The bullshit receptivity scale—a methodological tool that measures the level of profoundness that participants assign to a series of obscure and new-agey, randomly generated statements—has become increasingly popular since its introduction in 2015. Researchers that deploy this scale often frame their research in terms of Harry Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit, according to which bullshit is discourse produced without regard for the truth. I argue that framing these studies in Frankfurtian terms is detrimental and has led to some misguided theorizing (...) about the mental processes implicated in bullshit receptivity. I argue that we should, instead, frame these studies in terms of what G.A. Cohen calls unclarifiable bullshit. After reviewing some recent theorizing about the psychology of bullshit receptivity, I show how reframing the bullshit receptivity scale in terms of unclarifiable bullshit generates plausible conjectures about the psychological factors responsible for bullshit receptivity. I draw from the literature on the illusion of explanatory depth and the misplaced meaning effect to develop a novel account of bullshit detection and receptivity. I consider some empirical support for my account and draw attention to ways that it can also be extended to account for results from studies that don’t use the bullshit receptivity scale. (shrink)

This new book by Michael Slote argues that Western philosophy on the whole has overemphasized rational control and autonomy at the expense of the important countervailing value and virtue of receptivity. Recently the ideas of caring and empathy have received a great deal of philosophical and public attention, but both these notions rest on the deeper and broader value of receptivity, and in From Enlightenment to Receptivity, Slote seeks to show that we need to focus more on (...) receptivity if we are to attain a more balanced sense and understanding of what is important to us. -/- Beginning with a critique of Enlightenment thinking that calls into question its denial of any central role to considerations of emotion and empathy, he goes on to show how a greater emphasis on these factors and on the receptivity that underlies them can give us a more realistic, balanced, and sensitive understanding of our core ethical and epistemological values. This means rejecting post-modernism's blanket rejection of reason and of compelling real values and recognizing, rather, that receptivity should play a major role in how we lead our lives as individuals, in how we relate to nature, in how we acquire knowledge about the world, and in how we relate morally and politically with others. (shrink)

This is a marvelous book. Langton offers a fresh interpretation of Kant, the main tenets of which she states in a few bold propositions and then goes on to elaborate with great clarity and care. She supports her interpretation with a wealth of citations accompanied by insightful commentary. The “Humility” of her title is the thesis that we can have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, which is Langton’s gloss on the Kantian slogan that we can have no (...) knowledge of things as they are in themselves. The central argument she finds in Kant for this thesis proceeds from premises to which I believe many contemporary philosophers would give their assent. It is therefore an argument to which we should give careful consideration. (shrink)

This essay analyses Ricoeur’s notion of human being that is facilitated by cultural imagination (l’imagination culturelle). Following Ricoeur’s insight in his 1976 essay Ideology and Utopia as Cultural Imagination, this paper proposes that his more extensively examined notion of the mytho-poetic imagination, that extends to the social and practical imagination, is necessarily concretised as culture, or as human action that both receives and produces the cultural reality thatis the context of a subject’s action, in order to gain ‘a hermeneutics of (...) the being-able-to-be (pouvoir-être)’. I maintain that Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics of ‘being able’ is ultimately based on the cultural imagination initiating tradition-conscious change in the social reality that then facilitates the post-critical appropriation of one’s self as capable. In short, I claim that l’imagination culturelle is the basis for a sociocultural poetics of human action and, therefore, a condition for the birth of a situated subject in the positive fullness of belonging. (shrink)

The axiological receptivity view (AR) is critically assessed in some detail. I start by laying out the phenomenological motivation for the view. As proponents of the view tend to suppose, ordinary experience supports AR in that emotional feelings are commonly experienced as a type of impression or presentation of value. I show that AR is wrong about ordinary experience. An adequate view of emotional phenomenology does not represent them as presentations or impressions, but as ‘feelings towards’. As I argue, (...) feeling towards fundamentally differs from presentation in respect of its intentional features. I further explicate the relevant difference by noting that feeling towards is a response to certain aspects of its object. Expanding on this criticism, I show that emotional feelings are necessarily responsive to a specific value (their formal object) and can therefore not apprehend it since they already presuppose awareness of it. The chapter concludes by rejecting AR. (shrink)

