Does Naturalism Rest on a Mistake

American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):161-173 (2011)
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Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Ontology and the Completeness of Sellars’s Two Images.Willem deVries - 2012 - Humana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 21:1-18.
Christianity and the Extended-Mind Thesis.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2012 - In J. B. Stump & Alan G. Padgett, The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 491-499.

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References found in this work

Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Reduction of mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
The first person.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan, Mind and language. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 45–65.
Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter, The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

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