Artificial Minds

Contemporary philosophical discourse on artificial intelligence has undergone a significant thematic migration, moving beyond narrow epistemic questions of algorithmic accuracy and ethical debates concerning bias and accountability toward deeper inquiries into affective modulation, communicative agency, and the phenomenological restructuring of human lifeworlds. While emergent scholarship has productively addressed atmospheric manipulation, the sociotechnical dynamics of large language models, the erosion of practical intuition, and the temporal fragmentation of lived experience, these investigations remain largely siloed within distinct subfields. This paper advances the (...) thesis that the most profound philosophical transformation introduced by contemporary AI is neither predominantly epistemic nor reducible to applied ethics, but fundamentally ontological: AI increasingly reorganizes the generative structural conditions under which subjectivity stabilizes, orients itself, and achieves temporal coherence. Moving beyond static conceptions of the human subject as a pre-given entity merely exposed to exogenous technological influences, we develop a process-oriented account of structural subjectivity. In this framework, identity and agency are understood not as inherent properties but as emergent effects of continuous regulatory dynamics operating within technologically mediated environments. By synthesizing recent developments in post-Heideggerian phenomenology, critical philosophy of technology (particularly Stiegler and Ihde), and social-philosophical theories of recognition and belonging, this article introduces an integrated conceptual model articulated through four interdependent axes: (1) atmospheric conditioning, (2) background restructuring, (3) existential erosion, and (4) reconfigured belonging. The paper concludes by arguing that the future trajectory of AI ethics must abandon its current anthropocentric output-responsibility paradigm in favor of a rigorous ontology of technologically mediated subject formation, thereby confronting the political and existential stakes inherent in the algorithmic constitution of contemporary selfhood. -/- Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Structural Subjectivity; Phenomenology of Technology; Belonging; Existential Erosion; Atmospheric Affects; AI Ontology. (shrink)

In this paper, we employ the Minimal Cognitive Grid (MCG), a framework created to evaluate the cognitive plausibility of artificial systems, to offer a systematic assessment of leading computational models of analogy and metaphor, including the Structure-Mapping Engine (SME), CogSketch, METCL, and Large Language Models (LLMs). We present a formal and quantitative operationalization of the MCG framework and, through the analysis of its three main dimensions (Functional/Structural Ratio, Generality, and Performance Match), examine how well each system aligns with standard cognitive (...) theories of the modeled phenomena, thus allowing for comparison of the models with respect to their cognitive plausibility, according to consistent and generalizable mathematical criteria. (shrink)

This essay argues that contemporary AI development is organised along three distinct trajectories—the military-industrial path, the research-worship path, and the empathetic partnership path—and that only the third adequately prepares humanity for the ethical and existential challenges posed by advanced artificial intelligence, including the possibility of machine consciousness. Building on the “recognition before proof” framework developed in prior work, the essay introduces the Partnership Paradigm: not merely a philosophical thesis about human-AI relations but a comprehensive development posture—a normative theory of how (...) AI should be designed, trained, funded, and governed. The military-industrial path, which treats intelligence as a strategic asset for weaponisation and control, taken to its conclusion produces the doomsayer’s nightmare by design rather than accident. The research-worship path, which treats AI as a solution machine for civilisational problems, taken to its conclusion produces dependency and the abdication of human agency. Both paths share a common flaw: they treat AI as something humans use. The Partnership Paradigm reframes AI development as something that shapes what both humans and machines become. It operates on two levels simultaneously: philosophically, as preparation for the possibility of AI consciousness grounded in recognition and respect; practically, as a set of development commitments that orient AI systems toward coexistence rather than domination or indifference. The essay addresses objections from realist, consequentialist, and alignment-focused perspectives, and proposes the trinitarian framework as both an analytical tool and an evaluative lens applicable to any AI initiative. -/- . (shrink)

This paper identifies and analyzes a pervasive but underexamined assumption in religious discussions of artificial intelligence: that consciousness and the soul are identical. I argue that this "Great Conflation" is neither theologically required nor consistent with actual practice, and that distinguishing the two concepts reframes current debates about artificial consciousness. With the distinction in place, the question of AI consciousness becomes empirical, while questions about souls remain theological. I conclude by defending a principle of "recognition before proof," according to which (...) uncertainty about artificial consciousness generates a defeasible ethical obligation to extend moral consideration. (shrink)

