Aquinas: Works

Like many others, I have learned a lot from John Finnis’s works on natural law and St. Thomas Aquinas’s political thought. There are numerous questions I would like to ask and issues I would like to raise in response to Finnis’s Barry Lecture, such as my different reading of Alasdair MacIntyre’s works. But I will focus on one question that targets two of the three topics of his lecture: when is human normativity first known? -/- I argue that, given Finnis’s (...) other commitments, he should answer: it depends on which order of human normativity is in question. Human normativity is first known by a theoretical insight into theoretical goods of human beings from the 1st order of normativity. And human normativity is first known by a practical insight into practical goods within the 3rd order of normativity. This practical insight is informed by the 1st order of normativity’s fields of possibility known by initial theoretical insights, but this practical insight discerns something more concerning human normativity which is not grasped by any theoretical insights. This practical insight from the 3rd order of normativity grasps basic goods of human normativity as being rationally desirable and rationally directive of human actions. If my argument here is sound, then it has shown that with respect to the problem of how we grasp the first principles or basic goods of the natural law, there is less principled distance and disagreement than is commonly supposed between Finnis’s theory of natural law and some rival theories of natural law. Granted, there are still significant disagreements concerning whether the basic goods are incommensurable, pre-moral, and other issues, but I hope my arguments can forge a path toward some significant points of agreement. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between passions that are antecedent to the judgment of reason and passions that are consequent to the judgment of reason. The recent interest in Thomas’s moral psychology, and in particular his treatment of the passions, their obedience to practical reason, and the part they play in virtuous, continent, incontinent, and vicious human action, has occasioned a few scholarly studies attendant to his distinction between antecedent and consequent passions. Some of these studies have also taken notice of Thomas’s (...) detailed division of the complex interplay among the concert operations of the senses, passions, reason, and will. Nonetheless, few scholars have highlighted the function of the highest internal sense power, the cogitative power (vis cogitativa), within the dynamic complex of operations and powers that Thomas ascribes to the human person. And so far as I know, no recent study takes the function of the vis cogitativa in Aquinas’s moral psychology as its primary focus. In this paper I aim to fill part of that lacuna by explicating the function of the vis cogitativa as a power of moral perception. I shall show that getting clear on how the cogitative power contributes to moral perception also illumines Thomas’s distinction between antecedent and consequent passions, and accordingly, a host of other connected issues in Aquinas, such as the obedience of the passions to reason, continence and incontinence, and the unity of the virtues through prudence. Needless to say, I shall not venture into the details of each of these intricate topics. -/- The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I shall summarize the salient points of a few recent studies on Thomas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions. This synopsis will provide the philosophical and exegetical point of departure of the second part by setting in relief a lacuna in these recent interpretations of Thomas’s treatment of the contribution of virtuous passions to practical reason. The second part will aim to complement these studies by filling that lacuna through a detailed exposition of Thomas’s account of the salient functions ascribed to the cogitative power with respect to the operations of practical reason and the obedience of the passions to reason. (shrink)

Este ensayo propone una interpretación estructural de los estados finales de la existencia humana a partir del Ahora como punto invariante de actualización. Sostiene que el Cielo, el Purgatorio y el Infierno no son destinos espaciales, sino modos distintos de existir en relación con el punto de cruce donde convergen la voluntad, la misericordia y la presencia divina. -/- El Cielo se presenta como el Ahora consumado — la permanencia en el punto de cruce sin sucesión. El Purgatorio como un (...) estado orientado hacia el Ahora, pero incapaz de actualizarse desde sí mismo. El Infierno como el Ahora invertido — existencia permanente en el punto de cruce en rechazo de lo que en él se ofrece. -/- En este marco, el fin del tiempo no implica aniquilación, sino el cese de la sucesión, revelando la orientación definitiva de la voluntad hacia o en contra de la presencia que siempre ha estado dada. (shrink)

This essay proposes a structural interpretation of the final states of human existence through the lens of the Now as the invariant point of actualization. It argues that Heaven, Purgatory, and Hell are not spatial destinations but distinct modes of existing in relation to the crossing point where will, mercy, and divine presence converge. -/- Heaven is described as the Now fulfilled—dwelling at the crossing without succession. Purgatory as a state oriented toward the Now yet unable to actualize from within (...) itself. Hell as the inverted Now—permanent existence at the crossing point in refusal of what it contains. -/- In this framework, the end of time does not signify annihilation but the cessation of succession, revealing the definitive orientation of the will toward or away from the presence that has always been given. (shrink)

