REPowerEU

REPowerEU is a strategy adopted by the European Commission in May 2022 in response to the sharp rise in energy prices and the energy security risks that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The energy crisis triggered by the invasion of Ukraine led to a significant increase in electricity prices across Europe, partly due to the structure of the EU electricity market, where prices are often set by the marginal cost of production. As natural gas prices rise sharply in 2021 and 2022, electricity prices increased accordingly, making the reduction of dependence on imported gas a central objective of EU energy policy.

Against this backdrop, REPowerEU aims to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels, accelerate the deployment of renewable energy, improve energy efficiency, and strengthen the resilience of the EU energy system. This initiative combines short-term crisis response measures, such as demand reduction and diversification of energy supply, with longer-term structural reforms. It is also closely aligned with the EU’s climate objectives under the European Green Deal.

REPowerEU builds on existing EU legislation, notably the Fit for 55 package, which sets the goal of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 and achieving climate neutrality by 2050. In addition, the plan also makes use of funding under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, allowing Member States to finance energy infrastructure, renewable energy projects, and energy efficiency measures through dedicated REPowerEU chapters in their national recovery and resilience plans.

As a result of the measures taken since 2022, imports of Russian gas into the EU have declined significantly, falling from around 150 billion cubic metres in 2021 to approximately 52 billion cubic metres in 2024. Over the same period, Russia’s share of the EU gas market dropped from about 45% to below 20%. Building on this progress, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal on 17 June 2025 to gradually phase out imports of Russian gas and oil by the end of 2027, while further accelerating renewable energy deployment and energy efficiency improvements.

Background

Before 2022, the EU relied heavily on imports of fossil fuels from Russia, which was its largest external energy supplier. Russia accounted for approximately 40% of the EU’s natural gas imports, alongside substantial shares of oil and coal. However, this dependence varied considerably among Member States. Germany and Italy were among the largest consumers of Russian gas, while Poland and the Baltic States pursued diversification strategies aimed at limiting reliance on Russian energy due to historical concerns. In several Member States, close energy relations with Russia were supported by national energy companies such as ENI, Uniper, and Wintershall, which facilitated long-term supply arrangements. More precisely, these contrasting perspectives were particularly evident in Germany’s traditional view of energy cooperation as means of engagement and stability in relations with Russia, an approach commonly associated with its Ostpolitik which contributed to sustained support for Russian gas imports over several decades.

As a result, prior to the adoption of REPowerEU, Member States continued to follow different national approaches. Germany and Austria supported the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, Bulgaria facilitated the transit of the TurkStream pipeline through its territory, and the Netherlands maintained energy cooperation with Russia amid declining domestic gas production. Despite being the EU’s largest gas consumer, Germany had no operational liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals before 2022 and had made relatively limited efforts to diversify gas supply sources compared with some other Member States.

Underlying vulnerabilities in the EU energy system became increasingly visible in the second half of 2021, when energy prices began to rise sharply due to high import dependence and limited supply diversification. These pressures intensified following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which raised concerns about potential supply disruptions across Europe. In March 2022, the European Commission announced initial measures to reduce imports of Russian fossil fuels, followed shortly by a call from EU leaders at the Versailles Summit for a coordinated phase-out strategy.

At the national level, many Member States rapidly adjusted their energy policies. Germany announced the construction of several LNG import terminals and sought alternative suppliers, while Italy expanded gas imports from countries including Algeria, Azerbaijan, Libya, and Qatar. Although these measures helped prevent immediate energy shortages, the initial response was largely driven by national governments and companies. This led to competition among Member States on global energy markets and contributed to higher prices. To address such challenges, the EU introduced coordination mechanisms including joint gas purchasing through the AggregateEU platform, aimed at reducing intra-EU competition and strengthening collective energy security.

Legislative process

From a legal standpoint, REPowerEU does not establish a new standalone instrument. Instead, it builds on the existing RRF framework, ensuring continuity with its governance structure while introducing the flexibility required to address an energy crisis fundamentally different from the health emergency that initially justified the RRF. Germany, as the EU's largest Russian gas importer, served as the primary driver for REPowerEU's origins, drove by Markus Pieper (EPP, Germany) as ITRE rapporteur shaping energy decoupling priorities. This German-led initiative reframed the RRF amendment from pandemic recovery to macroeconomic stabilization under Article 122 TFEU, prioritizing LNG diversification, renewables acceleration, and hydrogen infrastructure to achieve full independence from Russian fossil fuels by 2027. REPowerEU marked a policy game-changer, mobilizing €300 billion through RRF chapters for 45% emissions cuts by 2030, 600 GW renewables by 2030, and energy efficiency gains, while embedding "energy security" as core EU objective alongside climate neutrality. Berlin's influence ensured pragmatic flexibility, fast-track permitting and temporary fossil imports, balancing urgency with long-term green goals, influencing subsequent Fit for 55 revisions.