Tombs of the kings of the Western Han dynasty often contain burial items that are related to the material culture of the Eastern Eurasian Steppe. These artifacts are usually interpreted in a general sense, for instance as a sign for the fascination of the Han elite with the exotic. A closer analysis of relevant finds, however, shows different strategies of dealing with foreign influences. While the exchange with the empire’s northern neighbors is evidenced through goods for which identical excavated parallels (...) from the steppe exist, the royal tombs of the Han also contained items that resemble and reference steppe motifs and objects but were clearly produced locally and for local consumers. Especially the latter type of artifacts can thus not simply be interpreted as the passive byproduct of exchange relations. Instead, we have to acknowledge that design, production, and usage of these objects were based on conscious decisions. Based on the insight that objects always have a social function, this article argues that the Han elite not only appropriated steppe influences and motifs but also strategically produced and integrated them into their world in order to redefine, enhance, and strengthen their position within their social framework. (shrink)

While the idea of art as self-expression can sound old-fashioned, it remains widespread—especially if the relevant ‘selves’ can be social collectives, not just individual artists. But self-expression can collapse into individualistic or anthropocentric self-involvement. And compelling successor ideals for artists are not obvious. In this light, I develop a counter-ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of the external world, or artistic objectivity. Objective artists are not trying to express themselves or reach collective self-knowledge. However, they are also not (...) disinterested or emotionless. They can be unmoved by personal feelings and human concerns, but they are still receptive—just attuned to the more elemental forces that creatively inspire them. I elaborate this ideal in dialogue with John Ruskin’s influential critique of the pathetic fallacy. By contextualizing Ruskin’s view vis-à-vis Romantic and Modernist poetics, post-Kantian aesthetics, modern environmental art, and contemporary theories of expressiveness, I show how it indirectly motivates my account. (shrink)

This article reconsiders a critique of Jean-Luc Nancy’s and Giorgio Agamben’s political philosophies as passive and unpractical. The article argues that in both cases, the political philosophy is motivated by the concept of “withdrawal of law,” as outlined in the texts Abandoned Being and Homo Sacer, respectively. This withdrawal is shown to situate the political philosophies within a broader “phenomenological receptivity,” whose indebtedness to Heidegger’s philosophy of the event is elucidated. As a consequence, the term receptivity turns out (...) to possibly be the better candidate for describing both philosophers’ political outlook, as opposed to passivity. Thus, instead of reproaching Nancy’s and Agamben’s theories for not providing the means for practical political interventions, the implicit phenomenological perspective they offer is restituted. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher's arguments for realism and secular humanism reveal a question as to the role of transcendence in pragmatism. There is a tension between Deweyan anti-foundationalism and naturalism—between the continuity of experience and nature, and the external reality of the universe— which re-emerges in Kitcher's “real realism.” The transcendence of the natural and the transcendence of the supernatural are distinct as regards their accessibility to inquiry. But the pragmatic fallibilist resistance to sources of justification external to the process of inquiry, (...) or “sky-hooks,” also clashes with the transcendence of nature insofar as it is viewed as a foundation. I argue that transcendence can be conceived not as a substance or ground, but as a possibility of radical receptivity or renewal, and that this is compatible with the continuity of inquiry. If this shift is made, religious transcendence can appear less as a flight to another world and more a method of producing a break with the (sinful).. (shrink)