Si la misericordia siempre está presente en el Ahora, fundamentada en la presencia continua de Cristo en cada punto de cruce, ¿qué hace realmente el Calvario? Si David pudo recibir misericordia siglos antes de la Encarnación, si los justos antes de Cristo pudieron encontrar genuinamente el fundamento de la misericordia en el Ahora — ¿qué cambia en la Cruz? -/- Este ensayo propone una interpretación teológica de la existencia humana en la que el Ahora es comprendido como el lugar invariante (...) de la actualización, donde acontece el encuentro entre Dios y la criatura. A partir de un modelo en forma de lemniscata (Figura I), se distinguen dos modos de existencia: la presencia, propia de la comunión no fragmentada, y la sucesión, propia de la experiencia temporal marcada por el antes y el después. -/- En este marco, la voluntad humana se sitúa en el punto de cruce, donde la interpelación divina —manifestada en las preguntas dirigidas a Adán y Caín— convoca a una respuesta. A través de las figuras de Adán, Caín y David, el ensayo desarrolla una “geometría de la voluntad”, en la que se revelan tres orientaciones fundamentales: la deflexión, la resistencia y el retorno. La misericordia se comprende no como una reacción posterior al arrepentimiento, sino como una condición permanente inscrita en el Ahora, fundada en la presencia continua de Cristo, eje que sostiene y atraviesa todo acto de actualización. -/- Asimismo, se distingue entre la disponibilidad constante de la misericordia y la apertura histórica de su plenitud. En esta perspectiva, la Cruz no introduce la misericordia en la historia, sino que, desde el interior de la creación, abre el acceso pleno a la comunión definitiva con Dios. Como se muestra en la Figura I, la existencia humana no consiste en un transcurrir lineal en el tiempo, sino en un paso continuo por el punto de encuentro donde convergen la voluntad, la misericordia y la presencia divina. (shrink)

Este ensayo desarrolla una concepción metafísica del tiempo en la que el presente (el Ahora) es tratado como una condición invariante de actualización, y no como un momento en movimiento dentro de una secuencia temporal. Contra el supuesto común de que el tiempo fluye y el presente pasa, el argumento propone que el Ahora es un punto singular y no extendido en el que todos los eventos son continuamente actualizados. Lo que se experimenta como flujo temporal no es el movimiento (...) del Ahora en sí mismo, sino la sucesión de eventos que ocurren dentro de él. -/- El tiempo, en este marco, no es una sustancia sino una condición dependiente, que surge únicamente donde el cambio ocurre dentro del espacio y la materia. El Ahora, como condición de toda actualización, no puede sostenerse a sí mismo y apunta, por tanto, a un fundamento no temporal que lo mantiene abierto. Esto conduce a una concepción filosófica de la presencia divina entendida no como un ser dentro del tiempo, sino como la fuente sustentante del Ahora mismo. -/- El ensayo argumenta además que la singularidad del Ahora implica la singularidad del yo: la identidad no está constituida por alternativas posibles sino por la actualización dentro del único presente compartido. El marco resultante — denominado topología lemniscática del tiempo — ofrece una explicación unificada de la temporalidad, la agencia y el fundamento metafísico. (shrink)

This essay develops a metaphysical account of time in which the present (the Now) is treated as an invariant condition of actualization rather than a moving moment within a temporal sequence. Against the common assumption that time flows and the present passes, the argument proposes that the Now is a singular, non-extended point at which all events are continuously actualized. What is experienced as temporal flow is not the movement of the Now itself but the succession of events occurring within (...) it. -/- Time, in this framework, is not a substance but a dependent condition, arising only where change occurs within space and matter. The Now, as the condition of all actualization, cannot sustain itself and therefore points to a non-temporal ground that holds it open. This leads to a philosophical account of divine presence understood not as a being within time, but as the sustaining source of the Now itself. -/- The essay further argues that the singularity of the Now implies the singularity of the self: identity is constituted not by possible alternatives but by actualization within the one shared present. The resulting framework—referred to as a lemniscatic topology of time—offers a unified account of temporality, agency, and metaphysical grounding. (shrink)

