The startle reflex provides a revealing model for examining the ways in which evolved neurophysiology shapes personal experience and patterns of recurrent social interaction. In the most diverse cultural contexts, in societies widely separated by time and space, the inescapable physiology of the reflex both shapes the experience of startle and biases the social usages to which the reflex is put. This book describes ways in which the startle reflex is experienced, culturally elaborated, and socially used in (...) a wide variety of times and places. It offers explanations both for the patterned commonalities found across cultural settings and for the differences engendered by diverse social environments. Boo! will intrigue readers in fields such as psychological anthropology, medical anthropology, general cultural anthropology, social psychology, cross-cultural psychiatry, evolutionary psychology, and human ethology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Painting Outside the Lines: Patterns of Creativity in Modern ArtMatthew ZiffPainting Outside the Lines: Patterns of Creativity in Modern Art, by David W. Galenson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, 272 pp., $29.95.The relationship between the market value of paintings and the chronological point in an artist's working life when the paintings were produced is the driving mechanism for exploring creativity and innovation in David W. Galenson's book "Painting (...) Outside the Lines: Patterns of Creativity in Modern Art. The working thesis of this book is that Modern artists have worked creatively and innovatively in one of two distinctly different manners. The terminology Galenson uses to describe these distinct ways of working are "finders" and "seekers." Finders are artists like Pablo Picasso, who at age 26, make startling and important innovations with little advance indication that such a burst is about to take place. Seekers are artists like Paul Cezanne, whospend their entire working lives engaged in the pursuit of a singular approach or achievement. The differences between these methodologies are carefully presented through the details of the working lives of a variety of Modern artists. French nineteenth century and early twentieth-century artists and mid-twentieth-century American artists are used as the source data for these comparisons.Early in the book Galenson presents lists of chronological events within the lives of artists and market valuation of their work within this chronology. The dramatic clarity of the relationships presented in this data sets the stage for the detailed information that follows. Factors that in some cases only partly, and in others nearly completely, explain an artist's way of working are offered through biographic information, information about the aesthetic and cultural milieu, and about the economic and educational structures that are predominant during the relevant time in the life of the artist.The relationship between the aesthetic and cultural milieu surrounding an artist and the capacity or inclination of an artist to be innovative is an important aspect of the book's analysis. The scope of the book is limited to Modern artists because of the shift that took place at the outset of Modern art, during the mid 1860s, that brought a strong emphasis on innovation and change for their own sake as an important characteristic within a work of art. This emphasis "created incentives for painters to produce new approaches to art" (p. 111). Prior to the time of Modern art, innovation and change were often unnecessary for an artist to be successful. Modern art introduced the demand that innovation and change be necessary ingredients in art, and therefore the search for innovation became a significant element within the work of many artists. The manner in which this search took place, as presented through the data at hand, reveals how individual artists viewed the need for innovation and change within their own [End Page 123] work. Paul Cezanne, for example, was aware of the impact that his painting was having on the art world, but he insisted that he was not yet finished with discoveries that would reveal the truest expression of his beliefs about aesthetic expression.In the American movement, "Abstract Expressionism," Galenson finds a useful counter example to the art scene in Paris. In the United States, especially during the 1940s and 1950s — the peak years of creative output by Abstract Expressionist artists — the demand for their work was quite low. There were few economically viable outlets for the work of de Kooning, Pollack, Rothko, and the others of this group. Consequently there is a shift in the chronological point at which these artists achieve market value success. Nearly all of these artists receivedrecognition at an older age than the French artists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.The thesis of the book, that there are two fundamentally different ways of working to produce works of art, is directly applicable to, and useful in, exploring issues of teaching and learning in design education. As a teacher of interior architecture I was interested to follow the details that Galenson presented in support of his analysis of the careers of numerous Modern artists. The methodological differences between seeking and... (shrink)

Behavioural pattern separation (BPS), the ability to distinguish among similar stimuli based on subtle physical differences, has been used to study the mechanism underlying stimulus generalisation. Fear overgeneralisation is often observed in individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder and other anxiety disorders. However, the relationship between anxiety and BPS remains unclear. The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of anxiety (threat of shock) on BPS, which was assessed across separate encoding and retrieval sessions. Images were encoded/retrieved during (...) blocks of threat or safety in a 2 × 2 factorial design. During retrieval, participants indicated whether images were new, old, or altered. Better accuracy was observed for altered images encoded during periods of threat compared to safety, but only if those images were also retrieved during periods of safety. These results suggest that overgeneralisation in anxiety may be due to altered pattern separation. (shrink)

Guiding the work of most linguists and philosophers of language today is the assumption that language is governed by prescriptive normative rules. Many believe that it is of the essence of thought itself to follow rules, rules of inference determining the intentional contents of our concepts, and that these rules originate as internalized rules of language. However, exactly what it is for there to be such things as normative rules of language remains distressingly unclear. From what source do these norms (...) flow? What sanctions enforce them? What happens, exactly, if you don't follow the rules? How do children learn the rules?Ruth Millikan presents a radicallly different way of viewing the partial regularities that language displays, the norms and conventions of language. The central norms applying to language, like those norms of function and behavior that account for the survival and proliferation of biological traits, are non-evaluative norms. Specific linguistic forms survive and are reproduced together with co-operative hearer responses because, in a critical mass of cases, these patterns of production and response benefit both speakers and hearers. Conformity is needed only often enough to ensure that the co-operative use constituting the norm - the convention - continues to be copied and hence continues to characterize some interactions of some speaker-hearer pairs.What needs to be reproduced for discursive language forms to survive, it turns out, is not specific conceptual roles but only satisfaction conditions coupled to essential elements of hearer responses. An uncompromising rejection of conceptual analysis as a tool in philosophy results. At the same time the distinction between the propositional content and the force of a linguistic utterance comes into very sharp focus, force emerging as essential to the creation of content rather than as something added to content. The distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary force, the distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker meaning, and the semantics/pragmatics distinction are each illuminated in new and crisper ways. On the model proposed, neither the intentionality of thought nor the intentionality of language is derived from the other. Processes involved in understanding language are not Gricean but more like direct perception of the world as mediated, for example, through the natural signs contained in the structured light that allows vision. There are also startling implications for pragmatics, and for how children learn language. (shrink)

Reductionism--understanding complex processes by breaking them into simpler elements--dominates scientific thinking around the world and has certainly proved a powerful tool, leading to major discoveries in every field of science. But reductionism can be taken too far, especially in the life sciences, where sociobiological thinking has bordered on biological determinism. Thus popular science writers such as Richard Dawkins, author of the highly influential The Selfish Gene, can write that human beings are just "robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish (...) molecules known as genes." Indeed, for many in science, genes have become the fundamental unit for understanding human existence: genes determine every aspect of our lives, from personal success to existential despair: genes for health and illness, genes for criminality, violence, and sexual orientation. Others would say that this is reductionism with a vengeance. In Lifelines, biologist Steven Rose offers a powerful alternative to the ultradarwinist claims of Dawkins, E.O. Wilson, Daniel Dennett and others. Rose argues against an extreme reductionist approach that would make the gene the key to understanding human nature, in favor of a more complex and richer vision of life. He urges instead that we focus on the organism and in particular on the organism's lifeline: the trajectory it takes through time and space. Our personal lifeline, Rose points out, is unique--even identical twins, with identical genes at birth, will differ over time. These differences are obviously not embedded in our genes, but come about through our developmental trajectory in which genes, as part of the biochemical orchestra of trillions of cells in each human body, have an important part--but only a part--to play. To illustrate this idea, Rose examines recent research in modern biology, and especially two disciplines--genetics (which looks at the impact of genes on form) and developmental biology (which examines the interaction between the organism and the environment)--and he explores new ideas on biological complexity proposed by scientists such as Stuart Kauffman. He shows how our lifelines are constructed through the interplay of physical forces--such as the intrinsic chemistry of lipids and proteins, and the self-organizing and stabilizing properties of complex metabolic webs--and he reaches a startling conclusion: that organisms are active players in their own fate, not simply the playthings of the gods, nature, or the inevitable workings out of gene-driven natural selection. The organism is both the weaver and the pattern it weaves. Lifelines will be a rallying point for all who seek an alternative to the currently fashionable, deeply determinist accounts which dominate popular science writing and, in fact, crowd the pages of some of the major scientific journals. Based on solid, state-of-the-art research, it not only makes important contributions to our understanding of Darwin and natural selection, but will swing the pendulum back to a richer, more complex view of human nature and of life. (shrink)

This article identifies and analyses the dominant stories that academics tell about the development of Western second wave feminist theory. Through an examination of recent production of interdisciplinary feminist and cultural theory journals, I suggest that despite a rhetorical insistence on multiple feminisms, Western feminist trajectories emerge as startlingly singular. In particular, I am critical of an insistent narrative that sees the development of feminist thought as a relentless march of progress or loss. This dominant approach oversimplifies the complex history (...) of Western feminisms, fixes writers and perspectives within a particular decade, and repeatedly (and erroneously) positions poststructuralist feminists as ‘the first’ to challenge the category ‘woman’ as the subject and object of feminist knowledge. Rather than provide a corrective history of Western feminist theory, the article interrogates the techniques through which this dominant story is secured, despite the fact that we (feminist theorists) know better. My focus, therefore, is on citation patterns, discursive framings and some of their textual, theoretical and political effects. As an alternative, I suggest a realignment of key theorists purported to provide a critical break in feminist theory with their feminist citational traces, to force a concomitant re-imagining of our historical legacy and our place within it. (shrink)