Nikolas Kompridis' Critique and Disclosure is a sustained argument for the proposition that critical social theory in the tradition of the Frankfurt School is best carried forward by rejecting central aspects of Habermas' neo-Kantian version of it. The most promising future direction for critical theory according to Kompridis involves a reconsideration of the resources of hermeneutic phenomenology, especially renewed attention to the Heideggerian concept ‘disclosure’. To this end, Kompridis develops a distinctive dialectical version of this concept. I agree that Kantian (...) versions of critical theory are philosophically suspect, and that critical theory is most conceptually vital and politically trenchant when turned away from ‘discourse ethics' and the like. I am a bit less sanguine than is Kompridis with a turn to Heidegger, however, and raise several issues having to do with that aspect of Kompridis' account. This caution is not rooted simply in the historical fact that critical theory from its inception has attempted to immunize itself against phenomenology; it is rather a conceptual matter. In my judgment, Kompridis does not need to develop, as he does, an intricate account of overlap between what he holds best about critical theory and Heidegger’s ontology. If one were looking for historical antecedents that do not come freighted with what Horkheimer derided as ‘irrationalism’, one would do better to investigate early German Romanticism, in which there is an explicitly interpretive yet dialectical methodology on offer. Moreover, the central doctrines of Jena Romanticism exhibit more positive points of contact with the earlier, more skeptical forms of critical theory that Kompridis might favor, e.g. Adorno’s. (shrink)

No-one can read far into our subject without finding an author linking aesthetic experience and freedom in one sense or another: Kant, notably of course, but also Schopenhauer, Schiller, and many more. In this article I want first [A] to remind you in a sentence or two of those by now classic ways of connecting concepts of freedom and aesthetic experience, and then [B] to outline some thoughts of my own. Section [C] opens up in more detail a less frequented (...) and less well-charted topic: basically, the many- layered nature of much aesthetic experience, and how that can involve freedom in an ‘improvisatory’ contribution by the apprec iator. Each layer can be thought of as containing a ‘given’—the product of earlier syntheses, plus a new component, in its turn, to be synthesized, whether historical, scientific, religious, or other. This probably occurs most of all in the aesthetic appreciation of nature, since art offers some controlling, ‘mastering’ of the appreciator’s response. (shrink)

In cases where structural oppression conditions the broader public sphere, the democratic ideal of a receptive public may be threatened by at least two possible outcomes which appear to undermine its stated goal of increasing understanding of counterhegemonic ideas amongst mainstream, oppressive groups. Either (a) counterhegemonic ideas are defanged to make them sufficiently palatable to a new audience, or (b) counterhegemonic ideas are taken up intact, and as a result the extant networks of publics which depend on oppressive structures and (...) hierarchies will be destroyed. As we will argue, in certain cases of colonialism such as the Straits Philosophical Society in colonial Singapore, the conditions which receptive publics are supposed to ameliorate: (i) the social costs of speech, (ii) inequality of epistemic labour, and (iii) the antagonism between groups, are not only an irreducible feature of counterhegemonic efforts, but are in fact increased in the attempt to maintain receptive publics. However, this may be more a feature than a bug: receptive publics need not be seen only as communicative intermediaries for oppressed groups, but as a possible dialectical step towards new modes of socio-material life. (shrink)

With so much attention on the issue of voice in democratic theory, the inverse question of how people come to listen remains a marginal one. Recent scholarship in affect and neuroscience reveals that cognitive and verbal strategies, while privileged in democratic politics, are often insufficient to cultivate the receptivity that constitutes the most basic premise of democratic encounters. This article draws on this scholarship and a recent case of forum theatre to examine the conditions of receptivity and responsiveness, (...) and identify specific strategies that foster such conditions. It argues that the forms of encounter most effective in cultivating receptivity are those that move us via affective intensity within pointedly mediated contexts. It is this constellation of strategies—this strange marriage of immersion and mediation—that enabled this performance to surface latent memory, affect and bias, unsettle entrenched patterns of thought and behaviour, and provide the conditions for revisability. This case makes clear that to lie beyond the domain of cognitive and verbal processes is not to lie beyond potential intervention, and offers insight to how such receptivity might be achieved in political processes more broadly. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo analiza el experimento de A. Pennycook et al., a fin de ampliar el alcance de sus hipótesis y las estrategias para contrastarlas, de modo que contemplen no solo factores cognitivos, sino también aspectos pragmáticos y contextuales implicados en la receptividad al bullshit. Se utiliza el experimento como ejemplo de las asunciones normativas implícitas en las investigaciones descriptivas de psicología y filosofía experimental, ya que, al contrastar hipótesis sobre las intuiciones filosóficas de sentido común, los investigadores parten de (...) supuestos axiológicos sobre la corrección de las respuestas y la fiabilidad de los procesos cognitivos implicados. ABSTRACT The article analyzes the experiment carried out by A. Pennycook et al., in order to expand the scope of its hypotheses and the strategies to contrast them, in such a way that, beyond cognitive contexts, they also take into account the pragmatic and contextual aspects involved in bullshit receptivity. The experiment is used as an example of the normative assumptions implicit in the descriptive research projects of experimental psychology and philosophy, given that when researchers contrast hypotheses regarding common sense philosophical intuitions, they start out from axiological assumptions with respect to the correction of answers and the reliability of the cognitive process involved. (shrink)

