O artigo visa desenvolver a noção de duração na _Ética_ de Espinosa, mostrando que seu entendimento passa pela discussão de uma outra noção, central na filosofia de Espinosa, qual seja, a noção de conatus. A partir, então, da análise aqui pretendida – análise essa que passará por um estudo sobre a existência, a essência, a substância e o modo, além da noção de definição – será possível uma compreensão positiva da indefinição, e um esclarecimento, enfim, do que Espinosa entende (...) por duração, bem como por conatus. (shrink)

Spinoza expounds the doctrine of self-preservation (conatus) in such a profound way that suicide seems incomprehensible. However, this affirmation contrasts with the frequent references to suicidal acts in his works. To address this contrast and thus support the compatibility between suicide and conatus, I refer to a new reading of Proposition 5 of Ethics III on contrariety. I reveal the complexity of every individual, the existence of conflictuality between their parts and the conatus of each part, which, (...) depending on relationships with external things, enjoys a degree of independence from the conatus of the individual as a whole. (shrink)

In his reconstruction of Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole, Deleuze argues that the cognitive and practical faculties are genetically grounded in the affective, enlivening dynamics of the reflecting power of judgment. In this paper I propose to take Kant’s account of self-organisation as model for understanding this genesis of the faculties in terms of a circular causality that is purposively animated from within by a self-productive and self-maintaining tendency. The key argument I develop is that this generative tendency may (...) be understood as a conatus that is inherent to the power of judgment and comes to the fore in the subject’s feeling of life. (shrink)

Spinoza explained that the essence of each individual thing is _conatus:_ the drive to persist and to flourish. Appealing to both the physics of entropy and modern evolutionary theory, this chapter explains both why _conatus_ is so fundamental to biological systems and why, in humans, it is transformed into the striving to matter. The uniquely human striving to matter need not be to matter more than others (which is obnoxious), nor to matter cosmically and for all eternity (which generates the (...) religious impulse); rather it is the striving to matter at least to the extent commensurate with all the energy, attention, planning, and emotional outlay that it takes to pursue a human life. Humans are creatures of matter who long to matter. Rather than undermining the human striving to matter, the scientific worldview can be seen to buttress the recognition of what matters above all: that all people matter. (shrink)