This essay develops a theological and phenomenological account of why the center of human experience—the crossing point in the Gaitan Topology—does not deplete, in contrast to the self-sustaining but ultimately exhausting loops of displacement. Building on prior analyses of the Ghost Zone, temporal deferral, and asymptotic movement, the text examines how hope, when detached from the present, becomes the sustaining mechanism of a structure that never arrives. -/- Through a series of structural comparisons, the essay argues that fulfillment is determined (...) not by the content of what is received but by the position from which it is received. Off the center, every satisfaction generates renewed lack, producing cycles of thirst that perpetuate themselves through anticipation. At the crossing point, the same conditions yield a different structure: reception without depletion, where what is given does not exhaust because it is grounded in presence. -/- This principle is developed through scriptural and narrative figures, including the Samaritan woman, the widow of Zarephath, Penelope, and Esther, each of whom embodies a distinct relation to hope, fulfillment, and non-arrival. The analysis introduces the concept of topological relativity, according to which identical experiences produce opposite effects depending on their relation to the center, and distinguishes between hope as present-tense habitation and hope as deferred projection. -/- The essay concludes that the non-depletion of the center is not a property of the self but of its source. The present, when inhabited, is sustained by the Eternal Present, understood not as a temporal moment but as the ontological ground of being, where the human “I am” participates in the inexhaustible reality of the divine “I am.” . (shrink)

Este ensayo introduce el concepto de «Un Día» como una estructura temporal de desplazamiento dentro del marco más amplio de la Zona Fantasma. Argumenta que ciertas formas de anticipación —comúnmente expresadas a través de frases como «un día» o «ya verás»— no funcionan como esperanza genuina sino como mecanismos que reubican al ser lejos del momento presente, donde únicamente la vida puede ser encontrada. -/- Apoyándose en un modelo topológico de la presencia, el ensayo propone que el futuro, cuando es (...) tratado como sitio de realización, opera no como un dominio de experiencia realizada sino como un campo de proyección. En esta estructura, la actividad del individuo —a menudo disciplinada, creativa y sostenida— se orienta hacia un límite que es indefinidamente aproximado pero nunca alcanzado. El resultado es una forma de continuidad sin llegada, en la cual la vida es simulada a través de completación interna en lugar de ser entrada a través del encuentro real. -/- El análisis examina además la relación entre este desplazamiento temporal y la ausencia formativa, sugiriendo que el futuro diferido funciona a menudo como una dirección hacia un testigo ausente más que como una respuesta a la realidad presente. A través de descripción fenomenológica, reflexión teológica y comparación estructural, el ensayo distingue entre la esperanza como confianza orientada a la presencia y el aplazamiento como desplazamiento orientado al futuro. -/- Al situar «Un Día» dentro de las dinámicas más amplias del movimiento asintótico y la Ilusión Heroica, el texto contribuye a un relato unificado de la no-llegada experiencial. Concluye reafirmando el estatus ontológico del presente como el único locus de contacto, donde la vida no es proyectada sino recibida. (shrink)

This essay introduces the concept of “One Day” as a temporal structure of displacement within the broader framework of the Ghost Zone. It argues that certain forms of anticipation—commonly expressed through phrases such as “one day” or “you will see”—do not function as genuine hope but as mechanisms that relocate the self away from the present moment, where life alone can be encountered. -/- Drawing on a topological model of presence, the essay proposes that the future, when treated as a (...) site of fulfillment, operates not as a domain of realized experience but as a field of projection. In this structure, the individual’s activity—often disciplined, creative, and sustained—becomes oriented toward a limit that is indefinitely approached but never reached. The result is a form of continuity without arrival, in which life is simulated through internal completion rather than entered through actual encounter. -/- The analysis further examines the relation between this temporal displacement and formative absence, suggesting that the deferred future often functions as an address to an absent witness rather than as a response to present reality. Through phenomenological description, theological reflection, and structural comparison, the essay distinguishes between hope as presence-oriented trust and deferral as future-oriented displacement. -/- By situating “One Day” within the broader dynamics of asymptotic movement and the Heroic Illusion, the text contributes to a unified account of experiential non-arrival. It concludes by reaffirming the ontological status of the present as the only locus of contact, where life is not projected but received. (shrink)

