Call the following claim Asymmetry: rationality often requires a more steadfast response to pure moral disagreement than it does to otherwise analogous non-moral disagreement. This paper briefly motivates Asymmetry and explores its implications for meta-ethics. Some philosophers have thought that anti-realists are better-placed than realists to explain Asymmetry because, if anti-realism is true, disagreement cannot provide evidence against the reliability of one's thinking about objective moral facts. This paper argues that this simple diagnosis fails to support otherwise plausible anti-realisms. It (...) closes by discussing an alternative explanation for Asymmetry, which appeals to the moral importance of steadfastness. (shrink)

Recently, Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this paper, I show that when we clearly distinguish among several types of Permissivism, Permissivism\, and Permissivism\), we (...) can see that any type of Permissivism fits well with steadfast attitudes. Further, even though Levinstein’s ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle’ does rule out a possibility for some types of Permissivism and Permissivism\), it is still compatible with the other type of Permissivism ), so we may regard at least that version of a deference principle as a viable position in connection with that particular type of permissive rationality. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Steadfast Views of peer disagreement – a family of views according to which standing firm in the face of peer disagreement can be rationally permissible -- are incoherent. First, I articulate two constraints that any Steadfast Views of disagreement should endorse: (i) Steadfastness’s Core (ii) The Deference Principle. I show that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent: they cannot both be true. My argument, briefly put, is that one cannot rationally treat one’s peer’s opinion (...) as unconditionally relevant to a hypothesis, H, but conditional on the supposition of a disagreement, irrelevant to H. Because Steadfast Views endorse a set of mutually inconsistent propositions, I conclude that Steadfast Views are incoherent. (shrink)

According to conciliatory views about peer disagreement, both peers must accord their disagreeing peer some weight, and move towards him. Non‐conciliatory views allow one peer, the one who responded correctly to the evidence, to remain steadfast. In this paper, I consider the suggestion that it may be rational for both disagreeing peers to hold steadfastly to their opinion. To this end, I contend with arguments adduced against the permissiveness the supposition involves, and identify some ways in which different responses for (...) different agents to the evidence might be reasonable. (shrink)

In this paper we consider a puzzle concerning Hume's account of time and what he calls “steadfast unchanging objects”—that is, unchanging objects coexisting with temporal successions. On the one hand, Hume maintains that steadfast unchanging objects are temporally indivisible. On the other, he allows that such unchanging objects are capable of undergoing a determinate number of alterations in a given length of time, which seems to imply that they are at least potentially temporally divisible. After arguing that Donald Baxter's influential (...) interpretation of Hume's theory of time cannot resolve this tension, we propose that Hume offers a skeptical resolution of the difficulty. (shrink)

Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundamental convictions than it does for our ordinary beliefs. Why is this? This essay explores three answers to this question: web-of-belief conservatism, moral encroachment, and hinge theories, and argues that hinge theories do a better job than the alternatives at vindicating the intuition that there is a rationally permissible asymmetry in our responses to disagreements over ordinary beliefs and fundamental convictions. The essay also shows how hinge theorists (...) can explain the existence of moral hinge propositions, which enables them to account for the rational permissibility of being steadfast in response to disagreements over fundamental moral convictions. (shrink)

The problem of religious disagreement between epistemic peers is a potential threat to the epistemic justification of one’s theistic belief. In this paper, I develop a response to this problem which draws on the central epistemological thesis of skeptical theism concerning our inability to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for permitting evil. I suggest that this thesis may extend over to our judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, and that when it does so, it can enable theists to remain (...) steadfast amid disagreement with epistemic peers who hold a contrary theistic belief (i.e., atheistic belief). For if we’re unable to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, then for all we know, God has some reason for not revealing Himself to our apparent epistemic peer. Thus, their epistemic credentials needn’t provide reason to reduce one’s confidence to such a degree as to no longer uphold one’s theistic belief. (shrink)

An important principle in the epistemology of disagreement is Independence, which states, “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P” (Christensen 2011, 1-2). I present a series of new counterexamples to both Independence and also a revised, more widely applicable, version of it. I then (...) formulate and endorse a third version of Independence that avoids those counterexamples. Lastly, I show how this third version of Independence reveals two new ways one may remain steadfast in the face of two real life disagreements: one about God’s existence and one about moral realism. (shrink)