Policy goals

Saving energy

One of the main objectives of REPowerEU is to reduce overall energy consumption in the EU, thereby lowering demand for natural gas and improving energy efficiency. This approach is intended to reduce dependence on gas imports, particularly from Russia, and to strengthen the resilience of the EU energy system.

Following the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted the Gas Demand Reduction Regulation as an emergency measure. “The regulation encouraged Member States to voluntarily reduce gas demand by 15% relative to the 2017-2021 average. That target was exceeded, and even after the regulation expired in March 2024, gas consumption remained below pre-crisis levels. Between August 2022 and January 2025, the EU reduced its gas demand by about 17%, saving 70 bcm per year.”

Energy efficiency measures were also strengthened. “The EU raised its 2030 efficiency target, requiring an 11.7% reduction in final energy consumption. As buildings use more than half of the EU’s natural gas, new rules were introduced to make buildings more efficient and to accelerate renovations. By 2023, final energy consumption had fallen to 894 Mtoe, around 5.6% lower than in 2021. Full implementation of the revised Energy Efficiency and Energy Performance of Buildings directives remains necessary to meet the 2030 targets.”

Last but not least, measures to improve energy security were introduced alongside demand reduction efforts. “After gas storage levels declined sharply in late 2021, the EU adopted rules requiring gas storage facilities to be filled to at least 90% of capacity before each winter. This threshold was reached ahead of schedule in both 2023 and 2024. By the end of the winter 2024-25, storage levels stood at around 34% on 1 April 2025, broadly in line with pre-crisis averages. These measures contributed to greater supply stability and reduced price volatility”

Diversify energy supplies

Another central objective of REPowerEU is to reduce the EU’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels by diversifying energy sources and strengthening supply infrastructure. Since its introduction, imports of Russian oil, coal and gas have declined substantially. EU sanctions and increased imports from alternative suppliers contributed to this reduction. “By the mid-2020s Russian crude oil accounted for approximately 3% of the EU’s oil imports, down from about 27% in 2022.”

“To support diversification, the EU established the EU Energy Platform in December 2022 followed by the AggregateEU joint purchasing mechanism in April 2023. AggregateEU enabled participating countries to coordinate gas purchases on a voluntary basis. Although the mechanism expired in March 2025, the European Commission has proposed developing a permanent framework for collective purchasing of gas and other strategic energy commodities. Furthermore, international energy cooperation has also expanded. The EU strengthened partnerships with key suppliers such as Norway, the United States, and countries in North Africa, particularly in relation to natural gas and emerging hydrogen markets."

Clean energy

Lastly, accelerating the deployment of renewable and low-carbon energy is a further core objective of REPowerEU, aimed at improving energy security while supporting the EU’s climate goals.

“Electricity generation from renewable sources, particularly wind and solar power, has grown rapidly since 2022. Wind and solar combined have generated more electricity than gas and by 2023, wind on its own produced more electricity than gas. In October of that same year, the EU revised the Renewable Energy Directive, introducing a binding target for renewable energy to account for at least 42.5% of final energy consumption by 2030, with the ambition of reaching 45%."

“The deployment of heat pumps, which play a key role in clean heating, increased sharply in 2022 but slowed in subsequent years due to higher costs and installation challenges. To align with 2030 climate targets, the EU launched the Heat Pump Accelerator in January 2025.” REPowerEU also promotes the development of renewable gases and hydrogen. Efforts include increasing biomethane production, establishing regulatory frameworks for hydrogen markets, and expanding electrolyser capacity across the EU.

National ownership

A central feature of REPowerEU is that its success depends heavily on the extent to which Member States take ownership of the reforms and investments embedded in their national recovery plans. Since the initiative is not a new standalone instrument but an amendment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, implementation occurs primarily through the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs), into which governments must insert a dedicated REPowerEU chapter.

This structure gives Member States considerable responsibility: they are required to design, finance, and execute the measures that will reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels, accelerate renewables, expand infrastructure, and improve energy efficiency. National authorities therefore determine the concrete mix of reforms, from building renovation programmes and permitting reforms to renewable auctions, hydrogen strategies and cross-border interconnections, and are accountable for meeting the milestones that condition EU financial disbursements. This creates strong incentives for national ownership but also introduces significant variation, as progress depends on political will, administrative capacity, and pre-existing energy systems. Some governments have moved quickly, while others retain substantial links to Russian energy, such as Hungary and Slovakia for oil or France, Spain and Belgium for LNG, illustrating how uneven engagement can shape the overall trajectory of the plan. While the Commission provides strategic guidance and funding frameworks, the design, execution, and sequencing of measures remain the responsibility of national governments and administrations, confirming the principle of national ownership that already characterized the implementation of NGEU.

In this sense, REPowerEU relies on a governance model in which the EU sets the strategic direction, while the depth and speed of the transition are determined by Member States through their national plans and the extent to which they commit to carrying them out.