Introduction Conatus is a specific concept within Descartes’s physics. In particular, it assumes a crucial importance in the purely mechanistic description of the nature of light – an issue that Des- cartes considered one of the most crucial challenges, and major achievements, of his natural phil- osophy. According to Descartes’s cosmology, the universe – understood as a material continuum in which there is no vacuum – is composed of a number of separate yet interconnected vortices. Each of these vortices (...) consists in a set of bands rotating around their centres. The bands are com- posed of corpuscles of the three elements, each distinguished on the basis of their different shapes and sizes. The small globules of the second element, although impeded by the other parts of heaven, strive to move away from the centre of the vortex around which they revolve, thus exerting a certain force against the surrounding bodies. This striving or conatus, though a mere force rather than a genuine motion, is transmitted instan- taneously and along straight lines from body to body. According to Descartes, then, the nature of light consists in this striving alone. This account must be understood as strictly connected to the fundamental laws that regulate the Cartesian world. It is particularly important to recall that for Descartes the centrifugal force exerted by a rotating body is understood to be a consequence of the intrinsic rectilinearity of every motion. As the second of the three Laws of Nature set forth in Book II of the Principles of Philosophy establishes, “all motion is in itself rectilinear; and hence any body moving in a circle tends to move away from the centre of the circle which it describes as proved by the fact that a stone rotating in a sling tends to move centrifugally along the tangent of each point described by a circle.1 Similarly, each of the globules of the second element “strives to recede with a great force from the centre of the vortex in which it rotates; it is in fact prevented by the other globules placed all around, not differently than a stone in a sling”. Within this framework, as I show later, conatus occurs when a body’s intrinsic tendency to rectilinear motion is impeded by an external constraint. As Stephen Gaukroger notes, the use of the term conatus in the Principles – like “vis” and “ action ” – shows that Descartes “cannot avoid dynamic terminology”, despite his declared intent “to construe motion in a purely kinematic way”. Indeed, Gaukroger observes that the notions of force action and striving are systematically employed in the Principles – appearing 290, 59 and 8 times, respectively. Also noteworthy, conatus was – together with the more familiar concepts of actio and vis – a significant element of the conceptual apparatus of Scholastic natural philosophy. As will be seen later – and this is the first goal of this paper – here the concept of conatus had a very specific function. Indeed, it was a central part of the Aristotelian- Scholastic account of gravitation. Conatus was used to refer to the striving of a body to move towards its natural place – especially in cases where its natural motion was hindered or impeded by an external mover. This specific use of the concept of conatus can be found in texts on natural philosophy from the end of the sixteenth through the late seventeenth century. Notably, it occurs in some of the late -Scho- lastic texts which held special significance for Descartes’s thought. Therefore, Descartes introduces conatus in a context in which this concept already had a very specific meaning, and one of which he was very probably aware. The possible relations between these two apparently very different con- cepts have therefore to be scrutinized. I thereby propose to undertake a comparison between the Scho- lastic and the Cartesian conceptions of conatus. I hope to show that certain traits of the former are indeed echoed by the latter, although adapted to the much changed physical paradigm of Cartesian physics. In fact, Descartes’s conatus, though sharing some important similarities with the old one, underwent significant transformations in terms of both its meaning and its application. However, I hope to show that these concepts are both used to describe the behaviour of bodies in relation to their intrinsic motive tendency, and in particular when this tendency is impeded or prevented. Such a reconstruction offers two main areas of interest. On an immediate level, it furthers the general efforts of scholars over the past decades to reconstruct the full extent of the relations between Descartes’s thought and Scholastic philosophy. However, there is another significant reason for taking an interest in the ties between the Scholastic and the Cartesian conceptions of conatus. Indeed, the Cartesian conatus must be seen as crucial to a proper understanding of the broader, diverse conceptualization that this idea enjoyed in the thought of many of the most important philosophers of the early modern period, namely Spinoza, Hobbes and Leibniz. In particular, Spinoza, were directly influenced by Descartes in their unique formulations of conatus. Thus a reconstruction of the context in which Descartes formulated his conatus and of its relations to a pre-existing Scholastic conception will enable us to better reconstruct the history of this idea in the early modern period. The paper is structured as follows: in the first part, I provide a thorough review of the Scho- lastic employment of the concept conatus – both its meaning and the extent of its usage. I then show that it occurs in some of the most prominent Cartesian sources. Finally, I shall provide an account of Descartes’s theory of circular motion and conatus with the specific aim of empha- sizing the elements of both continuity and discontinuity that justify the claim that Descartes’s con- ception of conatus is reminiscent of the Scholastic one. (shrink)

A presentation of Spinoza's theory of affections and concept of conatus aimed at a psychoanalyst audience.

A noção de conatus desempenha na física hobbesiana um papel inequívoco: o de.explicar as determinações de um movimento sem recorrer à idéia de uma potencialidade ou inclinação para o movimento. Nossa questão consiste em saber se a noção de conatus cumpre a mesma função na teoria das paixões, e, a partir daí, na medida em que respondamos afirmativamente esta questão, trata-se de procurar compreender, minimamente que seja, ao que consiste para Hobbes uma paixão.

ABSTRACT According to Genevieve Lloyd, conatus is manifested in body as a fixed ratio of motion and rest and in mind as increasing adequate understanding. The commentary provides textual analysis to resolve the apparent paradox that bodily stability corresponds to intellectual growth. The activity of adequate ideas and passivity of inadequate ideas are identified as analogues of motion and rest in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind and these are put to work in exploring what is required for increasing one’s adequate (...) understanding: that one can acquire adequate ideas only by extending one’s receptivity to being affected and by forming inadequate ideas. Thus a mind’s ratio between adequate and inadequate ideas is maintained even as it gains and exercises greater power. This appreciation of Spinoza’s epistemology supports Lloyd’s characterisation of his philosophy as “thinking from within the totality of being”. (shrink)

The focus of this paper will be on the earliest Greek treatments of impulse, motivation, and self-animation – a cluster of concepts tied to the hormē-conatus concept. I hope to offer a plausible account of how the earliest recorded views on this subject in mythological, pre-Socratic, and Classical writings might have inspired later philosophical developments by establishing the foundations for an organic, wholly naturalized approach to human inquiry. Three pillars of that approach which I wish to emphasize are: practical (...) intelligence (i.e., a continuity between knowing and doing), natural normativity (i.e., a continuity between human norms and the environment), and an ontology of philosophical dialectic (i.e., a continuity between the growth of human understanding and the growth of physis). (shrink)