Hume argues that there are steadfast objects - objects not themselves successions at all, yet which co-exist with successions. Given Hume's account of moments as abstractions from temporal simples, there being steadfast objects entails there being single moments that co-exist with successions of moments. Thus time is more like a wall of variously sized bricks than like a line. I formalize the assumptions behind this surprising view, in order to make sense of it and in order to show that it (...) is consistent. I note also that this view justifies the common-sense assumptions that time flows and is unlike space. (shrink)

Current responses to the question of how one should adjust one’s beliefs in response to peer disagreement have, in general, formed a spectrum at one end of which sit the so-called ‘conciliatory’ views and whose other end is occupied by the ‘steadfast’ views. While the conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that one is required to make doxastic conciliation when faced with an epistemic peer who holds a different stance on a particular subject, the steadfast views allow us to maintain our (...) confidence in our relevant beliefs. My aim in this paper is not to adjudicate between these views. Rather, I shall focus on a particular strategy, namely, denying the appearance of epistemic symmetry between peers, that the steadfast views standardly invoke in support of their position. Having closely examined certain representative examples of the steadfast approach, I will argue that this strategy is fundamentally flawed. (shrink)

Some moral propositions are so obviously true that we refuse to doubt them, even where we believe that many people disagree. Following Fritz and McPherson, I call our behaviour in such cases ‘moral steadfastness’. In this paper, I argue for two metaethical implications of moral steadfastness. I first argue that morally steadfast behaviour is sufficiently prevalent to present an important challenge for some prominent analogies between moral epistemology and non‐moral forms of epistemology. These analogies are often pressed by (...) moral realists. I then argue that moral quasi‐realism, unlike realism, can explain and vindicate our presumption that moral steadfastness is frequently rational. On the assumption that we frequently act as it is rational to act, quasi‐realism is therefore well placed to explain why we are so frequently morally steadfast. I conclude that this is an important respect in which quasi‐realism is explanatorily preferable to realism. (shrink)

For Descartes, duration is an attribute of everything that takes up time. Things with duration have successive temporal parts. Hume agrees that duration entails succession. However, his skeptical empiricism constrains him from attributing duration to everything that takes up time. To all appearances, some things—steadfast objects—take up time without being successive. Seeing Hume’s idiosyncratic view as a successor to Descartes’s under skeptical empiricist constraints makes Hume’s easier to understand and appreciate.

It is sometimes said that faith is recalcitrant in the face of new evidence, but it is puzzling how such recalcitrance could be rational or laudable. I explain this aspect of faith and why faith is not only rational, but in addition serves an important purpose in human life. Because faith requires maintaining a commitment to act on the claim one has faith in, even in the face of counter-evidence, faith allows us to carry out long-term, risky projects that we (...) might otherwise abandon. Thus, faith allows us to maintain integrity over time. (shrink)

In recent years, epistemologists have devoted enormous attention to this question: what should happen when two epistemic peers disagree about the truth-value of some proposition? Some have argued that that in all such cases, both parties are rationally required to revise their position in some way. Others have maintained that, in at least some cases, neither party is rationally required to revise her position. In this paper, I examine a provocative and under-appreciated argument for the latter view due to Elgin (...) Disagreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 53–68, 2010; The Philosopher’s Magazine, fourth quarter, pp 77–82, 2012; True enough, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017; in: Johnson Voicing dissent: the ethics and epistemology of making disagreement public, Routledge, New York, pp 10–21, 2018). I defend it against a series of objections, and I then identify some fruitful ways in which her view could be developed further. (shrink)

What is the rational response to disagreement with an epistemic peer? Some say the steadfast response of holding on to your own belief can be rational; others argue that some degree of conciliation is always rationally required. I argue that only an epistemological externalist about rationality—someone who holds that the rationality of a belief is partly constituted by factors outside a subject’s cognitive perspective—can defend the steadfast view. Or at least that this is so in the kinds of idealized cases (...) of peer disagreement that take center stage in the current debate about disagreement. The argument has three steps. First, I show how rationality internalism motivates conciliationism: in view of the mutually recognized internal epistemic symmetry between peers, it would be arbitrary for either peer to hold on to her own belief. Second, I strengthen this line of thought by considering various proposed ‘symmetry breakers’ that appear to introduce a relevant asymmetry between peers, which could be used to defend the rationality of a steadfast response. I argue that none of these alleged symmetry breakers can help internalists. Third, I show how externalism does have the resources to defend steadfastness and expose how extant defenses of steadfastness implicitly rely on externalist intuitions. (shrink)

