The Voluntary Simplicity Movement can be understood broadly as a diverse social movement made up of people who are resisting high consumption lifestyles and who are seeking, in various ways, a lower consumption but higher quality of life alternative. The central argument of this paper is that the Voluntary Simplicity Movement or something like it will almost certainly need to expand, organise, radicalise and politicise, if anything resembling a degrowth society is to emerge in law through democratic processes. (...) In a sentence, that is the ‘grass-roots’ or ‘bottom up’ theory of legal and political transformation that will be expounded and defended in this paper. The essential reasoning here is that legal, political and economic structures will never reflect a post-growth ethics of macro-economic sufficiency until a post-consumerist ethics of micro-economic sufficiency is embraced and mainstreamed at the cultural level. (shrink)

Criminal offenders may be offered to participate in voluntary rehabilitation programs aiming at correcting undesirable behaviour, as a condition of early release. Behavioural treatment may include direct intervention into the central nervous system (CNS). This article discusses under which circumstances voluntary rehabilitation by CNS intervention is justified. It is argued that although the context of voluntary rehabilitation is a coercive circumstance, consent may still be effective, in the sense that it can meet formal criteria for informed consent. (...) Further, for a consent to be normatively valid (“take the wronging out of the act”) under a coercive circumstance, the subject to be treated must (1) have the sovereign authority to consent, and (2) the offer-giver must be in the right normative position to make the offer. While I argue that subjects do have the sovereign authority to consent to treatment, I also argue that inappropriate offers yield invalid consents. Considerations on inappropriate offers should therefore inform which kinds of CNS intervention-based rehabilitation schemes the state may propose as part of the criminal justice system. Yet as I conclude in this paper, while there are some intrinsic constraints on voluntary rehabilitation programs, the main constraints on voluntary rehabilitation are likely to be contingent overriders. However, CNS intervention is not ruled out as such in the context of voluntary rehabilitation. (shrink)

Feldman defends the view that epistemic justification is analyzable in terms of an epistemic ‘ought’ against the objection that, unlike action, belief is not under voluntary control, which it would have to be if epistemic justification is indeed a function of what we ought to believe. In response to Steup's argument that we do enjoy voluntary control over our beliefs because we can deliberate, Feldman argues that for belief to be voluntary, it would have to be intentional, (...) which typically it is not. So Feldman holds that belief is not, in any significant sense, under our voluntary control. However, he rejects the other premise on which the objection is based: that for belief to be under the scope of an epistemic ‘ought’, it must be under voluntary control. He suggests that the epistemic ‘ought’ is a role ‘ought’ – an ‘ought’ that simply tells us what we should do in our role as believers – and thus crucially differs from the moral ‘ought’ because it does not require voluntary control. (shrink)

Background: The Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 passed into law in Victoria, Australia, on the 29 November 2017. Internationally, nurses have been shown to be intimately involved in patient care throughout the voluntary assisted dying process. However, there is a paucity of research exploring Australian nurses’ perspectives on voluntary assisted dying and, in particular, how Victorian nurses anticipate the implementation of this ethically controversial legislation will impact their professional lives. Objectives: To explore Victorian nurses’ expectations of the (...) ethical and practical impacts the voluntary assisted dying legislation will have on their professional lives. Research design: This qualitative study analysed nurses’ free text responses collected as part of a larger mixed methods online survey investigating staff views on the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act. Data were collected during the period between the passing of the voluntary assisted dying legislation and the start date and were analysed using inductive content analysis. Participants and research context: Free text survey responses were analysed from 1873 nurses employed across seven Victorian health services located in both metropolitan and regional areas of the state. Ethical considerations: The study obtained research ethics approval and all participants were informed of the voluntary and anonymous nature of their participation. Findings: This study identified three broad areas of Victorian nurses’ professional lives that they expected to be impacted by the implementation of voluntary assisted dying: professional identity, career development and workplace relationships. Conclusion: Participants anticipate diverse and nursing-specific impacts of the implementation of voluntary assisted dying in Victoria. Their insights can inform health services in jurisdictions considering or already implementing voluntary assisted dying, to develop policies, procedures and staff training programmes that safeguard the well-being and legal rights of their nursing staff. (shrink)

