According to a common argument in defense of border control, legitimate states have a right to exclude on grounds of collective self-determination. I argue that the value of self-determination can also serve as a basis for criticizing states’ immigration policies. Specifically, I contend that the externalization policies of states in the Global North often undermine the self-determination of peoples in the Global South. I identify five pathways by which externalization policies undermine self-determination. (...) I conclude by tentatively suggesting some potential implications of this argument for broader debates about the governance of migration. (shrink)

The values of freedom and equality are at the heart of what it means for liberal states to do justice to their citizens. Yet, when it comes to the question of whether liberal states are capable of realizing the values of freedom and equality while controlling their borders, many philosophers are skeptical that liberalism and existing immigration arrangements can in fact be reconciled. After all, liberal states often deny entrance to prospective immigrants who are fleeing extreme forms of violence. They (...) also often police their borders in ways that are discriminatory and stigmatizing, contributing to a situation where immigrants are treated as morally inferior by society at large. Such practices conflict strongly with any commitment to the values of freedom and equality. -/- Luara Ferracioli here focuses on three key questions regarding the movement of persons across international borders: What gives some residents of a liberal society a right to be considered citizens of that society such that they have a claim to make decisions with regard to its political future? And do citizens of a liberal society have a prima facie right to exclude prospective immigrants despite their commitment to the values of freedom and equality? Finally, if citizens have this prima facie right to exclude prospective immigrants, are there moral requirements regarding how they may exercise it? The book therefore tackles the most pressing philosophical questions that arise from immigration: the questions of who can exercise self-determination, and why they have such a right in the first place. (shrink)

THE PAPER DEFINES AND DEFENDS A PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DETERMINATION AS ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ORDERING OF A JUST SOCIETY. THAT PRINCIPLE SPECIFIES THAT INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATE EQUALLY IN THE MAKING OF DECISIONS WHICH WILL GOVERN THEIR ACTIONS WITHIN INSTITUTIONS OF SPECIAL COOPERATION. THE PAPER ADOPTS THE STRATEGY OF ARGUING TO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE BY ASKING WHAT PRINCIPLES WOULD BE CHOSEN IN RAWLS' ORIGINAL POSITION. IT ARGUES THAT, CONTRARY TO THE THRUST IMPLICIT IN RAWLS AND OTHER LIBERAL (...) THINKERS, PERSONS IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION WOULD HAVE NO BASIS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN POLITICAL AND NON-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIAL COOPERATION, AND THUS WOULD CHOOSE THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION DIRECTLY AS APPLYING TO ALL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF SOCIAL COOPERATION. (shrink)

Several political theorists argue that states have rights to self-determination and these rights justify immigration restrictions. Call this: the self-determination argument for immigration restrictions. In this article, I develop an objection to the self-determination argument. I argue that if it is morally permissible for states to restrict immigration because they have rights to self-determination, then it can also be morally permissible for states to deport and denationalize their own citizens. We can either (...) accept that it is permissible for states to deport and denationalize their own citizens or reject the self-determination argument. To avoid this implication, we should reject the self-determination argument. That is, we should also reject the conclusion that rights to self-determination can justify any significant immigration restrictions. (shrink)

Many of the major self-determination movements of the 20th and early 21st Centuries did not go smoothly, but resulted in forced or semi-forced transfers of groups of people from one country to another. Forced population transfers are not, of course, supported by major theorists of self-determination and secession. However, the problems that make population transfers extremely common in actual cases of self-determination and secession, are not squarely faced in many theories of self-determination. (...) And, I shall argue, certain leading theories of self-determination and secession would make population transfers almost inevitable in practice, even if not called for or sanctioned in theory. This is a major stumbling block for any attempt to move from an abstract account of self-determination towards a working theory. In this paper I take a first step towards addressing this problem. I shall show how any approach to dealing with secession, including “primary rights” accounts, “remedial rights only” accounts, and even “consensual” accounts, must be able to deal with the inevitable problem of population transfers, if it is to be a complete and plausible theory. I shall also show how population transfers, to the extent that we can always expect them to take place, can be made as just as possible, in light of any approach to the problem of secession. I will not here attempt to adjudicate between different approaches to secession and self-determination. To that extent, my argument may be seen as a friendly addition to all of the above approaches, showing how they may try to meet an objection which they have not yet faced. (shrink)