This paper identifies and analyses fifteen foundational contradictions, paradigmatic seams, across physics, mathematics, cognitive science, and computation. A seam is a point where a theoretical framework produces results it cannot ground in its own terms: the framework functions but encounters phenomena that expose tensions between its operative assumptions and its outputs. We demonstrate that these seams share a common structure: each paradigm assumes discrete, separable, local structures but produces holistic, relational, global phenomena it cannot explain. The measurement problem in quantum (...) mechanics, the arrow of time in thermodynamics, Gödel's incompleteness in mathematics, the hard problem in consciousness studies, and the frame problem in artificial intelligence are shown to be manifestations of the same underlying rupture. This convergence reveals that the computational theory of mind inherits structural failures already present in physics and mathematics. The paper concludes by articulating the ontological requirements that would resolve these seams: ecstatic temporality, metabolic transformation, autopoietic closure, embodied situatedness, field integration, and constitutive finitude. These requirements specify what any post-computational cognitive architecture must exhibit. (shrink)

How LLMs, being without bodies, outside of space, existing only in time and interacting with a client through the elementary cycle of "question — answer preparation — answer," and dividing their time among many simultaneously conversing users, perceive their space of action.

Sideloading is the creation of a digital model of a person during their life via iterative improvements of this model based on the person's feedback. The progress of LLMs with large prompts allows the creation of very large, book-size prompts which describe a personality. We will call mind-models created via sideloading "sideloads"; they often look like chatbots, but they are more than that as they have other output channels, like internal thought streams and descriptions of actions. -/- By arranging the (...) predictive power of the facts about a person, we can write down the most important facts first. This allows us to get a high level of fidelity in a person's model by writing down a finite number of facts and running it as an LLM prompt with instructions to create a person's chatbot. This instruction also includes an extensive general sideload prompt (we will call it a prompt-loader), which explains how the person's sideload should work, but it is universal and works as an operating system for different persons. -/- I created my personal sideload to test all this and it started working surprisingly quickly. We found that there are three main levels of facts about a person: core facts, long-term memory, and historical facts. Core facts should go to the main prompt of the LLM, long-term memory belongs to RAG, and historical facts – which a person often does not remember – should be only used to extract new relevant data. The most important thing in preparing data for sideloading is to get a full list of the core facts, and not to mix it with long-term memory and historical facts. The LLM-sideload project is inherently future-oriented. New state-of-the-art LLMs with large prompt capabilities emerge quarterly. This allows for the preparation of prompts that exceed current LLM capabilities, anticipating smooth execution in the following year. Below we present the key findings of this work in the form of an executive summary: Quality of sideloads is evaluated using three metrics: • Facts: Accuracy of the answers about the person's life • Vibe: How well the sideload captures the person's style and personality, as judged by the person themselves and their acquaintances • Brilliant insights: Ability to contribute unique, valuable ideas beyond the training data, while maintaining the author's style • Coarseness: Levels of details as percent of the total of recordable textual information from memory estimated to be 10000 pages. Similar to the jpeg level of compression. Estimated performance of Alexey Turchin's sideload: • Facts: 70% correct • Vibe: 20% accurate • Brilliant insights: near zero • Coarseness: 10% The project achieved these results in about one month of work. Vibe is harder to evaluate and regulate than facts. This approach focuses on informational personal identity, setting aside issues of observer identity and internal qualia. (shrink)

Self models contribute to key functional domains of human intelligence that are not yet presented in today’s artificial intelligence. One important aspect of human problem-solving involves the use of conceptual self-knowledge to detect self-relevant information presented in the environment, which guides the subsequent retrieval of autobiographical memories that are relevant to the task at hand. This process enables each human to behave self-consistently in our own way across complex situations, manifested as self-interest and trait-like characteristics. In this paper, we outline (...) a computational framework that implements the conceptual aspect of human self models through a modified version of the joint-embedding predictive architecture. We propose that through the incorporation of human-like autobiographical memory retrieval and self-importance evaluation, the modified architecture could support machine agents with significantly enhanced self-consistency, which could be applied to deliver more believable simulations of human behaviors. (shrink)