Paul frequently refers to the traditions of his ancestors as ‘the scriptures’, or with introductory formula such as ‘it is written’. Such references have often been taken as self-explanatory in that it was assumed that these were references to the writings which in Jewish and Christian tradition have acquired the status of canonicity. Since such a perception of the scriptures as canonical is anachronistic for the first century, the question needs to be asked to what does Paul actually refer when (...) he refers to the Scriptures. Which parts of which canon encompassed ‘the holy scriptures’ which Paul refers to e.g. in Rom 1:2? In addition to issues of divergent interpretations of scriptural texts could there also have been issues under debate concerning which written traditions were perceived as ‘scripture’? The issue of the fluidity of the collection as well as of the text deemed ‘holy’ in first-century Judaism has an impact on the question of how the authority of such a collection is perceived, particularly since Paul clearly aims at enculturating gentile Christ-followers into the world of the Scriptures. The mysterious reference in 1 Cor. 2:9 is explored as a test case for Paul’s understanding of the collection and text which he deemed to be ‘scripture’. (shrink)

Choo and Pittard recently have presented new attractive incommensurability arguments for remaining steadfast in religious beliefs even when disagreeing with sophisticated disputants. This article responds to the latest iteration of this genre in the work of Choo, and does double duty evaluating more generally the merits of this genre, which is becoming increasingly more popular since originally championed by Alston. Both Choo and Alston argue that it is reasonable to stay steadfast in one’s religious beliefs when there are no commensurable (...) ways of evaluating the disputant’s claims. This paper first describes four views about disagreement that inform Choo’s conclusion, one of which is the incommensurability argument similarly championed by Alston. Incommensurability arguments are attractive, but, when deployed in the most challenging disagreements, ultimately complacent. (shrink)

In the literature on John Locke’s metaphysics of space and time, there is a near-consensus that his views undergo a radical evolution. In the 1670s, Locke holds relationism, but, by the first, 1690 edition of Locke’s _Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, Locke has adopted Newtonian absolutism. This chapter argues for an alternative reading, on which Locke’s _Essay_ is explicitly neutral or non-committal with regard to the ontology of space and time, and yet there is reason to believe that the _Essay_ implicitly (...) preserves Locke’s earlier relationism. As well as challenging the existing scholarship, this chapter excavates another form of pre-Leibnizian relationism, and which may be of interest to twenty-first-century relationists; and provides ammunition to anti-Newtonian readings of Locke more generally. (shrink)

This paper explores belief-less, credence-based faith. I argue that such faith is both possible and plausible. After outlining some relevant background, I motivate the idea that faith can be grounded in credence rather than belief. I argue that if the contemporary view is correct that faith does not entail full belief, then credence-based faith offers a natural—perhaps the most natural—alternative picture. I then consider and respond to several objections, concerning thresholds (how high must one’s credence be for faith?), stability (can (...) credence-based faith preserve faith’s steadfastness?), error possibilities (would such faith be overly focused on the possibility of error?), and taking a stand (does credence take a stand in the way require for faith?). (shrink)

Argumentation is often conceived as a rational response to disagreement, even when it does not resolve differences of opinion. Arguing in the face of disagreement has, however, distinctive epistemic effects. Sometimes argumentation achieves convergence of opinion or at least the mutual recognition that a more thorough inquiry is required. But facing disagreement, participants of argumentative exchanges quite often remain steadfast in their initial views or even radicalize them. Can we make sense of these latter situations? To account for their occurrence, (...) it is common to point out that people’s ability to argue is flawed, that an “argumentative culture” is lacking, and that emotional and other non-rational factors often interfere in confrontative situations. But these suggestions do not amount to a thorough satisfactory explanation. In this paper, I provide the outline of a purely epistemic account of these peculiar effects of argumentation in the face of disagreement. I argue that probabilistic models of degrees of confidence (or “credences”) can shed light on the conditions that give rise to several of these effects. This could provide some guidance on how to avoid them. (shrink)

Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or ‘sticking to one's guns’ in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual humility, (...) courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectual humility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectual humility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective. (shrink)

Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or “sticking to one’s guns” in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual humility, (...) courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectual humility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectual humility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective. keywords: disagreement, conciliationism, steadfastness, intellectual humility, courage, actively open-minded thinking. (shrink)

This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing (...) party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast. (shrink)

In the late 1930s Heidegger makes allusions to?the wild? and?the mild? in connection with a human liberation that he understands as a steadfast response to the claim that historical being (Seyn) makes upon us. The following paper elucidates these allusions in terms of the overturning of metaphysics that they entail.

This paper examines religious disagreements between epistemic peers—individuals with equal cognitive capacities—focusing on the two dominant responses: conciliationism and steadfastness. While conciliationism advocates for a moderate attitude towards epistemic peers and revising one’s beliefs in case of disagreement, steadfastness argues that it is rational for an individual to maintain their current beliefs. I argue that conciliationism faces serious epistemic challenges, rendering it an unsustainable position. Building on a novel account of steadfastness, this study contends that retaining one’s (...) belief in religious peer disagreement is rational if the following four conditions are met: (i) the believer’s evidence continues to support their belief within their interpretive and epistemic framework (independent justification); (ii) no genuine defeater undermines the belief either by rebutting it directly or undercutting the reliability of the evidence (absence of genuine defeat); (iii) the believer’s confidence remains above a rational threshold appropriate to the stakes of inquiry (confidence threshold);, and (iv) the believer holds a higher-order judgment affirming that their justification remains at least as strong as their peer’s (meta-belief endorsement). By integrating these conditions, the paper demonstrates that conciliationism (a) has a restrictive effects on religious and philosophical inquiry, (b) is internally inconsistent, (c) carries the risk of widespread epistemic uncertainty by opening the way to skepticism, and finally (d) carries the risk of weakening or even eliminating the function of evidence. Consequently, this study argues that this revised steadfastness framework offers a more defensible and epistemically responsible alternative to conciliationism, preserving the integrity of religious, inquiry while upholding the demands of epistemic rationality. (shrink)

This chapter defends the view that an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs. The second section argues that in cases of disagreement about theism, the theist’s evidence for theism and for the reliability of her theistic belief is often strong enough to support steadfastness in the face of disagreement. The third section (...) argues that the theist’s evidence for the reliability of her disputant’s atheistic beliefs is often weak enough to allow her to rationally demote her atheist interlocutor. The final section focuses on theists whose disagreement-based doubts about theism persist. These doubts could result in defeaters for theistic belief, but the gift of faith can compensate for this. (shrink)

There are several proposals to resolve the problem of epistemic peer disagreement which concentrate on the question of how to incorporate evidence of such a disagreement. The main positions in this field are the equal weight view, the steadfast view, and the total evidence view. In this paper we present a new argument in favour of the equal weight view. As we will show, this view results from a general approach of forming epistemic attitudes in an optimal way. By this, (...) the argument for equal weighting can be massively strengthened from reasoning via epistemic indifference to reasoning from optimality. (shrink)

The current debate about disagreement has as rivals those who take the steadfast view and those who affirm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side maintain that resolute commitment to a belief is reasonable despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant for one’s belief. This article discusses the relevance of open‐mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory perspective are consistent with a robust and substantive display of open‐mindedness. However, (...) it also turns out that there are more ways to display open‐mindedness on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view. (shrink)

I assess Wayne Wu's thesis that intention is a form of practical memory functionally analogous to working memory. Wu argues that being active in intention involves vigilance and steadfastness (sustaining attention). I argue that being active in intention also requires strategic management, a distinct process of modulating intention's influence against other sources of bias like habit or emotion. I argue this strategic management (which relies on a particular form of practical reasoning I identify as meta‐reasoning) is not reducible to (...) Wu's concepts of steadfastness or fine‐tuning, and conclude that an agent's activeness in intention involves more than the memory‐like functions Wu identifies. (shrink)