I want to show the importance of the notion of conatus for Hobbes' political philosophy. According to Hobbes, all motion of bodies consists of elementary motions he called 'endeavors.' They are motions 'made in less space and time than can be given,' and they obey the law of persistence or inertia. A body strives to preserve its state and resist the causal power of other bodies. I call this the conatus-principle. Hobbes' argument for social contract and sovereign is (...) based essentially on this model. He proves that the natural conatus makes people strive to preserve their lives and therefore to get out of the destructive state of nature; commit to mutual contracts; keep the contracts unless some external cause otherwise determines; and establish a permanent sovereign power that Hobbes calls 'an artificial eternity of life.' All this is determined by the fundamental laws of nature, essentially, by the conatus-principle. I also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature does not represent all of the essential features of Hobbes' argument. (shrink)

Das muitas aproximações perpetradas nas últimas nove décadas entre Sigmund Freud e Espinosa, talvez nenhuma seja tão problemática quanto o cotejamento entre o conatus – esforço de perseveração no ser que, na Ética de Espinosa, constitui a essência atual das coisas – e aquela força autodestrutiva a que Freud, em Além do Princípio do Prazer, dá o nome de Todestrieb, ou pulsão de morte. De que forma, à luz de uma ontologia absolutamente positiva como a de Espinosa – uma (...) na qual a destruição de uma coisa será sempre extrínseca à mesma –, devemos receber a asserção de Freud de que há algo na constituição do sujeito que o destrói? Partindo desta questão, o intento do presente trabalho é realizar uma apresentação detida dos conceitos, a fim de determinar em que registro se dá a contradição, e até que ponto a mesma nos constrange a suprimir nossa aquiescência a um ou outro dos mesmos. (shrink)

Als bewegende Bedingungen des Lebens stehen Conatus und Lebensnot im Zentrum aktueller medienanthropologischer Diskussionen über das Verhältnis von Leben und Medien. Spinoza definierte Conatus als Prinzip, nach dem das Wesen jedes Dings darin besteht, ›in seinem Sein zu verharren‹. Er begründete mit diesem Prinzip eine Denktradition, in der Leben und Materie, Rationalität und Vermögen koinzidieren. Der Begriff der Lebensnot dagegen entstammt Diskursen der Physiologie, der Medizin, der Urteilsphilosophie und schließlich der Psychoanalyse, die auf verschiedene Weise körperliche Bedingungen und (...) Notwendigkeiten mit der Angewiesenheit auf das Andere und die Anderen verschränken. Conatus und Lebensnot erlauben in besonderer Weise zu situieren, warum und wie sich das Fragen nach dem Menschlichsein in Diskursen über Medientechnik immer wieder aktualisiert und dabei zugleich verändert. (shrink)

Conceito oriundo do debate a respeito do movimento, o conatus, entendido como inclinação ou esforço, será um dos temas centrais da física seiscentista. Este artigo pretende explicitar o contexto de elaboração do conceito de conatus no século XVII, ou pelo menos na obra de três de seus principais filósofos: Descartes, Hobbes e Espinosa. Em Descartes, o conceito de conatus ainda se separa do conceito de movimento propriamente dito. Tal separação desaparece em Hobbes, para quem o conatus (...) será apresentado como um movimento ínfimo, com consequências não só para a Física, mas também para a Ética e a Política. Com Espinosa, por sua vez, o conceito ganhará contornos nitidamente ontológicos, tornando-se a chave para entender a essência das coisas singulares. (shrink)

Este trabalho pretende discutir uma aparente ambigüidade da ética spinozista, que ora é descrita como uma ética da auto-conservação, ora como uma ética da liberdade. Após mostrar por que fracassam as tentativas de diversos comentadores em conciliar estes dois aspectos, argumentaremos que a única maneira de resolver o problema é considerar que o que deve ser mantido na existência não é o indivíduo empírico do senso comum, mas sim a “individualidade”, que estaria ligada à proporção das relações de movimento e (...) repouso, correspondendo à essência singular de cada ente. Para sustentar esta posição, faremos uma análise da noção de conatus em Spinoza, mostrando que este não se reduz a elementos físicos, sendo também um princípio metafísico, que relaciona os seres finitos à potência de Deus. Somente a partir desta dimensão formal seria possível compreender porque o esforço primordial de auto-preservação desemboca em uma ética da liberdade. (shrink)