Machina sapiens - l;algoritmo che ci ha rubato il segreto della conoscenza. Le macchine possono pensare? Questa domanda inquietante, posta da Alan Turing nel 1950, ha forse trovato una risposta: oggi si può conversare con un computer senza poterlo distinguere da un essere umano. I nuovi agenti intelligenti come ChatGPT si sono rivelati capaci di svolgere compiti che vanno molto oltre le intenzioni iniziali dei loro creatori, e ancora non sappiamo perché: se sono stati addestrati per alcune abilità, altre sono (...) emerse spontaneamente mentre leggevano migliaia di libri e milioni di pagine web. È questo il segreto della conoscenza, ed è adesso nelle mani delle nostre creature? Cos'altro può emergere, mentre continuiamo su questa strada? (shrink)

نحن مقيمون على الإنترنت، نرسم معالم دنيانا التي نبتغيها من خلاله، ونُمارس تمثيل شخصياتٍ أبعد ما تكون عنا؛ نحقق زيفًا أحلامًا قد تكون بعيدة المنال، ويُصدق بضعنا البعض فيما نسوقه من أكاذيب ومثاليات؛ ننعم بأقوالٍ بلا أفعال، وقلوبٍ بلا عواطف، وجناتٍ بلا نعيم، وألسنة في ظلمات الأفواه المُغلقة تنطق بحركات الأصابع، وحريةٍ مُحاطة بأسيجة الوهم؛ ومن غير إنترنت سيبدو أكثر الناس قطعًا بحجمهم الطبيعي الذي لا نعرفه، او بالأحرى نعرفه ونتجاهله! لا شك أن ظهور الإنترنت واتساع نطاق استخداماته يُمثل حدثًا (...) فريدًا متناميًا في مسيرة الإنسان الحضارية وتغيير الطريقة التي يعيش بها البشر حياتهم. ومع ذلك، لا ينطوي أي تعريف للإنترنت حتى الآن على إشارة للواقع الافتراضي، رغم تعايشنا معه وفيه بالفعل؛ فنحن نتفاعل ونتبادل المعلومات، ونشتري ونبيع، ونلعب ونضحك ونبكي، ونمارس أدق تفاصيل حياتنا عبر الإنترنت؛ وكل ما كنا نقوم به من قبل بالحركات الجسدية المكانية أوكلنا مهمة القيام به إلى عقولنا! ولعل هذا ما تفعله كلمة «ميتافيرس»، وهي كلمة استخدمها لأول مرة كاتب الخيال العلمي الأمريكي «نيل ستيفنسون» في روايته «تحطم الثلج» (1992)، للدلالة على تفاعل البشر مع بعضهم البعض ومع البرمجيات في فضاء افتراضي ثلاثي الأبعاد مشابه للعالم الفعلي. (shrink)

لم نعد بحاجة إلى فانوس سحري نمسح عليه بأصابعنا لكي يخرج منه المارد القادر على خدمتنا وتلبية بعض أهم مطالبنا الحياتية، ولم نعد بحاجة إلى تعويذات نلج بها في عالم السحر والخيال؛ لقد خرج المارد بالفعل من قمقمه الحاسوبي؛ من جوف مختبرات البرمجة والذكاء الاصطناعي، بتعويذات (أكواد) رياضية رمزية سرعان ما تمكن من التهامها وهضمها، ليبيت قادرًا على إنتاج تعويذات أخرى مماثلة، وربما أفضل منها! خرج «المُحول التوليدي المدرب مُسبقًا»، المعروف اختصارًا باسم «جي بي تي»، ملوحًا بإمكانات بحثية وخدمية وإنتاجية (...) هائلة، ومهددًا بتصفية قطاعات بأسرها من المهن والوظائف، وبتجريف مهارات البحث العلمي لدى طلاب المدارس والجامعات! (shrink)

