This article explores the nature of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate reputation using qualitative research approach. Specifically, the relationship between CSR and corporate reputation is examined from the viewpoint of value theory. This paper brings up for discussion the various value priorities lying in the background of CSR actions. The aim is to form categories of value priorities around CSR and reputation, based on qualitative research approach. The main concepts in this paper – CSR, reputation and (...) value – are also defined. This paper further discusses the theory of value structure and content, which identifies certain principal values among different cultures. The data consist of eight interviews with employees of a newspaper company. The results suggest that value priorities play an influential role in CSR actions, influencing to the essence of certain reputation stories in the corporate context. (shrink)

In this study the relationship of religiosity and value priorities is differentiated, based on a multidimensional measurement of different contents of religiosity. The structure of values is conceptualized using Schwartz’ (1992) two orthogonal dimensions of Self-transcendence vs. Self-enhancement and Openness to change vs. Conservation. The relations between these two dimensions and eight religious contents, ranging from open-minded to more close-minded forms of religiosity, were tested in a sample of church attenders (N = 685), gathered in Germany. The results show, (...) that depending on the content of religiosity, different values are preferred (self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition and security values). The results indicate the importance of the content of religiosity for predicting value-loaded behaviors. (shrink)

This study investigated the sensitivity to moral issues from a story in a professional context and development of the ability to interpret moral situations in a sample of 50 social psychology students participating in a one-semester course on professional ethics. The relationships between initial value priorities measured by Schwartz Value Survey (1992) and moral sensitivity were also explored. Nearly half of the respondents (46%) progressed on sensitivity from the pre-test to the post-test, whereas the control group's ( n (...) = 6) mean score declined significantly. Younger respondents and those without any previous degree progressed more in moral sensitivity than older ones and those with previous degree. No gender differences were found in the total moral sensitivity score. However, females and males seemed to focus partially on different issues while interpreting the situation. Concerning the value priorities, respondents with higher regard for the power, hedonism and stimulation value types were lower on sensitivity, whereas the universalism value type was positively related to the sensitivity level. (shrink)

At the centre of controversy over human rights policy in China is the disagreement on the relationship between two sets of human rights: civil and political rights on the one hand, and social and economic rights on the other. Much of the debate, however, has been undertaken on theoretical and normative levels. Empirical evidence is needed to advance this debate. Drawing data from a multination survey, this research explores whether Chinese and Westerners differ in their human rights policy preferences. The (...) findings suggest that while social and economic rights have a much broader support base in China than in Western nations, political and civil rights are also important concerns to the Chinese public. Sources and implications of the findings are also discussed. (shrink)

The paper investigates the relations between Schwartz’s values and beliefs which may reflect skepticism toward science – specifically vaccine rejection, climate change denial and creationism. Recent research on the causes of anti-science indicates that they may be motivational, pertaining to ideologies, worldviews, and one’s moral codes. Therefore, we postulated that value priority hierarchies hierarchies may be predictors of anti-science. Results (N = 509) indicated that Conservation metatype values were positively associated with anti-science, while Self-Transcendence and Openness to change (...) metatypes were connected with support for science. We also found significant differences in value profiles between participants with lower vs. higher anti-scientific beliefs. We discuss the possible motivational underpinnings of these results. (shrink)

The Schwartz Values Survey (SVS), developed by Shalom Schwartz, was used to explore the values and value priorities of undergraduate business students in a mid-sized Canadian university. These business students considered family security as their top individual value and ranked successful, healthy, and enjoying life among their top ten individual values. On the other hand, detachment, accepting my portion in life and social power were least valued. They regarded Benevolence and Achievement as their top two value types (...) (cluster of related values), and ranked the higher order meta-value Self-Transcendence first followed by Openness to Change. The accounting and finance majors considered Hedonism as their top priority while the other business majors valued Benevolence most highly; however, overall, there were more similarities than differences between these two groups. When compared with the males, females valued the meta-value Self-Transcendence significantly more and exhibited values and value systems that have more of a social focus and less of a personal focus. First-year and fourth-year business students ranked the meta-values in the same order; however, Self-Transcendence was rated as significantly more important to the students in their first year compared to those in their fourth year. (shrink)

