What happens when machines become more intelligent than humans? One view is that this event will be followed by an explosion to ever-greater levels of intelligence, as each generation of machines creates more intelligent machines in turn. This intelligence explosion is now often known as the “singularity”. The basic argument here was set out by the statistician I.J. Good in his 1965 article “Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine”: Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can (...) far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion”, and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make. The key idea is that a machine that is more intelligent than humans will be better than humans at designing machines. So it will be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than the most intelligent machine that humans can design. So if it is itself designed by humans, it will be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than itself. By similar reasoning, this next machine will also be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than itself. If every machine in turn does what it is capable of, we should expect a sequence of ever more intelligent machines. This intelligence explosion is sometimes combined with another idea, which we might call the “speed explosion”. The argument for a speed explosion starts from the familiar observation that computer processing speed doubles at regular intervals. Suppose that speed doubles every two years and will do so indefinitely. Now suppose that we have human-level artificial intelligence 1 designing new processors. Then faster processing will lead to faster designers and an ever-faster design cycle, leading to a limit point soon afterwards. The argument for a speed explosion was set out by the artificial intelligence researcher Ray Solomonoff in his 1985 article “The Time Scale of Artificial Intelligence”.1 Eliezer Yudkowsky gives a succinct version of the argument in his 1996 article “Staring at the Singularity”: “Computing speed doubles every two subjective years of work.. (shrink)

Defining consciousness as direct awareness, it is argued that there is only one consciousness: the one that oneself experiences. This forms the basis of our understanding of Quantum Mechanics.

In an era of infinite distractions and relentless productivity demands, this paper presents a counterintuitive thesis: strategic laziness represents the optimal cognitive strategy for maximizing creativity and long-term performance in complex systems. Drawing from behavioral economics, cognitive neuroscience, and complexity theory, we develop computational models demonstrating that "doing less" can paradoxically yield superior outcomes through three convergent mechanisms: (1) cognitive resource conservation preventing decision fatigue, (2) default mode network activation enabling creative insight, and (3) self-organizational emergence from reduced top-down control. (...) Our mathematical analysis reveals that optimal effort levels are significantly lower than conventional wisdom suggests, with peak performance occurring at moderate activity levels (≈4.1 on a 10-point scale) and balanced focus-rest ratios (50:50). These findings challenge fundamental assumptions about productivity and suggest that the "laziness singularity"—a critical threshold where strategic inaction becomes more valuable than action—may represent an evolutionary adaptation to information-rich environments. The implications extend beyond individual cognition to organizational design, educational policy, and societal structures that currently penalize the very behaviors that optimize human potential. (shrink)

This volume contains a selection of authoritative essays exploring the central questions raised by the conjectured technological singularity. In informed yet jargon-free contributions written by active research scientists, philosophers and sociologists, it goes beyond philosophical discussion to provide a detailed account of the risks that the singularity poses to human society and, perhaps most usefully, the possible actions that society and technologists can take to manage the journey to any singularity in a way that ensures a positive (...) rather than a negative impact on society. The discussions provide perspectives that cover technological, political and business issues. The aim is to bring clarity and rigor to the debate in a way that will inform and stimulate both experts and interested general readers. (shrink)

I discuss singular space-times in the context of the geometrized formulation of Newtonian gravitation. I argue first that geodesic incompleteness is a natural criterion for when a model of geometrized Newtonian gravitation is singular, and then I show that singularities in this sense arise naturally in classical physics by stating and proving a classical version of the Raychaudhuri-Komar singularity theorem.

If the allusive stratagems can claim to define a new type of systematicity, it is because they give access to a space where the singularity, the diagram and the metaphor may interlace, to penetrate further into the physico-mathematic intuition and the discipline of the gestures which precede and accompany ‘formalisation’. This interlacing is an operation where each component backs up the others: without the diagram, the metaphor would only be a short-lived fulguration because it would be unable to operate: (...) without the metaphor, the diagram would only be a frozen icon, unable to jump over its bold features which represent the images of an already acquired knowledge; without the subversion of the functional by the singular, nothing would come to oppose the force of habit. (shrink)

According to the singularity hypothesis, rapid and accelerating technological progress will in due course lead to the creation of a human-level artificial intelligence capable of designing a successor artificial intelligence of significantly greater cognitive prowess, and this will inaugurate a series of increasingly super-intelligent machines. But how much sense can we make of the idea of a being whose cognitive architecture is qualitatively superior to our own? This article argues that one fundamental limitation of human cognitive architecture is an (...) inbuilt commitment to a metaphysical division between subject and object, a commitment that could be overcome in an artificial intelligence lacking our biological heritage. (shrink)