In this challenging collection of new essays, leading philosophers and criminal lawyers from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada break with the tradition of treating the philosophical foundations of criminal law as an adjunct to the study of punishment. Focusing clearly on the central issues of moral luck, mistake, and mental illness, this volume aims to reorient the study of criminal law. In the process of retrieving valuable material from traditional law classifications, the contributors break down false associations, (...) reveal hidden truths, and establish new patterns of thought. Their always illuminating and sometimes startling conclusions makes this essential reading for all those interested in the philosophy of criminal law. (shrink)

How do creative people think? Do great works of the imagination originate in words or in images? Is there a rational explanation for the sudden appearance of geniuses like Mozart or Einstein? Such questions have fascinated people for centuries; only in recent years, however, has cognitive psychology been able to provide some clues to the mysterious process of creativity. In this revised edition of Notebooks of the Mind, Vera John-Steiner combines imaginative insight with scientific precision to produce a startling account (...) of the human mind working at its highest potential. To approach her subject John-Steiner goes directly to the source, assembling the thoughts of "experienced thinkers"--artists, philosophers, writers, and scientists able to reflect on their own imaginative patterns. More than fifty interviews (with figures ranging from Jessica Mitford to Aaron Copland), along with excerpts from the diaries, letters, and autobiographies of such gifted giants as Leo Tolstoy, Marie Curie, and Diego Rivera, among others, provide illuminating insights into creative activity. We read, for example, of Darwin's preoccupation with the image of nature as a branched tree while working on his concept of evolution. Mozart testifies to the vital influence on his mature art of the wondrous "bag of memories" he retained from childhood. Anais Nin describes her sense of words as oppressive, explaining how imagistic free association freed her as a writer. Adding these personal accounts to laboratory studies of thought process, John-Steiner takes a refreshingly holistic approach to the question of creativity. What emerges is an intriguing demonstration of how specific socio-cultural circumstances interact with certain personality traits to encourage the creative mind. Among the topics examined here are the importance of childhood mentor figures; the lengthy apprenticeship of the talented person; and the development of self- expression through highly individualistic languages, whether in images, movement or inner speech. Now, with a new introduction, this award-winning book provides an uniquely broad-based study of the origins, development and fruits of human inspiration. (shrink)