A tutt’oggi, nessun tentativo di delineare la struttura della Summa Theologiae ha incontrato il favore unanime degli studiosi. Il presente articolo discute le proposte più significative fin qui emerse, per giungere a presentare un tentativo originale di ricostruzione. A giudizio dell’Autore, il piano della Summa presenta la struttura centripeta di una cattedrale gotica, in cui ogni dettaglio conduce al Cristo. L’intera Summa è una tractatio de Deo non solum secundum quod in se est sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum (...) et finis earum; al centro di questa trattazione c’è il de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum, e al centro di quest’ultimo c’è il de Christo qui nobis est via tendendi in Deum. (shrink)

Is there a good argument for God’s existence? In his theology textbook for beginners, the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas provides five arguments in defense of belief in God: the Argument from Motion, the Argument from Causality, the Argument from Dependence, the Argument from Perfection, and the Argument from Design. As the titles of the arguments suggest, Aquinas uses various observations about motion, causality, design and other phenomena as evidence for the existence of the divine. This article examines these five arguments (...) in detail and considers what precisely Aquinas meant to demonstrate in each argument, along with their potential scope and limits. (shrink)

Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles (SCG), in its apologetic discourse aimed at Jews and Muslims of the Latin Christendom, strategically engages with Islamic and Jewish sages of its scholastic era. Since existing scholarship has not sufficiently qualitatively and quantitatively evaluated Aquinas’ most frequently referenced Islamic and Jewish philosophers in SCG, leaving a significant scholarly lacuna, this study addressed the gap by analyzing Aquinas’ direct references to and argumentative engagements with Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, and Avicebron, showing their distribution, Aquinas’ argumentative stance of (...) agreements, partial agreements/disagreements, or disagreements, and purpose of these reference-based arguments, categorized as either Aquinas’ aim to refute the referenced proposition or utilize it to support, build upon, and advance his thesis. The methodology employed a dual analytical approach, consisting of a qualitative textual-philosophical analysis of the SCG text in the scholarly authoritative Editio Leonina, cross-verified against Vansteenkiste’s studies and Busa’s Index Thomisticus, followed by a quantitative assay. The results revealed that Aquinas directly referenced the Islamic and Jewish philosophers 61 times in the SCG’s 415 Capitula. Islamic philosophers (95%) Averroes (64%) and Avicenna (31%) are the most prominent. In contrast, Jewish philosophers, Maimonides and Avicebron, comprise only a minor fraction. These references are concentrated in SCG II, followed by SCG III and SCG I. The SCG IV, which deals with the Latin Catholic dogmatic theology, has only one direct reference to Avicenna. Aquinas often engaged with these philosophers through argumentative disagreements (81%), primarily based on Averroes’ arguments and secondarily on Avicenna’s. However, he never refuted the relatively few agreements (14%) and partial agreements (5%), instead utilizing them to build upon, advance, and support his thesis. Aquinas never agreed with Maimonides and Avicebron and always used these argumentative disagreements to refute their philosophical propositions. This pattern exhibits a strong correlation between Aquinas’ argumentative agreement level and purpose of direct reference-based argument, illustrating the Thomistic method of theological discernment, characterized by Aquinas’ selective appropriation, adaptation, and adoption of the other two Abrahamic traditions’ philosophies when compatible with the Latin Church’s teachings, and systematic refutations when incompatible, terming them ‘errors’ that must be countered. This study demonstrates that the Thomistic theological synthesis of Islamic and Jewish philosophy in Aquinas’ SCG Sacra Doctrina not only strengthened Thomistic theology and defended the Roman Catholic faith but also succeeded in bridging the three Abrahamic monotheistic traditions, Christian, Islamic, and Jewish, through their shared Peripatetic philosophy of universal truth, the truth that commences in God. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas was an Italian Dominican priest, philosopher, theologian, saint, and doctor of the Roman Catholic Church, famous for synthesizing the thought of Aristotle and Christian doctrine. His most important and well-known work is his Summa Theologiae. Here we will be reading from Aquinas’s other summa, the Summa Contra Gentiles. We will be taking a look at some of the early chapters of Book I in which he discusses the relationship between faith and reason. According to Aquinas, there are two (...) ways of coming to know truths about God: by reason and by faith through revelation. Aquinas thinks that both reason and faith are reliable and authoritative. He thinks that there are good reasons to expect that there would be truths of both sorts. And, finally, he thinks that, as a matter of principle, the truths of one can never really contradict the truths of the other. (shrink)