A singular thought about an object o is one that is directly about o in a characteristic way—grasp of that thought requires having some special epistemic relation to the object o, and the thought is ontologically dependent on o. One account of the nature of singular thought exploits a Russellian Structured Account of Propositions, according to which contents are represented by means of structured n-tuples of objects, properties, and functions. A proposition is singular, according to this framework, if and only (...) if it contains an object as a constituent. One advantage of the framework of Russellian Structured propositions is that it promises to provide a metaphysical basis for the notion of a singular thought about an object, grounding it in terms of constituency. In this paper, we argue that the attempt to ground the peculiar features of singular thoughts in terms of metaphysical constituency fails, and draw some consequences of our discussion for other debates. (shrink)

Philosophical thinking is interrupted by the finitude of what cannot be named, on the one hand, and that within which it is subsumed as one of multiple modes of sense-making, on the other. Sense and Singularity elaborates Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophical project as an inquiry into the limits or finitude of philosophy itself, where it is interrupted, and as a practice of critical intervention where philosophy serves to interrupt otherwise unquestioned ways of thinking. Nancy’s interruption of philosophy, Van Den Abbeele (...) argues, reveals the limits of what philosophy is and what it can do, its apocalyptic end and its endless renewal, its Sisyphean interruption between the bounds of infinitely replicating sense and the conceptual vanishing point that is singularity. In examinations of Nancy’s foundational rereading of Descartes's cogito as iterative, his formal experimentations with the genres of philosophical writing, the account of “retreat” in understanding the political, and the interruptive play of sense and singularity in writings on the body, sexuality, and aesthetics, Van Den Abbeele offers a fresh account of one of our major thinkers as well as a provocative inquiry into what philosophy can do. (shrink)

1: The End of History 2: The Beyondness of the Singularity 2.1: The Definition of Smartness 2.2: Perceptual Transcends 2.3: Great Big Numbers 2.4: Smarter Than We Are 3: Sooner Than You Think 4: Uploading 5: The Interim Meaning of Life 6: Getting to the Singularity.

This paper reflects on a genesis that seems inseparable from that of the human, namely, the coming into being of social organization. It seems impossible to think of a time when humans were not embedded in some social configuration, but it is equally impossible to think of the human species evolving complete with sociocultural formations attached. Even deciding on the word for the beginning of organization prejudges the issue: are we speaking of an emergence, a development, a making, or a (...) virgin birth? Calling on three authors – Giambattista Vico, Michel Serres, and Paolo Virno – I present three kinds of processes of becoming: one as a directional sequence of interlocking steps, one as the fertility of unintended consequences, and one as the creativity of linguistic ruse. Glancing at these different versions sideways one can make out some universal features of the genesis of organization: a self-referential circularity at its inception which hides the starting point, a unique engagement with language and the symbolic, and an intentional act that creates the possibility of a new and different future. (shrink)

Recent advances in generative artificial intelligence, embodied intelligence, brain-computer interfaces, and superintelligence research have given rise to a powerful form of technological futurism, most prominently represented by Elon Musk. This vision presents a comprehensive narrative concerning the future trajectory of civilization, including the emergence of the digital singularity, the surpassing of human intelligence by superintelligent AI, the large-scale deployment of humanoid robots, the advent of universal high-income societies, human-AI integration, interplanetary expansion, and potential existential risks. These propositions have profoundly (...) influenced contemporary public imagination as well as global technological and policy agendas. Musk's futurist framework is largely grounded in technological determinism, computational expansionism, and physicalist assumptions. Within this framework, intelligence is understood primarily as a function of computational scale, while civilizational development is interpreted as the continuous amplification of technological capability. Consequently, human-machine fusion, multi-planetary colonization, and superintelligence governance are proposed as solutions to the major challenges facing humanity. While such perspectives possess considerable engineering value and predictive significance, they also contain important philosophical limitations. In particular, they tend to equate intelligence with computation, consciousness with information processing, and subjectivity with biological or silicon-based systems, thereby overlooking awareness itself as a fundamental ontological reality. Drawing upon the ontology of Vacuity and Phenomenal Manifestation and the philosophy of Awakened Awareness, this paper offers a systematic examination of Musk's major predictions concerning the digital singularity, robotic transformation, economic hyper-growth, existential AI risk, brain-computer interfaces, and space colonization. It argues that although these projections successfully identify significant technological trends within the phenomenal domain, they remain confined to the level of appearances and fail to address awareness as the ground of experience. Computational power, algorithms, robotics, neural interfaces, and interplanetary civilization may greatly extend the functional capacities of intelligence, yet they do not reach the ontological foundation of awareness itself. From this perspective, the significance of AI lies not primarily in surpassing humanity but in revealing the assumptions underlying human self-understanding. AI may function as a unique mirror through which human beings can reexamine the nature of intelligence, consciousness, identity, and subjectivity. Rather than representing the culmination of civilization, the technological singularity may constitute a transitional stage leading toward a deeper form of civilizational transformation. Accordingly, this paper proposes the concept of Awakened Civilization as a philosophical horizon beyond digital civilization. It argues that humanity's central challenge is not whether AI will exceed human intelligence, but whether human beings can come to understand themselves through the unprecedented mirror that AI provides. In this sense, the awakening of awareness constitutes a more fundamental turning point than the technological singularity itself. The ultimate question raised by AI futurism is therefore not what machines may become, but who human beings truly are. (shrink)