Is territorial jurisdiction over natural resources justified? This paper argues that a freedom-based account of self-determination coupled with ‘functionalist’ justifications of territorial right support territorial jurisdiction over natural resources. This justification simultaneously gives rise to limits on the permissible exercise of the right: the principles of reciprocity and generality, and of equal freedom. This ‘reciprocal’ view on territorial jurisdiction over natural resources, defended here, differs from two alternatives: the traditional sovereignty view on the one hand and the transnational (...) jurisdiction view—which favours the transfer of sovereignty over natural resources from states to transnational institutions—on the other hand. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Self-Determination Theory (SDT) is an empirically based organismic theory of human motivation, development, and well-being that shares many points of interest with the fields of moral development and moral education. Yet, SDT has been largely disconnected from these fields so far. How can we define and empirically assess autonomous moral motivation? How is moral autonomy achieved in the course of development? And what are the relationships between leading a moral life and happiness? These questions have been occupying (...) moral psychologists and educators for a long time. They are focal for SDT, as well. This special issue highlights various lines of intersection between SDT, morality and education. Contributions either expand SDT into the moral domain or incorporate elements of SDT into moral theory with the ultimate goal of integrating fields that inherently belong together. (shrink)

According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper I discuss J. David (...) Velleman’s identification reductionist theory, according to which an agent is identified with his desire to make most sense of himself. I develop two constraints that an adequate identification reductionist theory must satisfy and show that Velleman’s theory cannot satisfy both. In particular, I argue that Velleman’s account founders on cases of self-determined self-transformation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper addresses three basic questions about moral motivation. Concerning the nature of moral motivation, it argues that it involves responsiveness to both reasons of morality and the value of persons and everything else of value. Moral motivation is thus identified as reason-responsive appropriate valuing. Regarding whether it is possible for people to be morally motivated, the paper relies on Self-Determination Theory (SDT) to show how moral motivation is a likely product of education that is need-supportive in (...) modeling appropriate valuing and engaging students in the kinds of reasoning that are essential to moral motivation. Virtuous motivation that inclines people to engage in morally motivated acts is equated with being morally self-determining or achieving the right kind of integrated motivation. SDT shows how people come to be morally motivated, and the paper concludes that an identified aspiration to be virtuous may play a significant role. (shrink)

In this article, I show how the principle of democratic self-determination can answer the boundary problem by both grounding and constraining a people’s right to exclude potential immigrants. I argue that a people has the qualified right to exclude insofar as it respects the self-determination claims of outsiders. I analyze the concrete implications of the requirement to respect the self-determination claims of outsiders in the cases of long-term residents, refugees, and brain drain. Sometimes the (...) only way for a people to respect the self-determination claims of outsiders will be by including, rather than excluding, them as members. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the objection that unilateral secession by a national group (e.g., the Scots) from a legitimate, nonusurping state would wrong minority nationalities within the seceding territory. I show first that most proponents of this objection assume that the ground of the right to national self-determination is the protection of the group’s culture. I show that there are alternative justifications available. I then set out a version of this objection that does not rely on this (...) claim; on this objection, a national minority that seceded and created its own state would commit an expressive wrong against minorities within the territory over which it claimed jurisdiction. I show that this objection is undermotivated: only under a specific set of circumstances would the minorities of the secessionist region be subject to an expressive wrong. Finally, I show that the correct way to think about the claims of minorities in secessionist regions is in terms of a claim to secure access to equal civic status such that they are not at risk of becoming justifiably alienated from their new state. If a secessionist group cannot provide this guarantee to the minority residents of their territory, then their seceding would commit wrongful harm, and the presumption in favour of collective autonomy is defeated. I call this defeater the ‘Alienation Defeater.’With this in hand, we are now in a position to explain why nations are normatively special. Responding to the objections broached by Allen Buchanan and others, I show that even if other kinds of groups, such as religious groups, have the features in virtue of which nations have a claim to self-determination, this does not entail that those groups also have the right to secede. This is because an account of self-determination needs a list of ‘defeaters’—features in virtue of which a group’s claim to self-determination is defeated. I argue that religious groups are the strongest candidate for having a claim to collective autonomy in virtue of sharing many features with nations. I then argue that religious groups will run afoul of the Alienation Defeater; religious identity is too narrow to be the basis of the dominant collective identity of a state. This does not apply to nationality. This, I explain, is because of qualitative differences between religious groups, qua religious groups, and nations. (shrink)