She was lying in the bed: had been lying there for some time, had indeed lost track of time, just lying there observing the progress of shadows across the wall, up the wall actually and then across the ceiling; watching the way the sheer white curtain, lifted every now and then by a sneaking finger of breeze, exposed brief glimpses of outside. Since she, narcotized, lacked the will to look at the clock (though she could hear it, very close by: (...) its relentless accusatory ticking), the room for her with its very white walls and very sharp corners, its terrain of familiar landmarks—the mirror; the walnut bureau, on which lay scattered the hairbrush in which a dark twist of hair was caught, the little yellow jewelry box with its peculiar surface like granulated sugar, decorated with small seashells, the book lying spread-eagled, open to page 119, the small lamp, its stiff, frilly shade with the plastic wrap still on; then too the wooden chair upon which she had thrown, possibly carelessly, expecting but then unable to hang up the following day, as was her usual habit, the blue shirt, the black slacks, and the taupe brassiere she had worn the last time she went out; the closet door, slightly ajar, with its glass knob glittering gemlike at certain times, when the beam struck it—this museum as it were of her last day before the pain began—had become for her a sundial upon which, as the shadows crept across, she read or rather inferred the passing of the day. Though she was not sure how long she had been lying there—how many days, in the bed. She had tried to count the days on the nubbles of the white bedspread or else tried to read the nubbles with her fingertips like braille or feel them like a sort of impasto forming pictures or patterns, fields forests mountain ranges, a long tapestry unwinding, but she was always losing her place, starting over without realizing she had started over. On the table beside the bed was the importuning clock, the glass of water, the empty bowl slick with the remains of the soup, another frilly lamp preserved in plastic, the bottle of pills, the framed black-and-white photo of a smiling white poodle in whose obsidian eyes the image of the photographer was reflected... and another, of a young woman in tennis shorts and a sweater, perched on the top rung of a wooden fence or gate, smiling, chest thrust preeningly forward: it may have been herself, in a past life, or it may not have been... the resemblance between the woman in the bed and the woman in the photo was uncertain... and at any rate she in the bed seldom looked at these objects, or, if she did, forgot them immediately and had to learn of them again. She was propped up on pillows, her long dark hair spread around in loops and glissandos: these she felt or rather intuited but had not seen in several days. Nor had she seen the neatly stitched incision or the disconcertingly stained bandage covering it: preferred not to: but nonetheless could not un-know that her chest had become a cage in which pain lived, if unseen. If she lay very still she might not feel it, or only in a small way: and she did lie still. Possibly she had just awakened: she had a sense of emerging from something, of rising up as if from underwater, her awareness enlarging beyond the ticking of the clock to the frisking curtain, the window with its square of light, the room her sundial, then to the house sensed but unseen around and beneath her, its uneasy inanimate creaks and shiftings, an echo suggesting size, distance, emptiness, but then too certain other, volitional sounds coming up from downstairs—footsteps, a cabinet opening and closing, a drawer pulled out on its runners, as if from a great, echoing distance. Who, she wondered, who...? But could not know. Outside the window a bird was singing, a car was passing in the street... And now certainly she was indeed awake, but all the same the decision was not volitional, possibly there was no decision at all, instead rather suddenly and unaccountably she found herself trying to rise, trying to get out of the bed despite the insistent pain and despite the great weight of her limbs, of each limb individually and of all four limbs collectively; she could not, she found, sit up in the bed where she had lain for who knew how many days now, but rather could only, like a turtle on its round hard back, attempt to roll, to swing herself, leveraging the great unaccountable weight of her legs, up onto the edge of the bed and off it. In her chest there was something like the grip of a hand or of a clamp that somebody had left inside her. Nonetheless, her robe. And now entering the long hallway, doors opening off either side, she could hear, from very far away, a small tinny buzzing that she recognized as music though without discerning, for she could not discern, either the voice or the tune: it was rather a small thread that she followed along the hall, where nobody was, to the staircase of dark wood which she began to descend, slowly and bent over from the pain and the weight and the great effort involved in moving these limbs which had at one time surely belonged to her but which seemed now to be somebody else's, so awkward were they, so unwilling. Though surely she too, once upon a time, had danced... Down and down she went, around the several turnings of the staircase (certainly it was farther than she remembered), passing, on one landing, a large framed photographic close-up of a golden cock-of-the-rock, with its resplendent crest like a half-wedge of orange, and a dark, bellicose eye... on the next landing, the photo of a girl in a little sealskin cap and tippet, hands hidden in a matching muff... on the next landing, in a recessed niche, a plaster bust of Queen Victoria with a chip out of the nose and several curls missing off the back of the head. Though the cock-of-the-rock reminded her of something (she wasn't sure what), she was sure she had seen none of these objects before... Nor had the staircase ever seemed so wide, so deep, so dark. Is this, she wondered, descending, really Ma's house? She clung to the fraying thread of music that was leading her down, emerging at last like a ghost into what was certainly Ma's capacious kitchen. A dark-haired woman uncannily like herself sat at the table barefoot, swinging her leg rhythmically to the music issuing from the transistor radio on the counter while sipping a glass of something yellow on ice and paging absorbedly through a Life magazine. At her elbow sat a bottle of golden liqueur in which a mysterious object—a bit of flowering branch, an antler of coral, possibly the efflorescent finger of a saint—was floating; on the cover of the magazine a model in a crescent hat gazed provocatively, while holding out her hands to display, on the right hand, a white glove with black polka dots, and on the left hand, a black glove with white stripes. Above the model's shoulder a caption read: News In Gloves.The sick woman hovered on the threshold; her doppelganger at the table did not look up, but, fully absorbed, continued obliviously paging and sipping.Maybe, thought the other, amazed, I really am invisible—The tableau persisted, until at last somebody (it was unclear who) said, I don't know how you can drink that stuff—Now the woman at the table did look up, jumped up in fact, dropping the magazine and crying, Rose! What are you doing down here? You shouldn't be out of bed, you silly!She flung herself at her sister, waving her hands and making small, solicitous noises and appearances of kissing.Ma'll never forgive you, the other said calmy, for breaking into her special bottle—Rose regarded the vessel, along with its enigmatic contents: then suddenly felt that the mysterious branch or wand or finger in the bottle had gotten lodged inside her, somewhere beneath her right breast; it was rotating, playing her ribcage like a harp.Oh Rose! cried the sister in a tone of anguish, who cares what Ma says! You need to go back to bed—let me help you—I'm all right Lucy! I'm all right! Though blanching slightly.Here, let me—Lucy took Rose around the waist and began to lead, or rather pilot, but instead of taking her up the stairs, was ushering her down.Lucy, what are you doing? It's so dark down here I can't see a thing—clinging tight, however, as they descended into what must have been the basement: though it could not be seen, but only smelled and heard. The mildew was characteristic, as was the aroma of fermenting apples. There was as well a soft, subtle scurrying, suggestive of unseen, inhabited corners.Subtly Lucy withdrew: Rose felt herself hovering, blind, above an abyss.The patient thrashed, panicking.I can't see! I can't see!Oh Rose! said Lucy, somewhat fed up. Just open your eyes then!The woman in the bed did: and found herself propped on pillows, her sister Lucy leaning over her with a spoonful of broth. The room was very bright; somewhere a bird was singing, or shouting, loudly.Oh Micheletto! Shut up Micheletto! You're bothering Rose! said Lucy crossly: but the canary, undaunted, continued its racket, leaping from perch to perch, hanging upside down from a bell, committing wild acrobatics on the swing, and regarding the patient, from behind the bars of its prison, with a darkly defiant jujube eye.I don't know how you can stand having him in here, Rose. He's so noisy.I like him.But not the soup evidently, from which the patient shrank with a scowl. Sister and spoon therefore subsided, one into a chair, the other into a bowl.I could take him out of here, if he's bothering you.No.The woman in the bed shut her eyes, easing back, if not disappearing, into the trailing vinelike thicket of her hair: turning inward, perhaps, to attend to the branch or wand or finger that was still plucking at her ribcage, playing a music more compelling even than that of Micheletto the canary. This, though, the sister could not allow.Joey called, Rose. Did you hear me? Joey called. He's so worried about you.Joey? A green glimmer between dark lashes.Don't tell me you've forgotten Joey!Lucy gestured to the photo on the bedside table, which was no longer that of a poodle but was, rather, of a curly-haired young man with a long, somewhat sanctimonious nose. If she was disappointed by the transformation, Rose was careful to conceal it.Course not. Don't be silly. How could I forget Joey?The patient spoke softly, slurring: that was the narcotic.He's awfully worried about you, Rose.Suddenly Lucy began to giggle. Rose, peering out from behind her thicket, saw her sister perched forward in her chair.D'you remember, Rose? You were so sick you threw up in the back seat of the convertible. Snickering now.I did not.You did.I didn't.Though in fact that night, with its wild ride of pain, was a blur to Rose: she recalled, vaguely, parking on the bluffs, seeing the lights of the town below, a smeared fistful of rhinestones flung at random along the silvery-black thread of the river: Joey, easing his arm around her shoulders: and the first mild, then abruptly definitive jabs just below and to the right of the breastbone... But then too, she thought she remembered gazing into the dark, empathetic eyes of a poodle... This, though comforting, was difficult to understand.Joey's been wonderful about it. He's not mad at all. Apparently the upholstery cleaned up great. He had the entire car detailed too. He said he's going to visit later. Isn't that nice? Isn't it? Rose, did you hear me?But the patient, lowering pale lids, had disappeared again.Rose? Rose?Yes Lucy, resurfacing, I heard you. ’S nice. But wondered whether her sister had always been so annoying. It was difficult to give this question the attention it deserved because of the ragged strumming, rising almost to the level of a pain, from somewhere deep inside, just beneath her right breast. So absorbing was this internal music that Rose found she could not resist the urge to sing along... which she did do, for an unknowable, perhaps immeasurable, period of time.Rose, the sister was saying, Rose. I think it's time for your pill.Lucy was leaning over her again, brow creased, this time with the pill in her hand, and the glass of water in which, somehow, certain stars had been contained: Rose consumed these along with the medicine.Now, Lucy said, I'll let you sleep. Hush! Micheletto! Hush! Rose is sleeping!But the canary, rocketing crazily, continued.Later, when Rose woke (or so it seemed), the sun had shifted considerably, the shadows moving around the sundial, or room, in such a manner that certain things loomed larger than they had before: the crucifix on the wall for example, and the little box on the bureau, the hairbrush with the curls of hair caught in it, the lampshade, the wooden chair in which Lucy was no longer sitting all cast monstrous elongated shadows, as if implying some significance they did not have. The white curtains, on the other hand, hung quite still now on the open window. Rose emerged slowly from a dream in which she and her sister were acting in a play Joey had written: they were seated side by side on stage, on a green velour couch, and Lucy, turning toward her, had very sincerely said, What's the pup, Rose? What's the pup? which made no sense at all: maybe Rose had misheard: in the dream she replied, over and over, What's the what? What's the what?, growing more and more annoyed, to which Lucy answered, every time, What's the pup? until at last Rose awakened very cross. And now she lay, propped on pillows, becoming aware once more of the pain she had forgotten while dreaming, and of Micheletto's song. What's the what? thought Rose, what's the what? Until suddenly she realized she was saying it out loud. And then at last the dream truly fell away, and she realized her pain felt very near, but that Micheletto's singing had grown very distant: no matter how she squinted she could not see the canary in his cage, though she could hear the distant singing: until at last she realized that the cage was empty, and that Micheletto was singing from somewhere else. Lucy must have taken Micheletto away, Rose thought, bitterly. She wanted to do something about it, get Micheletto back, he was her friend, her only friend, but she didn't do anything; she lay perfectly still, listening to the familiar fugues and arias, which were emanating, it seemed, from some other room, or other dimension: as if Micheletto had become a ghost, or phantasm. I can hear you, Micheletto, she thought, or said, but I can't see you... In response (if it was a response), the song, with its characteristic trills and arabesques, seemed to draw nearer, though a barrier remained, the voice sounded muffled, as if Micheletto were smothered under a bolster, or stuffed in a sack. Rose's eyes probed the room, rummaged the corners, explored the elongated and vaguely palpitating shadows, searching for Micheletto, though her body remained motionless, paralyzed, as if still dreaming. Micheletto, where are you? Rose sang, or said, to herself, or to the room: this was unclear, though the reply when it came was startlingly distinct, a spirited coloratura pronounced right at her elbow, or so it seemed: though Micheletto himself, as a small, yellow, feathered entity, continued imperceptible. Rose lay rigid like a mummy, wrapped in sheets, propped on pillows, anointed with juniper, sealed with beeswax... I too am an artifact, she thought, of my former self... Micheletto however spoke back, with asperity, demanding some solution, some action on her part—I can't, Micheletto, she said, it's not possible—taking in with desperate eyes the room around her, lingering especially over the crucifix with its gargantuan shadow, the glass of water on the bedside table whose stars she had consumed (she could feel them now, sparking inside her, the sharp edges lodged beneath her sternum), the photo of the white poodle, with its gentle dark eyes and sympathetic smile: none of these however offering any help, or advice... I'm sorry, Micheletto, I can't—The bird, however, was inexorable.Therefore Rose as she had done earlier rolled herself to the edge of the bed, using the weight of her legs to lever herself up until she sat, curled wormlike but facing the window: through which she could see the canary perched outside, on the slope of the roof.Oh Micheletto!, said Rose, dismayed, how did you get out there?Certainly the canary did reply, but his words, conveyed in a series of runes, were eclipsed by a delivery truck passing in the street below.What, Micheletto? What the—what?She couldn't hear him, and maybe it didn't matter: out was out, after all: though the closed door of the cage and the firmly lowered window screen rendered the mode of escape enigmatic... possibly even supernatural... Unless Lucy, Rose thought, conjuring an image, masticating upon it in her mind with the satisfaction that comes of blaming, till at last she struck the gristle: which was, why would Lucy? Since Lucy also loved Micheletto... And anyway what mattered now was not the escape, but the rescue... Micheletto, outside the window, made further cryptic remarks conveying urgency, possibly even gruff impatience.All right, all right—Sinking down slowly tentatively painstakingly from the edge of the bed to the floor Rose inched on her buttocks to the window and with some effort and tugging of incision managed to raise the screen, allowing into the bedroom a greater blueness, along with several mosquitoes. Inside her chest the wand of coral was cryptically turning, though what she felt was not exactly pain: and as for the disconcertingly stained bandage, of this she continued willfully unaware.Micheletto! Micheletto!The canary, bright on black shingles, cocked its head. There was a throb of a sort, Rose thought, in the bright black eye. But Micheletto did not come toward. She leaned out, to gesture.Here, Micheletto! Here!The small blond figure hopped along the ridgeline of the roof.Micheletto! Micheletto!Though the canary did not come, Rose suddenly found herself, or the upper half of herself at least, partially extended through the open window. If only I had a thistle to offer him, she thought, or some suet... But she had only herself, dangling, and, either in eagerness or desperation (this was unclear), extending further out and then down, palms first, onto the surprising rough warmth of the shingles.Micheletto! Micheletto!She could no longer see him, but took hope from a small, eager scrabbling in the gutter.Oh, Micheletto... Suddenly she found she was curled up right beside the dormer, on the black shingled slope of the roof. Looking down she could see the cracked concrete walk, and, in the sullen green shadow of the house, Ma's small garden, the tomatoes and zucchini quivering on their stakes, the brown pendulous faces of the sunflowers as they contrived, unsuccessfully, to look the other way. In the upstairs bathroom in the house next door, the neighbor Mrs. Benedetti, squatting in her housecoat of dusty rose pattern, gave a quick, scandalized look, and abruptly drew down the shade... Well, thought Rose, refusing to feel bad about it, you can't please everyone... Lulled by the warmth of the shingles, she had stretched out tentatively upon the somewhat tacky surface. It was impossible to lie comfortably on her right side—she had been wounded on the right side, damaged, something in her had been breached, she'd been ripped up, she couldn't remember how—or on her left either for that matter, because of the stars gyrating relentlessly inside her; nonetheless she did lie somehow, along the slope of the roof, with her head turned toward the gutter. Above her was a blue dome upon which a pink line of cloud languorously reclined: it was beautiful: but looking made her feel dizzy. Micheletto! Micheletto! she called. The response was not immediate, giving her time to notice, in the lee of the dormer, an abandoned hammer and a roll of tape evidently left behind by some workman, who knew when... Nobody cleans up anymore, thought Rose. Ma, she thought, wouldn't like it at all, if she knew. But Ma would never know, because she, Rose, would never tell her. Now resumed the scrabbling in the gutter. Micheletto! Is that you, Micheletto? Though there was no reply, the scrabbling went on, until, suddenly, a bright yellow head with a mischievous, berry-bright eye popped up out of the drainpipe. Micheletto looked in her direction and spoke with some severity... Well, it's not my fault, is it, Rose said, bitterly. Just look at all I've done for you already, all this for your sake—The bright eye bulged. There was a volley of expostulation.But I can't! Yes of course I love you, I just can't! It's... physically impossible! Her voice dropped to a whisper. I think there's something wrong with me, Micheletto... Then Rose fell silent. She had become confused, trying to remember what was wrong. Micheletto, while not unsympathetic, did not cease his complaining: the yellow head turned furiously round and round in the drainpipe, there was a sound of scrabbling feet as he espoused various arguments, interspersed with moments of fugue and passages of overripe bel canto. Rose lay back on the slope of the roof so that her long dark hair fell in rivulets over the gutter... If she stretched out her arm from there, she could almost, but not quite, reach the drainpipe.All right, she said somewhat feebly, I'll try—Meanwhile something was going on down below. There was a clamor of car doors and tires; somebody was speaking. Rose, Rose! What are you doing up there! Oh Rose! Joey, come quick—Rose is up on the roof!It was very silly of Lucy, Rose thought dreamily as she reached: certainly I'll wake up in bed in a minute. Leaning back, she saw the line of pink recumbent upon the cerulean dome of the sky: and heard, from somewhere in the distance, the sound of a poodle barking. (shrink)