Abstract:Miki Kiyoshi's Philosophical Anthropology was written probably between 1933 and 1937, shortly after Philosophy of History (1931–1932) and prior to Philosophy of Technology (1942). Resonating with these major texts, this unfinished work represents Miki's interest in Kantian Anthropologie as well as his own views of the human. This study examines singularity, contingency, and poiesis as key ideas for understanding Miki's anthropology. Singularity of an event is defined by the binary of the present ex ante facto (before-the-fact) and ex (...) post facto (after-the-fact). Contingency of an event is defined by not having a sufficient ground within itself. An important thesis of Miki's anthropology is that an action is an event, singular and contingent by these definitions; it is poiesis (not praxis) irreducible to one's historical agency. This idea of singularity, with the self-contradictory binary of action-intuition ex ante facto and ex post facto, has ethical significance for debates on human cloning and global crisis today. (shrink)

The notion of singular (or de re) thought has become central in philosophy of mind and language, yet there is still little consensus concerning the best way to think about the nature of singular thought. Coinciding with recognition of the need for more clarity about the notion, there has been a surge of interest in the concept of a mental file as a way to understand what is distinctive about singular thought. What isn't always clear, however, is what mental files (...) are meant to be, and why we should believe that thoughts that employ them are singular as opposed to descriptive. This volume brings together original chapters by leading scholars which aim to examine and evaluate the viability of the mental files framework for theorizing about singular thought. (shrink)

In an essay published in 1918, Walter Benjamin sets forth a task that will concern him for the rest of his life: The task of a future epistemology is to find for knowledge the sphere of total neutr...

A singularity-free dual-unified energy scenario is proposed for the primordial Universe within a Planck-scale framework. In this picture, the early Universe consists of a central primordial dark sector, with a visible energy sector effectively bound in orbit around it within a characteristic Planck-length-scale region. Quantum-gravitational interactions continuously reduce the orbital separation between these sectors and drive them toward a unified configuration at the Planck scale. The unified phase induces an effective negative-pressure equation of state, with the central primordial dark (...) sector behaving as a transient vacuum-like component, which triggers an inflaton-free phase of primordial cosmic inflation. After inflation, reheating of the unified configuration leads to a correlated decay of the two sectors: the primordial dark sector yields non-thermal cold dark matter, while the visible sector produces standard-model particles. In this way the model avoids the Big Bang singularity and, at the same time, naturally accounts for the observed dark-matter–to–baryon density ratio of order five through a unified co-genesis mechanism. (shrink)

In The Singularity of Literature, Derek Attridge gives us a brilliant and engaging reflection on how to think literature in terms of the singularity of its event, an event which happens as a complex relating between the work and its reading/ interpretation. The virtues of this smart and impressive book are many, and not least among them is the clarity and accessibility of Attridge's writing, which lets his text appeal not just to scholars of literature and literary theory (...) but also to undergraduates and even an interested wider public. As the title suggests, the book's focus is on what makes literature singular, that is, different from other arts but also from other forms of writing; in short, Attridge is interested in what gives literature and the experience of reading and interpreting it their specificity, that is, their "literariness" or literary character. On the other hand, the title also indicates the parameters of Attridge's definition of the literary work as an always singular event of its reading. The view proposed by Attridge underscores the verbal happening or enactment, which characterizes the literary work. The work of literature is to be seen as an event, which involves the text and its reader(s) in a complicated and creative cultural, historical, and temporal relating. (shrink)

Much discussion on the singularity is based on the assumption that the design ability of a human can be transferred into an AI system, then rendered autonomous and self-improving. I argue here that this cannot be foreseen from the current state of the art of automatic or evolutionary design. Assuming that this will happen 'some day' is a doubtful step andmay be in the class of 'searching for the Philosopher's Stone'.