In his dialectic, Schleiermacher proposes a view of cognitive activity in which the difficulties inherent in a vision of knowledge defined as original spontaneity come to light. At the origin of rationality, determination is also present, but not as a determination which limits or conditions, rather as a symbol of spontaneity and freedom, which is still insufficient in some aspects. Finding out what these insufficiencies consist in is a way of picking up the problematic tension between the spontaneous and the (...) receptive, the extent of which goes beyond the limits of epistemology.This paper explores Schleiermacher's transformation of the tension between spontaneity and receptivity in the opposition between the general and the individual, insofar as this tension is articulated by the relationship between thought and language.This paper explores Schleiermacher's transformation of the tension between spontaneity and receptivity in the opposition between the general and the individual, insofar as this tension is articulated by the relationship between thought and language. (shrink)

The paper offers an examination of the patterns of philosophizing in Slovakia. In the author’s view, its predominating feature is its receptivity, i.e. accepting the particular streams and conceptions of European philosophy. However, not all forms of receptivity are to be judged as mere imitativeness or plagiarism. In spite of its receptiveness the philosophizing in Slovakia very often included creative reinterpretations, modifications and applications.

A new construct, termed music receptivity, is introduced and discussed in this work. Music receptivity can be defined as a measure of the extent of internalization that an individual has, to a given piece of music, as measured at the point of listening. Through three studies, we demonstrate the psychometric properties of the construct—the Music Receptivity Scale. Exploratory factor analysis on a sample of 313 revealed good psychometric validity, with a four-factor solution, with a Cronbach’s alpha of (...) 0.89, and a two-factor solution, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87. The tool also had a good test–retest reliability. Overall, the tool had 20 items in the long form and 12 items in the short version. The MRS could distinguish musicians and non-musicians supporting its discriminant validity. We have also discussed the implication of the MRS in the field of music psychology. (shrink)

Patricia Joy Huntington reflects that loneliness does not only consist of the heartfelt absences of a friend, partner, spouse, or child, but rather stems from a radical breach in one's life journey. In this conceptually rigorous and warmly poetic book, Huntington develops a unique philosophy of receptivity and an original portrait of redemptive suffering. By fully exploring notions of pain, she also examines how the relation between the heart's musical attunement and meaning-filled life passages can lead one to a (...) more spiritual philosophy and a more independent life. Huntington reveals the maternal face of God and encourages the feminine divine in her poignant narrative of overcoming. This deeply philosophical meditation offers a nuanced view of religious experience, providence, and transcendence. (shrink)