Funding

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the core pillar of NextGenerationEU, provides the primary financial basis for the REPowerEU plan, aimed at reducing energy dependence on Russia and accelerating the green transition. Additional national chapters for REPowerEU in Member States' recovery and resilience plans are funded through resources already mobilised or reallocated within the RRF, including unused loans, extra ETS grants, and transfers from other EU funds. Member States revised their RRF plans to include dedicated REPowerEU chapters, allowing combinations of grants, loans, and transfers from structural funds, offering greater flexibility than the original COVID-focused plans. These revisions enabled nearly all Member States to add energy-specific chapters from April 2023 onward, with new funding options exclusive to REPowerEU, including up to 7.5% cohesion fund transfers after mandatory consultations. For instance, by 2025 the Commission has disbursed REPowerEU pre-financing to various countries (e.g., Austria, Czech Republic), with total RRF payments exceeding €181 billion overall. These payments, up to 20% of additional REPowerEU funds, support implementation of energy-saving and diversification measures, driving bottom-up energy projects across revised plans.

Criticism

Despite being presented as complementary to the European Green Deal, the REPowerEU plan has attracted criticism regarding its coherence with the EU’s long-term climate objectives.

Tensions between energy security, climate objectives, and environmental sustainability

According to Beatriz Pérez de las Heras, one major concern relates to the tension between short-term energy security measures and climate mitigation goals. Although REPowerEU increases targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency, its implementation has also seen some Member States, such as Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands, turn back to coal and other fossil fuels in order to compensate for reduced gas supplies from Russia. Although these measures were presented as temporary, they are considered incompatible with the EU’s objective of reducing greenhouse gas emission and achieving climate neutrality by 2050. In light of this situation, another critic concerns the diversification of fossil fuels suppliers. REPowerEU has led to increased imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from distant countries such as the U.S. and Qatar. These imports cause higher methane emissions and require new fossil fuel infrastructure, which risks prolonging the EU’s reliance on gas beyond the short term. Furthermore, environmental impacts have also been questioned. Achieving the objectives of the REPowerEU, depends heavily on access to large quantities of raw materials and rare minerals that are needed for renewable energy technologies such as solar panels, electrolysers, etc. Many of these materials are sourced from China, which also plays a major role in mineral extraction in African countries (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo). This dependence raises concerns about the European Green Deal’s goals by creating new external dependencies and shifting environmental impacts beyond the EU, rather than building on a sustainable and resilient transition. Lastly, in the same light as above, another concern relates to energy security. Increased gas imports through pipelines from countries such as Algeria and Azerbaijan may reduce dependence on Russian supplies, but risk replacing one dependency with others. This strategy may address short-term needs without fully resolving long-term energy security challenges.

Energy security and uneven reduction of Russian dependence

This shift away from Russian energy dependence is not absolute, and progress remains uneven across the EU. While overall EU reliance on Russian fossil fuels has declined, “less than 19% of total EU gas imports in 2024”, some Member States continue to depend on Russian energy to a greater extent than others. In 2024, countries such as France, Spain and Belgium accounted for the majority of the EU’s Russian LNG imports in 2024, even as most of their LNG came from other suppliers, particularly the U.S. Hungary and Slovakia also remain heavily dependent on Russian oil. These dynamics highlight that, although the EU is moving away from Russian energy, vulnerabilities persist and some countries are still more exposed than others.

One of the policy goals in decline: heat pumps

The European Commission has identified heat pumps as a key technology for clean heating and for meeting the EU’s 2030 climate goals. Although installations increased sharply in 2022, deployment slowed significantly in 2023 and 2024. According to the European Heat Pump Association (EHPA), sales in 14 major European countries fell by an average of 22% in 2024 after years of steady growth. The steepest drops occurred in Germany and France where sales fell by 48% and 39% respectively. Overall, only around 2 million heat pumps were sold in 2024, representing a 23% drop compared with 2023.

The decline has serious consequences for the heat pump industry, which had expanded production in previous years, especially in 2022 and 2023, when demand was strong. As a result of this slowdown, at least 4.000 jobs were lost and over 6.000 workers faced reduced working hours. EHPA argues that the decline was mainly due to high purchase and installation costs, which were harder for households to afford during a period of inflation and high interest rates. In addition, high electricity prices compared with gas prices reduced the financial attractiveness of heat pumps, particularly in Belgium and Poland. Finally, frequent changes to subsidy schemes and policies created uncertainty, leading many consumers to delay investment decisions.

Against this backdrop, early signs of recovery were seen in 2025. Heat pump sales increased by 9% in the first half of 2025 compared with the same period in 2024. Sales rose from 898,000 units in the first half of 2024 to 980,000 units in the first half of 2025, although overall sales remain below the peak reached in earlier years, due to policy uncertainty and reduced incentives.

Next steps

Since this project was started in 2022, European Union has met most of the goals successfully, and is now on track to eliminate fossil fuel imports from Russia while heading towards the green energy resources.

See also

• Stop Bloody Energy