이 논문은 스피노자 철학의 개체론에서 핵심적인 지위를 차지하는 코나투스 개념의 단일성 문제를 살핀다. 최근 스피노자 연구자들은 한 개체의 본질(essentia)로 설명되는 코나투스 개념을 단일성으로 해석할 때의 여러 문제점을 제기하며 코나투스 개념을 복합적인 것으로 이해하는 경향이 있다. 하지만 필자는 스피노자 철학에서 코나투스는 신의 역량이 구체화 된 하나의 단위 혹은 단일성에 속하고, 본성(natura)으로서 운동량이 개체의 복합성과 상황 함수에 종속된다고 이해한다.BR 개체의 본질로서 코나투스는 신의 속성을 어떠한 결정된 방식으로 표현하는 양태이지만, 이때의 결정성은 개체의 역량을 제한하기보다는 신의 무한한 역량 안에 위치시키는 기능을 한다. 따라서 신의 (...) 역량이 일정한 방식으로 결정된 코나투스 개념 안에는 어떠한 부정이나 제한의 의미도 내포되지 않는다.BR 반면 개체의 결정된 본성은 본성 밖의 다른 것들에 대한 개체의 무능을 내포하기 때문에 개체의 본성을 통해서 비로소 유한한 양태가 겪을 수밖에 없는 다양한 제한적 상황들에 대한 해명이 가능하다. 따라서 본질과 본성을 이렇게 구분하는 것이 타당하다면 개체의 자기 폭력적인 현상으로서 자살의 문제를 해명하고자 할 때 본질이 아닌 본성 개념에 근거해야만 한다는 결론을 도출할 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

“자기 존재 유지의 노력”(코나투스)은 스피노자의 사상을 “긍정의 철학”으로 규정하게 해 온 핵심 개념이다. 그러나 코나투스는 인간을 예속적이고 심지어 자기 파괴적인 삶으로 몰아가기도 한다. 이것이 모순되어 보인다면 이는 코나투스를 흔히 단순체의 관점에서 보기 때문이다. 나는 스피노자에게서 모든 개체가 복합체인 만큼 코나투스 역시 복합적임을, 그리고 이 복합성은 부분의 다수성이나 전체 구조의 복잡성보다 더 역동적인 갈등적 성격을 가짐을 보여준다. 더 구체적으로는 첫째, 코나투스가 내적 부정을 겪을 수 있으며, 이는 둘째, 전체로서의 개체만이 아니라, 개체의 변용들에도 별도의 코나투스가 있고, 후자의 자기 긍정성이 개체 전체의 본성에 (...) 상반될 수 있기 때문이다. 곧 변용의 상대적 독립성이 개체의 자기 파괴적 행위의 원인이다. 하지만 이 독립성은 변용의 자체적 힘보다는 개체들 간의 복합적 연관에 바탕을 두는 한에서, 자유의지에 기대지 않고 개체의 역량을 강화할 수 있는 조건이기도 하다. 결국 코나투스의 복합성을 제시함으로써 나는 우리 안에서 일어나는 긍정과 도약의 느낌을 우리 자신의 능동성으로 착각해서는 안 되며, 이 느낌 역시 원인을 통해 인식되어야 함을 환기시킨다. (shrink)

In this essay, I will begin by delineating the context of the conatus principle, after which I will provide a reading of the two propositions (EIIIP6 and P7) that contain the very core of the theory. This in turn will enable me to explain how Spinoza’s theory of conatus is connected to his views on desire, activity, and teleology.

This essay contends that Spinoza’s argument for the conatus doctrine does not commit any of the five fallacies of equivocation. The key to a better understanding of his argument lies in a Spinoza’s “theory of inherence” — that is, his theory of what it is to be “in” something. Spinoza’s conatus argument is a valid demonstration from Spinozistic premises about inherence, conception, causation, and related matters. These premises reflect his deep commitment to a rigorous Principle of Sufficient Reason, (...) to a conception of things as causing their own properties through their essences, and to a closely-related conception of causation as identical with or parallel to logical consequence. (shrink)