I argue that scientific and poetic modes of objectivity are perspectival duals: 'views' from and onto basic natural forces, respectively. I ground this analysis in a general account of objectivity, not in terms of either 'universal' or 'inter-subjective' validity, but as receptivity to basic features of reality. Contra traditionalists, bare truth, factual knowledge, and universally valid representation are not inherently valuable. But modern critics who focus primarily on the self-expressive aspect of science are also wrong to claim that our (...) knowledge is or should be ultimately mediated by ourselves. In objective science, we represent nature as a field of phenomena determined by and within explanatorily-basic physical structures that encode the causal impact of elemental physical forces. These causally-basic forces hence ground the possibility of objective scientific theory, even though (I argue) they are systematically excluded from its representational contents. I show how my notions of force and field emerge partly through my effort to naturalize concepts of 'God' and 'Laws' in 17th-century natural philosophy. In science, we use the structure of basic forces' impact to see corresponding objects. We do not see these forces themselves—and this relates to the 'transcendence' of 'God'. I supplement this historical analysis by critiquing standard accounts of objectivity, and by synthesizing elements from neo-Kantian epistemology and current 'structural' realism into a view that I call 'dynamic structuralism'. Finally, I argue that physics systematically relies on passive characterizations of phenomena like inertia and impressed force. Dynamic alternatives that are just as empirically adequate are possible, but they are non-scientific. Poetic objectivity involves a direct presentation of nature as an order of interacting forces. I elaborate first by developing a novel theory of the relation between beauty and sublimity, mediated by a basic category of 'sensory force' (e.g. a 'singing' tone in a beautiful melody). I then describe the interaction between sensory and affective dimensions of aesthetic experience, in relation to an original historical analysis of passion and 'disinterestedness' in Kant, Schiller and Nietzsche. I synthesize these lines of analysis into a critique of the role of 'expression' in art. I also resist 'spectator'-centric aesthetics, in this connection, by developing an account of artistic objectivity in dialogue with Ruskin's critique of the 'pathetic fallacy'. I contrast artistic objectivity with Romantic ideals of self-expression, while elaborating its positive relation to certain currents within Victorian and Modernist aesthetics, including Imagists' stress on 'exteriority'. My project creatively extends Nietzsche's view that philosophical and scientific theories are 'perspectival' expressions of theorists' drives. It is a virtue of Nietzsche's account that he takes the outlet of strong human drives in creative acts of theorizing to be just one among many higher modes of 'will to power' in nature—many of which are totally impersonal. But Nietzsche is still too focused on self-expression or willing one's own power. Objective science involves external forces' 'expression' in and through us, not just 'expressing' our own powers. And Nietzsche's vitalistic 'will to power' must be replaced by a basic ontology that better accommodates inorganic phenomena, like the 'lawful' order of celestial motions. Thus I aim to de-anthropomorphize and 'de-organicize' post-Kantian notions of willful striving and organic development, while preserving for force the primary ontological and evaluative status that theorists from Schiller and Goethe to Schelling and Schlegel to Emerson and Nietzsche attributed to will or to life. (shrink)

This essay—a revised version of a presentation at the Twelfth Annual Conference of the Association for Core Texts and Courses (8 April 2006)—examines the role of theology in liberal education as both a restraint on sophisticated ideologies and as an avenue towards contemplative receptivity.

Psychoanalytic practice and theory do not map together in any seamless ways. Nevertheless, the creative tension between the two is essential in the production of psychoanalytic knowledge. In this paper, I recount Emma’s psychoanalytic journey using a series of five vignettes from her four-year psychotherapy. When I met Emma, she had been unable to walk for six months. The reasons for her affliction were, at this time, mysterious. During her therapy, a transformative process took place reflecting a movement from symptom (...) to the symbolization of an inner receptive space. The insights that emerged from this psychic journey challenge the conceptualization of a simple linear progression from the pre-Oedipal to the Oedipal moment which is seen to structure subjectivity. I argue that the representation of a receptive inner space is a necessary precondition for thought – and this is especially so for women’s development of mind. This argument calls into question the centrality given to the Oedipus complex and the associated paternal function in the structuring of subjectivity in some psychoanalytic models of mind. I suggest these models sit too closely to patriarchal fantasies which underestimate the complex processes involved in entering the symbolic realm. (shrink)