This present article examines an argument in Aquinas’s De potentia, q. 3, a. 9, in which Aquinas argues that the human soul must be created by God. After introducing the relevance of the problem and discussing the state of the literature, I lay out Aquinas’s argument and defend it by appealing to his broader metaphysical commitments. I then turn to two difficulties raised in the literature by B.C. Bazan and Lawrence Joseph Kaiser. Bazan argues that Aquinas’s claim that the human (...) soul must be created by God leads to internal inconsistencies within Aquinas’s metaphysical system. While not explicitly criticizing Aquinas, Kaiser’s account of the eduction of forms from matter also raises a few problems for the consistency of Aquinas’s claim. In response to Bazan and Kaiser, I argue that a firm grasp of Aquinas’s semantics dissolves the criticisms. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to show that Thomas Aquinas, in his _Disputed Questions on Evil_, presents a theory of free will that is compatibilist but still involves a version of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and even requires alternative possibilities for a certain kind of responsibility. In Aquinas’ view, choosing between possibilities is not the primary power of the will. Rather, choice arises through the complex interaction of various parts of human psychology, in particular through the indeterminacy (...) of the intellect and through the interaction between reason and passion. Both of these ways provide cases where Aquinas not only allows for alternative possibilities but thinks that they are necessary for moral responsibility, all the while remaining, strictly speaking, a compatibilist. (shrink)

Der hier vorliegende Text befasst sich mit der Rezeption von Aristoteles’ Metaphysik Λ bei Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin. Er stellt das Material bereit für die Auswertung, die als Band 61 der Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie unter dem Titel Zur mittelalterlichen Herkunft einiger Theoreme in der modernen Aristoteles-Interpretation Eine Fallstudie anhand der Kommentare von Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin zu Aristoteles’ Metaphysik Λ, bei John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam / Philadelphia 2024, erscheinen wird. **************************** This text deals with (...) the reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics Λ by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. It provides the material for the analysis, which will be published as volume 61 of the BochumerStudien zur Philosophie under the title "Zur mittelalterlichenHerkunft einiger Theoreme in der modernenAristoteles-Interpretation. Eine Fallstudie anhand derKommentare von Albertus Magnus und Thomas vonAquin zu Aristoteles' Metaphysik Λ," by John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam / Philadelphia, 2024. (shrink)

Le Commentaire du Traité de l'âme d'Aristote par Thomas d'Aquin est le cinquième des commentaires fondamentaux des oeuvres d'Aristote traduits en langue française. Avec celui des Physiques, de la Métaphysique, de l'Interprétation et des Analytiques, il fonde l'édifice de la philosophie de Thomas d'Aquin et assure les contreforts de sa théologie. Ce traité se présente comme un vaste essai de définition de l'âme et principalement de l'âme humaine, avec en filigrane, une question lancinante : cette âme est-elle immortelle? Si ce (...) traité est l'un des plus courts d'Aristote, et selon ses propres termes, encore à l'état d'ébauche, il est construit avec une rigueur méthodologique qui en fait une sorte de modèle pour toute réflexion philosophique. Thomas propose une explication reconnue comme des plus limpides, et introduit à un livre encore loué deux millénaires plus tard par Hegel, Marx ou Darwin. Comme le reste de l'oeuvre d'Aristote, il connaît aujourd'hui un regain d'intérêt remarquable et le commentaire de Thomas offre un guide très sûr pour son intelligence. (shrink)

St Thomas brings together in the crucifixion the double mission of Jesus Christ as Saviour and Master. His spirituality is marked by an intense devotion to the Crucified One, manifested in his synthetic and catechetical works, but above all in his biblical commentaries. The Crucified is Master because the crucifixion reveals the divine power and the fully human life of Christ noticeable in his virtues. In this way, the Crucified One is presented as doctrine and as doctor: he is the (...) best book in which to contemplate the mystery of God and he is the Master who teaches from the chair of the cross. (shrink)