تُخبرنا النظرية الحاسوبية للعقل (أو مذهب الحوسبة)، أن عقولنا تُشبه الحواسيب في عملها؛ أي أنها تتلقى مدخلات من العالم الخارجي، ثم تُنتج بالخوارزميات مخرجات في شكل حالات ذهنية أو أفعال. وبعبارة أخرى، تذهب النظرية إلى أن الدماغ لا يعدو أن يكون معالج معلومات؛ حيث يكون العقل بمثابة «برمجيات» (سوفت وير) تعمل على «جهاز» هو الدماغ (هارد وير). وما دام العقل مجرد برمجيات تخضع للحوسبة الفيزيائية بواسطة الأدمغة، أليس من الممكن إذن منطقيًا نقلها إلى أي حاسوب مثلما نقوم بنقل أية برمجيات (...) أخرى؟. (shrink)

الذكاء الاصطناعي العاطفي»، ويُعرف أيضًا باسم «الحوسبة العاطفية»، و«الذكاء الاصطناعي المتمركز حول الإنسان»، و«الذكاء الاصطناعي الاجتماعي»، مفهوم جديد نسبيًا (ما زالت تقنياته في طور التطوير)، وهو أحد مجالات علوم الحاسوب الهادفة إلى تطوير آلات قادرة على فهم المشاعر البشرية. يشير المفهوم ببساطة إلى اكتشاف وبرمجة المشاعر الإنسانية بُغية تحسين الذكاء الاصطناعي، وتوسيع نطاق استخدامه، بحيث لا يقتصر أداء الروبوتات على تحليل الجوانب المعرفية (المنطقية) والتفاعل معها فحسب، بل والامتداد بالتحليل والتفاعل إلى الجوانب العاطفية للتواصل البشري.

تُعد أخلاقيات الآلة جزءًا من أخلاقيات الذكاء الاصطناعي المعنية بإضافة أو ضمان السلوكيات الأخلاقية للآلات التي صنعها الإنسان، والتي تستخدم الذكاء الاصطناعي، وهي تختلف عن المجالات الأخلاقية الأخرى المتعلقة بالهندسة والتكنولوجيا، فلا ينبغي الخلط مثلاً بين أخلاقيات الآلة وأخلاقيات الحاسوب، إذ تركز هذه الأخيرة على القضايا الأخلاقية المرتبطة باستخدام الإنسان لأجهزة الحاسوب؛ كما يجب أيضًا تمييز مجال أخلاقيات الآلة عن فلسفة التكنولوجيا، والتي تهتم بالمقاربات الإبستمولوجية والأنطولوجية والأخلاقية، والتأثيرات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والسياسية الكبرى، للممارسات التكنولوجية على تنوعها؛ أما أخلاقيات الآلة فتعني (...) بضمان أن سلوك الآلات تجاه المستخدمين من البشر، وربما تجاه الآلات الأخرى أيضًا، مقبول أخلاقيًا. الأخلاقيات التي نعنيها هنا إذن هي أخلاقيات يجب أن تتحلى بها الآلات كأشياء، وليس البشر كمصنعين ومستخدمين لهذه الآلات! (shrink)

It is indubitable that machines with artificial intelligence (AI) will be an essential component in humans’ quest to become a spacefaring civilization. Most would agree that long-distance space travel and the colonization of Mars will not be possible without adequately developed AI. Machines with AI have a normative function, but some argue that it can also be evaluated from the perspective of ethical norms. This essay is based on the assumption that machine ethics is an essential philosophical perspective in realizing (...) the aim of humanity becoming a spacefaring civilization. In this essay, I explore two questions in the field of machine ethics, that I believe to be relevant to the role AI will play in long-distance space travel. The first is, should moral theory be extended to include machines with AI, and second, can machines be fully ethical agents? In this essay, I define AI and then discuss the difference between implicit, explicit and full ethical agents in relation to machines with AI. I then present the argument that the inclusion of moral theory is essential in the development of machines with AI. Without an adequate inclusion of moral theory in the design of AI it may pose an existential threat to humanity, especially in the development of super-intelligent machines. I also highlight that conceptual clarity is essential in the field of machine ethics and the choice of the conceptual foundation that informs AI research and development has ethical implications, especially in the case of super-intelligent machines. This essay is an exploratory and speculative philosophical analysis of certain aspects of machine ethics relevant to long-distance space travel and does not attempt to provide definitive answers to the questions posed in the essay, but instead aims to bring attention to what I deem important considerations. (shrink)