Moral disagreement is often invoked to support skeptical conclusions about moral judgment, typically by modeling it on the epistemology of peer disagreement. On the dominant picture, disagreement with a peer supplies higher-order evidence of error and thereby rationally requires suspension of judgment or a substantial reduction in confidence. We argue that this evidential picture is problematic, especially in the moral domain. First, the conditions for epistemic peerhood are difficult to specify and apply without arbitrariness, and this undermines the assumption that (...) disagreement is a uniform sign of error. Second, even where peerhood conditions are plausible, moral disagreement need not play the specific evidential role presupposed by the skeptical argument. Drawing on resources from social epistemology, we develop an alternative framework on which persistent moral disagreement can function as a structured form of collective inquiry, regulated by argumentative practices and epistemic institutions. On this view, steadfastness is not automatically a sign of epistemic arrogance; under appropriate conditions, it is compatible with epistemic humility, and it can contribute to both epistemic and moral improvement. (shrink)

This paper argues for extreme rational permissivism—the view that agents with identical evidence can rationally believe contradictory hypotheses—and a mild version of steadfastness. Agents can rationally come to different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence because their way of weighing the theoretic virtues may differ substantially. Nevertheless, in the face of disagreement, agents face considerable pressure to reduce their confidence. Indeed, I argue that agents often ought to reduce their confidence in the higher-order propositions that they know (...) or rationally believe disputed content. I argue, however, that when the subject matter is difficult, there is more flexibility for agents to simultaneously believe that p while withholding belief about whether such belief is rational or known. This allows for modest steadfastness on hard questions in, e.g., philosophy and religion. (shrink)

The extent of the current climate crisis can be such as to give rise to existential anxieties for students who confront it: their sense of personal identity, security, agency and place can be disturbed. Some themes that contribute to envisioning an education that would help to equip them in meeting this situation are elucidated. These include the cultivation of a consciousness that is environmental in the sense of being receptive to the intrinsic integrity, value and normativity of the natural world (...) through shedding immoderate anthropocentrism, and the idea of developing a neo-stoic sense of steadfastness and purpose. It is argued that consciousness informed in this way both enables an authentic understanding of the underlying nature of the current climate emergency and indicates the character of a moral compass required in order to sustain a proper response to it. (shrink)

This paper examines two competing strategies for connecting the concept of truth with the phenomenon commonly described as “post-truth.” The first, which I call the Disagreement Approach, draws on Huw Price's argument that truth functions as a substantive epistemic norm governing disagreement. The second, which I develop and defend, is a Value-theoretic Approach. I argue that the Disagreement Approach struggles to account for a phenomenon I call innocent steadfastness and therefore misidentifies the distinctive pathology of post-truth discourse. What characterizes (...) genuinely post-truth steadfastness is not mere persistence in disagreement, but the subordination of truth to competing values, most notably ideological purity or partisan loyalty. I then offer a partial account of how such subordination amounts to a process of normative erosion, weakening a substantive epistemic norm of truth. Finally, I argue that minimalist or purely deflationary accounts of truth face difficulty explaining both this erosion and its political consequences. If post-truth discourse involves the degradation of a genuine epistemic norm, then any adequate theory of truth must be able to account for that norm and its weakening. (shrink)

The introduction by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey briefly explains some of the main themes that have surfaced in the literature on disagreement. It sketches the distinction between “conciliatory/conformist” views and “steadfast/non-conformist” views about the extent to which disagreement with peers should undermine rational confidence in one's opinions. It raises the issue of how one is to evaluate the epistemic credentials of those with whom one disagrees (in particular, whether this needs to be done in a way independent of the (...) relevant dispute), and indicates how this issue interacts with the debate between conciliatory and steadfast views. Finally, it gives a brief tour of the papers in the volume. It divides them into three categories: those focusing on the conciliatory/steadfast dispute, those that concentrate on disagreement about philosophy, and those that address more general theoretical issues that bear on the disagreement debate. (shrink)

A singular figure in the Bhakti movement, Meera Bai (1498−1547) is the only woman among North India’s most revered poet-saints. Her story is one of steadfast spiritual rebellion. Born a Rajput princess in 1498, wedded young, widowed early—Meera Bai refused to fade into the shadows of the palace and the pyre. Instead, she claimed Krishna, the cowherd-god, as her divine lover and composed ardent poetry that defied caste rules, gender norms, and social traditions. Her timeless bhajans resonate as ecstatic love (...) letters to her dark Lord. In this volume, Manjul Bajaj interprets the imagery and symbols, metaphors and motifs of Meera Bai’s hymns for the modern reader and presents seventy-five devotional songs in a fresh and eloquent translation. (shrink)