Confucianism has a deep influence on the opinion of value priority in traditional Chinese culture, which consider the value of morality prior to that of utility; the value of moral merit prior to that of intelligent; the value of group prior to that of individuals; the value of peace and safety prior to that of freedom and liberty; the value of harmony prior to that of conflict. This kind of value priority (...) has performed very important and positive functions in Chinese culture, along with certain side-effects. Under the context of globalization, it is possible for the Chinese and Western values to complement each other in fusional harmony. (shrink)

The paper proposes a general account of how real-life practical argumentation can be explained on the basis of empirical data regarding cultural value priorities. This general account is built upon Schwartz’s theory of human values and the value-based theory of normative reasons for action, as well as upon the principle that an agent ought to perform an action, if and only if the total weight of the reasons for the agent to perform the action is greater than the (...) total weight of the reasons for the agent not to perform the action. The practical significance of this general account is demonstrated by applying it in case studies of two real-life instances of practical argumentation – the 2018 Bulgarian debate about the ratification of the Istanbul convention and the 2015 Putin-Obama discussion about the intervention in the Syrian civil war. In both case studies, empirical data regarding cultural value priorities is gathered from the results from the European Social Survey. The theoretical significance of the general account is demonstrated through comparison and contrast with related research. (shrink)

The article discusses the meanings of life and value priorities of the post- Soviet society. The author argues that, at present, there are symptoms of a global ideological crisis in the world, that the West does not have its own vision of where and how to move on and has no understanding of the future. Unfortunately, most of the post-Soviet countries do not have such vision as well. In these conditions, there are mistrust, confusion, paradoxical manifestation of human consciousness. (...) The main meanings that determine our life-world are: the desire of citizens for social justice and social security, the desire to figure out and understand the basic values of modern society, how honestly and equally the authorities act toward their fellow citizens, and to what extent they reflect their interests. The meanings of life, which are the answers to the challenges of the time, are embodied in the cultural code of each nation, state. The growth points of new values, which will become the basis for the future sustainable development of a new civilization, have yet to be discovered in the systemic transformative changes of the culture. In this process, the emergence of a new system of values that governs human life is inevitable. However, modern technology brings new troubles to humans. It has provided wide opportunities for informational violence and public consciousness manipulation. Nowadays, the scenario that is implemented in Western consumer societies claims to be the dominant scenario. Meanwhile, today there is no country in the world that is a role model, there is no ideal that others would like to borrow. Most post-Soviet states failed to advance their societies to more decent levels of economic development, to meet the challenges of the modern information age, and to provide the population with new high living standards. Therefore, in conditions of growing confrontation, we should realistically understand the world and be ready to implement changes that will ensure sustainable development of the state and society without losing our national identity. (shrink)

In this article, readers are presented with an analysis of some of the problems that became the center of discussion at the XXI International Likhachev Scientific Readings held in May 2023 at the St. Petersburg Humanitarian University of Trade Unions. The readings were held under the general title "Dialogues and conflicts of cultures in a changing world", combining the traditional theme of dialogue with the problems of conflict that have arisen in recent years. This review focuses on two significant issues, (...) one of which determined the course of the plenary discussion, and the other became the main one for the breakout session devoted to the values and trends of the modern world. The main issue of the plenary session was the consideration of the conflict between the unipolar and multipolar world. Both domestic and foreign participants actively spoke out on this issue. The speakers who spoke at the Readings adhered to the idea of prioritizing the values of a multipolar world, pointing to the undemocratic nature of unipolarity. Analyzing this aspect of the discussion, the author of the review notes that in modern society the same value attitudes develop to the limits where they lead to opposite conclusions. The idea of unipolarity implies the uniqueness of the democratic model. From the idea of multipolarity, there are many different development scenarios, which looks like a more democratic position. It can be concluded that the value attitude coincides, but the basis of the ideological conflict is a political conflict. Nevertheless, the final value discrepancy is very acute. The philosophical and cultural section of the conference was devoted to this. Noting the sharpness of the criticism expressed by the speakers to the "new ethics" and the "culture of cancellation", the author of the review points out that in this criticism there is a desire to "cancel" the criticized, which again unites both positions, but does not provide grounds for a constructive dialogue. To overcome the contradiction, a rational analysis of the ideological and historical foundations, as well as the dynamics of the development of opposing value positions, is necessary. (shrink)

Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed (...) as person-affecting in a weaker sense. Thirdly, it is possible to construct a Relational version of the Priority View which incorporates the Egalitarian value of just equality in this sense. Two reasons are given for why this Relational View and Egalitarianism are superior to the Parfitian Absolute Priority View. However, no attempt is made to abjudicate between the first two views, the main point being that they both accept the value of just equality in the same sense. (shrink)

As priority setting committees become commonplace in contemporary welfare states, it becomes increasingly important to understand how they operate. This article contributes to our understanding of contemporary priority setting by examining how the Danish Medicines Council (DMC) makes and justifies its decisions, as well as the role of different (and perhaps conflicting) concerns and values in these decisions. We conducted seventeen interviews with DMC members and observed three DMC meetings spanning five days. Firstly, we find that health-related effect (...) is the most crucial factor in DMC members’ recommendations of newly proposed medicines and that discussions of effects take precedence over other considerations in council deliberations. Secondly, we find that the ability of DMC members to adequately assess the effect of newly proposed medicines is often significantly limited by poor data quality and a lack of sufficient documentation, which shifts the DMC’s task from making recommendations on an informed basis to providing estimated assessments of the expected effect. In these circumstances of uncertainty about effect, recommendations are influenced by considerations such as the age of patients and the rarity of the disease. This raises significant moral issues in which the DMC has no particular expertise. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of the normative basis of priority setting in health care as combining the values which a given society holds for the common good of its members, with the universal provided by a principle of common humanity. We discuss national differences in health basket in Europe and argue that health care decision-making in complex social and moral frameworks is best thought of as anchored in such a principle by drawing on the philosophy of need. We (...) show that health care needs are ethically ‘thick’ needs whose psychological and social construction can best be understood in terms of David Wiggins’s notion of vital need: a person’s need is vital when failure to meet it leads to their harm and suffering. The moral dimension of priority setting which operates across different societies’ health care systems is located in the demands both of and on any society to avoid harm to its members. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of the normative basis of priority setting in health care as combining the values which a given society holds for the common good of its members, with the universal provided by a principle of common humanity. We discuss national differences in health basket in Europe and argue that health care decision-making in complex social and moral frameworks is best thought of as anchored in such a principle by drawing on the philosophy of need. We (...) show that health care needs are ethically ‘thick’ needs whose psychological and social construction can best be understood in terms of David Wiggins’s notion of vital need: a person’s need is vital when failure to meet it leads to their harm and suffering. The moral dimension of priority setting which operates across different societies’ health care systems is located in the demands both of and on any society to avoid harm to its members. (shrink)

I develop the recent claim that prioritarianism, and not only its egalitarian competitors, must be committed to an impersonal outcome value (i. e. a value that makes a distribution better even if this does not affect anyone’s welfare). This value, that I label telic priority and that consists in the goodness of benefits going to the worst off recipients, implies implausible judgments that more than compete with ‘pure’ (Parfit) egalitarianism’s applause in leveling down scenarios. ‘Pure prioritarianism’, (...) an axiological theory that would consist in an unqualified commitment to telic priority only, must therefore be developed into a pluralist version of the priority view. Contra Parfit, prioritarianism and egalitarianism are on a par concerning the relationship between their pure (and implausible) formulations and their pluralist (and plausible) versions. The final section explains why telic priority always assigns preference to the worst-off (and not merely to the worse-off). (shrink)

It is now commonly held that values play a role in scientific judgment, but many arguments for that conclusion are limited. First, many arguments do not show that values are, strictly speaking, indispensable. The role of values could in principle be filled by a random or arbitrary decision. Second, many arguments concern scientific theories and concepts which have obvious practical consequences, thus suggesting or at least leaving open the possibility that abstruse sciences without such a connection could be value-free. (...) Third, many arguments concern the role values play in inferring from evidence, thus taking evidence as given. This paper argues that these limitations do not hold in general. There are values involved in every scientific judgment. They cannot even conceivably be replaced by a coin toss, they arise as much for exotic as for practical sciences, and they are at issue as much for observation as for explicit inference. (shrink)