The ideal of the autonomous knower—characterized by self-reliance and first-hand knowledge acquisition—has been celebrated as a hallmark of epistemic excellence. However, this emphasis has faced critiques from social and virtue epistemologists, who highlight the inherently social nature of human inquiry. Despite these critiques, contemporary discourse continues to privilege intellectual autonomy to some extent, associating epistemic agency with the independent acquisition of knowledge and attributing epistemic superiority to such endeavors. This chapter challenges this prevailing assumption by introducing the concept of “intellectual (...) receptivity” as a critical yet undervalued epistemic good. Drawing insights on receptivity from care ethics, this chapter argues that intellectual receptivity offers a vital counterbalance to the overemphasis on intellectual autonomy. The analysis underscores the importance of intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, humility, and epistemic justice, demonstrating their indispensability for intellectual flourishing. By addressing the tension between the value of intellectual autonomy and the significance of testimonial knowledge, this chapter positions intellectual receptivity as a foundational epistemic good for a more balanced and inclusive understanding of epistemic agency. Although care ethicists briefly acknowledge intellectual receptivity, they do not examine its relation to reliance on testimony or to other intellectual character traits in detail. The account of intellectual receptivity developed in this chapter may, in turn, prove significant for moral considerations and thereby enhance our understanding of receptivity within the ethics of care. (shrink)

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, our potential intellect is a purely receptive capacity. Alexander also claims that, in order for us to actualise our intellectual potentiality, the intellect needs to abstract what is intelligible from enmattered perceptible objects. Now a problem emerges: How is it possible for a purely receptive capacity to perform such an abstraction? It will be argued that even though Alexander's reaction to this question causes some tension in his theory, the philosophical motivation for it is a (...) sound one. Rather than a calculation of actualities and potentialities, the doctrine of receptivity is supposed to explain how human beings come to grasp universal aspects of reality in an accurate manner. (shrink)

Authenticity, Reception and Media Reality This article deals with the reception of media reality, which is meant to be an alternative mode of consciousness, and with the phenomenon of authenticity and its understanding within media reality. It is also pointed out the distortion in the reception of media reality. As an unifying concept for media education and for the treatment of reception defects it is mentioned media anthropology - an interdisciplinary, respectively trans-disciplinary science, which can provide more consistent re-analyzing of (...) the relationship between man and media as tools for improving his skills. From the methodological point of view the method of epistemological anarchism, Paul Feyerabend's "anything goes" is explained as an epistemological translation tool for developing reviewing competences and reception skills as a whole (organic reception). We propose to deal the distortion of media reception in different therapeutic ways: from sensory deprivation, through media substitution, organic reception, to transcendence of the observer and imitation of media - meta-creation. In the sense of organic, systemic reception we in fact propose to "copy" the communication strategy of media system(s) in order to extend or set appropriate "epistemic" competences. In the related illustration of this mechanism, the theory of A. Weinstock is applied for setting a research indifference point in the middle of a fictive reception continuum of polarities sympathy and antipathy with media. This paper represents a part of activities, which summarize author's dissertation thesis Reception instruction in the media reality, where there are presented not only analyses and attempted typology of reception instructions, but also case studies with specific proposals for teaching and researching within areas of media ethics and media education. (shrink)

Investigation into the theme of receptions and influences is one of traditional topics in the historiography of national philosophies. This article analyses the models of reception and influence used by Ukrainian historians of philosophy: the model of “influence without reception” (А. Tykholaz), the model of “studying philosophy” (D. Tschižewskij) and the model of “reception without influence” (V. Horskyi). Resting upon works by J.-L. Viellard-Baron and P. Hadot, the author tried to argue that: а) the place that reception studies occupies in (...) historiography as well as understanding of its phenomenon is traditionally dictated by the perception of the historic-philosophical process, the genre of the historiography of philosophy and specific historiographic attitudes; b) reception is a complex phenomenon, which has totally different configurations and meanings in different periods of the history of philosophy and cannot be put into one formula; c) the application of obvious formulas from the contemporary vision of receptions in separate historical contexts can verify or objection of the originality or even the existence of separate philosophical traditions; d) through the reflection on the phenomenon of reception in all of its complexity it possible to reveal some aspects, research into which notably corrects our perception of the history of philosophy; e) the popular over the past decades idea of the history of philosophy as dialogue among philosophers is a challenge for the historiography, though it can have a positive effect on historic-philosophical research as well as on historic-philosophical discourse in general. Particularly, the research into reception and using dialogue as a regulatory idea can influence the international circulation of ideas and contribute to turning it into “rational dialogue”, promoted by P. Bourdieu. (shrink)

