Abstract

This paper examines Spinoza’s concept of human nature, focusing on the ambiguities in its relationship with notions such as essence, singularity, and universality. The central problem lies in the apparent contradiction between essence as a singularizing principle and the possibility of a common human nature. The argument posits that Spinoza redefines essence as a property that is reciprocal to the singular thing (EII def. 2), rejecting universal abstractions (such as the Aristotelian model) and linking it to the conatus (EIII P6) and common notions. The analysis unfolds as follows: (1) redefinition of essence; (2) totalization as a structure integrating the singular into the whole; (3) individuation through conatus; and (4) reconciliation between singularity and community in human nature. The conclusion asserts that Spinoza’s human essence is dynamic, grounded in natural laws that unite the particular and the collective.