I would like to discuss the claim that the resources of plural reference and plural quantification are sufficient for the purpose of paraphrasing all ordinary statements apparently concerned with composite material objects into plural statements concerned exclusively with simples.

In a recent paper titled ' Simples ', Ned Markosian asks and answers the Simple Question, which is, 'under what circumstances is it true of some object that it has no proper parts?' Markosian 's answer to the simple question is MaxCon, which states that an object is a simple if and only if it is a maximally continuous object. I present several arguments against MaxCon.

Gareth Evans has argued influentially against vague identities. David Lewis and Theodore Sider have argued against vague parthood. Much of the distaste among philosophers for metaphysical vagueness is sourced in these arguments. I argue that even if the considerations adduced by Evans, Lewis and Sider are conclusive, metaphysical boundary vagueness remains possible.

There are four main theories concerning the ultimate constitution of matter: atomism version 1, atomism version 2, the theory of gunk, and the theory of extended simples. These four theories are usually seen as diametrically opposed. Here I take a stab at ecumenism, and argue that atomism version 1 and the theory of extended simples can be reconciled and rendered compatible by reference to the reality of dispositions.

Si loin que l’on puisse mener la description des comportements religieux des humains, l’analyse des comment et leurs attitudes ne répond pas toujours à la question du pourquoi. C’est dans ce double contexte pluraliste que se pose la question du juste sens à donner au concept de religion. Car l’expérience quotidienne des médias, comme de la lecture d’ouvrages philosophiques, apologétiques, théologiques et autres, révèle que des mots comme religion, divin, sacré, sont lestés de sens multiples et souvent contradictoires. Il paraît (...) donc indispensable de préciser les notions que nous utilisons dans l’analyse du fait religieux, et de prendre en compte le lieu où se situe le discours : histoire, sociologie, philosophie, théologie. Car plus les voies sont multiples pour appréhender le religieux, plus il faut préciser les mots et la chose : toutes exigences auxquelles se soumet Michel Meslin.As far back as we can take the description of the religious behavior of human beings, the analysis of the how and their attitudes does not always answer the question of why. It is in this twofold context that the question arises of the exact meaning to be given to the concept of religion. The daily experience of the media, as well as the reading of philosophical, apologetic, theological, and others works, reveal that words like religion, divine, and sacred, are weighed down by multiple and often contradictory meanings. Thus, it appears indispensable to specify the notions that we use in the analysis of the religious fact, and to take into consideration where the discourse is situated: history, sociology, philosophy, or theology. The more ways there are to grasp the religious phenomenon, the more precise we must be in the words we use about it, requirements with which Michel Meslin has rigorously complied. (shrink)

O estatuto do simples e a questão do real: o horizonte nominalista de David Hume.

Esta obra oferece uma visão analítica e espiritual sobre as dificuldades da vida cotidiana, propondo que a raiz de nossos conflitos materiais reside no esquecimento de nossa natureza transcendental. Baseado nos ensinamentos de A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, o livro apresenta soluções definitivas extraídas da Bhagavad-gita para lidar com o estresse, a ansiedade e a insatisfação, trocando medidas temporárias por um despertar da consciência.

When a tree is chopped to bits, or a sweater unravelled, its matter still exists. Since antiquity, it has sometimes been inferred that nothing really has been destroyed: what has happened is just that this matter has assumed new form. Contemporary versions hold that apparent destruction of a familiar object is just rearrangement of microparticles or of 'physical simples' or 'world stuff'. But if destruction of a familiar object is genuinely to be reduced to mere alteration of something else, (...) we must identify an alteration proper to the career, the course of existence, of this something else; relatedly, the alteration must be characterizable without asserting the existence of the familiar object. All contemporary views fail one of these requirements. (shrink)