This article seeks to defend prioritarianism against a pair of challenges from Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve. Otsuka and Voorhoeve first argue that prioritarianism makes implausible recommendations in one-person cases under conditions of risk, as it fails to allow that it is reasonable to act to maximize expected utility, rather than expected weighted benefits, in such cases. I show that, in response, prioritarians can either reject Otsuka and Voorhoeve's claim, by means of appealing to a distinction between personal and impersonal (...) value, or alternatively they can harmlessly accommodate it, by means of appealing to the status of prioritarianism as a view about the moral value of outcomes, rather than as an account of all-things-considered reasonable action. Otsuka and Voorhoeve secondly claim that prioritarianism fails to explain a divergence in our considered moral judgement between one-person and many-person cases. I show that the prioritarian has two alternative, and independently plausible, lines of response to this charge, one more concessive and the other more unyielding. Hence, neither of Otsuka and Voorhoeve's challenges need seriously trouble the prioritarian. (shrink)

Drawing from such diverse sources as Aristotle and Patrisse Khan-Cullors, Wolflink argues that abstractions of value discourse have been complicit in devaluing the lives of women, queer people, and people of color. Yet value claims nevertheless hold democratic potential.

Judgement internalism claims that our evaluative judgements will motivate us to act appropriately, at least in so far as we are rational. I examine how this claim should be understood, with particular focus on whether valuing enjoys a kind of 'normative priority' over desiring. I consider and reject views according to which valuing something provides one with a reason to be moved; this claim of normative priority and the readings of internalism it suggests are too strong. I also (...) reject an interpretation which eschews claims of normative priority, whilst maintaining that valuing nevertheless rationally commits or requires one to be motivated; this rejection of normative priority and the reading of internalism it supports are too weak. In the final sections I sketch the understanding of judgement internalism I favour, and defend it against objections. (shrink)

With the limited initial availability of COVID-19 vaccines in the first months of 2021, decision-makers had to determine the order in which different groups were prioritized. Our aim was to find out what normative approaches to the allocation of scarce preventive resources were embedded in the national COVID-19 vaccination schedules. We systematically reviewed and compared prioritization regulations in 27 members of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Israel. We differentiated between two types of priority categories: groups that have (...) increased infection fatality rate (IFR) compared to the average for the general population and groups chosen because their members experience increased risk of being infected (ROI). Our findings show a clear trend: all researched schedules prioritized criteria referring to IFR (being over 65 years old and coexisting health conditions) over the ROI criteria (eg occupation and housing conditions). This is surprising since, in the context of treatment, it is common and justifiable to adopt different allocation principles (eg introducing a saving more life-year approach or prioritizing younger patients). We discuss how utilitarian, prioritarian, and egalitarian principles can be applied to interpret normative differences between the allocation of curative and preventive interventions. (shrink)

Priority setting in health care means making distributional decisions, which inherently involves limiting access to some health services. Public health ethics involves many ethical principles like efficiency, equity and individual choice, which are frequently appealed to but rarely analysed. How these concepts are understood and applied impacts on healthcare planning and delivery policies. This article discusses findings of a research study undertaken in the context of the Iranian health system in which two main ethical values appear to be operating: (...) equity and personal choice. It asserts that the pro-market perspective, driven by individual choice appears to be dominant as it is influenced by the powerful medical profession. This is despite egalitarian intentions proclaimed in the Constitution and the majority of national laws. The study argues that the market influence in healthcare priority setting is unlikely to diminish because of weak implementation of existing laws. In conclusion, the article suggests that the private health sector could help to achieve the state’s proclaimed egalitarian goals only if new regulatory systems and new systems of governance are implemented. Such measures should be aimed at monitoring and controlling the performance of the private sector, to better manage and harness its capacities. (shrink)