Prior research suggests that voluntary environmental governance mechanisms operate to enhance a firm’s environmental legitimacy as opposed to being a driver of proactive environmental performance activities. To understand how these mechanisms contribute to the firm’s environmental legitimacy, we investigate whether environmental corporate governance characteristics are associated with voluntary environmental disclosure. We examine an increasingly important attribute of a firm’s disclosure setting, namely the disclosure of greenhouse gas (GHG) information. GHG information represents proprietary non-financial information about the firm’s exposure (...) to environmental concerns and is related to the firm’s operations and future profitability. Thus, we expect governance participants would view such information as a potentially important strategic device for managing stakeholders’ demands for information concerning environmental risks. We find that the presence of an environmental committee and a Chief Sustainability Officer (CSO) is positively associated with the likelihood of GHG disclosure and that CSOs are associated with disclosure transparency. Further analysis reveals that the likelihood of disclosure is associated with committee size, number of committee meetings, expertise of committee members and CSO, and overlap between the environmental committee and audit committee. Only expertise of the environmental committee members and the CSO are associated with GHG disclosure transparency, while larger committees tend to be associated with lower transparency. Our results are particularly important to those with interests in evaluating the potential role that corporate governance mechanisms play in responding to stakeholder concerns about environmental risks. Directors and officers who are considering appointment to similar governance positions, may wish to consider what attributes would make such governance positions more influential. (shrink)

Nearly 400 million adults have been vaccinated against COVID-19. Children have been excluded from the vaccination programmes owing to their lower vulnerability to COVID-19 and to the special protections that apply to children’s exposure to new biological products. WHO guidelines and national laws focus on medical safety in the process of vaccine approval, and on national security in the process of emergency authorisation. Because children suffer much from social distancing, it is argued that the harms from containment measures should be (...) factored in a broader perspective on the good of the child. Considering the available knowledge on the disease, vaccine, and coping strategies, the decision about vaccine access to children is a public responsibility. The ultimate choice is a matter of paediatric informed consent. Moreover, jurisdictions that permit non-participation in established childhood vaccination programmes should also permit choice of vaccines outside of the approved programmes. Even if vaccine supply is too short to cover the paediatric population, the a priori exclusion of children is unjust. It may also exacerbate local and global inequalities. The second part of the paper delineates a prudent and ethical scheme for gradual incorporation of minors in vaccination programmes that includes a rigorous postvaccination monitoring. This is a theoretical paper in ethics that uses the Pfizer vaccine as a stock example, without discussing possible differences among existing vaccines. The key purpose is reflection on the good of the child in emergencies and vaccine policymaking. All data relevant to the study are included in the article and in its refernces. (shrink)

Patients seeking to access voluntary assisted dying (VAD) are necessarily at the end of their lives. Hence, they are likely to be concurrently receiving care from institutions (community nursing services, health services, palliative care services, and aged care facilities) with different levels of participation in VAD. This article reports on the various institutional approaches to VAD based on eighteen semi-structured interviews with regulators from Victoria and Western Australia, representing fifteen institutions with varying levels of support for VAD. We generated (...) five main themes from reflexive thematic analysis of the interview data: settling on a position; operationalizing a position and determining level of involvement; local policy decisions on specific VAD activities; transparency; and navigating pluralism and accommodating diverse views. Overall, our findings revealed significant diversity in how institutions approached various VAD activities and that an institution’s position on VAD (whether it supports it or not) does not necessarily indicate the extent to which it will facilitate access to VAD. These findings may have relevance for institutions seeking to implement (or revise) their approach to VAD and suggest that greater transparency about institutional approaches to VAD is needed to enable people to make informed decisions about where to seek care. (shrink)