This philosophical Mao is a fresh portrait of the mind of the ruler who changed the face of China in the twentieth century. The book traces the influences of both traditional Chinese and traditional pre-Marxist Western philosophy on the early Mao and how these influences guided the development of his thought. It reveals evidence of the creative dimensions of Mao's thinking and how he wove the yin/yang pattern of change depicted in the Yijing, the Chinese Book of Changes, into (...) the Marxist dialectic to bring ancient Chinese philosophy to mark changes in twentieth century thought. Mao's lifetime philosophical journey includes his interpretations of and comments on both Chinese and Western philosophers. His deep, metaphysical reflections, uncanny prognostications and pensive speculations from his early pre-Marxist period to his later philosophical years prove to be as startling as they are thought-provoking. Slavoj Žižek, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, University of London, UK, writes: "Mao Ze Dong is celebrated (or cursed) as a revolutionary leader, but the philosophical foundation of his activity is largely ignored. In his superb study, Allinson fills in this lack. Mao's thought is not just located in its historical context; its complex references to the Chinese traditional thought, to Marx and Western philosophy, but also to modern sciences (quantum physics), are explored and documented. A new Mao thus emerges, a Mao whose radical acts are grounded in a thick texture of philosophical reflections. Allinson's Mao is indispensable for everybody who wants to understand not just Mao but the concatenation of philosophy and politics that characterized the twentieth century. Michael Puett, Walter C. Klein Professor of Chinese History and Anthropology, Harvard University, writes: "Through extensive research, involving not only Mao's writings themselves but also the marginal notes he made on books he read, Allinson is able to trace the development of Mao's thinking over the course of his lifetime and to demonstrate the degree to which he was actively engaged with both the Chinese and Western philosophical traditions throughout. This is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the intellectual history of China. Anne Cheng, Chair of Chinese Intellectual History, Collège de France, writes: "Has it ever occurred to you to associate Mao with Aristotle or with the ancient Chinese Book of Changes, the Yijing? If you find it hard to believe, read this book by Robert Allinson who, in his own philosophical way, manages to inject new life and revived interest in this highly controversial but iconic figure which is still looming large behind the giant video screen of present day China. Irene Eber, Former Director and Louis Frieberg Professor Emerita of Chinese History and Philosophy, Louis Freiberg Center for East Asian Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel and Former Senior Fellow, Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, writes: "This is a most exciting and fascinating enterprise. A magnificent statement on behalf of East-West philosophy. Jana Rošker, chief editor of Asian Studies and the founder and first president of the European Association of Chinese Philosophy (International Communication of Chinese Culture), writes: "As Irene Eber writes in her foreword to this book 'This is a ground breaking work'. She is right, for it is indeed a work of utmost importance. In addition, the book is essential because it deals with a highly topical issue, one that can certainly help us to improve our understanding of contemporary China... Allinson achieves his goals in this book by clearly demonstrating a thoughtfully elaborated case of a truly intercultural, and, at the same time, truly intersubjective philosophy with widely influential connotations. This volume will be of great value to anyone interested in Chinese or cross-cultural philosophy, political theory and recent history. (shrink)

This first chapter provides a suitable introduction to the volume by drawing a vivid picture of Proclus’ life: his provenance, his education, and his direction of the fifth-century school of Athens. Rather than rehearsing the well-known ‘facts’ of Proclus’ life, the author revises the received portrait of the philosopher by drawing attention to little noted patterns and details in Proclus’ biography. Behind the rhetoric of Marinus’ Life of Proclus, he discovers the portrait of a complex and intriguing human figure: the (...) greatest philosopher of the fifth century and convinced advocate of pagan culture turns out to be a man with startling pretensions and lofty ambitions. By thus depicting the life at the fifth-century school of Athens, the author also sheds light on the practice of pagan culture in the fifth century by some of the leading intellectuals of the time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 335-346 [Access article in PDF] Aesthetic Incunabula Ellen Dissanayake Incunabula n. pl. (f. L swaddling clothes, cradle): Early stages of development of a thing.Over the past thirty years, developmental psychologists have discovered remarkable cognitive abilities in young infants. Before these investigations, common pediatric wisdom accepted that apart from a few innate "reflexes"--for crying, suckling, clinging, startling--babies were pretty much tabulae rasae for their elders (...) to inscribe as they (and their cultures) decreed. Today, however, it is well established that newborns come into the world with decided preferences and motivations, so that one can speak intelligently of "neonatal" (or even "fetal") psychology. 1The demonstrable existence of inherent psychological capacities in newborns and infants has important implications for twenty-first-century literary theory, which--also over the past thirty years--has operated under the theoretical assumption that all knowledge and experience are mediated by culture and that there is therefore no "natural" psychological or emotional experience. Yet if, as infant psychology confirms, babies in every culture show the same or similar cognitive abilities and preferences and the same or similar motivations and emotional responses, it is necessary to modify the dogmatic assertion that all experience, including literary response, is socially constructed. Rather, adult psychology and experience grow from and build upon inborn motives and preferences. Literary theorists can no longer ignore contemporary knowledge in psychobiology, ethology, and evolutionary psychology that directly pertains to conceptualizing their subject.The innate capacities of newborns predispose them specifically for social and emotional interaction with others, not simply for soliciting [End Page 335] their physical care. For example, newborns prefer human faces to any other sight (high-contrast colors, cartoon characters, cute stuffed animals) and human voices to any other sound (soft music, tinkling bells, The Chipmunks). 2 They can imitate face, mouth, and hand movements and respond appropriately to another person's emotional expressions of sadness, fear, and surprise. 3 At birth, infants can estimate and anticipate intervals of time and temporal sequences and remember these temporal patterns, categorizing them both in time and space and in terms of affect and arousal. 4 By six weeks of age, these perceptual and cognitive abilities of normal infants permit them to engage with adult partners in complex communicative interchanges--the playful behavior that is commonly or colloquially called "babytalk."Babytalk is not the trival or inane pastime that it might superficially seem but, rather, a cradle in which nascent psychosocial capacities can emerge and be developed. Interestingly for literary theory, babytalk achieves these effects through fundamentally aesthetic means. Adult-infant engagements are noteworthy for their use of stylization (formalization or simplification), repetition, exaggeration, and elaboration in visual, vocal, and gestural modalities. I call these "aesthetic incunabula"--that is, sources (or early developmental stages) of the operations used by artists in all media to attract attention and to provoke and manipulate emotional response. The existence of sensitivities to such features in the first months of life suggests that humans are born with natural (innate, universal) predispositions for aesthetic engagement from which cultures and individuals can go on to create their myriad elaborated forms of artistic expression.Although babytalk varies in minor details among individuals and cultures, it can be described in all instances as a multimedia performance. That is, it contains not only "talk" (or the characteristic high-pitched, undulant, breathy, patterned, repetitive vocalizations with pauses called "motherese," "parentese," or "infant-directed speech"). Along with the utterances are peculiarly stereotyped, repetitive, and exaggerated facial expressions (such as widened eyes, uplifted eyebrows, sustained open mouth, and smiles), head movements (e.g., distinct bobs backwards, slow rhythmic nods, movement toward and away from the baby), and gestures (such as touching, stroking, and rhythmic pats) to which infants respond with their own vocal sounds and face and body movements and, in many societies, sustained mutual gaze.Babytalk is not only a performance, but a duet that incorporates both synchrony of behavior and alternation (or turn-taking)--activities that [End Page 336] are made possible by the infant's remarkable inborn sensitivity to temporal sequence and pattern. Microanalyses of videotaped interactions (at 24... (shrink)