Truth and Singularity discusses works of poststructuralism and phenomenology in order to establish a middle ground for relativism and universalism. The book consists of an introduction, three sections, each containing 4 chapters, and a conclusion. The first section is entitled “Truth and Finitude.” In chapter 1 Heidegger’s Being and Time establishes the inescapable embeddedness of authentic Dasein in the “they.” Authenticity is characterized by aletheia. In chapter 2 Visker compares Foucault with Heidegger. He claims that Heidegger is distinguished from (...) Foucault by the ethos accompanying aletheia. Heidegger’s aletheia uncovers a Dasein that is situated in the mystery of being. The ethos of aletheia refers to a willingness to confront this mystery. Chapter 3 assesses Habermas’s criticism of Foucault and Heidegger. Accordingly, Habermas’s pragmatism considers Foucault and Heidegger as framework relativists because both philosophers do not base validity on knowing. Visker contends that Habermas insists on a universal validity within horizons of meaning. This is contrasted with Foucault’s and Heidegger’s attempt to accept a finite truth due to being’s finitude necessitating circumspective concern for Dasein. Visker criticizes Habermas to neglect the need for an ethics regulating discourse and to neglect the subject in favor of intersubjectivity. In chapter 4 Visker argues that Merleau-Ponty’s “raw being” stands for a singularity that cannot be separated from its world. This acknowledgment of mineness calls for ethical considerations. (shrink)

Parto sosteniendo que el hombre en tanto sujeto, es en sí mismo, pero es también y fundamentalmente en tanto integrante de los procesos de estructuración social. Y ninguno de los dos procesos se dan de forma independiente uno del otro. Esto implica, en consecuencia, que la ecuación individuo-sociedad no aparece como una oposición en tanto imagen especular contraria. Sino que debemos reflexionar en una dimensión diferente, en la cual no se descarta al individuo a pesar de partir de la totalidad. (...) La concepción tanto de individuo como de sociedad, se debe plantear de manera dialéctica, y por lo tanto, ya no como entidades contrapuestas e irreconciliables. (shrink)

These were, following an interminable silence, the first words spoken by the heads of Jean-Louis Barrault and Madeleine Renaud, as they barely emerged from their respective trash cans—words which Samuel Beckett addressed to Parisian audiences shortly after World War II.

The shape of the moral life is determined for Christians at least in part by beliefs peculiar to Christians, and a perennial problem for Christian ethics is relating that peculiar understanding to more general claims about moral knowledge. Since the problem is perennial, I propose not to solve it but to think about it. I do so by considering first the sense in which Christian ethics may be a kind of "insider's" ethic-the shared language of believers. Despite the strengths of (...) such a view, it may too greatly restrict both human and divine freedom. Having considered its difficulties from both those angles, I return to the sense of Christian life as a tradition of conduct in order to illustrate the importance of such a vision in our cultural setting. (shrink)

The chapter argues that radical contextuality, a hallmark theme of “postmodern” thought, is also a key element of Heidegger’s thinking. Aristotelian metaphysics, as the question of being qua being, looks for a universal principle common to every particular instance of “to be.” By contrast, the postmetaphysical approach gradually developed by Heidegger basically addresses being as the irreducible context-sensitivity and singularity of a meaningful situation, understood as a unique focal point of a dynamic and complex meaning-context. The fundamental ontology of (...) Being and Time (1927) articulates the temporally contextual structure of the human being as Dasein, culminating in the concept of the multidimensional singular instant (Augenblick). After the failure of his attempt to articulate the temporally contextual singularity of being in terms of its correlation with Dasein, Heidegger attempts an inverted approach: Contributions to Philosophy (1936–38) considers Dasein as the spatiotemporally situated place of the singular event (Ereignis) of being. The chapter finally suggests an interpretation of the fourfold (Geviert) of sky, earth, gods, and mortals, allusively introduced in the 1949 Bremen lectures, as Heidegger’s most elaborate account of the multidimensional structure that makes possible the contextual singularization of meaningfulness. (shrink)