Poor working conditions remain a serious problem in supplier facilities in developing countries. While previous research has explored this from the developed buyers’ side, we examine this phenomenon from the perspective of developing countries’ suppliers and subcontractors. Utilizing qualitative data from a major knitwear exporting cluster in India and a stakeholder management lens, we develop a framework that shows how the assumptions of conventional, buyer-driven voluntary governance break down in the dilution of buyer power and in the web of (...) factors rooted in suppliers’ traditions, beliefs, local demands and resource dependency. We reveal out how success in governing collaborative global supply chains often falls short within the subcontracting stage, where a stakeholder management mindset is elusive to most participants. We suggest that success in governing collaborative global supply chains is dependent on concepts of stakeholder utility and the presence of shared value that is often at odds with the realities of power, information asymmetry and compliance/reward systems inherent in the non-market coordination of global supply chains. Our findings offer important insights for delineating the concepts of value creation from CSR concepts and practices, and for modifying the basic assumptions of conventional supply chain governance. (shrink)

A key question in the theory of migration and in public debates on immigration policies is when migration can be said to be voluntary and when, conversely, it should be seen as nonvoluntary. In a previous article, we tried to answer this crucial question by providing a list of conditions we view as sufficient for migration to be considered nonvoluntary. According to our account, one condition that makes migration nonvoluntary is when people migrate because they lack acceptable alternatives to (...) doing so. In this article, we take the opportunity to further explore and clarify this crucial condition. More specifically, we focus on two main sets of questions. First, we ask whether migration is always voluntary when it serves goals that are voluntarily chosen, and whether those who decide to migrate voluntarily but only have the option of choosing among a limited set of dangerous, harmful, or illegal means for doing so, can be said to be forced to choose those means. Second, we ask whether what counts as “nonacceptable” alternatives should also include cases in which people could have their needs and fundamental rights met, but at the cost of betraying their moral principles or conceptions of the good. (shrink)

Anselm of Canterbury holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu (...) diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3,... (shrink)

This chapter argues that the standard ‘voluntariness-based model of action’, according to which actions are performed on the basis of some prior pro-attitude towards performing the action, should be rejected. It argues that the model leads to a view of action that does not adequately accommodate a notion of self-determination capable of capturing our intuitions about moral responsibility. We need instead to accept a ‘practical reason-based theory of action’ according to which intentional action is not any expression of prior motivation, (...) but rather a special mode of exercising rationality in its own right. This practical mode of exercising rationality is found not in voluntary action alone, but also in non-voluntary intention-formation. This view allows for freedom of agency to characterize not just voluntary action based on a prior decision or intention to act, but also the decision or intention itself. (shrink)

This paper is about why voluntary associations, such as churches, unions and political parties, are subject to natural justice requirements in common law: in other words, why they are required to treat their members fairly. These requirements are typically imposed (under the name of procedural fairness) by public law on exercises of state authority, but voluntary associations do not exercise state authority. Voluntary associations are set up in private law, as structures of property and contract, but property (...) and contract law do not ordinarily require rights to be exercised in accordance with natural justice. What is needed is an account which locates voluntary associations within private law while adverting to what they have in common with the state: that they make and apply rules to facilitate human interaction. I propose such an account, drawing on an idea from Lon Fuller. Natural justice requirements on voluntary associations are grounded in the rule of law. (shrink)

The degree of autonomy present in the choices made by individuals with an addiction, notably in the context of research, is unclear and debated. Some have argued that addiction, as it is commonly understood, prevents people from having sufficient decision-making capacity or self-control to engage in choices involving substances to which they have an addiction. Others have criticized this position for being too radical and have counter-argued in favour of the full autonomy of people with an addiction. Aligning ourselves with (...) middle-ground positions between these two extremes, we flesh out an account of voluntary action that makes room for finer-grained analyses than the proposed all-or-nothing stances, which rely on a rather static metaphysical understanding of the nature of the voluntariness of action. In contrast, a dynamic concept of voluntary action better accounts for varying levels of voluntariness of the person with an addiction which takes into consideration internal and external determinants of choice. Accordingly, like other components of autonomous choices such as level of information, voluntariness can fluctuate. Therefore, there are important implications for research and clinical ethics in matters of consent, recruitment, and therapeutic approaches. Overall, our proposal is inspired by a pragmatist understanding of voluntary action, notably with respect to how voluntariness is both informed by actions and experiences that shape one's view of the world. (shrink)