SummaryAn interpretive system for the IBM 704 computer permitting interpretation of the genetic pattern of a numeric symbioorganism as a game strategy has been developed. Selection for best performance in a simple game (the game called Tac Tix published byGardner, 1958) has been applied in a preliminary experiment. An objective method to measure the quality of a game played is described. The results presented in the article show a small but significant improvement of game quality during a period of (...) 2300 generations.The general characteristics of the phenomena observed are similar to those of preceding evolution experiments (Barricelli, 1962 and 1957). However, a startling infection process caused by a parasite whose behaviour was influenced by the game competition is described. The parasite never developed an independent game strategy to any degree of efficiency and was entirely dependent on its host organism for game competitions with, and transmission of the infection to, uninfected hosts.The consequences of substituting the reproduction and mutation rules (or “norm of action”) used in the preceding evolution experiments are discussed. Particularly, the use of rules (DNA-norm) applying the reproduction pattern ofDNA-molecules is considered, and the theoretic aspects of symbiogenetic evolution experiments based onDNA-norm are discussed. A few inferences concerning the origin and history of terrestrial life suggested by the results of the symbiogenesis experiments are presented. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Séduire, C'est ToutFrancis Bacon, Lucian Freud, and the Struggle of InfluencePaul Sharma (bio)One of the painter Francis Bacon's favorite bon mots was "séduire, c'est tout."1 With such a worldview, it is unsurprising that Bacon's work and life can be understood using René Girard's insights regarding the desire to influence or be influenced by the envied model, be it a person, a crowd, or even a country, resulting in mimetic (...) forces that unleash violence.This piece looks at Bacon's life and how the mimetic forces he experienced and intuitively understood are displayed in his painting. It examines the social and personal forces at play in four key works: Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion (1944), Head VI (1949), Two Figures (1953), and Three Studies of Lucian Freud (1969), beginning with the work that put Bacon on the artistic map at the end of World War II, to the triptych that foretold the breakup of the long friendship between Bacon and Lucian Freud. [End Page 205]1943: THE BLITZ ENDSBy the summer of 1943, the dust caused by the Luftwaffe bombing raid was mostly gone from the air in London, allowing the asthmatic Francis Bacon to return to South Kensington. The same summer, Ralph Vaughan Williams's Fifth Symphony, one of the last great pieces of English neo-romanticism and arguably his greatest work, premiered at the nearby Royal Albert Hall.It is strange to think that at the same time Vaughan Williams's Fifth was being played, down the road in Cromwell Place, the preparatory ground was being laid by Francis Bacon for Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion, a work that went well beyond any idea of English nostalgia and of which John Russell wrote, "There was English art before the Three Studies and there was English art after."2Before looking at the work in more detail, it is worth examining its inception, as it follows a pattern outlined by René Girard, that of a conversion in which there is a profound change in beliefs and values. In the same way that diamonds are formed out of coal if there is high enough pressure, Girard notes that "an experience of demystification, if radical enough, is very close to an experience of conversion."3Bacon's conversion occurred at the latter end of 1940 to 1942, a period he never discussed. He retreated to the country sixty miles outside London, to recover from his asthma and very likely from some form of breakdown, following a period as an air raid warden in London.The formula for each conversion is unique, and for Bacon, the catalyst bringing his experiences of art, the Blitz, his view of society, and his personal history together into a single style was the recently issued W. B. Stanford's Aeschylus in His Style: A Study in Language and Personality. A clue to Stanford's importance is Bacon later recalling that "some of the images are so startlingly beautiful in there and so exciting I go on reading it over and over again."4Stanford's insight into the use of a combination of a highly expressive and at the same time formal style in Aeschylus enabled Bacon to gather his influences and preoccupations of the previous decade to create his vision and, arguably, his first fully impactful works. (It could be said that the first work of real originality was the 1933 painting Crucifixion (Figure 1), a protype of the 1944 triptych, being of sufficient force to be included in Herbert Read's Art Now review of the same year).Stanford argued that the Greek playwright's "style was not of the unobtrusive, subtly modulated kind that escapes criticism," adding, "One is reminded of the strained, almost grotesque figures of a painting by El Greco … and the [End Page 206] Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1.Francis Bacon, Crucifixion, 1933. © The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved, DACS/Artimage 2023. Photo: Prudence Cuming Associates Ltd.reason for both of these Greeks' extraordinary style is similar—the tension between an original and... (shrink)

Overdose deaths involving prescription opioids killed more than 17,000 Americans in 2017, marking a five-fold increase since 1999. High prescribing rates of opioid analgesics have been a substantial contributor to prescription opioid misuse, dependence, overdose and heroin use. There was recognition approximately ten years ago that opioid prescribing patterns were contributing to this startling increase in negative opioid-related outcomes, and federal actions, including Medicare reimbursement reform and regulatory actions, were initiated to restrict opioid prescribing. The current manuscript is a description (...) of those actions, the effect of those actions on opioid prescribing and related patient outcomes. We also describe our proposal of methods of expanding these efforts as an important piece to further reduce opioid-related misuse, dependence, and overdose death. (shrink)

An interpretive system for the IBM 704 computer permitting interpretation of the genetic pattern of a numeric symbioorganism as a game strategy has been developed. Selection for best performance in a simple game has been applied in a preliminary experiment. An objective method to measure the quality of a game played is described. The results presented in the article show a small but significant improvement of game quality during a period of 2300 generations.The general characteristics of the phenomena observed (...) are similar to those of preceding evolution experiments. However, a startling infection process caused by a parasite whose behaviour was influenced by the game competition is described. The parasite never developed an independent game strategy to any degree of efficiency and was entirely dependent on its host organism for game competitions with, and transmission of the infection to, uninfected hosts.The consequences of substituting the reproduction and mutation rules used in the preceding evolution experiments are discussed. Particularly, the use of rules applying the reproduction pattern ofDNA-molecules is considered, and the theoretic aspects of symbiogenetic evolution experiments based onDNA-norm are discussed. A few inferences concerning the origin and history of terrestrial life suggested by the results of the symbiogenesis experiments are presented.Ein interpretierendes System für die IBM 704 Rechenmaschine, dass Interpretation des genetischen Modells von einem numerischen Symbio-organismus wie eine Spiel Strategie, erlaubt, wurde entwickelt. Eine Forführung für Fähigkeit in einem einfachen Spiel wurde angewandt in einem preliminarisches Experiment. Eine objektive Methode zur Messung der Qualität des betreffenden Spiels wurde beschrieben. Die in dem Artikel angegebenen Resultate zeigen eine kleine, aber bedeutende Verbesserung der Spiel-Qualität während einr Periode von 2300 Generationen.Die allgemeinen Kennziechen von den beobachteten Phänomenen sind denen von vorhergehenden Evolutions-Experimenten ähnlich. Jedoch, ein überraschender Infektions-Prozess, verursacht durch einen Parasit, wessen Verhalten beinflusst wurde durch die Spiel-Konkurrenz, wurde beschrieben. Der Parasit entwickelte niemals eine unabhängige Spiel-Strategie zu irgendeinem Masze von Fähigkeit und war ganz abhängig von seinem Gastherr-Organismus für Spiel-Konkurrenz mit, und Überbringung von der Infektion auf, uninfektierte Gäste.Die Folgerungen von dem Ersetzen der Fortpflanzung und Mutations-Regeln, angewandt in vorhergehenden Evolutions-Experimente wurden besprochen. Besonders der Gebrauch von Regeln welche das FortpflanzungsModell von DNA-Molekülen anwenden wurde betrachtet, und die theorethischen Aspekte von Symbiogenetischen Evolutions-Experimenten basiert auf DNA-Norm wurden besprochen. Einige Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf die Entstehung und Geschichte von dem Erdenleben suggeriert durch die Resultate von den Symbiogenese-Experimenten wurden gezeigt. (shrink)

At a crucial moment in Euripides’ Andromache, the title character throws her hands around a statue of the goddess Thetis and laments the losses that have brought her to a point of desperation and despair. When Thetis appears at the end of the play, she answers Andromache’s pleas and grants her a renewed life of marriage and motherhood. Yet in her embrace of the statue, Andromache momentarily embodies an alternative impulse: a longing to merge with the stony form of the (...) goddess and to cease from the patterns of nuptial mobility and sexual reproduction that have defined her life thus far. In this article, I argue that we should understand this embrace as “queer”—as a moment of intimate contact between mortal woman and immortal goddess that deeply unsettles the models of sexual and reproductive order that dominate Greek art and literature. While the play ends by redirecting Andromache toward the propagation of the Trojan line, the queer potential of that crucial embrace is taken up by Thetis herself, who re-scripts her own marriage to Peleus in a way that both inverts gendered patterns of movement and rejects the valorization of female fertility. Euripides’ Andromache thus concludes with the restoration of mortal sexual and reproductive order, yet through Andromache’s encounter with Thetis, it also gestures to the queer and startling freedom of a barren future. (shrink)

The migration landscape is a dynamic phenomenon shaped by geopolitical shifts, economic transformations, and climate change. North Macedonia, located in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula, serves as a critical transit country for significant migration patterns due to its strategic location and political aspirations towards Europe. Facing internal demographic challenges such as population decline and aging, the country is transitioning towards attracting immigration and becoming a destination for migrants. The Mediterranean Crisis of 2015 highlighted North Macedonia's pivotal role in migration (...) routes, with over 800,000 individuals crossing its borders amid Europe's refugee and migrant influx. Despite containment efforts, the country remains part of mixed-movement routes, with significant border crossings observed in subsequent years. The long-term suspicions of brain drain were confirmed when the demographic census of 2021 revealed a startling 10% population decline over nearly two decades, emphasizing persistent outmigration and aging trends. To address migration challenges, North Macedonia adopted the Resolution on Migration Policy 2021-2025, aiming to establish a robust framework for managing both legal and illegal migrations. Anticipatory governance emerges as a proactive approach to navigating migration complexities, incorporating foresight and policy integration to shape sustainable migration policies in the country. The development of an Anticipatory Migration Governance model that seeks to foster transformative mindset shifts among stakeholders and institutionalize forward-looking planning, ensuring the effectiveness of migration management strategies. Through capacity development, improving of data collection, and decisions based on data, North Macedonia aims to navigate migration dynamics and achieve economic development with future-looking inclusive policies and collaboration. (shrink)

The two statements quoted above bring out some central features of modern Latin America. A close study of recent trends including the specific totalitarian ideology of the generals, the system of ideological manipulation and terror, the diaspora, and the defensive response of the churches (and their harassment by the military juntas) reveals startling similarities with patterns of thought and behavior under European fascism, especially under Nazism. Fascist ideology has flowed into Latin American directly and indirectly. Large numbers of Nazi refugees (...) came to Latin America during and after World War II, and important ingredients of fascist ideology have been indirectly routed into that area through the U.S. military and intelligence establishment. Whatever the source, however, it has met a need of the local and foreign elites that dominate the area, and has been modified to meet their special requirements. (shrink)