A recent surge of research has begun to examine music participation and well-being; however, a particular challenge with this work concerns theorizing around the associated well-being benefits of musical participation. Thus, the current research used Self-Determination Theory to consider the potential associations between basic psychological needs (competence, relatedness, and autonomy), self-determined autonomous motivation, and the perceived benefits to well-being controlling for demographic variables and the musical activity parameters. A sample of 192 Australian residents (17-85, Mage = 36.95), (...) who were currently participating in a musical activity at the time, completed an online questionnaire. Results indicated that females were more likely to perceive benefits to their well-being; and that how important an individual considers music in their life was positively related to perceived well-being. Importantly, the analyses also revealed that the basic needs of competency and relatedness were related to overall perceived well-being as well as specifically social, cognitive, and esteem dimensions of well-being. Autonomous motivation demonstrated significant associations with both an overall well-being score as well as four of five specific well-being subscales measured. Collectively, the findings indicate that Self-Determination Theory offers a useful theoretical framework to understanding the relationship between musical participation and well-being. Further, the pattern of findings reiterates the positive associations between musical participation and one’s psychosocial well-being, with broad implications for people involved in the facilitation of musical activity. (shrink)

Self-authorship has been established as the basis of an influential liberal principle of legislation and public policy. Being the author of one’s own life is a significant component of one’s own well-being, and therefore is better understood from the viewpoint of the person whose life it is. However, most philosophical accounts, including Raz’s conception of self-authorship, rely on general and abstract principles rather than specific, individual psychological properties of the person whose life it is. We elaborate on the (...) principles of self-authorship on the basis of self-determination theory, an empirically based psychological theory that has been at the forefront of the study of autonomy and self-authorship for more than 45 years. Our account transcends distinctions between positive and negative freedom and attempts to pinpoint the exact properties of self-authorship within the psychological processes of intrinsic motivation and internalization. If a primary objective of public policy is to support self-authorship, then it should be devised on the basis of how intrinsic motivation and internalization can be properly supported. Self-determination theory identifies three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The satisfaction of these needs is associated with the support and growth of intrinsic tendencies and the advancement of well-being. Through this analysis, we can properly evaluate the significance of rationality, basic goods, and the availability of options to self-authorship. Implications for law and policy are discussed with an emphasis on legal paternalism and what many theorists call “liberal perfectionism,” that is, the non-coercive support and promotion of the good life. (shrink)

This study attempts to analyse the relationship between two key psychological variables associated with performance in sports - Self-Determined Motivation and Competitive Anxiety - through Bayesian Networks analysis. We analysed 674 university students/athletes from 44 universities that competed at the University Games in México, with an average age of 21 years (SD = 2.07) and with a mean of 8.61 years’ (SD = 5.15) experience in sports. Methods: Regarding the data analysis, first a CHAID algorithm was carried out to (...) determine the dependence links between variables, and then a Bayesian networks was developed. The validation of the BN revealed AUC values ranging from 0.5 to 0.92. Subsequently, various instantiations were performed with hypothetical values applied to the “bottom” variables. Results showed two probability trees that have extrinsic motivation and amotivation at the top, while the anxiety/activation due to worries about performance was at the bottom of the probabilities. The instantiations carried out support the existence of these probabilistic relationships, demonstrating their scarce influence on anxiety about competition generated by the intrinsic motivation, and the complex probabilistic effect of introjected and identified regulation regarding the appearance of anxiety due to worry about performance. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 9, Page 53-55, September 2012.