We study imagination as reality-oriented mental simulation (ROMS): the activity of simulating nonactual scenarios in one’s mind, to investigate what would happen if they were realized. Three connected questions concerning ROMS are: What is the logic, if there is one, of such an activity? How can we gain new knowledge via it? What is voluntary in it and what is not? We address them by building a list of core features of imagination as ROMS, drawing on research in cognitive (...) psychology and the philosophy of mind. We then provide a logic of imagination as ROMS which models such features, combining techniques from epistemic logic, action logic, and subject matter semantics. Our logic comprises a modal propositional language with non-monotonic imagination operators, a formal semantics, and an axiomatization. (shrink)

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s _De Motu Animalium_ 11 (MA 11). While the rest of the treatise was concerned with voluntary or intentional actions and movements of animals, in this final chapter Aristotle discusses the case of involuntary and non-voluntary movements. The contribution discusses whether and how the standard account of animal self-motion that was developed through the previous chapters is also applicable to these non-standard cases.

Problems of cooperation have often been simplified as the choice between defection and cooperation, although in many empirical situations it is also possible to walk away from the interaction. We present the results of two lab-in-the-field experiments with a diverse pool of subjects who play optional and compulsory public goods games both with and without punishment. We find that the most important institution to foster cooperation is punishment, which is more effective in a compulsory game. In contrast to Rand and (...) Nowak (Nat Commun 2(1):1–7, 2011), we find that loners are not responsible for anti-social punishment, which is mostly imputable to low-contributors (free-riders). Loners neither totally free-ride nor they significantly punish cooperators (or other types of players): they simply avoid all forms of participation whenever possible. (shrink)

Some maintain that voluntariness is a value-neutral concept. On that view, someone acts involuntarily if subject to a controlling influence or has no acceptable alternatives. I argue that a value-neutral conception of voluntariness cannot explain when and why consent is invalid and that we need a moralized account of voluntariness. On that view, most concerns about the voluntariness of consent to participate in research are not well founded.

Voluntariness of consent to research has not been sufficiently explored through empirical research. The aims of this study were to develop a more comprehensive approach to assessing voluntariness and to generate preliminary data on the extent and correlates of limitations on voluntariness. We developed a questionnaire to evaluate subjects’ reported motivations and constraints on voluntariness. 88 subjects in five different areas of clinical research—substance abuse, cancer, HIV, interventional cardiology, and depression—were assessed. Subjects reported a variety of motivations for participation. Offers (...) of financial incentives were common but not influential, pressures from others were rare, and no threats were reported. However, certain financial incentives and—paradoxically—altruistic motivations led some subjects to feel more constrained. Consistent with previous studies, no one pattern of motivation was common to all research subjects. There was little evidence of constrained voluntariness, but some suggestion of areas of concern. Voluntariness appears to be susceptible to systematic empirical investigation. (shrink)

No laws or official guidelines govern medical assistance for dying in Japan. However, over the past several years, cases of assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia, rarely disclosed until recently, have occurred in close succession. Inspired by these events, ethical, legal, and social debates on a patient’s right to die have arisen in Japan, as it has in many other countries. Several surveys of Japanese people’s attitudes towards voluntary assisted dying suggest that a certain number of Japanese prefer active (...) euthanasia. Against this background, it is important to discuss voluntary assisted dying cases in Japan and the Japanese views on them and to consider their implications. We review three recent Japanese voluntary assisted dying cases and discuss the various objections to voluntary assisted dying that have been published in response to these in various media outlets. Our counterarguments include the double suffering of people who are unable to give up their desire to die, individuality of death, variability of culture, problem of being an annoyance to (burden on) others, a slippery slope argument supporting voluntary assisted dying, and unfair claims about responsibility and excessive burden on people who are unable to give up their desire to die. We also point out the psychocultural and social problems in Japanese society that these objections reflect, and argue that voluntary assisted dying can be ethically acceptable under certain conditions. We conclude that Japanese society must change in order to enable those who sincerely wish to die to do so in a better way. (shrink)