Leading versions of hedonism generate implausible results about the welfare value of very intense or unwanted pleasures, while recent versions of desire satisfactionism overvalue the fulfillment of desires associated with compulsions and addictions. Consequently, both these theories fail to satisfy a plausible condition of adequacy for theories of well-being proposed by L.W. Sumner: they do not make one’s well-being depend on one’s own cares or concerns. But Sumner’s own life-satisfaction theory cannot easily be extended to explain welfare over time, (...) and it makes mistaken (autonomous, informed) self-assessment impossible. A new account of well-being based on the stable realization of personal values enjoys the advantages claimed for these subjective theories while avoiding these problems. (shrink)

Adam Sedgwick's complaint that Darwin's rejection of final causes indicated a "demoralized understanding" cannot easily be dismissed: if nothing happens because it should, our opinions about what is morally beautiful are no more than projections. Darwin was carrying out an Enlightenment project — to exclude final causes or God's purposes from science because we could not expect to know what they were. That abandonment of final causes was an episode in religious history, a reaction against complacent idolatry, an attempt to (...) purify the soul. By not moralizing the universe we were to be released to see the beauty in all its parts, and in the whole, and so to acknowledge our own selves as fragments or facets of a cosmos whose value transcends our petty purposes. Unfortunately, later thinkers, forgetful of the priority of value (both in human life and in the universe at large), supposed that merely material causes could and (weirdly) should explain away the very recognition of value which drives us and the world. If Darwin had been right — if we value what we do solely because our ancestors somehow outbred their cousins — there could be no authority in science, nor any real distinction between savages and sages (except, no doubt, that savages have more descendants). If he is wrong, then the way is open to consider that archetypes and values, as partial realizations of the single, simple, transcendent One, have had an effect on Nature as well as on our attitudes. The 'moral', so to speak, is always breaking in on the 'material', and always losing its way, to be renewed again. The real explanation of the world's existence, and of life's, is that God wills it so. This does not enable us to predict what else He wills, any more than Darwinian theory itself can actually predict in anything but the broadest, emptiest of terms. Without an appeal to that, broadly Platonic, picture there can be no genuine explanation of the world's variety, nor any duty to seek one. (shrink)

One of the chief problems of the American environmental movement is the definition of philosophy—the exploration, examination, and elucidation of ideas—of the many different causes that have been combined in it. In this book Joseph Petulla sorts out the various issues and concepts of environmentalism by tracing their inspiration and values from the three traditions of environmental thought—the biocentric, the ecologic, and the economic. He examines the movement's historical roots, assumptions, goals, values, politics, struggles, successes, limitations, trends, and, finally, the (...) priorities it has brought to the national consciousness. This disentangling, clarifying process involves political implications and judgments about the recent directions of the environmental movement. Absolutist assumptions and methodologies often lead environmentalists and their opponents into conflict, yet even conflict groups must live with each other in the natural world, and that natural world must be understood by reason. This book attempts to establish wider ethical understanding and a political basis for support of environmentalism by promoting rational discussion about increasingly important subjects. (shrink)

1. When we face a choice among conflicting actions, it is necessary to prioritize one action over others. This paper explores the issue of whether there is a universal priority, and if so, how we c...

Using a sample of over 700 business people and students, this study tested the premise of promise-keeping as a core ethical value in the work place.The exercise consisted of in-basket planning for layoffs within an organization. Only one of the five employees within the group had been given an express commitment/promise of continued employment for a two year period. The layoffs were being considered six months after the two year promise had been made. All five employees were performing their (...) jobs adequately, and each had either personal or work attributes representing competing values that would have made it difficult to choose among them.Clearly, promise-keeping does not matter most in the workplace: subjects overwhelmingly ignored their promises even when legally bound to keep them. Further, promise-keeping consistently was found to rank last in a hierarchy of workplace values. The legal system was suggested as a viable mechanism for encouraging promise-keeping in the workplace. Although the possibility of legal sanctions increased the frequency with which promises were kept, overall fewer than one-third (30%) of the subjects kept their word. Of those respondents who expressly were told that the promise was legally enforceable, the number who stated that they would keep their promise increased to 57%. (shrink)