Is it possible that there are extended simples—material objects extended in space or spacetime that have no proper parts? The most commonly cited argument for this possibility is based on a version of the Humean principle: namely (and with some qualifications), any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation is possible. In this paper, we make the Humean argument fully explicit, and criticise it from three aspects—the Disjunction problem, the Pluralist problem, and the Accidentality problem. First, the original argument (...) only shows a disjunctive thesis: either extended simples are possible, or unextended complexes are possible. In order to reach the desired conclusion, some additional premise is needed. Yet, even though we agree that the Disjunction problem can be met, we argue that the Humean argument fails to establish the possibility of extended simples, for two reasons: the first comes from compositional pluralism, and the second is about the definition of accidental properties. We contend that the latter two problems put the proponents of the Humean argument in serious difficulty. Thus, metaphysicians who hold that there are extended simples should find better arguments for this view. (shrink)

Many philosophers have supposed that while most of the objects in our immediate experience are composed of parts, at some point we must come down to those fundamental impartite objects out of which all partite things are composed: the metaphysical simples (usually conceived of as enduring, even eternal, entities). I consider what reason we have to believe that there really are simples, then we also have good reason to believe in their momentariness.

In the course of modern philosophy, there have been several attempts to demonstrate the existence of ultimately simple objects by purely logical methods. One of the most recent of such attempts forms part of the foundation of Wittgenstein's logical doctrine. As Wittgenstein has, until quite recently, been considered the authoritative source of Logical Positivism, an examination of his supposed demonstration of logical simples is propaedeutic to an evaluation of the method of the school.

Este artículo investiga la coherencia entre la propuesta de una organización modular masiva de la mente y el enfoque de las heurísticas simples. Se discute una serie de potenciales conflictos entre los dos programas, pero finalmente son desestimados. De todos modos, el programa de las heurísticas simples sí termina socavando uno de los muchos argumentos propuestos para apoyar la modularidad masiva, al menos en el modo en que esta última es comprendida por los filósofos. Así que un resultado (...) de la argumentación será forzarnos a reexaminar la mejor manera de caracterizar la noción de modularidad en la ciencia cognitiva, para que la tesis de la modularidad masiva no deba ser abandonada completamente. Lo que está en juego en esta discusión es si existe una noción de "módulo" que esté bien motivada, de modo que tengamos una buena razón para pensar que la mente humana deba ser masivamente modular en su organización. Argumentaré que tal noción existe. This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind are consistent with the main elements of the simple heuristics research program. A number of potential sources of conflict between the two programs are investigated and defused. However, the simple heuristics program turns out to undermine one of the main arguments offered in support of massive modularity, at least as the latter is generally understood by philosophers. So one result of the argument will be to force us to re-examine the way in which the notion of modularity in cognitive science should best be characterized, if the thesis of massive modularity isn't to be abandoned altogether. What is at stake in this discussion, is whether there is a well-motivated notion of "module" such that we have good reason to think that the human mind must be massively modular in its organization. I shall be arguing that there is. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es examinar la relación entre seres simples y cuerpos en las Institutions de Physique (1740; 1742) o Instituciones de Física de Émilie Du Châtelet. Reflexionaremos acerca del diálogo que Du Châtelet mantiene con Leibniz y Wolff en esta obra para mostrar cómo entiende la filósofa la idea de que los seres simples o elementos son los fundamentos de los cuerpos. Estudiaremos la manera en que ella aborda los problemas filosóficos que hereda de estos (...) dos autores, debido a su original integración en la tradición filosófica leibniziana-wolffiana. Nuestro foco estará puesto en examinar la manera en que la filósofa da cuenta de la fenomenalidad de lo extenso y de la organización de los seres simples entre sí. (shrink)

It is sometimes claimed that string theory posits a fundamental ontology including extended mereological simples, either in the form of minimum-sized regions of space or of the strings themselves. But there is very little in the actual theory to support this claim, and much that suggests it is false. Extant string theories treat space as a continuum, and strings do not behave like simples.