In this paper we analyse the concept of coerced exchange (and partly of voluntary exchange inasmuch as the absence of coercion is its necessary condition), which is of utmost importance to economic theory in general and to the Austrian School of Economics in particular. The subject matter literature normally assumes that a coerced action occurs under threat. Threats in turn can be studied from the perspective of speech act theory, which is concerned with the speaker’s intentions. Ultimately, our goal (...) is to provide a descriptive (i.e. non-moralized) definitions of threat and coercion, based on the analysis of the coercer’s intentions. If successful, we would be in a position to present such an account of coerced and voluntary exchanges that is compatible with both speech act theory and the Austrian methodology. Although we focus on the Austrian School of Economics, we believe that our investigations might impact on economic theory in general. We also criticize a rights-based account of coercion employed in the research practice of some neo-Austrians and based on the libertarian ethic of property rights. (shrink)

The permissibility of actions depends upon facts about the flourishing and separateness of persons. Persons differ from other creatures in having the task of discovering for themselves, by conjecture and refutation, what sort of life will fulfil them. Compulsory slavery impermissibly prevents some persons from pursuing this task. However, many people may conjecture that they are natural slaves. Some of these conjectures may turn out to be correct. In consequence, voluntary slavery, in which one person welcomes the duty to (...) fulfil all the commands of another, is permissible. Life-long voluntary slavery contracts are impermissible because of human fallibility; but fixed-term slavery contracts should be legally enforceable. Each person has the temporarily alienable moral right to direct her own life. (shrink)

In research involving patients with implantable brain–computer interfaces (BCIs), there is a regulatory gap concerning post-trial responsibilities and duties of sponsors and investigators towards implanted patients. In this article, we analyse the case of patient R, who underwent non-voluntary explantation of an implanted BCI, causing a discontinuation in her sense of agency and self. To clarify the post-trial duties and responsibilities involved in this case, we first define the ontological status of the BCI using both externalist (EXT) and internalist (...) (INT) theories of cognition. We then give particular focus to the theories of extended and embedded cognition, hence considering the BCI either as a constitutive component of the patient’s mind or as a causal supporter of her brain-based cognitive capacities. We argue that patient R can legitimately be considered both as an embedded and extended cognitive agent. Then, we analyse whether the non-voluntary explantation violated patient R’s (neuro)rights to cognitive liberty, mental integrity, psychological continuity and mental privacy. We analyse whether and how different mental ontologies may imply morally relevant differences in interpreting these prima facie neurorights violations and the correlational duties of sponsors and investigators. We conclude that both mental ontologies support the identification of emerging neurorights of the patient and give rise to post-trial obligations of sponsors and investigators to provide for continuous technical maintenance of implanted BCIs that play a significant role in patients’ agency and sense of self. However, we suggest that externalist mental ontologies better capture patient R’s self-conception and support the identification of a more granular form of mental harm and associated neurorights violation, thus eliciting stricter post-trial obligations. (shrink)

I agree with Nachev and Hacker’s general approach. However, their criticism of claims of covert automaticity can be strengthened. I first say a few words on what voluntary action involves and on the consequent limited relevance of brain research for the determination of voluntariness. I then turn to Nachev and Hacker’s discussion of possible covert automaticity and show why the case for it is weaker than they allow.