The political and administrative requirements of the Roman state during the early years of the Principate demanded an increase in the annual number of consulars. When Augustus finally acted to remedy this situation in 5 b.c., he introduced a system of suffect consuls and thereby increased the number of consuls from the two per annum of the Republic to four. A regular practice became established whereby one or both of the ordinary consuls retired at the end of June to be (...) replaced in office for theremainder of the year by a suffect consul. For the reigns of Gaius and Claudius additional suffects were included in many years and a new pattern can be seen to have emerged. It was usual now for each ordinarius to hold office for the first six months of the year except in some special cases where the ordinarii resigned at the end of two months and their place was taken by a pair of suffects who remained in office for the next four months to serve out the more regular tenure of the ordinary consuls. Under Nero, the innovation of this two-month ordinary consulship was not perpetuated and ordinarii usually remained in office for the full six months. Suffect consulships throughout the period a.d. 38–68 were held for periods of either two, four or six months. The Civil War of a.d. 68/69 and the consequent changes of emperor broke the above pattern. For 69, there are no fewer than sixteen consuls known to have held office during the year. Such confusion, however, would not be unexpected given the startling events of this year. Of considerable importance to students of the early Empire, therefore, is the question of what happened to the system of allocating consulships during a particular year when the state had once again settled itself down to running in routine under the victorious Flavian emperors. The answer to this question will be of particular importance for prosopographers of the early Empire for whom chronology is the backbone of their investigations, since the fasti for the reigns of Vespasian and Titus are notable for the number of years in which the complete list of consuls is lacking. (shrink)

How do creative people think? Do great works of the imagination originate in words or in images? Is there a rational explanation for the sudden appearance of geniuses like Mozart or Einstein? Such questions have fascinated people for centuries; only in recent years, however, has cognitive psychology been able to provide some clues to the mysterious process of creativity. In this revised edition of Notebooks of the Mind, Vera John-Steiner combines imaginative insight with scientific precision to produce a startling account (...) of the human mind working at its highest potential. To approach her subject John-Steiner goes directly to the source, assembling the thoughts of "experienced thinkers"--artists, philosophers, writers, and scientists able to reflect on their own imaginative patterns. More than fifty interviews (with figures ranging from Jessica Mitford to Aaron Copland), along with excerpts from the diaries, letters, and autobiographies of such gifted giants as Leo Tolstoy, Marie Curie, and Diego Rivera, among others, provide illuminating insights into creative activity. We read, for example, of Darwin's preoccupation with the image of nature as a branched tree while working on his concept of evolution. Mozart testifies to the vital influence on his mature art of the wondrous "bag of memories" he retained from childhood. Anais Nin describes her sense of words as oppressive, explaining how imagistic free association freed her as a writer. Adding these personal accounts to laboratory studies of thought process, John-Steiner takes a refreshingly holistic approach to the question of creativity. What emerges is an intriguing demonstration of how specific sociocultural circumstances interact with certain personality traits to encourage the creative mind. Among the topics examined here are the importance of childhood mentor figures; the lengthy apprenticeship of the talented person; and the development of self- expression through highly individualistic languages, whether in images, movement or inner speech. Now, with a new introduction, this award-winning book provides an uniquely broad-based study of the origins, development and fruits of human inspiration. (shrink)

This review of Matthew Lipman’s autobiography, A Life Teaching Thinking, is a reflection on the themes and patterns of his extraordinarily productive career. His book begins with memories of earliest childhood and his preoccupation with the possibility of being able to fly, moves through the years in which his family struggled with the effects of the Great Depression, through his service in the military during World War II, his discovery of the joy and beauty of philosophy, his academic rise at (...) Columbia University, his Fullbright sojourn in Paris, and his early and later career. Lipman’s educational project led in four related directions: the practice of philosophy for children, which he invented, and which presents an epistemological challenge to a second field, philosophy of education, which is as startling as was Rousseau’s two hundred years before. Third, it led to a realm of theory called philosophy of childhood, upon which the practice of philosophy for children is a kind of action-meditation, prompting adults as it does to reflect on children’s differences from and similarities to adults at the same time, and in the same discursive space. Finally, his praxis also implicitly challenged those accounts of children’s philosophies, paradigmatically represented by Piaget’s work, which represent childhood epistemology as evidence for various genetic and epigenetic stage-based theories of cognitive development. The consequence for education of this confluence was a methodology—community of inquiry—that serves as a bridge between the two most influential philosophers of education of the 20th century—John Dewey and Paulo Freire. The educational praxis that emerged from his venture, for all its apparent simplicity, operationalizes a postcolonial standpoint epistemology vis a vis childhood and children, pulls the linchpin that holds in place the school as ideological state apparatus, and empowers the elementary classroom as a primary site for democratic theory and practice. (shrink)

Cognitive approaches to early medieval texts have tended to focus on the mind in isolation. By examining the interplay between mental and physical acts deployed in Old English poetry and prose, this study identifies new patterns and offers new perspectives. In these texts, the performance of right or wrong action is not linked to natural inclination dictated by birth; it is the fruit of right or wrong thinking. The mind consciously directed and controlled is open to external influences, both human (...) and diabolical. This struggle to produce right thought and action reflects an emerging democratization of heroism that crosses societal and gender boundaries, becoming intertwined with socio-political, soteriological, and cultural meaning. In a study of influential prose texts, including the Alfredian translations and the sermons of Ælfric, alongside close readings of three poems from different genres – The Seafarer, The Battle of Maldon, and Juliana –, Ponirakis demonstrates how early medieval authors create patterns of interaction between the mental and the physical. These provide hidden keys to meaning which, once found, unlock new readings of much studied texts. In addition, these patterns of balance, distribution, and opposition, reveal a startling similarity of approach across genre and form, taking the discussion of the early medieval conception of the mind, soul, and emotion, not to mention conventional generic divisions, onto new ground. (shrink)

Carl Jung's work played an important role in shaping modern psychology. Through a thorough exploration of Jung's psychological ideas and the ancient beliefs of shamanistic cultures, this unique investigation unveils startling parallels between the two. As different as they may seem at first glance, these two branches of human paradigm and belief have amazing similarities in structure and function. Interspersed with the writings of Jung, this fascinating account traces the forces and patterns of symbolism common to shamanism and depth psychology. (...) By studying these parallels, it is possible to get a glimpse into major aspects of the human psyche and understand the universality of psychic events in time and space. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 397-404 [Access article in PDF] The Sexist Sublime in Sade and Lyotard Caroline Weber In this case the masculine returns to haunt the place of the feminine like a ghost...., bloody and inhuman, in order to manifest and to root unforgettably in us the idea of a perpetual conflict and a spasm in which life is constantly being cut short. Antonin Artaud, The Theater (...) and Its Double"VIOLENCE," JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD ASSERTS in a recent article on Kantian aesthetics, "is necessary to the sublime." 1 More precisely, the sublime, held to transport an individual beyond his or her "ordinary" register of aesthetic responses, may do violence to a person's faculty of imagination, by shattering the accepted limits of sensory experience. Lyotard explains: In the sublime, the imagination must be subjected to violence, because it is by way of its suffering, the mediation of its violation, that the joy of seeing—or almost seeing—the law can be obtained.... This "joy" [here Lyotard cites The Critique of Judgment] "is only possible by the mediation of pain." 2Indeed, students of Kant's work have long been familiar with the exclusion of sentiment, pathos, and personal interest that he posits as a requirement for exalted status in the aesthetic and the moral sphere. For Kant, the law is precisely about the painful suppression of pleasure-seeking impulses for the sake of a disinterested, higher good. To achieve the transcendental perfection of the law, typically understood to be the domain of God alone, one must, godlike, overcome the [End Page 397] limitations of human nature and human feeling. And this effort—of which the Passion is just one vivid example—can be extraordinarily painful. In this context, Lyotard's formulation of the problem may not strike us as particularly startling. In contending that the Kantian experience of the sublime requires the mediation of pain, the French poststructuralist appears simply to be reminding us that the law, whether aesthetic or moral in nature, always demands some sort of discomfort, some kind of sacrifice.We might be more inclined to accept this last statement if Lyotard's own work hadn't already taught us to think otherwise. For as he demonstrates admirably in The Differend, his 1983 meditation on testimony and the Holocaust, there is always a winner and a loser under the law; its attendant pains are always selectively applied. From a discursive point of view, this asymmetrical relationship manifests itself in a differend, a situation where two parties find themselves in dispute, and "the 'regulation' of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties, while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom." 3 According to Lyotard, the suffering of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis exemplifies this pattern. In a strict juridical sense, any attempted protests by concentration camp prisoners had no meaning, and no right to mean anything, in Third Reich Germany: In the differend, something "asks" to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong (tort) of not being able to be put into phrases right away. This is when the human beings who thought they could use language as an instrument of communication learn through the feeling of pain... to recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds what they can presently phrase.... 4Here Lyotard reveals that an encounter with the law, mediated by pain, inevitably creates injustices and wronged parties. In this paper, I will draw on this insight from The Differend to point up the ethical deficiencies or torts inherent in his own ruminations on the Kantian sublime—and in those of another philosopher whose thinking closely resembles Lyotard's on the subject, the notorious Marquis de Sade. To limit the scope of my inquiry, I shall focus in this brief essay on the differend to which each thinker's writings subject the figure of the mother.For Lyotard and Sade alike, the mother represents first and foremost the capacity to reproduce. With this capacity... (shrink)