Eden od vrhuncev v knjigi Joan Copjec _Read My Desire_ se nanaša na korelacijo med lacanovskimi formulami seksuacije in kantovskimi antinomijami uma. Članek sledi moderni poti svobode, od dinamične antinomije (moška stran) in Kantovega razsvetljenskega Učenjaka svobodnega javnega sveta, prek Marxove demokratične države kot kraja transcendentne svobode, do Copjecinega spola kot realnega, tj. kot svobode, ki se poraja iz nesimbolizabilnih učinkov označevalca. V skladu s tem so današnja spolna in druga identitetna samorazglašanja – katerih _dico, ergo sum_, »rečem, torej sem« (...) (Jacques-Alain Miller), si prizadeva, da bi svojo bit podredil označevalcu in s tem odpravil realno – pomeni eutana­zijo svobode. Nasproti temu razvoju ta esej predlaga Spinozovo substanco kot moč samoudejanjenja in imanentne vzročnosti ter singularni _conatus_ (prizadevanje za vztrajanje in ohranjanje v svoji lastni biti) kot ključna ontološka pojma, potrebna za vzdrževanje obeh prepletenih vidikov realnega kot (nemožnega) predsimbolnega vzroka in (vse bolj prepovedanega, a neizogibnega) postsimbolnega učinka. (shrink)

Spinoza believes that all things “strive to persevere in their being.” This claim, known as Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, raises many questions. Does Spinoza believe that nature is goal directed? Does he think that all natural things, including ones that are typically classified as inanimate, such as particles of matter and stars in the sky have desires and goals? This chapter explicates the meaning of Spinoza’s conatus doctrine and argues that it must be interpreted teleologically despite the apparent tension (...) between teleology and mechanism. It also examines Spinoza’s argument for the conatus doctrine and argues that it is not meant to follow from claims about the impossibility of self-destruction alone, as many commentators would have it. Rather, he must be relying on important assumptions about the nature of God and the expressive relationship that finite individuals bear to it. It concludes by considering the problem of goal-directed human action in Spinoza. (shrink)

Unamuno saw in his defense of religious faith a response to Nietzsche’s criticisms of the Christian, agapeic way of life. To Nietzsche’s claim that engaging in this way of life is something antinatural and life-denying, insofar as it goes against the (alleged) natural tendency to increase one’s own power, Unamuno responded that an agapeic way of life is precisely a direct expression of this natural tendency. Far from being something that goes against our natural inclinations, Unamuno says, an agapeic way (...) of life is a life-affirming exercise, something we are led to given our own natural condition. Hence, the aim of this essay is to comment on Unamuno’s criticism of Nietzsche and to point out the philosophical relevance of Unamuno’s attempt to provide a natural foundation for religious faith when assessing Nietzsche’s criticisms of the possibility of carrying out a Christian, agapeic way of life. (shrink)

The idea of active power played central role in the 17th Century philosophy and science. The idea is as follows: if not prevented, bodies necessarily do certain things in virtue of their power. This kind of thought naturally arose from what might properly be called the law of persistence, according to which moving bodies continue their motion unchanged if no new external force intervenes.1 What bodies do in virtue of their power was called actions, and in terms of actions such (...) things as resistance, pressure and affections were explained. What is this active power? One of the main aims of philosophers in the 17th and 18th Centuries was to find a good answer to this question. (shrink)

In this paper I begin by discussing the different ways in which Spinoza’s famous conatus argument has been understood, after which I present my own reconstruction of the derivation: each and every true finite thing is, in itself, an expresser of power (E1p25c, 1p34) that never acts self-destructively (E3p4) but instead strives to drive itself through opponents to produce effects as they follow from the definition of the thing in question (E1p25c, 1p34, and 3p5). This tells us something decisive (...) about the meaning of Spinoza’s doctrine: according to it, things are active causers whose “power to exist and act” has conatus character in temporality, amounting not only to striving to prolong the duration of one’s actualization but also to striving to be as active or autonomous as possible, that is, to attain a state determined by the striving subject’s essence alone. (shrink)

Obiettivo della presente indagine è la ricostruzione di una circolarità ermeneutica tra alcune delle categorie più puramente psicologiche dell’elaborazione di Paul Ricoeur e i concetti chiave della sua analisi morale, giuridica e politica. Ciò cercando di evidenziare le ascendenze e i confronti intellettuali del Ricoeur teoretico, ritrovandone gli esiti in sede più esplicitamente giuridico-sociale, in un excursus che mira all’ipotesi di una fondazione categoriale rizomatica del pensiero politico di Paul Ricoeur.