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...) fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules for making decisions when time is pressing and deep thought an unaffordable luxury. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? Can judgments based simply on one good reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? Simple Heuristics explores these questions, developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analyses. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can produce adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop out rates, and playing the stock market. As an interdisciplinary work that is both useful and engaging, this book will appeal to a wide audience. It is ideal for researchers in cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science, as well as in economics and artificial intelligence. It will also inspire anyone interested in simply making good decisions. (shrink)

Philosophers have long been familiar with the contrast between predicates privado privado son las únicas características cualitativas realmente simples. Con base en que, después de todo, sus referentes externos admiten un análisis estructural, relacional, causal o funcional de algún tipo. En este artículo quiero adoptar un enfoque más general y más filosófico que los argumentos antireduccionistas evidenciando los problemas que generan con la filosofía de la ciencia; la neurociencia emergente y con la historia de la ciencia en general. Sus (...) argumentos carecen incluso de solidez con respecto a los estándares de la filosofía puramente analítica únicas características cualitativas realmente simples. Con base en que, después de todo, sus referentes externos admiten un análisis estructural, relacional, causal o funcional de algún tipo. En este artículo quiero adoptar un enfoque más general y más filosófico que los argumentos antireduccionistas evidenciando los problemas que generan con la filosofía de la ciencia; la neurociencia emergente y con la historia de la ciencia en general. Sus argumentos carecen incluso or concepts that denote “qualitative simples,” as opposed to predicates or concepts that denote or express “structural, relational, causal, or functional” features. The tendency has been to think of these two classes of properties as being ontologically quite different from each other. Some would insist that the features displayed in this private cognitive domain are the only genuinely simple qualitative features, on grounds that their external brethren all turn out to admit of a structural, relational, causal, or functional analysis of some kind after all. In this paper I wish to take a more general and more philosophical approach to the anti-reductionist arguments which run into trouble with the philosophy of science, with emerging neuroscience, and with the history of science generally. They lack integrity even by the standards of purely analytic philosophy. / Los filósofos conocen bien el contraste entre predicados o conceptos que denotan características “cualitativas simples”, a diferencia de predicados o conceptos que señalan características “estructurales, relacionales, causales o funcionales”. La tendencia ha sido pensar estas dos clases de propiedades como ontológicamente diferentes entre sí. Algunos insistirían en que las características que se muestran en este dominio cognitivo de solidez con respecto a los estándares de la filosofía puramente analítica. (shrink)

In so many of his epistemological writings, Aristotle defends a sensible flavor of gradualism about our cognitive capacities: we start with the partial grasps afforded by what is better known to us, and if things go well, we end up with understandings of those objects better known by nature. The picture is of a step-wise process, rather than a transforming moment of illumination.

At the end of I.3, 319a29ff, Aristotle asks a series of questions. This difficult and condensed passage, whose translation is controversial at some points, raises two questions: what is what is not without qualification? and is the matter of earth and fire the same or different? In this essay, I shall focus on the second question.

Rocío García-Retamero y Dafina Petrova Centro de Investigación Mente, Cerebro y Comportamiento, Universidad de Granada, España … Read More →.

Na Religião nos Limites da Simples Razão, Kant se propõe a investigar o núcleo racional da religião e sua relação com a religião histórica. O ponto de vista da filosofia crítico-transcendental e os princípios da religião racional-moral desenvolvidos nas três Críticas são apresentados como a base de uma análise da religião histórica, sobretudo da religião cristã. Com efeito, o conjunto de dogmas e estatutos da religião cristã é interpretado como um conjunto de símbolos que representam os meios pelos quais (...) os princípios morais puramente racionais se tornam intuitivos na experiência humana. De um modo geral, o propósito dessa exegese é verificar e demonstrar, respeitando certos limites, que existe compatibilidade e unidade entre os princípios da religião racional e os dogmas da religião cristã. Ao mesmo tempo, ela se propõe a acusar os elementos que não são compatíveis ou não são essenciais à religião. O resultado disso é um discurso consistente sobre a “essência moral” do cristianismo que culmina em um manifesto contra todo tipo de “entusiasmo” religioso e contra as “práticas religiosas” contraprodutivas à moralidade. Em última instância, pode-se argumentar ainda que o objetivo de Kant na Religião ultrapassa o empreendimento de oferecer um discurso sobre a essência da religião ou mesmo uma interpretação moral do cristianismo, dirigindo-se a uma investigação sobre as condições de possibilidade do progresso moral da humanidade e da realização do objeto último da razão, para o qual tanto a religião racional quanto a religião histórica desempenham um papel fundamental. (shrink)

I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as is commonly supposed. In the final section of the paper, I show that if the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, the most popular argument against extended simples fails.

Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.

This article discusses the text of the work On Simples attributed to Dioscorides. It argues that in fifteen places the transmitted text is faulty, and it proposes emendations. It also studies certain types of insertions made in the text by its most recent editor, Max Wellmann, and concludes that they are unnecessary. Finally, it discusses two points where On Simples sheds light on Dioscorides’ De materia medica.

O seguinte artigo tem como objetivo apresentar o problema das ideias de natureza simples para o desenvolvimento da ciência. Partindo da perspectiva de Gaston Bachelard, apresentaremos dois casos específicos da geometria e da física em relação ao problema da simplicidade de suas noções de base, desde as dificuldades ocasionadas pela simplificação até a superação realizada pelo desdobramento das ideias simples de “paralelas” e “simultaneidade” através do desdobramento dessas noções. A ciência contemporânea ao utilizar como ferramenta metodológica a teorização (...) matemática, descobre que os fenômenos estudados por ela são compostos por diversos tipos de relações que escapam a análise puramente empírica. A matemática consegue examinar de maneira mais profunda o fenômeno, e descobre que aquilo que parece simples aos sentidos, é na realidade, complexo, pelo fato de ser composto por uma diversidade de elementos. O pensamento científico moderno com base no cartesianismo procurava sempre partir da análise daquilo que é considerado simples, e desse modo, acaba mutilando algumas características que compõe os fenômenos. O método matemático possibilita a deformação das ideias simples, permitindo que a ciência contemporânea altere quando necessário suas noções de base. Os avanços na área da física e da geometria são exemplos de reformulação de pensamento, devido à alteração dos princípios simples sobre os quais estavam assentados. (shrink)

Le XIVe siècle peut sans nul doute être considéré comme «l’âge d’or» de la mystique en Angleterre. Parmi les noms de R. Rolle, W. Hilton, J. de Norwich, l’auteur du Nuage d’Inconnaissance occupe une place importante, gardant un anonymat manifestement recherché. Il apparaît très vraisemblable que cet Anonyme ait longtemps et assidûment fréquenté les milieux cartusiens, s’il n’a pas été lui-même chartreux, avant peut-être de choisir une vie plus radicalement érémitique. Le but de son œuvre est l’union à Dieu par (...) le détachement absolu, union au Tout-Autre selon le mode apophatique légué par Denys le pseudo-Aréopagite dont il se réclame explicitement, et auquel il emprunte le titre de son principal ouvrage. Il revendique également l’influence de Grégoire de Nysse, de saint Augustin, de Richard de Saint-Victor dont il traduira en anglais le Benjamin minor, et laisse clairement entendre qu’il a lu Thomas d’Aquin, saint Bernard et Guillaume de Saint-Thierry. Mais il est une influence profonde et non avouée qu’il nous a semblé intéressant de dégager ici; il s’agit de celle du Miroir des Simples âmes anéanties de Marguerite Porete. (shrink)

