Linda Brakel. (2023). Categories of Wrong Beliefs—A Preliminary Proposal

Qeios (2023)
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L.A.W. Brakel
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
The possibility of practical reason.James David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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