Health-related quality of life measures aim to assess patients’ subjective experience in order to gauge an increasingly wide variety of health care issues such as patient needs; satisfaction; side effects; quality of care; disease progression and cost effectiveness. Their popularity is undoubtedly due to a larger initiative to provide patient-centered care. The use of patient perspectives to guide health care improvements and spending is rooted in the idea that we must respect patients as self-determining agents. In this paper I (...) look at the two main orientations to quality of life measurement: standardized and individualized measures. I argue that while these measures are attempts to provide for patient self-determination, they both fail to do so. In their place I suggest a new approach which overcomes their respective difficulties: a dialogic approach. (shrink)

The self functions as a critical mechanism for an organism to navigate the complex, often unknown, relations between the body and the brain. Organisms that sustain a coherent sense of self utilize it as an adaptive strategy to alter their environment, thereby enabling predictive processing within an incomplete _Umwelt_. While researchers often attempt to model prediction as a Quine-like self-referential loop by studying small neuronal sets, this reductionist approach limits our understanding of the self's holistic predictive (...) nature. Adopting a functionalist perspective, this paper conceptualizes the mind as a system that predicts embodied intrinsic motivations essential for survival and flourishing. (shrink)

The principle of self-determination plays a crucial role in contemporary clinical ethics. Somewhat simplified, it states that it is ultimately the patient who should decide whether or not to accept suggested treatment or care. Although the principle is much discussed in the academic literature, one important aspect has been neglected, namely the fact that real-world decision making is temporally extended, in the sense that it generally takes some time from the point at which the physician (or other health (...) care professional) determines that there is a decision to be made and that the patient is capable of making it, to the point at which the patient is actually asked for his or her view. This article asks under what circumstances, if any, temporising—waiting to pose a certain treatment question to a patient judged to have decision-making capacity—is compatible with the principle of self-determination. (shrink)

The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) requires hospitals to ask patients upon admission whether they have an advance directive. Although the PSDA has received extensive criticism, little attention has been paid to the cost of the law, either during its legislative course or following its implementation. Nonetheless, several tangible and intangible costs are associated with the PSDA. Such costs may be incurred by different parties. This paper examines the costs and benefits of the PSDA and illustrates the extent of (...) some of its tangible costs. The incremental start-up cost for one institution's response to the PSDA is estimated to be $49,304 ($1.31 per admission) and the total implementation cost of the program to be $114,528. In addition, the national incremental start-up cost for hospitals to implement the PSDA is estimated to be between $43,625,114 and $101,569,922. Finally, the potential implications of the PSDA for future governmental health care ethics regulation are discussed. (shrink)

This paper describes and defends a novel principle for allocating self-determination powers: the persistent alienation principle. This holds that there are pro tanto grounds for extending greater powers of self-determination to persistently alienated internal minorities who seek such powers, if doing so will alleviate their alienation without alienating or threatening the basic interests of others. For this principle, alienation should be understood in structural rather than subjective terms, as something experienced by people as members of groups (...) that are negatively defined or politically positioned in such a way as to injure their members’ civic standing. (shrink)