An important distinction lies between consciousness attributed to creatures, or subjects, (creature consciousness) and consciousness attributed to mental states (state consciousness). Most contemporary theories of consciousness aim at explaining what makes a mental state conscious, paying scant attention to the problem of creature consciousness. This attitude relies on a deeper, and generally overlooked, assumption that once an explanation of state consciousness is provided, one has also explained all the relevant features of creature consciousness. I call this the priority of (...) state consciousness thesis (PSC). In this paper, I want to explore how the renewed centrality bestowed to phenomenology in contemporary discussions on consciousness challenges PSC and, consequently, the standard way of framing the problem of consciousness. More precisely, I examine PSC in light of a view about the structure of phenomenal character that is paradigmatic of the approach above. This is subjectivism about phenomenal character (SUBJ), according to which a mental state is conscious when it acquires the property of for-me-ness. I argue that PSC and SUBJ are incompatible because the latter implies that creature consciousness is explanatorily prior to state consciousness. Consequently, if SUBJ is true, then PSC is false, and what constitutes the problem of consciousness is primarily a problem of explaining (a kind of) creature consciousness. I conclude by defending my claim from a pair of possible objections and drawing some implications for the discussion of for-me-ness and the debate on the explanation of consciousness. (shrink)

Using a sample of over 700 business people and students, this study tested the premise of promise-keeping as a core ethical value in the work place.The exercise consisted of in-basket planning for layoffs within an organization. Only one of the five employees within the group had been given an express commitment/promise of continued employment for a two year period. The layoffs were being considered six months after the two year promise had been made. All five employees were performing their (...) jobs adequately, and each had either personal or work attributes representing competing values that would have made it difficult to choose among them. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show how certain approaches in Values Based Practice duplicate key moves in liberal political theory.

How should scarce healthcare resources be distributed? This is a contentious issue that became especially pressing during the pandemic. It is often emphasised that studies exploring public views about this question provide valuable input to the issue of healthcare priority setting. While there has been a vast number of such studies it is rarely articulated, more specifically, what the results from these studies would mean for the justification of principles for priority setting. On the one hand, it seems (...) unreasonable that public values would straightforwardly decide the ethical question of how resources should be distributed. On the other hand, in a democratic society, it seems equally unreasonable that they would be considered irrelevant for this question. In this paper we draw on the notion of reflective equilibrium and discuss the relevance and roles that empirical studies may plausibly have for justification in priority setting ethics. We develop a framework for analysing how different kinds of empirical results may have different kinds of implications for justification. (shrink)

Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and health authorities are increasingly recognising the need for priority setting guidelines to ensure efficient, fair, and equitable resource allocation. While cost-effectiveness concerns seem to dominate many policies, the tension between utilitarian and deontological concerns is salient to many, and various severity criteria appear to fill this gap. Severity, then, must be subjected to rigorous ethical and philosophical analysis. Here we first give a brief history of the path to today’s severity (...) criteria in Norway and Sweden. The Scandinavian perspective on severity might be conducive to the international discussion, given its long-standing use as a priority setting criterion, despite having reached rather different conclusions so far. We then argue that severity can be viewed as a multidimensional concept, drawing on accounts of need, urgency, fairness, duty to save lives, and human dignity. Such concerns will often be relative to local mores, and the weighting placed on the various dimensions cannot be expected to be fixed. Thirdly, we present what we think are the most pertinent questions to answer about severity in order to facilitate decision making in the coming years of increased scarcity, and to further the understanding of underlying assumptions and values that go into these decisions. We conclude that severity is poorly understood, and that the topic needs substantial further inquiry; thus we hope this article may set a challenging and important research agenda. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to consider the role that values play in priority setting through the use of EBP. It is important to be clear about the role of values at all levels of the decision making process. At one level, society as a whole has to make decisions about the kind of health provision that it wants. As is generally accepted, these priority setting questions cannot be answered by medical science alone but involve important judgements (...) of value. However, as I hope to show values come into priority setting questions at another level, one not often explicitly recognised in much of the literature: that of the very definition of the effectiveness of treatments. This has important consequences for patient care. If we do not recognise that the effectiveness of a treatment involve subjective elements — a patient's own assessment of the value of the treatment — then this could lead to the belief that we can purchase one treatment that is the most effective for all patients. This might result in a detrimental reduction in the range of options that a patient is given with some patients not receiving the treatment that is most effective for them. (shrink)