In work influenced by Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell has explored a connection between philosophical scepticism and social alienation. He has found this connection symbolized in, of all places, the art of Golden Age Hollywood, specifically in Vincente Minnelli’s 1953 MGM musical The Band Wagon. In one Fred Astaire song-and-dance number from that film, Cavell finds a representation of anxiety produced by failures of knowledge and understanding, and in another Astaire number he finds restored human connections that relieve that anxiety. However, Robert (...) Gooding-Williams has challenged Cavell’s interpretations, taking these dances to represent, and to exemplify, white American privilege and cultural exploitation rather than general human conditions of anxiety and relief. This article defends Cavell’s reading by arguing that, under Minnelli’s direction, Astaire’s performances pay tribute to the subcultures of several oppressed American groups, thereby displaying a broad aspiration for America and humanity. Astaire’s dances become nuanced expressions of an ideal, not simple cases of cultural appropriation. (shrink)

The article conceptualizes the phenomenon of reception of foreign philosophical trends and authors as a social phenomenon that demands a socio-historical approach. The author attempts to demonstrate the advantages of such a genre of the history of philosophy as the history of reception. The merit of the socio-historical approach to reception, according to the author, lies in its ability to elucidate factors hidden from a purely exegetical approach. It allows for the explanation of phenomena that are unexplained from an exegetical (...) perspective, such as the effects of misreading and misunderstanding during the borrowing of foreign philosophical production. These effects are not random but systematic. The author also seeks to clarify Hans Joas's formulated paradox: during reception, misunderstandings arise not only between irreconcilable positions but also between similar ones. The author focuses on the “agents” of reception, which include not only professional philosophers but also translators, publishers, commentators, whose perspectives are always shaped by their position in the social and professional space. This space has its disciplinary, ideological, and national limitations. Based on the analysis of texts from representatives of reception histories, the article formulates key elements of reception theory. Reception is viewed as a social, structured, and transformative phenomenon measured by its impacts. The article also establishes connections between types and periods of reception, each having its own purpose and logic. The article analyzes the conditions for the international circulation of ideas and demonstrates how factors of intellectual, ideological, political, and national character determine both appropriation (successful reception) and rejection of foreign trends or authors. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that public discourse as we know it is less than ideal from an epistemological point of view. In this paper, we develop an underappreciated aspect of the trouble with public discourse: what we call the Listening Problem. The listening problem is the problem that public discourse has in giving appropriate uptake and reception to ideas and concepts from oppressed groups. Drawing on the work of Jürgen Habermas and Nancy Fraser, we develop an institutional response to the (...) listening problem: the establishment of what we call Receptive Publics, discursive spaces designed to improve listening skills and to give space for counterhegemonic ideas. (shrink)

The author analyzes the role and significance of the new scientific area within the Ancient philosophy studies, named Classical Reception Studies. This area manifests itself as a reconceptualization of Antic Studies and therefore is as an interdisciplinary field, which focuses on the study of the receptions of Antiquity. This area is specific in its sphere of interest – not only philosophical heritage of a certain period, but also literary, historical and other sources. Such aspect of classical reception studies are important (...) as it contributes to thorough and fundamental studies of the history of Ukrainian philosophy because the ancient philosophical heritage was at the center of reflections on Ukrainian philosophy from Kievan Rus' to the present day. Therefore, we see the importance of domestic scientific studies devoted to the study of the receptions of antiquity in general and in the history of Ukrainian philosophy in particular. The latter can help to more understand the specifics of the formation and development of the philosophical tradition in Ukraine. Classical reception studies can be a specific historical and philosophical method of research of ancient philosophical heritage, along with other methods such as doxography, rational and historical reconstruction, etc. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that it can incorporate elements of doxography, as well as rational reconstruction or other historical and philosophical methods alone or together The author argues that in the context of classical reception studies, ancient philosophical texts can become a basis for solving contemporary global or local problems and issues of humanity (political, social, cultural, etc.). The potential of ancient texts and fragments (including philosophical ones) is important not only for understanding the past, but also in relation to the developments of society in the present. (shrink)