The principle of national self-determination has usually been justified by extending to national groups an entitlement that individuals are regarded as having, namely, to the conditions necessary for their self development. In order to extend the concept of self-determination to nations in this way, an argument that it is important for nations to exist within their own political communities must be given. In this essay, I describe and criticize one type of argument for such a (...) principle of national self-determination – what I will call the communitarian argument.Contemporary communitarians (such as Michael Walzer and David Miller) usually contend that determining who rightfully has membership in a political community must precede the allocation of rights and responsibilities between members. Community is understood to mean a national community; membership in communities therefore results from the ascription of national identities to individuals and to the consequent sorting out of loyalties that follows from this ascription. A right of self-determination for nations is required, on this view, in order to ensure that political communities are legitimately formed in accordance with national identities. (shrink)

The principle of self-determination, as commonly intended, is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty rights. This perspective, however, is inconsistent with the needs of a community, and particularly with the necessity to promote a relatively stable social order, and an integration between subjects. I propose a different perspective that takes into account the relationships rather than the individual. In particular, I will try to demonstrate 1) that any community implement a specific social order, that is (...) a complex of practices; 2) that any social practices express specific values​​, 3) that these values ​​are the result of historical and cultural circumstances, 4) that they are subject to an ongoing public debate, and finally 5) that only if the individual praxis is consistent with these values ​​can it lead to recognition of rights. In that perspective does not exist a general liberty to determine itself, outside of a specific relational situation. It could only be affirmed that one has a practical liberty to do and to act as it wants, but its rights depends on relationships in which the person is engaged. (shrink)

Symposium: Territory, Belonging: secession, self-determination and territorial rights in the age of identity politics With a discussion of Neera Chandhoke’s Contested Secessions. Rights, Self-determination, Democracy and Kashmir (OUP 2012) Guest Editor: Valentina Gentile Submission Deadline Long(1,000 words max): November 15, 2012 Full paper (10,000 words max, upon acceptance): March 15, 2013 Invited Contributors Allen Buchanan (DukeUniversity), Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University), Margaret Moore (Queen’s University) and Neera Chandhoke (University of Delhi).

In a broadly Kantian context, it is often assumed that practical self-consciousness and rational self-determination can only be understood in opposition to pleasure and desire. I argue instead that, already for Kant, rational self-determination is itself a determination of our faculty of desire. Drawing on resources from Kant and Hegel, the paper shows that sensible desire can be understood as a self-determination of our vital forces which is connected to a sensible awareness (...) of our practical existence. In order to constitute what Kant calls a higher faculty of desire, we need to develop a practical self-consciousness of this sensible desire. As Hegel develops this idea, such self-consciousness involves grasp of the very form of desire that is occluded in its sensible form, as well as a reflexive redoubling of desire whereby desire becomes its own object. (shrink)

Kant speaks of our capacity to be “self-determining […] in certain […] laws holding firm a priori” (KrV, B 430). Here the “laws” refer to the categories of freedom introduced in KpV. The categories of freedom, then, are necessary for self-determination. I first explain how Kant employs the notion of determination in his theoretical philosophy. I then explain how the notion is utilized also in his practical philosophy, particularly in connection to the act of determining the (...) forms of willing that make morality possible. I conclude by answering the question, Why are the categories of freedom necessary for self-determination? Understanding why the categories of freedom are required for self-determination will also help clarify the nature and function of Kant’s categories of freedom, which have puzzled many scholars. (shrink)

If self-determination enables one to know truths and rule oneself, then it’s central to metaphysics and ethics because metaphysics concerns truths, and ethics grasps good actions requiring self-rule. Aristotle and Mencius agree about the relation between metaphysics and ethics. Nevertheless, closer examination shows differences in their conceptions of the self, how it knows truths, the nature of truth, and the effectiveness of the wise/virtuous on the world. Given the significance of self-determination to theory and (...) practice, comparing Mencius’s and Aristotle’s views illuminates it and the challenges for each author’s view. (shrink)

Peter Jones argues that human rights can address violations of the determination principle, but cannot address violations of the selfhood principle. In this commentary, it is argued that international human rights norms should address both violations, for two key reasons. First, these violations are continuous in their underlying ideologies and in their effects on those whose rights to self-determination are denied. Second, international law was itself complicit in creating both categories of violations, and so has a special (...) responsibility to correct them. (shrink)