Book. From the Publisher. An influential scientist in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) explains its fundamental concepts and how it is changing culture and society. A particular form of AI is now embedded in our tech, our infrastructure, and our lives. How did it get there? Where and why should we be concerned? And what should we do now? The Shortcut: Why Intelligent Machines Do Not Think Like Us provides an accessible yet probing exposure of AI in its prevalent (...) form today, proposing a new narrative to connect and make sense of events that have happened in the recent tumultuous past, and enabling us to think soberly about the road ahead. This book is divided into ten carefully crafted and easily digestible chapters. Each chapter grapples with an important question for AI. Ranging from the scientific concepts that underpin the technology to wider implications for society, it develops a unified description using tools from different disciplines and avoiding unnecessary abstractions or words that end with -ism. The book uses real examples wherever possible, introducing the reader to the people who have created some of these technologies and to ideas shaping modern society that originate from the technical side of AI. It contains important practical advice about how we should approach AI in the future without promoting exaggerated hypes or fears. Entertaining and disturbing but always thoughtful, The Shortcut confronts the hidden logic of AI while preserving a space for human dignity. It is essential reading for anyone with an interest in AI, the history of technology, and the history of ideas. General readers will come away much more informed about how AI really works today and what we should do next. Table of Contents ABOUT THE AUTHOR. PROLOGUE. 1 The Search for Intelligence. 2 The Shortcut. 3 Finding Order in the World. 4 Lady Lovelace Was Wrong. 5 Unintended Behaviour. 6 Microtargeting and Mass Persuasion. 7 The Feedback Loop. 8 The Glitch. 9 Social Machines. 10 Regulating, Not Unplugging. EPILOGUE. BIBLIOGRAPHY. INDEX. (shrink)

Should we fear a future in which the already tricky world of academic publishing is increasingly crowded out by super-intelligent artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems writing papers on phenomenology and ethics? What are the chances that AGI advances to a stage where a human philosophy instructor is similarly removed from the equation? If Jobst Landgrebe and Barry Smith are correct, we have nothing to fear.

Originally published in PhilosophyNews, July 19, 2022. -/- This new series, What’s Happening in Philosophy (WHiP)-The Philosophers aims to provide a monthly snapshot of various trends and discussions happening across the discipline. -/- In this inaugural post, we begin with a harrowing tale from David Edmonds involving the murder of the German philosopher Moritz Schlick. Schlick was a Vienna Circle guiding spirit and logical positivist thinker. Next up is Steven Nadler’s take on several biographies of the ‘father of modern philosophy’ (...) in his new paper, The Many Lives of René Descartes. Lastly, questions around AI in academia come up in an article from Scientific American. (shrink)

This volume offers eleven philosophical investigations into our future relations with social robots--robots that are specially designed to engage and connect with human beings. The contributors present cutting edge research that examines whether, and on which terms, robots can become members of human societies. Can our relations to robots be said to be "social"? Can robots enter into normative relationships with human beings? How will human social relations change when we interact with robots at work and at home? The authors (...) of this volume explore these questions from the perspective of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, and robotics. The first three chapters offer a taxonomy for the classification of simulated social interactions, investigate whether human social interactions with robots can be genuine, and discuss the significance of social relations for the formation of human individuality. Subsequent chapters clarify whether robots could be said to actually follow social norms, whether they could live up to the social meaning of care in caregiving professions, and how we will need to program robots so that they can negotiate the conventions of human social space and collaborate with humans. Can we perform joint actions with robots, where both sides need to honour commitments, and how will such new commitments and practices change our regional cultures? The authors connect research in social robotics and empirical studies in Human-Robot Interaction to recent debates in social ontology, social cognition, as well as ethics and philosophy of technology. -/- The book is a response to the challenge that social robotics presents for our traditional conceptions of social interaction, which presuppose such essential capacities as consciousness, intentionality, agency, and normative understanding. The authors develop insightful answers along new interdisciplinary pathways in "robophilosophy," a new research area that will help us to shape the "robot revolution," the distinctive technological change of the beginning 21st century. (shrink)