Dans la série de principes auxquels un Mémoire pour Gabriel Cramer rédigé par Condillac début 1747 ramène le système monadologique de Leibniz, le principe de l’ingrédience de la matière par les êtres simples ou monades échappe à la critique. Condillac accorde le principe [P1] les monades sont les premiers éléments de la matière. Il rejette seulement les deux principes subalternes [P2] les monades ont un principe interne de tous leurs changements et [P3] chaque état passager d’une monade représente sous (...) un certain point de vue l’univers, qui sous-tendent la notion de perceptions inconscientes. Composée dans la même période, la dissertation anonyme Les Monades est tout entière organisée en vue de la démonstration par Condillac en personne de la vérité de la thèse monadologique il y a des composés, donc il y a des êtres simples et de son corrélat, le principe la matière a pour éléments des êtres simples. Une analyse minutieuse des procédés argumentatifs déployés dans Les Monades permet d’interpréter cette défense de la thèse monadologique comme une remise en cause par Condillac en 1747 de l’hétérogénéité qu’il a maintenue en 1746 dans l’ Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines entre l’étendue et les qualités dites secondes. En donnant en son nom propre une preuve (opposée à celle par la raison suffisante dans l’ Ontologia de Wolff) de la vérité de la thèse monadologique, Condillac essaie de fonder une parfaite phénoménalisation de l’étendue. La dissertation Les Monades ne doit pas être vue simplement comme un préliminaire à la critique des systèmes abstraits dans le Traité des systèmes de 1749. La tentative d’une monadologie réformée dans la dissertation de 1747 marque le commencement d’une interrogation sur l’idée d’étendue appelée à se poursuivre dans le Traité des sensations de 1754. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é propor, de modo simples e saudável, uma releitura transformadora na relação entre os ministérios ordenados e a missão leiga, sobretudo no tocante à espiritualidade laical como colaboração eclesial. Com efeito, desde o tempo de Jesus, o protagonismo leigo, como cooperador à evangelização sempre foi ressaltado e muito bem aproveitado pelo Mestre; dessa forma, nota-se o quanto a Igreja carece hoje dessa ajuda primordial. Não por menos, o Concilio Vaticano II, no decreto Apostolicam Actuositatem, diz (...) que o fiel leigo é indispensável á missão da Igreja. Assim, entre tantas orientações, o mesmo decreto convoca a renovar e valorizar o ardor missionário com o apostolado leigo no interior da Igreja. Nesse sentido, é urgente a aplicação do pedido solicitado no Concílio Vaticano II para os tempos atuais, visando à sua concretização e não ficar somente em uma longínqua teoria. É nesta óptica, que a V CELAM, realizada em Aparecida, enfatiza mais uma vez a indispensabilidade do leigo como colaborador profícuo na missão eclesial. Por fim, vemos em muito a realização exemplar de muitos fiéis leigos batizados em seu exercício de ministros não-ordenados que oferecem subsídios riquíssimos para santificar a vida na Igreja. (shrink)

This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only (...) if it is phenomenally individuated. And in response to the explanatory question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is among the determinants of justification. This provides the basis of an argument for a phenomenal conception of justification, according to which a mental state is among the determinants of justification if and only if it is phenomenally individuated. (shrink)

This paper presents a simple but, by my lights, effective argument for a subclassical account of logic—an account according to which logical consequence is (properly) weaker than the standard, so‐called classical account. Alas, the vast bulk of the paper is setup. Because of the many conflicting uses of ‘logic’ the paper begins, following a disclaimer on logic and inference, by fixing the sense of ‘logic’ in question, and then proceeds to rehearse both the target subclassical account of logic and its (...) well‐known relative (viz., classical logic). With background in place the simple argument—which takes up less than five pages—is advanced. My hope is that the minimal presentation will help to get ‘the simple argument’ plainly on the table, and that subsequent debate can move us forward. (shrink)

Both extended simples and unextended complexes have been extensively discussed and widely used in metaphysics and philosophy of physics. However, the characterizations of such notions are not entirely satisfactory inasmuch as they rely on a mereological notion of extension that is too simplistic. According to such a mereological notion, being extended boils down to having a mereologically complex exact location. In this paper, I make a detailed plea to supplement this notion of extension with a different one that is (...) phrased in terms of measure theory. This proposal has significant philosophical payoffs. I provide new characterizations of both extended simples and unextended complexes, that help re-evaluating the question of whether such entities are metaphysically possible. Finally, I advance several suggestions as to how different notions of extension relate, first, to one another and, second, to mereological structure. (shrink)

Substitution and simple sentences -- Simple sentences and semantics -- Simple sentences and implicatures -- The enlightenment problem and a common assumption -- Abandoning (EOI) -- Beyond matching propositions -- App. A : extending the account -- App. B : belief reporting.

I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting (...) to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents. (shrink)