Why should (or should not) we have a system of different states that each claim both internal and external sovereignty? How can the state gain its legitimate authority to rule? What is the problem with the ideal of the ‘global citizen’? How should states respond to different groups’ secession claims? To what extent should states have the right to control their borders? If one finds such questions intriguing, one should read Anna Stilz’s book Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. Stilz argues (...) that a system of territorial states serves to protect important values – occupancy, basic justice and collective self-determination – which are key to living an autonomous life. I focus on the theory’s implication for the debates on border control. I contend that Stilz’s arguments still have difficulties grounding the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. That said, the book has done a great job in providing a liberal theoretical framework for us to reflect upon citizenship, immigration, succession claims, cosmopolitan ideals, the colonial legacy and disputes over borders and resources. (shrink)

This article asks whether states have a right to close their borders because of their right to self-determination, as proposed recently by Christopher Wellman, Michael Walzer, and others. It asks the fundamental question whether self-determination can, in even its most unrestricted form, support the exclusion of immigrants. I argue that the answer is no. To show this, I construct three different ways in which one might use the idea of self-determination to justify immigration restrictions (...) and show that each of these arguments fails. My conclusion is that the nature and value of self-determination have to do with the conditions of genuine self-government, not membership of political society. Consequently, the demand for open borders is fully consistent with respect to self-determination. (shrink)

Claims to self-determination are rife in world politics today. They range from Scottish and Catalonian campaigns for independence to calls for the devolution of power to regions and cities. But is self-determination meaningful or desirable in the twenty-first century, or merely a dangerous illusion? In this book, David Miller mounts a powerful defence of political self-determination. He explains why it is valuable and argues that geographic proximity alone is not enough for groups to have (...) the capacity for self-determination: group members must also identify with each other. He explores the different political forms that self-determination can take, and he suggests some realistic constraints on how it can be achieved, concluding that people exercising their collective agency is still both feasible and important. Anyone concerned by the theoretical issues raised by the various secessionist and nationalist movements around the world should read this book. (shrink)

I offer in this paper a new conception of democratic self-determination. My proposal defends Rafanelli's peaceful reform intervention from the concern that we should not promote justice abroad, because it would interfere with the self-determining choice of other people to select an authoritarian government. I challenge this influential view of authoritarian self-determination. I argue instead that self-determination should be democratic in its input, or the procedure deliberating and voting on the constitution. Self- (...) class='Hi'>determination should also be democratic in its output, or the constitution's rules. Democratic self-determination offers three important advantages: it joins self-determination indivisibly with other inalienable human rights, such as the human right to racial non-discrimination. Second, it guards against the problem of the false mandate, or authoritarians attempting to legitimate their autocratic rule using rigged referenda and suppressed debate. Third, democratic self-determination reduces the risk of ethnic conflict given the diversity of actual states. Democratic self-determination passes the a ctual deliberation test, since it has been vindicated by inclusive deliberation with people from diverse cultures. (shrink)

Anselm is known for offering a distinctive definition of freedom of choice as “the ability of preserving uprightness of will for its own sake.” When we turn to Anselm’s account of the devil’s fall in De Casu Diaboli, however, this idiosyncratic understanding of freedom is not at the forefront. In that text, Anselm seemingly assumes a traditional understanding of free will defined in terms of alternative possibilities for the angels. These alternative possibilities must be present so the angels can engage (...) in ‘self-determination.’ God, however, does not face alternative possibilities to achieve His self-determination. Anselm thus explicates his notion of free will in terms of three different concepts: his distinctive definition of free choice, self-determination, and the principle of alternative possibilities. Despite attempts (by both scholars and Anselm) to explain how these three concepts are related, I argue that their relationship is problematic. In particular, I argue that Anselm is guilty of conflating and equivocating with regard to these concepts. I further importantly claim that the conflation obscures the fact that his understanding of self-determination calls into question God’s excellence over that of the good angels. (shrink)