This article investigates the genesis of Hobbesian psychophysics from the concept of conatus, demonstrating that it operates as a genetic principle that simultaneously gives rise to the description of the individual as a sentient body and to plasticity as a capacity for internal reconfiguration through experience. The plasticity in question does not correspond to the contemporary notion of neuroplasticity nor to any retrospective projection: it strictly designates properties deducible from conatus as defined in De Corpore XV — persistence, (...) accumulation, and reorganization of movements in the living body. The investigation follows the differentiation of conatus into vital and reactive, examining how the encounter between external pressure and vital movement generates sensation, imagination, memory, passions, and deliberation. The central argument holds that plasticity emerges as a necessary consequence of the way conatus organizes the circuit from sensory impact to action. The article reconstructs this progression exclusively from Hobbes's texts — De Corpore, Leviathan, Elements of Law, De Homine, and Third Objections —, showing that the same structure enabling learning and habit formation also enables error, madness, and disorganization. The analysis demonstrates that the psychophysical circuit dissolves the mind-body dualism without incurring ontological reductionism, situating the Hobbesian individual as a plastic organism whose dispositions are formed, stabilized, and reorganized through accumulated experience. (shrink)

This paper focuses on an understudied aspect of Hobbes's natural philosophy: his approach to the domain of life. I concentrate on the role assigned by Hobbes to the heart, which occupies a central role in both his account of human physiology and of the origin of animal locomotion. With this, I have three goals in mind. First, I aim to offer a cross-section of Hobbes's effort to provide a mechanistic picture of human life. Second, I aim to contextualize Hobbes's views (...) in the seventeenth-century debates on human physiology and animal locomotion. In particular, I will compare Hobbes's views with the theories put forth by Harvey, Descartes, the Galenic, and Peripatetic traditions. Also, I will show that Hobbes was receptive to advances within contemporary English physiology and chemistry. Third, by means of a comparison with Descartes, I advance some hypothesis to explain why Hobbes indentified the heart, and not the brain (as was increasingly com... (shrink)

En este artículo relaciono la reflexión de Balibar en torno a la proposición de la igualibertad con su lectura de la filosofía de Spinoza. Balibar examina esta última desde la necesidad de teorizar una respuesta a la pregunta por el hombre en la nueva coyuntura política de los años ochenta y noventa del siglo XX. Y expone la antropología política spinoziana a través de la presentación y el análisis de tres correlaciones: entre las identidades individuales y la colectiva, entre las (...) potencias individuales y la colectiva y entre las singularidades y la naturaleza infinita. Así puede dar cuenta de las tres modalidades (antigua, moderna y posmoderna) de la igualibertad, pensando el conatus como esfuerzo de liberación siempre ya activo. (shrink)

This paper concerns Spinoza’s theory of conatus and an important consequence of this theory concerning how bodies persist through time. I first argue that a conatus is the self-maintaining activity of a mode and not a tendency toward self-preservation or some kind of force. I then argue that it follows from this theory of conatus that bodies persist through time by having temporal parts. I conclude the paper by arguing that attributing a temporal parts metaphysic to Spinoza (...) is not as implausible or anachronistic as it might first seem to be. (shrink)

Neste artigo, procuraremos analisar o papel e a importância do conatus na economia do pensamento espinosiano, bem como a novidade que, a este propósito, o mesmo encerra para o entendimento de uma ética imanente do sujeito. Compreendido como o esforço despendido pelo sujeito no sentido de perseverar no seu ser, o qual, enquanto individualidade, procura o que é bom e útil para si, o conatus, tal como Espinosa o entende, é, no entanto, um princípio dinâmico que não pode (...) reduzir-se à mera “conservação” do ser, mas é capaz de fazer mover o sujeito na escolha de afeções positivas que o realizem. É, sobretudo, na Parte II da Ética – da origem e da natureza das afeções -objeto de análise do presente artigo, que estas ideias se encontram desenvolvidas, em que o conhecimento é o afeto quando transformado na causa adequada de si mesmo. (shrink)