Do intellectuals have a place in the world of politics? Do hardheaded political figures have any use for eggheads? Do decision and action in critical circumstances require movers and shakers rather than thinkers and deliberators? Such questions permeate (even without direct articulation) Volk's rich study of intellectual life in the late Roman Republic (63 – 43 BCE) and reverberate for decision-makers in contemporary society. The choice of period is perfectly logical: a time of turbulence, fraught with peril, when the very (...) endurance of the republic was in question, yet also an era of abundant scholarly and cultural productivity that has left a continuing legacy. Was this remarkable confluence a happy coincidence or a source of friction and contention?Volk resolves the issue through amalgamation: The major figures on the political scene of the late republic and the leading lights of the intellectual world were largely one and the same. There is much truth to that generalization. Prominent personalities like Cicero, Caesar, Cato, and Brutus were heavily engaged in public policy as well as literary output and philosophical reflection. Such persons eschewed specialization or professionalism. Political life was as central an ingredient in their makeup as their scholarship and their literary contribution. The convergence mattered. And the enterprise was communal. As Volk observes, the dialogues of Cicero that depict intellectual exchanges among these figures, though fictional, represent genuine collective and sustained activities in the network of learned upper-class Romans who also operated at the highest levels of government.In addition to denying any tension between politics and the life of the mind, Volk also relieves the Romans of supposed anxieties about alleged Hellenic cultural ascendancy. There was no inferiority complex that led to anti-intellectualism. Romans not only could do everything that Greeks did but did it better. Late Republican polymaths like Cicero, Varro, and Nigidius Figulus did more than hold their own. And Caesar eclipsed all in the combination of political, military, and literary accomplishment.The sticking point, however, might be philosophy. Learned Romans engaged in it. But how conscientiously and how successfully? Eminent scholars have argued that Roman dabbling in Greek philosophy did not leave a mark on their public principles or policies. Volk, however, makes a strong case for the integration rather than segmentation of these spheres. Cato's Stoicism motivated his convictions and his steadfastness in the public arena, culminating in his suicide, as both moral commitment and display. Cicero's sometimes tortured grappling with alternate political successes and disappointments reflected his embrace of academic skepticism that provided reasoned bases for his shifting political positions. But did not Roman Epicureans have a problem? We can identify more of them than adherents of any other doctrine: Cassius, Piso, Memmius, Pansa, Trebatiius Testa, and others. How could they square their public ambitions and careers with the principles of Epicureanism that stressed quietism, the pleasures of the Garden, and avoidance of the hurly-burly and stresses of political life? How could the ardent Epicurean Cassius bring himself to orchestrate the assassination of Julius Caesar? Some, like Volk, have tried to resolve the contradiction by proposing that Epicureans were not all that rigid. The hedonistic calculus was manipulable. Contingent circumstances allowed for compromises and modifications when called for. Well, yes — but is this a rationalization or a dodge? The resolution remains irresolute. Epicureans do not easily fit the picture. And since Epicureanism seems the dominant creed among philosophical Romans, it makes one wonder about how solid was the integration of philosophy and politics. Cicero's great friend Atticus did indeed succeed in exercising an influential impact in the upper reaches of Roman society while staying true to Epicureanism and staying out of political engagement. But, wealthy, elegant, and accomplished as he was, Atticus did not belong to the senatorial class, and political ambitions would have their limits. Atticus could easily have made his choice on nonphilosophical grounds.After Caesar's victory over Pompey in the civil war and his assumption of the dictatorship, the republic seemed doomed — and so did “the Republic of letters.” There might still be polite epistolary interchanges, and literary debates on public matters, as with the Cato and Anti-Cato dueling treatises. But things were not the same, nor could they have been. Cicero might offer collegial advice to the dictator in speeches and letters on pardoning enemies or retaining some trappings of the republic. But his messages had to be vetted first by Caesarian agents. And when they asked for major changes in a letter, the despondent Cicero simply scrapped the missive. It was a new world. Insofar as there had been a smooth overlap between scholarship and statesmanship, the bonds were now loosened, if not severed. Caesar generously, perhaps disingenuously, praised Cicero's literary skills and style but made it clear that his accomplishments lay in the intellectual sphere, not in the political, where the dictator was dominant. Segmentation eclipsed integration.Volk's intellectual history of the late republic is learned and wide-ranging. In addition to philosophy, it touches on writers and works in chronology, historiography, oratory, political theory, grammar, language, astrology, and religion. The towering figures throughout, however, remain Cicero and Caesar. In terms of interaction and interplay on both intellectual and political fronts, they may, in the end, be more exceptional than representative. But no matter. The brilliant and gifted pair can still serve to define the era. (shrink)