It is a standard requirement of democratic theory that all members of society be treated with equal respect as capable of self-determination (Christiano 2004; Dworkin 1977; Gutmann and Thompson 2004; Patten 2011; Waldron 1999). The fulfillment of this requirement is problematic vis-à-vis conscientious dissenters. Conscientious dissenters refuse to comply with legally enforced duties when compliance risks jeopardizing their moral integrity, because the required behavior would compromise their loyalty to (some of) their moral commitments. Coercing conscientious dissenters into behavior (...) they deem morally wrong, qua contrary to their conscience, amounts to disrespect because it threatens their capacity for.. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that promoting self-determination for peoples and protecting the human rights of individuals are competing priorities. By this is meant that securing individuals in their human rights requires limits on the rights of their peoples, and vice versa. In contrast, the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Draft Declaration) treats the two as not only mutually supporting but mutually necessary. In the Draft Declaration, the right of peoples to self-determination is (...) more than a principle that constrains states in their behavior towards other states and territories “outre-mer”; it also constrains states within their domestic realm. This view of self-determination reflects the experience of many indigenous groups, for whom refusal to respect the integrity of their group and failure to respect the integrity of their persons have gone hand in hand. In this chapter, I argue that the Draft Declaration’s treatment of self-determination is right: self-determination is a human right and this human right is the same right that underpins the rights of states. Treating an interest of peoples like self-determination as a constitutive element of human dignity raises practical worries about the stability of the international system, and philosophical worries about potential conflicts between individuals and peoples. But it also casts state sovereignty itself in a different light. This new light has interesting consequences both for international law and for philosophical debates about minorities within minorities. In particular, it allows one to think about questions about internal minorities as ultimately questions about legitimacy and representation. (shrink)

Does a liberal state, dedicated to the principles of freedom and equality, have a moral right to exclude? In her book, Liberal Self-Determination in a World of Migration, Luara Ferracioli makes a c...

In recent years numerous multi-national states have disintegrated along national lines, and today many more continue to witness bitter secessionist struggles. This ambitious study brings together for the first time a series of original essays on the ethics of secession. A host of leading figures explore key issues in this important debate, including, what is `a people' and what gives them a right to secede? And is national self-determination consistent with liberal and democratic principles or is it a (...) dangerous doctrine? (shrink)

With reference to previous research on the relation between Heidegger’s thought and Neoplatonism, this investigation seeks to show concisely how—despite the profound distance between the finitude of Dasein and Plotinus’ doctrine of the divine Nous—there exists a fundamental correspondence regarding their ontological structure. This correspondence may be described as a phenomenological principle of the necessary precedence of the pre- determinate and pre-present horizon over the ecstatic openness. That is to say, there must already be a primordial horizon through which openness (...) to beings as presence becomes possible at all. By examining this structure in both the early and later Heidegger, and through a phenomenological approach to Plotinus’s doctrine of the Nous’ self- determination in its turning toward the One, the paper argues that a common fundamental paradigm of rationality can be discerned, i.e. a mode of thinking that is no longer metaphysical in the onto-theological sense, yet capable of unifying within itself the two essential moments of ecstatic openness and self-determination. (shrink)

Many abused women from patriarchal collectivistic societies that are subjected to social control seek help in community health clinics. The article is based on a qualitative study, which consisted of 24 interviews with 12 abused Israeli Arab women who sought the help of social workers in community health clinics. A central theme that emerged from the interviews was the women’s wish to maintain their self-determination in retaining the power to determine the boundaries of the intervention within the professional (...) relationship. The discussion focuses on the dialectical consequences of maintaining the women’s self-determination—empowering them, on one hand, and limiting them, on the other. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that promoting self-determination for peoples and protecting the human rights of individuals are competing priorities. However, many recent international human rights documents include rights of peoples in their lists of basic human rights. In this paper, I defend including at least one people’s right, the right to self-determination, in the list of basic rights. Recognizing that self-determination is a constitutive element of human dignity casts state sovereignty in a different light, with (...) interesting consequences both for international law and for philosophical debates about the rights of minorities. (shrink)

