, we consider the principle that an argument that attacks another argument claiming A triggers the existence of an attack on an argument featuring the stronger claim [Formula: see text]. We formulate a number of such principles pertaining to conjunctive, disjunctive, negated, and implicational claims. Some of these attack principles seem to be prima (...) facie more plausible than others. To support this intuition, we suggest an interpretation of these principles in terms of coherent conditional probabilities. This interpretation is naturally generalized from qualitative to quantitative principles. Specifically, we use our probabilistic semantics to evaluate the rationality of principles which govern the strength of argumentative attacks. In order to complement our theoretical analysis with an empirical perspective, we present an experiment with students of the TU Vienna ([Formula: see text]) which explores the psychological plausibility of selected attack principles. We also discuss how our qualitative attack principles relate to well-known types of logical argumentation frameworks. Finally, we briefly discuss how our approach relates to the computational argumentation literature. (shrink)

Within the framework of argumentative semantics, argumentative interpretation takes place using two methods, one of which consists in determining the terms of an "argumentative chaining”, an argumentative discourse used to represent the meaning of an utterance. The aim of this article is to show that in such an interpretation, the context, and in particular the cotext, of the utterance to be interpreted can be exploited in various ways, which leads to rethink the notion of context.

I propose some changes to the conceptions of argument and of argumentative discussion in Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). An argument is a discourse whose author seeks to persuade an audience to accept a thesis by producing reasons in support of it and discharging his dialectical obligations. An argumentative discussion (what Johnson calls ‘argumentation’) is a sociocultural activity of constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing, and revising arguments for the purpose of reaching a shared rationally supported position on some issue. (...) Johnson's theory of argumentative discussion, with occasional modifications, is derived from this definition as a sequence of 17 theorems. Argumentative discussion is a valuable cultural practice; it is the most secure route to correct views and wise policies. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 220 Seiten: 123-153.