This article recommends that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) not regulate corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. Accounting disclosures, whether voluntary or regulated, increase transparency and credibility for all companies. Regulated disclosure increases costs and results in few gains; thus, this article recommends against CSR disclosure regulation. Varying definitions of CSR and nonuniform disclosure make CSR project analysis difficult for investors and analysts. This article presents a model that defines CSR items such as organizational size, CSR project size, (...) amount invested in the project, and what standard companies use for CSR definition and reporting for easy voluntary disclosure. Based on a review of the literature, this article recommends that CSR disclosure stay voluntary. The model suggests allowing SEC oversight in the collection and verification of information but not regulating CSR disclosure. This article suggests that the SEC issue a CSR “seal of approval,” increasing firm values, stock prices, and firm legitimacy. (shrink)

I discuss the argument of Persson and Savulescu that moral enhancement ought to accompany cognitive enhancement, as well as briefly addressing critiques of this argument, notably by John Harris. I argue that Harris, who believes that cognitive enhancement is largely sufficient for making us behave more morally, might be disposing too easily of the great quandary of our moral existence: the gap between what we do and what we believe is morally right to do. In that regard, Persson and Savulescu's (...) position has the potential to offer more. However, I question Persson and Savulescu's proposal of compulsory moral enhancement, proposing the alternative of voluntary moral enhancement. (shrink)

In 2017, Victoria became the first state in Australia to pass legislation permitting voluntary assisted dying. Under this law, only those people who are near the end of their lives may access voluntary assisted dying, and because many of these people require nursing care to manage the progression of their illness or their symptoms, it will invariably have an impact on nursing practice. The Victorian law includes a series of procedural steps as safeguards to ensure that the law (...) operates as intended. To support people who choose voluntary assisted dying and to practice safely within boundaries of the law, nurses must be aware of these requirements and how they operate. However, there are often gaps in nurses’ legal knowledge. This was demonstrated in an article that aimed to inform nurses about the operation of Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic) but contained several errors and misstatements of the law. Our article corrects these errors and discusses how the law is intended to be applied by revisiting the fictional case of Chloe – a woman with a terminal illness who is seeking voluntary assisted dying. As the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic) also protects nurses from liability if they act in accordance with its provisions, we conclude that sound knowledge and understanding of its operation support nurses to provide the safe, comprehensive and compassionate care their patients deserve at the end of life. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of the societal impact of a rising dementia population and examines the legal and ethical implications posed by voluntary registries as a community-oriented solution to improve interactions between law enforcement and individuals with dementia. It provides a survey of active voluntary registries across the United States, with a focus on Arizona, which has the highest projected growth for individuals living with dementia in the country.

In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never (...) intentional. In response to this strategy, I distinguish between two types of intentionality and argue that belief is no less intentional than action is. (shrink)

How do we determine whether a migration is voluntary when persons organize their own displacement under the shadow of ethnic violence? I examine this question through a case study of a 1989 Soviet village exchange between Azerbaijanis from Gizil-Shafag (in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic – SSR) and Armenians from Karkanj (in the Azerbaijani SSR), where residents negotiated their mutual relocation while operating under threats to their safety. Through analyzing competing accounts of voluntary migration, I demonstrate why the (...) agential account fails to capture the fundamental difference between fleeing ethnic violence and migrating for career advancement. This inability makes the agential account susceptible to misuse by nationalists attempting to justify ethnic cleansing. However, the political account – which focuses on whether migration is motivated by one’s belief that one lacks objectively acceptable alternatives – not only better reflects the lived experiences of ethnic minorities facing displacement but also provides clearer guidance for migration policies. (shrink)

It has been shown that moral reflection is requisite for proper MBE. As compulsory MBE renders moral reflection practically redundant, the option that remains is VMBE. Three issues that are essential for the conception of VMBE will be discussed: freedom (of the will) in additional detail, the epistemic fallacy of the wish that the human species ought to survive at any cost, and the conception of happiness as the grounding rationale for MBE.