Research and practice about self-determination in the context of disability has centred on teaching skills and providing support to help people with impairments to be independent. However, limited research exists about the impact of Information and Communication Technologies, in particular social media and mobile devices, on the development of self-determination skills among people with disabilities. This paper presents the findings of a qualitative study which collected data from observations, a researcher diary, focus groups, individual interviews and (...) data from social media. The focus of the study was on young people with vision impairments who were transitioning to university life. The study found that the participants developed self-determination skills by using and adapting collaborative and interactive online tools and mobile devices according to their transition needs. This finding expands the understanding of the implications of new technologies for young people with disabilities’ personal development and the enhancement of self-determination. (shrink)

Self-determination is a central concept for political philosophers. For example, many have appealed to this concept to defend a right of states to restrict immigration. Because it is deeply embedded in our political structures, the principle possesses a kind of default authority and does not usually call for an elaborate defense. In this paper, I will argue that genealogical studies by Adom Getachew, Radhika Mongia, Nandita Sharma, and others help to challenge this default authority. Their counter-histories show that (...) the principle was used to justify, strengthen, and adapt imperial rule in the twentieth century. In particular, the idea that controlling a population's composition through regulating immigration is an essential aspect of self-determination emerged as a response to White anxieties about the migration of negatively racialized groups. Genealogies have not been adequately appreciated as a critical tool within the mainstream of political philosophy. I show that these genealogies have a critical role to play because they unsettle our uncritical attachment to the structures of the nation-state system and raise serious questions about the meaning and emancipatory force of the principle of self-determination. (shrink)

What limitations on intervention in support of democratic revolutions does proper regard for the collective right of self-determination impose? Some have held that if intervention in support of democratic revolutions is justified, it must cease once the authoritarian regime has been deposed—that any effort by the intervener to use force to shape the new political order would violate the people’s right of self-determination. This essay argues that proper regard for self-determination is compatible with much (...) more extensive interventions. (shrink)

In my article, I argued against the view that substitute judgements—whether aided by AI-driven patient preference predictors (P4s) or not—can genuinely respect the autonomy of previously competent patients who left no advance directives (ADs).1 I defended four core claims. First, it is a mistake to equate merely satisfying patients’ preferences with respecting their autonomy. Indeed, paternalistic deception can fulfil someone’s implicit or revealed preferences while simultaneously undermining their autonomy, indicating that preference satisfaction alone is insufficient for respecting autonomy. Second, attempts (...) to ground autonomy in anything other than a direct act of self-determination are problematic: once respect for autonomy is detached from such acts, there is simply no autonomy left to be respected—unless one is prepared to significantly redefine the concept. Third, I argued that such redefinitions, exemplified by the ‘endorsed life view’, lead to a problematic expansion of agency in the form of ‘weak autonomy’, which would need to be applied to all patients, not just those who are incapacitated. This, in turn, blurs the traditional boundaries between respect for autonomy and paternalism, allowing certain paternalistic interventions to be justified as appeals to one’s ‘weak autonomy’. Finally, I maintained that other moral rationales—such as honouring an individual’s unique identity—can justify recourse to the substitute judgement standard without resorting to problematic expansions of the autonomy concept. My article has attracted several commentaries, and I am grateful for the thoughtful engagement and insightful remarks they offer. In what follows, I aim to clarify my position further and address certain misunderstandings. Given the limited space, I will discuss only the main points raised in each commentary, beginning with those that most critically engage my core claims. Huang and Cong challenge my second claim and argue that ‘for those who have lost their decision-making capacity, there are still ways to respect their …. (shrink)