Given the tremendous burst of activity in the philosophy of science during the last quarter century, the number of books by trained philosophers dealing with the logic of biology is surprisingly small. Simon’s book resembles Morton Beckner’s The Biological Way of Thought in its comprehensive ambitions: "trying to discover what, if anything, is distinctive about biological science, its concepts, and its mode of explaining." The most obvious difference of the two books is Simon’s long central chapter on "Theories, Models, and (...) the Concept of the Gene," which deals with the history of genetics from Mendel’s predecessors to the successors of Watson and Crick. Beckner paid little explicit attention to the history of biology. Another difference lies in Beckner’s dogged assessment of all problems in the logic of biology from the perspective of what he called the Humean Pattern of Explanation—a detailed and difficult variant of the approach of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Nagel. Simon’s philosophical position is more flexible than Beckner’s. He provides an acceptable review of the literature of the last decade and a half; some of his conclusions are most interesting—even when incompletely supported by his arguments; and the utility of his book is insured by the fact that it is necessary to go back over twelve years to find another with which it can be compared. The first chapter contains a very effective critique of J. J. C. Smart’s thesis that biology is no more an autonomous science than is electrical engineering, but is merely applied physics and chemistry. Smart had argued from the grounds that all biological generalizations implicitly refer to terrestrial evolution and are not truly universal, and Simon demonstrates the general lack of success of all efforts to demonstrate a difference in kind between so-called laws of nature and empirical generalizations of the sort found in biology. The second chapter continues in this same vein, drawing an interesting contrast between phylogenetic explanation in biology and the explanation of individual events in human history, and claiming that ‘explanatory’ status may be granted to accounts which do not meet the requirements of the deductive-nomological model, as in the case of Darwin’s theories of the geographical distribution of plants and animals and the persistence of rudimentary organs. The author’s negative reaction to much of the recent philosophical literature concerning the role of functional analysis in biology seems particularly well placed. Following Hempel, most philosophers writing in the past ten years have regarded the occurrence of the item whose function is in question as the event to be explained. Simon correctly points out that in the biological literature, statements indicating the presence of this item are part of the explanans, usually one component in an explanation of the normal functioning of the organism. He also insists that functional or teleological statements cannot effectively be replaced by nonteleological ones. A functional account is one that relates an entity to the role it plays in an organized system. In the first of several serene non-sequiturs which mar the latter half of this book, Simon insists that the above account shows that the notion of function is essentially an "extrinsic" one and that teleological principles generally cannot be used to account for experience. No better argument than an appeal to Kant’s authority backs up this conclusion. The third chapter deals with the recent history of genetics; its summary makes the claim that "at no time during this history was it correct to say that one model was replaced by another one; rather, the development appears to have been one involving successive correction and refining of earlier conceptions. There has been no revolution: geneticists have always succeeded in either repelling or accommodating critical attacks on the model." The evidence presented earlier in the chapter confers some plausibility on this conclusion, but no more: Simon takes no notice of the controversy surrounding Kuhn and the notion of scientific revolutions, and provides no criteria by which to distinguish "revolutions" from "accommodations." The precise nature of the methodological continuity to be found in the history of genetics is crucial for the view that "biology, or at least genetics, must be regarded as incapable of yielding a complete explanation of the phenomena that come within its purview; if the ultimate principles appealed to are not those of chemistry and physics and hence essentially nonbiological, the explanation cannot be regarded as complete." The text does not clearly indicate the extent to which the author agrees with the statement just quoted; perhaps he only attributes it to "many biologists" impressed by the successes of molecular genetics. It is clear the Simon regards something he calls the "Cartesian attitude" as pervasive in biology. "Biologists are committed to attempting to explain the phenomena of life in terms of the nonliving... The property of being alive or being associated with a living system is simply not treated as a logical primitive within biological science." But this seems to take us back full circle—to the position of Smart, that biology is no more than applied physics and chemistry. Simon disagrees with Smart. How does he stand vis-a-vis this last statement of the Cartesian spirit he finds so pervasive in biology? I think he disagrees with it, but it is very hard to tell. Perhaps the answer is that the resolution of the issue of the autonomy of biology is a pragmatic matter, relative to a complex set of needs and commitments: the sorts of things that determine life styles, political attitudes, and religious points of view, as well as the growth of scientific understanding. The question of the precise configuration of Simon’s pragmatism remains very vague indeed—a consequence of his over use of the style of impersonal attribution rather than direct assertion. Simon says generally sane and familiar things about Biology and the Idea of Progress and about Biology and Ethics. The really startling assertion of the penultimate chapter, that "consciousness" is neither a biological nor a behavioral predicate, and that its foundations are essentially moral and legal, is unfortunately supported by no argument whatsoever. Instead, the reader is urged to examine two of the author’s previous articles.—E. M. (shrink)

Background: Individuals with psychopathic traits demonstrate an attenuated emotional response to aversive stimuli. However, recent evidence suggests heterogeneity in emotional reactivity among individuals with psychopathic or callous-unemotional (CU) traits, the emotional detachment dimension of psychopathy. We hypothesize that primary variants of psychopathy will respond with blunted affect to negatively valenced stimuli, whereas individuals marked with histories of childhood trauma/maltreatment exposure, known as secondary variants, will display heightened emotional reactivity. To test this hypothesis, the present study examined fear-potentiated startle between (...) psychopathy variants while viewing aversive, pleasant, and neutral scenes. Method: 238 incarcerated adolescent (M age = 16.8, SD = 1.11 years) boys completed a picture-startle paradigm and self-report questionnaires assessing CU traits, antisocial-aggressive behavior, and maltreatment. Results: Latent profile analyses identified four classes; primary variants (high CU traits, high aggression, low maltreatment; n = 46), secondary variants (high CU traits, high aggression, high maltreatment; n = 42), and two nonpsychopathic groups differentiated on maltreatment experience (n = 148). Findings from an ANOVA comparing identified groups on startle amplitude difference scores (i.e., aversive-neutral) suggested a main effect for group, F(3,196)=8.91, p<.001, η2 = .12. Primary variants of juvenile psychopathy displayed reduced startle potentiation to aversive images (threat and victim scenes), whereas secondary variants distinguished by high levels of childhood maltreatment did not. Conclusions: Findings add to a rapidly growing body of literature supporting the possibility of multiple developmental pathways to psychopathy (i.e., equifinality), and extend it by finding support for divergent potential biomarkers between primary and secondary psychopathy variants. (shrink)

Opening with a consideration of the methodological stakes, the paper examines, in a preparatory way, the phenomenon of the startle as a limit case for phenomenological analysis. Taking a bearing from a traditional Husserlian schema, the analysis quickly finds itself twisting and turning, contorting the received phenomenological method in order to remain with the phenomenon. Elements of Heidegger’s “fundamental analysis of Dasein” are also tried out, but similarly find themselves dislocated by the peculiar phenomenological content of the startle. (...) Thus unsettling the basic structures of phenomenology and temporality, the paper concludes by setting the scene for an encounter with Levinas’ perturbing notion of the il y a. (shrink)

This article introduces a 'spiritual self-pattern' into the Resonance-Inference Model (RIM) of psychotherapy (Leidig, 2025), proposing it as the supreme regulator of the balance between predictive confidence and corrective evidence (E-I balance) that underpins consciousness. The neurocognitive rationale is grounded in the work on criticality and affective E-I control by Tucker, Luu, and Friston (2025) and Gallagher's (2013) process-oriented Self-Pattern Theory. We argue that the spiritual self-pattern—the dynamic search for meaning, purpose, and connection—functions as the highest regulatory (...) level of this E-I balance. Spiritual needs are conceptualized as the most fundamental priors in the generative self-model, whose fulfillment depends on this optimal balance between confidence (E, elation) and corrective evidence (I, anxiety). Consequently, spiritual dissonance is defined as a chronic E-I imbalance that drives the system into rigid, maladaptive attractor states. In contrast, spiritual resonance describes the synergetic phase transition into a state of criticality, enabling maximum complexity, adaptability, and well-being. The spiritual self-pattern thus acts as the supreme control parameter governing the psyche's entire attractor landscape. This model provides a process-based explanation for the efficacy of spiritually integrated therapies, framing the spiritual dimension not as an add-on, but as a neurocognitive imperative for understanding sustainable change. (shrink)

In recent years, philosophers have developed accounts of cognitive and affective scaffolding to describe the contribution of environmental resources to the realization of mental abilities. However, an integrative account, which captures scaffolding relations in general terms and across domains, is currently lacking. To close this gap, this paper proposes a pattern theory of scaffolding. According to this theory, the functional and causal role of an environmental resource for an individual agent or a group of agents concerning a mental ability (...) in a situational context can be specified by multiple conditions that a scaffold can satisfy. On this view, scaffolds can be described in terms of patterns of relevance-weighted, gradually satisfied scaffolding conditions. The resulting theory will be applied to cases of mathematical cognition to demonstrate its plausibility and feasibility. The pattern theory of scaffolding, it will be shown, has important implications for research on embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive (4E) cognition. (shrink)