Michael Otsuka, Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey have challenged the priority view in favour of a theory based on competing claims. The present paper shows how their argument can be used to recast the priority view. All desert claims in distributive justice are comparative. The stronger a party’s claims to a given benefit, the greater is the value of her receiving it. Ceteris paribus, the worse-off have stronger claims on welfare, and benefits to them matter more. This (...) can account for intuitions that at first appear egalitarian, as the analysis of an example of Larry Temkin’s shows. The priority view, properly understood, is desert-adjusted utilitarianism under the assumption that no other claims pertain. (shrink)

Philosophers commonly make claims about the aims of science, and these claims have played a significant role in debates about topics like scientific realism, modeling, and idealization. Nevertheless, there has been little discussion about the basis for those aims or the source of justification for claims about those aims. We use recent debates about the appropriate roles for values in science to bring this lack of discussion to the fore. These debates raise the question of whether there are global aims (...) that apply to all areas of science. In response to this question, we examine a variety of different ways of conceptualizing the aims of science and conclude that no matter how one conceptualizes them, there do not appear to be convincing arguments for the view that science has global aims that constrain the influence of local aims on scientific practice. Thus, we place the burden of proof on those who claim that science has one or more global aims of this sort to show how those aims can be justified. Furthermore, we develop an account of scientific normativity that relies solely on local aims. When applied to debates about values in science, this view vindicates the cogency of what we call an “equal aims” approach to managing roles for values in science. Abandoning global aims might seem to raise the potential for epistemic corruption in science, but we argue that this concern is not compelling. We conclude that a local conception of scientific aims provides the foundation for a highly naturalized and engaged approach to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Rawls offers three arguments for the priority of liberty in Theory, two of which share a common error: the belief that once we have shown the instrumental value of the basic liberties for some essential purpose (e.g., securing self-respect), we have automatically shown the reason for their lexical priority. The third argument, however, does not share this error and can be reconstructed along Kantian lines: beginning with the Kantian conception of autonomy endorsed by Rawls in section 40 (...) of Theory, we can explain our highest-order interest in rationality, justify the lexical priority of all basic liberties, and reinterpret Rawls’ threshold condition for the application of the priority of liberty. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this Kantian reconstruction will not work within the radically different framework of Political Liberalism. (shrink)

Libertarian views on rights tend to rule out coercive redistribution for purposes of public health care guarantees, whereas liberal conceptions support coercive funding of potentially unlimited access to medical services in the name of medical needs. Taking the “priority of liberty” seriously as supreme political value, a plausible prudential argument can avoid these extremes by providing systematic reasons for both delivering and limiting publicly financed guarantees. Given impending demographic change and rapid technical progress in medicine, only a two-tier (...) system with explicitly limited public guarantees and optional privately financed health services seems acceptable. (shrink)

One‐third of all human deaths are due to poverty‐related causes, to malnutrition and to diseases that can be prevented or cured cheaply. Yet our politicians, academics, and mass media show little concern for how such poverty might be reduced. They are more interested in possible military interventions to stop human rights violations in developing countries, even though such interventions – at best – produce smaller benefits at greater cost. This Western priority may be rooted in self‐interest. But it engenders, (...) and is sustained by, a deeply flawed moral presentation of global economic cooperation. The new global economic order we impose aggravates global inequality and reproduces severe poverty on a massive scale. On any plausible understanding of our moral values, the prevention of such poverty is our foremost responsibility. (shrink)

This article analyzes some aspects of the modern Ukrainian values, including religion and religiosity in the system of values and priorities in life. It describes the relationship between religious self-identification and some of their values and philosophical positions. It is concluded that the primary value in contemporary Ukrainian society, regardless of religious self-identify, is a family. Having faith is a kind of internal moral and ethical code. According to empirical indicators of people who consider themselves believers, they are more (...) responsible towards institute of family. Individuals with certain religious beliefs, compared to non-believers are more negative towards social issues such as bribery, using office, prostitution, homosexuality, drug addiction and have higher moral expectation for their own behavior. (shrink)

