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What beliefs are not
In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Wagner, Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press (1993)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Author's Profile
Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
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Author's Profile
Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Citations of this work
Understanding implicit bias: A case for regulative dispositionalism.Annemarie Kalis & Harmen Ghijsen - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (8):1212-1233.
Making sense of folk psychological practices: the value of anthropological methods.Annemarie Kalis, August Christensen & Samuel Nikolai Langelaan - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
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