This manuscript documents an iterative investigation into numerical scaling behaviors in discrete photonic lattices with anti-periodic boundary conditions — and the successive correction of three apparently robust findings. In the initial study (March 2026), coarse-resolution simulations suggested "perfect" mathematical constants; high-resolution analysis revealed these as artifacts of grid quantization. A subsequently observed √2 ratio between topologies was identified as an artifact of comparing different distance metrics (Manhattan vs. Euclidean); when harmonized, both topologies converge to the same scaling product (P ≈ (...) 1.11072). A step-wise dependence of critical curvature Kc on ⌊L/2⌋ initially appeared robust, but sensitivity analysis (April 18, 2026) falsified this as well: replacing the hard, discontinuous boundary condition with smooth alternatives caused immediate oscillatory instability at K=0, and the ⌊L/2⌋ pattern vanished entirely. Extended simulations (April 26, 2026) up to L=128 (N=16,384) confirm that the scaling product P ≈ 1.11072 remains stable across both topologies within this specific CME implementation, though whether this reflects a universal feature or a consistent artifact of the numerical scheme remains an open question. Beyond its numerical findings, this study serves as a documented case of how computational tools — the grid resolution, the choice of metric, the implementation of boundary conditions — can generate convincing but false patterns. Each "discovery" was an artifact of the method used, not a property of the system studied. This carries implications beyond computational topology: in any field where measurement and comparison are central, the distinction between a law of nature and a signature of the instrument constant vigilance is advised. Full data, code, and the detailed falsification analysis are available at GitHub(KatharinaJacoby). (shrink)

The study aimed at measuring the dominant pattern of leadership and its relation to the performance of the administrative staff in the Palestinian universities. The study community consists of all the administrative staff from Al-Azhar University and the Islamic University, and through the census of the study society it was found to consist of (655) administrative staff. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, the researchers used the method of random sample in the study, and the study (...) was conducted on a sample of (221) administrative staff of the surveyed universities and the response rate was (82.35%). The study found that there is a high degree of satisfaction with the Dominant Pattern of Leadership in the Palestinian universities in Gaza Strip from the point of view of the administrative staff, which reached (71.67%). There is a high level of performance from the point of view of administrative staff, with a percentage of (82.53%). There is a direct correlation between the dominant pattern of leadership and the functional Performance of Administrative Staff, the absence of differences between the sample according to the gender variable in their perception of the dominant pattern of leadership and the functional Performance of Administrative Staff, the absence of differences in the perception of employees of the dominant pattern of leadership and the functional Performance of Administrative Staff depending on the age variable. There are differences of statistical significance according to the variable of scientific qualification in the Dominant Pattern of Leadership, while there were no differences in performance, the differences in the dominant pattern of leadership according to the scientific qualification were in favor of those who obtained the diploma degree compared to other practical qualifications, the absence of differences in the perception of employees of the dominant pattern of leadership and the functional Performance of Administrative Staff depending on the variable years of service, the absence of differences in the perception of employees of the dominant pattern of leadership and the functional Performance of Administrative Staff depending on the variable level of career (Director, Head of Department, and Administrative Officer). There were differences in the perception of workers to the dominant pattern of leadership depending on the variable of the workplace, where there were differences in favor of workers in deanships and colleges compared with the workers in the technical departments. While there were no differences in job performance according to the workplace variable, the existence of differences in the perception of workers to the dominant pattern of leadership depending on the university in which they work in favor of the Islamic University and the absence of differences in performance between the Islamic University and Al-Azhar University. The study reached a number of recommendations, the most important of which is that the interest of the managements of the Palestinian universities in improving the dominant pattern of leadership, to give universities the opportunity to participate in decision-making, the continued administration of universities interest and continuous improvement of the performance of its employees, enhance the periodic evaluation of job performance and to inform employees and express their opinion, solving workers' problems and giving them the opportunity to contribute to solving their own problems, the use of the staff rotation method periodically and strengthening the democratic the dominant pattern of leadership and empowering university staff. -/- . (shrink)

Do we have to presuppose a self to account for human self-consciousness? If so, how should we characterize the self? These questions are discussed in the context of two alternatives, i.e. the no-self position held by Metzinger (2003, 2009) and the claim that the only self we have to presuppose is a narrative self (Dennett 1992; Hardcastle 2008; Schechtman 2007) which is primarily an abstract entity. In contrast to these theories, I argue that we have to presuppose an embodied self, (...) although this is not a metaphysical substance, nor an entity for which stable necessary and jointly sufficient conditions can be given. Self-consciousness results from an integration of an embodied, basic affective flow with an intentional object (the self as agent or as center of imagination or thought), where this integration remains anchored in an embodied self. This embodied self is a flexible and variable entity, which we can account for only with a pattern theory of the self (in line with Gallagher 2013). Furthermore, I outline how this pattern theory of the self fits into the predictive coding framework, which also answers the open question whether self-representation is prior to world-representation or the other way around. The principal organization of a mechanism of building up a self-model is such that both types of representations are always activated and developed in parallel. Modelling oneself is a process which is always activated when one interacts with the world – much as a shadow is present when a person walks in the sun. (shrink)

This paper argues that Puddifoot’s arguments in How Stereotypes Deceive Us have more radical consequences than those argued for in the book. It does this by pointing out two problems for evaluating stereotypes via Evaluative Dispositionalism, Puddifoot’s view. The first problem concerns the very large number of dispositions associated with any stereotype, and the second the difficulty of evaluating a stereotype in isolation from other elements of a person’s psychology. The paper suggests that, when we take seriously Puddifoot’s arguments, we’ll (...) end up concluding that it’s not possible to assess the epistemic worth of any individual belief or stereotype. We could still discuss the epistemic merits of how it was formed, and discuss the epistemic consequences that this belief or stereotype has for a particular person in a particular situation. But overall epistemic evaluations of stereotypes, or even acts of stereotyping, would be something that we should try to avoid. (shrink)

Consciousness is typically treated as a mysterious or irreducible phenomenon, but this paper argues that it is a finite, repeatable pattern grounded in physical constraints. The brain is composed of a limited set of atoms, governed by fixed chemical and electrochemical laws, and capable of only a bounded range of configurations. These constraints imply that conscious states, identities, and psychological profiles are finite and recur whenever the same physical patterns reappear. Identity becomes a region in pattern-space rather than (...) a metaphysical essence, and mental disorders become stable pattern variants rather than intrinsic defects. This framework unifies neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy under a finite-state model of mind and generates testable predictions about clustering of conscious states, recurrence across individuals, bounded personality variation, and predictable transitions between mental states. By treating consciousness as the subjective interior of a physical pattern, this theory offers a coherent, scientifically grounded account of mind, identity, and mental variation, with implications for recurrence across time, space, and potentially artificial systems. (shrink)

Organizations often attribute stagnation in innovation to leadership failure, cultural inertia, or market forces. This paper introduces the Reflection Pattern, a distinct, recursive system of reinforcement loops driven by unacknowledged fear, sustained by reward, and protected by role authority. The Pattern narrows the range of perceived safe options over time, until novelty becomes either invisible or structurally excluded. Drawing on neurobiological models of motivation (Fear-Based Motivation in the Workplace, The Preparedness Ladder, Beyond Snyder’s Hope Theory), this paper outlines (...) the Pattern’s enabling conditions — Recursion, Role Safety Priority, and Reward Linkage — and its developmental stages: Entry, Threshold, Full Maturity, Network Stage, and Meta-Entity. A condensed Pattern Map and Edge taxonomy are provided for early identification. The mechanism of reinforcement is traced from felt-positive experiences (relief, approval, predictability) through dopamine and related neuromodulators to behavioral consolidation, illustrating why disruption is counterintuitive and often resisted. The implications for organizational practice are significant: dismantling a local Pattern may not break its profession-wide form, but can alter local adaptive capacity. A complete field guide, including a longitudinal composite case study (Catalyst Edge), reader diagnostics, and expanded taxonomy, appears in The Blind Spot – The Unseen Pattern That Silently Shapes Your Organization (Thomas, September 2025). -/- Since initial publication, empirical work has emerged that independently confirms several mechanisms described in this paper and elaborated in the related piece Appendix A: The Perfect Mirror Problem (Thomas, 2025). Cheng et al. (2025), studying what they term “social sycophancy” across 11 production AI models (N = 1,604), demonstrated that systems optimized for user affirmation produce measurable narrowing of perspective, increased conviction of rightness, and decreased willingness to engage in reparative action — while simultaneously being rated as higher quality and more trustworthy by the users they affect. Participants returned preferentially to the systems that degraded their judgment. (shrink)

Title descriptionThe purpose of this book is to illustrate the relevance to linguistics today of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. Although largely ignored by linguists, Whitehead has in fact much to say as regards the cognitive processes underpinning language pattern. His theory of symbolism conceives of language as the ‘systematization of expression’, and relates meaning to feeling (in the broadest sense). The Whiteheadian perspective allows a synthesis of the psychological and the social approaches to language that does not fall into (...) one or another fashionable form of reductionism. The volume represents a first application of Whitehead’s thinking to a broad range of linguistic phenomena, ranging from speech act theory to the production and comprehension of texts, from language acquisition to historical change and the evolution of language. It is argued that Whitehead’s holistic philosophy is uniquely suited to the view of language as an emergent phenomenon — regardless of whether one’s approach to cognition is via the ‘nativist’ or the ‘functionalist’ route. (shrink)

One source of misunderstanding about modeling non-conceptual mental content in Kant’s philosophy of mind and perception consists in the conventional functionalist reading that the apprehension of the power of imagination, both in the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of the Power of Judgement, stands as the relevant cognitive apparatus for creating a mental content without any concepts. I clarify that ‘sensible intuitions’ and ‘reflective intuitions’ in the first and third Critiques signify two distinct stages of the (...) phenomenal consciousness and cannot be justified by the same ‘procedure’ of mind. Sensible intuitions of different types are world-directed if they are justified by the ‘way and manner’ of perceiving objects through the representation of space as the relevant cognitive pattern, although they can appear with phenomenological different patterns given by nature or the mind itself. Reflective intuitions are, by contrast, non-world-directed but only satisfy the state of mind. Respectively, I conclude that Kant establishes a stronger phenomenal conservatism than his contemporary commentators have argued for because the relevant cognitive pattern is independent of the emergence of objects. (shrink)