: The move from a notion that community values ought to play a role in health care decision making to the creation of health care policies that in some way reflect such values is a challenging one. No single method will adequately measure community values in a way appropriate for setting health care priorities. Consequently, multiple methods to measure community values should be employed, thereby allowing the strengths and weaknesses of the various methods to complement each other. A preliminary research (...) agenda to bring together empirical research on community values with more traditional research on health care ethics is outlined, with the goal of identifying and measuring acceptable community values that are relatively consistent across measurement methods and, ultimately, developing ways to incorporate these values into health care priority decision making. (shrink)

자유의 우선성은 자유의 개념적 지위를 공고히 하기 위한 롤스의 독창적인 장치다. 그러나 자유의 우선성은 여러 학자에 의해 도전받는다. 이러한 비판이 첫째, 나름의 논리적 인 근거를 지니고 둘째, 롤스 정치철학의 본질적인 주제에 영향을 끼친다면 이에 대한 대 응은 롤스 정치철학의 설득력을 좌우하게 될 것이다. 이에 본 고는 2장에서 논의의 배경으 로서 자유의 우선성 개념을 살피고 원조 격인 비판을 탐구한다. 다음으로 3장에서는 자유 의 우선성 비판의 평등주의적 해석을 탐구한다. 평등주의 진영에서는 자유의 우선성 비판 을 평등주의적으로 해석하여 롤스 이론의 평등주의적 색채가 희석되었음을 지적하고 (...) 그 대안을 제시한다. 뒤이어 4장에서는 정치적 자유의 공정한 가치를 활용하여 자유의 우선 성 비판의 평등주의적 해석에 대응할 수 있음을 보인다. 특히 평등주의 진영이 내놓은 3장 의 대안보다 정치적 자유의 공정한 가치를 재조명하는 것이 롤스 정치철학의 평등주의적 함의와 자유의 우선성 개념의 공존에 유리함을 논증한다. 마지막으로 5장에서는 정치적 자유의 공정한 가치는 제도적으로 보완되어야만 현실에서 유의미하게 받아들여질 수 있으 며 정치적 전회 이후 차등의 원칙의 역할이 축소되었다는 비판은 여전히 해결되지 않았음 을 본 고의 한계로 남긴다. (shrink)

Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential (...) considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science. (shrink)

All health care systems face problems of justice and efficiency related to setting priorities for allocating a limited pool of resources to a population. Because many of the central issues are the same in all systems, the United States and other countries can learn from the successes and failures of countries that have explicitly addressed the question of health care priorities. We review explicit priority setting efforts in Norway, Sweden, Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and (...) the state of Oregon in the US. The approaches used can be divided into those centered on outlining principles versus those that define practices. In order to establish the main lessons from their experiences we consider the process each country used, criteria to judge the success of these efforts, which approaches seem to have met these criteria, and using their successes and failures as a guide, how to proceed in setting priorities. We demonstrate that there is little evidence that establishment of a values framework for priority setting has had any effect on health policy, nor is there evidence that priority setting exercises have led to the envisaged ideal of an open and participatory public involvement in decision making. (shrink)

Recently theorists have demonstrated a growing interest in the ethical aspects of resource allocation in international non-governmental humanitarian, development and human rights organizations (INGOs). This article provides an analysis of Thomas Pogge's proposal for how international human rights organizations ought to choose which projects to fund. Pogge's allocation principle states that an INGO should govern its decision making about candidate projects by such rules and procedures as are expected to maximize its long-run cost-effectiveness, defined as the expected aggregate moral (...) class='Hi'>value of the projects it undertakes divided by the expected aggregate cost of these projects? I critique Pogge's argument on two fronts: (1) I demonstrate that his view is problematic on his own terms, even if we accept the cost-effectiveness framework he employs. (2) I take issue with his overall approach because it generates results which can undermine the integrity of INGOs. Further, his approach mis-characterizes the nature of INGOs, and this mistake is at the root of his problematic view of INGO priority-setting. Ultimately, I argue for a conception of INGOs in which they are understood as ?organizations of principle?, in the sense that they are independent moral agents and so should be permitted a fairly wide sphere of autonomy within reasonable moral constraints. (shrink)