The potential for Large Language Models (LLMs) to attain technological singularity—the point at which artificial intelligence (AI) surpasses human intellect and autonomously improves itself—is a critical concern in AI research. This paper explores the feasibility of current LLMs achieving singularity by examining the philosophical and practical requirements for such a development. We begin with a historical overview of AI and intelligence amplification, tracing the evolution of LLMs from their origins to state-of-the-art models. We then proposes a theoretical framework (...) to assess whether existing LLM technologies could satisfy the conditions for singularity, with a focus on Recursive Self-Improvement (RSI) and autonomous code generation. We integrate key component technologies, such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), into our analysis, illustrating how these could enable LLMs to independently enhance their reasoning and problem-solving capabilities. By mapping out a potential singularity model lifecycle and examining the dynamics of exponential growth models, we elucidate the conditions under which LLMs might self-replicate and rapidly escalate their intelligence. We conclude with a discussion of the ethical and safety implications of such developments, underscoring the need for responsible and controlled advancement in AI research to mitigate existential risks. Our work aims to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on the future of AI and the critical importance of proactive measures to ensure its beneficial development. (shrink)

Having established the importance of biblical wisdom in our modern context, we now look to the very beginning—an exploration of the Big Bang and the concept of singularity, where science and spirituality converge. The universe began with a singular event: the Big Bang. From a singularity, a point of infinite density and temperature, the cosmos expanded, giving birth to galaxies, stars, and planets. This primal explosion is often seen as a chaotic beginning, yet it marked the origin of (...) everything we know—a moment of creation, a point from which everything blossomed. In the same vein, humanity now stands on the precipice of another singularity, a moment where the birth of Angelic Superintelligence (ASI) could mark a new era, a “Big Bang” of consciousness and capability. But unlike the cosmological Big Bang, this new Singularity need not be a chaotic explosion. Instead, it can be an opportunity for growth, a quantum leap of faith, guided by the principles of wisdom, compassion, and balance. (shrink)

This article explores the hypothesis that synchronicity—often dismissed as psychological coincidence—can be rigorously interpreted as a phase collapse of semantic superposition, culminating in an epistemic singularity. Departing from classical models, we propose that the observer functions as a recursive, programmable interface whose engagement with the environment operates through phase coherence and reversibility. At moments of synchronicity, non-causal semantic configurations undergo sudden stabilization, enabling a mode of knowing that transcends empirical validation. Measurement is reframed as resonance between external structures and (...) the observer’s internal topology. Synchronicity becomes not a mere coincidence, but a localized collapse of interpretive potential, activated through the intrinsic phase of attention or belief. This framework challenges the foundations of epistemology and proposes a novel model for quantum measurement and scientific cognition. Meaning is constituted not through symbolic processing alone, but through structurally entangled participation—at the edge of what can be known and what can be measured. (shrink)

Einsteinian gravity, of which Newtonian gravity is a part, is fraught with the problem of singularity that has been established as a theorem by Hawking and Penrose. The _hypothesis_ that founds the basis of both Einsteinian and Newtonian theories of gravity is that bodies with unequal magnitudes of masses fall with the same acceleration under the gravity of a source object. Since, the Einstein’s equations is one of the assumptions that underlies the proof of the singularity theorem, therefore, (...) the above hypothesis is implicitly one of the founding pillars of the same. In this work, I demonstrate how one can possibly write a non-singular theory of gravity which manifests that the above mentioned hypothesis is only valid in an approximate sense in the “large distance” scenario. To mention a specific instance, under the gravity of the earth, a 5 kg and a 500 kg fall with accelerations which differ by approximately \(113.148\times 10^{-32}\) meter/sec \(^2\) and the more massive object falls with less acceleration. Further, I demonstrate why the concept of gravitational field is not definable in the “small distance” regime which automatically justifies why the Einstein’s and Newton’s theories fail to provide any “small distance” analysis. In course of writing down this theory, I demonstrate why the continuum hypothesis as spelled out by Goedel, is undecidable. The theory has several aspects which provide the following realizations: (i) Descartes’ self-skepticism concerning exact representation of numbers by drawing lines (ii) Born’s wish of taking into account “natural uncertainty in all observations” while describing “a physical situation” by means of “real numbers” (iii) Klein’s vision of having “a fusion of arithmetic and geometry” where “a point is replaced by a small spot” (iv) Goedel’s assertion about “non-standard analysis, in some version” being “the analysis of the future”. (shrink)