The ‘British’ cultural studies tradition, taking its name from the foundational Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, is a rich source of polemical dismissals of Frankfurt critical theory. These form part of the former’s cultural populist tendency, an intellectual populism that celebrates all ‘popular culture’ as constituting the voice of ‘the people’. Adorno, most strikingly, is so framed as a place marker for the ‘elitist other’ of such populism. The demonstrable nonsensicality of such claims, however, risks obscuring more considered scholarship (...) within that cultural studies tradition. This chapter situates this place marking problem but also goes beyond place marking characterizations of both these intellectual formations. Accordingly, three key figures in the serious reception of critical theory are investigated as their work achieves a degree of scholarly elaboration suitable for immanent critique: Stuart Hall (1932–2014), Raymond Williams (1921–1988) and Paul Gilroy (1956- ). For the Welsh-born Williams and leading Black intellectuals Hall and Gilroy a ‘British’ identity is necessarily problematic. Each draws on the Frankfurt tradition productively, if unevenly, in establishing their own distinct stances as critical intellectuals. (shrink)

I argue that psychopathy undermines three common assumptions typically invoked in favor of moderate reasons responsive theories of moral responsibility. First, I propose a theory of psychopathic agency and claim that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate into at least two sub-systems of receptivity. Next, I claim that the bifurcation of systems for receptivity suggests that reactivity is not “all of a piece” but that it too decomposes into at least two subsystems. (...) Lastly, I argue that prior attempts by Fischer and Ravizza to address these concerns contain an appeal to internalism. Since Fischer and Ravizza want their theory to remain agnostic about the nature of reasons for action, this appeal to internalism is problematic for their view. I close by suggesting that if we are to make sense of when and why psychopaths are responsible then a mechanism-based theory of responsibility must be able to explain how different systems of receptivity and reactivity come together to constitute a single mechanism that grounds responsibility ascriptions for action and they must do so without tacitly appealing to implausible forms of internalism about reasons for action. (shrink)

Open Access: I rely on Nel Noddings’ analysis of receptivity as "an essential component of intellectual work," to argue that receptivity is a virtue of argumentation, practicing the principle of charity excellently for the sake of an author and their philosophical community. The deficiency of receptivity is epitomized by the philosopher who listens to attack. The excess of receptivity is the vice of insufficiently critical acceptance of an author regardless of the merits of an argument.

Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac emphasizes values of receptivity and perceptivity that appear to be mutually reinforcing, critical to an ecological conscience, and cultivatable through concrete and embodied experience. His priorities bear striking similarities to elements of the ethics of care elaborated by feminist philosophers, especially Nel Noddings, who notably recommended receptivity, direct and personal experience, and even shared Leopold’s attentiveness to joy and play as sources of moral motivation. These commonalities are so fundamental that ecofeminists can (...) and should see Leopold as a philosophical ally. The three ecofeminist scholars who have devoted the most concerted attention to Leopold’s work argue that his Land Ethic is not, and does not provide a basis for, an ecofeminist ethic. I dispute the main criticisms of these scholars, and conclude that ecofeminists should attend more often to Leopold’s work, which extends possibilities for excellent praxis. (shrink)

Receptive Spirit develops the thesis that the notion of self-induced mental activity at the heart of German idealism necessitated a radical rethinking of humans’ dependence on culturally transmitted models of thought, evaluation, and creativity. The chapters of the book examine paradigmatic attempts undertaken by German idealist thinkers to reconcile spontaneous mental activity with receptivity to culturally transmitted models. The book maps the ramifications of this problematic in Kant’s theory of aesthetic experience, Fichte’s and Hegel’s views on the historical character (...) of philosophy, the Fichtean model of philosophical communication, and Friedrich Schlegel’s theory and practice of literary communication and criticism. Drawing on Gadamer and McDowell, I argue that the conceptual framework established by the Idealists remains indispensable for orientation in the contemporary intellectual landscape. (See the PDF file below for a synopsis). (shrink)