The contemporary interpretation of Lao-Zhuang’s thought reveals a multidimensional dialogue between tradition and modernity, the local and the exotic, and East and West. The interaction between Lao-Zhuang’s thoughts and Western religious philosophy can be explored through the lens of mysticism. By examining the non-material nature of the Tao, the transcendence of language, and the cultivation goal of the unity of nature and humanity, we can discern the relationship between the cultivation practices in Lao-Zhuang’s thought and religious mysticism. The chaos, uncertainty, (...) infinity and nothingness associated with the non-physical Tao present a subtle and mysterious depiction of nature. The silence of the perfect man, who sees things in terms of the Tao, along with their conversion to the Tao, steadfastness to the Tao, flexibility in treating things according to the Tao and freedom to be one with the Tao, provides an ethical realm of inner cultivation. Through the dialogue between Lao-Zhuang’s philosophy and Western religion, we can uncover the commonalities and differences between Chinese and Western cultures, as well as the significant value of Lao-Zhuang’s thought in contemporary cultural and philosophical discussions. Contribution: This article examines the relationship between cultivation practice in Lao-Zhuang’s thought and religious mysticism from the perspective of cross-cultural research. By discussing the immateriality and infinity of ‘Tao,’ as well as the relationship between Tao and name, speech and debate, it presents the mystery of Tao. Through the non-cognitive practice mode of real people, they experience ‘Tao’ and achieve the realm of ‘Harmony between nature and man,’ demonstrating the mystery of cultivation efforts. (shrink)

In these reflections on leadership in Church and State, Frank Brennan states ideals and proposes practical challenges in addresses ranging from his non-partisan Light on the Hill' address to the Australian Labor Party after the 2013 federal election to his address to the representatives of the world's Jesuit universities. He reflects on the leadership of past prime ministers Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser. He offers insights into tested leadership with his ANZAC Centenary Address in the Harvard Memorial Chapel. He challenges (...) church leaders to be more transparent and compassionate in their responses before the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. He draws inspiration from leaders like Pope Francis, El Salvador's Archbishop Oscar Romero and Redfern's Father Ted Kennedy. Frank writes with the conviction that we the people are seeking spiritual and political leaders who can inspire us to dedicate ourselves to taking up the burdens of the fallen in the Great War and, with the same high courage and steadfastness with which they went into battle, to setting our hands to the tasks they left unfinished (some of which they could not possibly have imagined a century ago), and giving our utmost to make the world a better and happier place for all people, through whatever means are open to us. As well as being bloodied and tested, our new leaders need to be nurtured, encouraged, and espoused. They need strong moral contours to navigate the modern demands of leadership when taking on the big issues like climate change and entrenched inequality. (shrink)

The author argues that in Mably's thought indignation is the theoretical pivot for understanding politics both as the government of the passions and as a prudential art rooted in natural law. Within a Platonic framework that reduces politics to morals, Mably distinguishes bodily passions from thymotic ones. Among the latter, indignation is the impulse that drives the individual beyond the private sphere, opens onto the public dimension, and can act as a "virtue by instinct". Its temporality is decisive: instantaneous in (...) its onset, yet capable of being held, guided, and transformed into duration by reason and by love of glory, the meta-­virtue that channels its thrust toward the common good. Fear and private interests neutralize indignation;; history, by contrast, prolongs its energy over time, converting the impulse into habits through exemplarity. Thus, indignation becomes both a temporal and a political device. It stabilizes steadfastness and courage, prepares the practice of republican virtues, and, in moments of crisis, preserves an operative residue of morality where reason falters. (shrink)