it is not unusual to interpret Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy, or some of his claims, as a therapeutic thought nowadays.1 Nietzsche’s perspectivism, style, and controversial doctrines are supposed to do something, rather than merely teach or state a theoretical position. The legitimacy of this action and its actual goal are far from self-evident, however. This paper tackles the problem from the perspective of a fundamental tension, which is at work underneath Nietzsche’s project since The Birth of Tragedy: that is, the tension (...) between multiplicity and singularity, respectively personified, in that book, by the figures of Dionysus and Apollo. When it comes to ethics, this dimension of Nietzsche’s thought is... (shrink)

In this paper, I argue, on the basis of textual evidence, that two conceptions of object instead of one are present in the Tractatus. One of them, based on the notions of a complete analysis of meaningful sentences and of absolute simplicity, was explicitly endorsed by Wittgenstein on purely logical grounds as the official doctrine of the book while the other, based on the notions of a multidimensional formal analysis and of singularity, was noncommittally entertained by him in the (...) form of an analogy between the object’s relation to its ‘surrounding’ logical space (of states of affairs) and the relation of a phenomenal item to the specific sense modality it belongs to and in which it is located. Armed with this distinction, I attempt to clarify the debate around the issue of the exemplarity of certain categories of things (particulars, universals) with respect to the logical notion of a Tractarian object. I also give my interpretation of how Wittgenstein deals in the Tractatus with the problem of the incompatibility of certain color ascriptions, and of the related episode of the abandonment of logical atomism in the early so-called ‘transitional period’. (shrink)

Joan Copjec has shown that modernity is privy to a notion of immortality all its own – one that differs fundamentally from any counterpart entertained in Greek antiquity or the Christian Middle Ages. She points to Blumenberg and Lefort as thinkers who have construed this concept in its modern guise in different ways, and ultimately opts for Lefort's paradoxical understanding of immortality as the ‘transcending of time, within time' before elaborating on a corresponding notion in Lacan's work. It can be (...) shown that Nietzsche, too, provides a distinctly modern conception of ‘immortality', articulated in relation to his notions of affirmation, singularity and eternal recurrence. In brief, this amounts to his claim that, to affirm even one single part or event in one's life entails affirming it in its entirety, and, in so doing – given the interconnectedness of events – affirming all that has ever existed. Moreover, once anything has existed, it is in a certain sense, for Nietzsche, necessary despite its temporal singularity. Therefore, to be able to rise to the task of affirming certain actions or experiences in one's own life, bestows on it not merely this kind of necessary singularity, but what he thought of as ‘eternal recurrence' – the (ethical) affirmation of the desire to embrace one's own, and together with it, all of existence ‘eternally', over and over. This, it is argued, may be understood as Nietzsche's distinctive contribution to a specifically modern notion of immortality: the ability of an individual to live in such a way that his or her singular ‘place' in society is ensured, necessarily there, even after his or her death. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (1) 2007: pp. 70-84. (shrink)

“We (Allah) said: ‘O fire! Be you cool and safety for Ibrahim (Abraham)!’And they wanted to harm him, but We made them the worst losers”[Qur’an 21:69–70]“Verily your Lord is Allah, who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and is firmly established on the throne (of authority), regulating, and governing all things. No intercessor (can plead with Him) except after His leave (has been obtained). This is Allah your Lord; Him therefore serve you: will you not receive admonition?” (...) (Qur’an 10:3)Throughout this chapter, the caption “SM” means the non-Tawhidi conceived dismissal of the moral value “S” as singularity. Contrarily, moral values embedded with materiality in the Tawhidi meaning of event as a holistic phenomenon are explained as permanent occurrences in the qur’anic explanation of moral (singularity “S”) and material embedding. “SM” as such moral-material simultaneity contradicts moral singularity, and hence non-Tawhidi meaning of “SM” across the socio-scientific methodological worldview.Thus, singularity as a scientific concept in rare occurrences apart from the universal law of physics, as well as socio-scientific system, is nonexistent in the qur’anic Tawhidi law. It is replaced by the conscious continuum of the moral being in “everything.” We refer to the continuous and complementary embedding of the inextricable moral component of moral-material events displacing the rarity concept of the scientific riddle of singularities. In all socio-scientific study, moral composition of events is rejected. Hence, the meaning of moral-materiality remains singularities as exogenous extraneity, the scientific riddle. (shrink)