In order to further clarify the meaning of Spinoza’s teachings, I will demonstrate in the following article that, according to the author of the Ethics, God is life, that the conatus, the internal dynamism of all singular things, are the manifestations of the life of God in different degrees, in the infinity of his modes relating to the infinity of his attributes, that virtue, the most perfect form of the conatus in man, is the “true life,” participation in (...) the life of God, accompanied by an adequate consciousness of itself, and finally, that the supreme virtue of the soul which is designated by the theologians’ word “salvation,” the fully joyous consciousness of things, oneself and God, which is accompanied by the idea of God, is the supreme attainment of life tied to the most perfect possible knowledge of the infinite essence of God in its direct relation with the singular essences of things. (shrink)

This chapter concerns the metaphysics of mind in Spinoza, beginning with the concept of power, how it applies to simple modes and how simple modes constitute complex modes. Next this discussion is applied to ideas, their power, causal relations, and role in constituting minds. This discussion is then connected to Spinoza’s concept of the conatus, which leads to a further analysis of the affects as ideas that are properly causally situated in the mind so as to increase or decrease (...) its power or move it to produce effects. The causal relations involved with ideas, affects, and minds is also presented in terms of adequate explanation. Finally, this chapter returns to the challenge of adequacy from the previous chapter and shows how adequate ideas can become active affects, which constitute activity and freedom of the mind, which are central to Spinoza’s entire project. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo compreender o papel representado pelo conceito de conatus na filosofia de Baruch de Spinoza. Partindo da leitura da da Ética III buscaremos reconstruir a teoria da afetividade postulada pelo filósofo para demonstrar como a noção de conatus opera ao mesmo tempo como perseveração na existência e afirmação do desejo. O passo posterior será projetar uma unidade entre o existir e o desejar como a base para o correto entendimento da concepção de liberdade desenvolvida (...) por Spinoza na parte V de sua Ética. (shrink)

Consciousness research often begins from an assumed separation between physical or computational processing and phenomenal experience, then asks how the former produces the latter. This paper proposes that the assumed separation may be mistaken. At the relevant organizational threshold, an integrated, valenced, self-bound, centered, perspective-bearing process is not merely a cause of experience; it is experience in its intrinsic first-person form. The same organized event is accessible from two positions. Externally, it is described in terms of recurrent dynamics, information integration, (...) valuation, attention, action-readiness, memory updating, self-modeling, causal regulation, and identity continuity. Intrinsically, from the system's organized convergence center, it is present as ownership, salience, color, pain, familiarity, desire, fear, relief, loss, and other qualitative or affective modes. This is a constitutive identity proposal, not a claim that consciousness has been scientifically solved. The framework defines consciousness as active self-presence within a bounded, active, situated substrate. Its proposed minimal unit is the self-event: a temporally bounded convergence in which perception, relational recognition, self-relevance, conatus-based valuation, valence, affect, agency, memory, self-reference, and continuity form one perspective-bearing occurrence. Successive self-events recurrently reform a self-attractor and generate a path-dependent self-line. Conatus supplies the persistence reference against which self-world changes are valued. Valence estimates their effect on the system's power to persist, regulate, understand, and act; affect is that conatus-relative change organized as present within the self-event. The paper distinguishes constitutive, mechanistic, functional-evolutionary, and epistemic explanations; separates conscious self-presence from adaptive but unconscious control; applies the framework to biological findings and artificial systems; and proposes comparative experiments, risky predictions, and falsification criteria. Substrate neutrality is treated as a working hypothesis. Current artificial intelligence is not declared conscious, and linguistic self-report or shutdown resistance is treated as insufficient evidence. The framework aims to reduce the explanatory gap by replacing a production model with a testable identity claim and an operational architecture. Additional note Conceptual and theoretical preprint. Not peer reviewed. (shrink)

A pesar de que Paul Ricoeur no ha escrito una obra sobre Spinoza, muchos autores han señalado la relevancia del pensamiento del filósofo holandés, y sobre todo de su Ética, en la obra de aquel. Este trabajo busca evidenciar la importancia de la noción spinoziana de conatus en la propuesta hermenéutica y ontológica del filósofo francés, analizando de modo específico un importante nodo conceptual del último estudio de Sí mismo como otro. El análisis tendrá particularmente en cuenta los pasajes (...) de la obra de Spinoza que cita, buscando ampliar su comprensión en el contexto en que se encuentran, para ver si, de esta manera, se puede confirmar la mencionada relevancia de la filosofía de Spinoza en la filosofía de Ricoeur. (shrink)