IntroductionAs we near the semicentennial of the 1976 publication of the first volume of Foucault’s History of Sexuality, for all its influence in the interim, this work remains today extraordinarily challenging in relation to our sexual mores. In this article, I will attempt to reapply its insights to analyze contemporary trends in sexuality and gender. Questions that I will consider include the continuing applicability of Foucault’s analyses, to what extent and how they may need to be revised in light of (...) historical developments, and what reading Foucault can tell us about our contemporary conjuncture. I will argue that volume 1 of The History of Sexuality remains highly relevant in this regard, although I will also indicate some ways in which things have moved on since Foucault’s time, and thus in which his thesis might be modified. Despite Foucault having apparently been extremely influential on academic thinking about sex, we seem nonetheless to have become or remained “other Victorians,” perversely mimicking the nineteenth-century sexology that Foucault pilloried. I will argue that we have continued to believe exactly the great myths about sex that Foucault sought to dispense with: namely, that sexuality has primarily been shaped by historic “repression,” that sexuality needs to be “liberated” from this repression, and that there is a “truth of sex” that is on the side of freedom. These beliefs have all mutated, however, to the extent that questions of sex (like many other social questions) are increasingly oriented around individual identities and the supposed sovereignty of the individual to determine their own truth. (shrink)

This book addresses a central theme in social and political theory: what is the motivation behind the theory of ideology, and can such a theory be defended?

Military activities with the framework of the IDF [Israel Defense Force] is carried out by citizens in a variety of positions. In addition to the ordinary positions of career officers and NCOs, the IDF consists of conscripted men and women as well as reservists. Some of the latter serve under an ordinary command to serve for a certain relatively short period. Other reservists, including pilots and special forces officers have served since they volunteered to serve. Facing the political clash between (...) the government, who have been viewed as trying to change the democratic nature of the state, and the popular opposition, who have tried to protect the judiciary and other elements of democracy, many officers who belong to the latter reservist group have suspended their voluntary service or even retired. Their decision has raised the obvious issue of whether such decisions can be justified, morally, ethically, and democratically. This is the topic of the present paper. (shrink)

I distinguish voluntary retirement (of those able to work) from involuntary retirement (of those unable to work). I discuss the former. I argue that the state's pensions policy should be neutral between life-plans, and this requires the following two changes. First, tax relief on private voluntary retirement pensions (PVRPs) should be abolished because it effectively transfers money to those saving for a long and/or prosperous voluntary retirement from those who would prefer to have more time and/or money (...) while young and middle-aged in exchange for a shorter and/or less prosperous voluntary retirement. Tax relief would remain unchanged on private involuntary retirement pensions. Second, state pensions should be split into two components: a compulsory “state involuntary retirement pension” (SIRP) and an optional “state voluntary retirement pension” (SVRP). Citizens opting out of the SVRP—or paying less toward it—would correspondingly enjoy a higher income while young and middle-aged. (shrink)

I try to square three very different contributions to the discussion of responsibility by Bernard Williams in ‘Moral Luck’, ‘Recognizing Responsibility’ (in Shame and Necessity), and the rarely discussed ‘Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom’. The three sources are not obviously compatible, but I show that there is unifying interpretation leading to developing an account of the role and the limits of freedom and moral luck in attributing responsibility to an agent.

The article elaborates on two kinds of relations between people that seem crucial to understanding what is the real nature of processes going on in society. First, each of the relations is characterized with cybernetic nomenclature. Then the relations are compared and their intrinsic properties are showed. The last section pictures their consequences for shaping the contemporary society.

ABSTRACT Belgium legalised voluntary euthanasia in 2002, thus ending the long isolation of the Netherlands as the only country in which doctors could openly give lethal injections to patients who have requested help in dying. Meanwhile in Oregon, in the United States, doctors may prescribe drugs for terminally ill patients, who can use them to end their life – if they are able to swallow and digest them. But despite President Bush's oft‐repeated statements that his philosophy is to ‘trust (...) individuals to make the right decisions’ and his opposition to ‘distant bureaucracies’, his administration is doing its best to prevent Oregonians acting in accordance with a law that its voters have twice ratified. The situation regarding voluntary euthanasia around the world is therefore very much in flux. This essay reviews ethical arguments regarding voluntary euthanasia and physician‐assisted suicide from a utilitarian perspective. I shall begin by asking why it is normally wrong to kill an innocent person, and whether these reasons apply to aiding a person who, when rational and competent, asks to be killed or given the means to commit suicide. Then I shall consider more specific utilitarian arguments for and against permitting voluntary euthanasia. (shrink)