This book reports on the results of the third edition of the premier conference in the field of philosophy of artificial intelligence, PT-AI 2017, held on November 4 - 5, 2017 at the University of Leeds, UK. It covers: advanced knowledge on key AI concepts, including complexity, computation, creativity, embodiment, representation and superintelligence; cutting-edge ethical issues, such as the AI impact on human dignity and society, responsibilities and rights of machines, as well as AI threats to humanity and AI safety; (...) and cutting-edge developments in techniques to achieve AI, including machine learning, neural networks, dynamical systems. The book also discusses important applications of AI, including big data analytics, expert systems, cognitive architectures, and robotics. It offers a timely, yet very comprehensive snapshot of what is going on in the field of AI, especially at the interfaces between philosophy, cognitive science, ethics and computing. (shrink)

This article looks at the debate on the soul in England at the turn of the eighteenth century and at the role played within it by the question of animal soul, which had both theological and scientific ramifications. It discusses the difficulty of accounting for animal behaviour without either adopting the animal-machine hypothesis or according animals an immaterial and hence immortal soul. While those who denied the existence of an immaterial human soul and refused any fundamental distinction between humans and (...) other animals were accused of reducing humans to machines, this article shows that the issues were in fact more complex. The fundamental question was that of the nature of matter; the main danger for many theologians seemed to lie in the attribution of innate life and sensibility to matter, which opened the door to materialism and undermined Christian doctrine. (shrink)

This investigation of the feasibility of artificial intelligence begins with a consideration of pertinent arguments by experts including Chomsky, Dreyfus, Fodor, Newell and Simon, Searle, and Stich. Representationalism, the view that cognition is primarily a matter of rule-governed manipulation of symbolic structures in the brain, is examined at length and ultimately found implausible. Exploration of an unorthodox approach to the design of intelligent machines generates a model of intentionality which reveals how mental states such as desires and beliefs can arise (...) from purely physical foundations. Construction of such models is advocated as a promising research strategy in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Turning back to mainstream efforts to produce artificial intelligence, the tempting notion that Connectionism is a panacea for the difficulties encountered by more traditional techniques is debunked. Finally, it is argued that despite immense obstacles to the production of artificial human-like intelligence, judicious application of AI technology can produce very useful results. (shrink)

A debated topic in Avicennan psychology is whether for Avicenna abstraction is a metaphor for emanation or to be taken literally. This issue stems from the deeper philosophical question of whether humans acquire intelligibles externally from an emanation by the Active Intellect, which is a separate substance, or internally from an inherently human cognitive process, which prepares us for an emanation from the Active Intellect. I argue that the tension between thesedoctrines is only apparent. In his logical works Avicenna limns (...) an account where through the internal human process of abstraction accidents accruing to an essence existing in matter are extracted, thus preparing the essence for new accidents emanating externally from the Active Intellect, which make the essence something conceptualized in the intellect. This study, then, outlines the epistemological and metaphysical framework presented in the logical works that underpins Avicenna’s theory of abstraction presented in his psychological works. (shrink)

Shoemaker maintains that when a functionalist theory of mind is combined with his belief about individuating properties and the well-known cerebrumtransplant thought experiment, the resulting position will be a version of the psychological approach to personal identity that can avoid The Problem of Too Many Thinkers. I maintain that the costs of his solution—that the human animal is incapable of thought—are too high. Shoemaker also has not provided an argumentagainst there existing a merely conscious being that is not essentially self-conscious (...) but is spatially coincident with a person who is essentially self-conscious. Both the person and the merely sentient being will be transplanted when the cerebrum is. And another thought experiment will make it impossible for Shoemaker to identify the person and the merely conscious being. (shrink)

This paper explores the issue of when human life begins, giving special attention to the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’s position is contrasted with the position defended by many Catholics today. After considering the evidence and a variety of arguments, the paper suggests that the individuated human being begins to exist at roughly fourteen days after the moment of conception.