The debate concerning the phenomenology of thought is marked by severe disagreement about how best to characterize a given conscious thought on the basis of introspective reflecting upon it. In this paper I focus on the fact of this introspection‐based disagreement—in particular, on its epistemic import for participants in the debate. How ought these philosophers respond when facing such radical disagreement about the deliverance of introspection? I argue that the fact of such disagreement itself should lead participants to be less (...) confident—or even to suspend judgement—in their own introspection‐based claims. If that is right, then to the extent that the debate about the phenomenology of thought is carried out by appeal to introspective evidence, this constitutes a serious epistemological concern. At the very least, if this is the epistemically appropriate response, non‐trivial reliance of introspective evidence in the debate comes under pressure. (shrink)

This paper introduces and motivates a solution to a dilemma from peer disagreement. Following Buchak (2021), I argue that peer disagreement puts us in an epistemic dilemma: there is reason to think that our opinions should both change and not change when we encounter disagreement with our epistemic peers. I argue that we can solve this dilemma by changing our credences, but not our beliefs in response to disagreement. I explain how my view solves the dilemma in question, and then (...) offer two additional arguments for it: one related to contents and attitudes, and another related to epistemic peerhood. (shrink)

Epistemic courage requires me to sometimes adopt a belief even in the face of doubts. Open-mindedness requires me to be able to reconsider my beliefs. It is generally assumed that we should have both virtues. But it seems that if I am epistemically courageous toward adopting a certain belief, then I can’t also be open-minded toward undoing that same belief. Imagine someone tells you she was harassed, and has some evidence for it (but inconclusive). A case like this might require (...) you to courageously believe the victim despite some remaining doubts. Imagine also that it’s a fact about you that you tend to believe presumed victims. The virtue of open-mindedness would thus require of you to challenge that tendency of yours, that is, to not believe the victim too fast. Hence, it seems that you cannot be epistemically courageous and open-minded at the same time in this situation. This article challenges the prima-facie opposition of these two epistemic virtues. It is argued that instead, courageously acquiring a belief and courageously letting beliefs go are two forms of epistemic courage. Hence, it is suggested that open-mindedness is also a form of epistemic courage. (shrink)

The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nested goal/sub-goal (...) hierarchy that the authors claim is inherent to the structure of epistemically responsible belief-formation: pursuing true beliefs by pursuing beliefs that are objectively likely given one’s total available evidence; pursuing this sub-goal by pursuing beliefs that are likely true (given that evidence) relative to one’s own deep epistemic sensibility; and pursuing this sub-sub-goal by forming beliefs in accordance with one’s own all-in, ultima facie, epistemic seemings. (shrink)

How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people—or other entities—we are hoping to understand and predict. These principles of (...) radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. The Intentional Stance brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters—its first and the final three—appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection—an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

This chapter examines the relationship between delusions and conspiracy theories through the lens of hinge epistemology. While delusions may be understood as irrational acceptances that conflict with de facto or de jure hinges, conspiracy beliefs—such as flat-earth or COVID-19 anti-vaccination theories—share certain features with delusions, including steadfastness in the face of contrary evidence and reinterpretation of such evidence to support the believer’s position. Despite surface similarities, the chapter argues for distinguishing delusions from conspiracy theories while providing a hinge-based account (...) of the latter. Standard distinctions between delusions and conspiracy theories based on numbers of believers are inadequate; instead, etiology and phenomenological deviance provide better criteria to demarcate delusions from conspiracy theories. The chapter further considers mystical experiences, as classified by the DSM-5, showing that their classification as delusions or veritable mystical experiences depends on cultural recognition and the availability of empirical explanations. Overall, the hinge framework illuminates the structure and rational evaluation of these classes of non-ordinary beliefs. (shrink)

The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nested goal/sub-goal (...) hierarchy that the authors claim is inherent to the structure of epistemically responsible belief-formation: pursuing true beliefs by pursuing beliefs that are objectively likely given one’s total available evidence; pursuing this sub-goal by pursuing beliefs that are likely true (given that evidence) relative to one’s own deep epistemic sensibility; and pursuing this sub-sub-goal by forming beliefs in accordance with one’s own all-in, ultima facie, epistemic seemings. (shrink)