This paper raises a problem for the pair of views that universals are immanent in their instantiations and that these instantiations, or states of affairs, are somehow constructed from the instantiated universals. It is argued that the pair is inconsistent. The first view implies that universals are prior to states of affairs, whereas the second view implies that states of affairs are prior to universals. This paper does not attempt to solve this problem, but rather to formulate it (...) precisely. That promises to illuminate how to solve the problem if it can be solved, or why it cannot be solved if it is unsolvable. (shrink)

The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and (...) Machery (2010). (shrink)

The problem of measurement is often considered an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism. Many attempts to solve it have been made since the inception of quantum mechanics. The form of these attempts depends on the philosophical position that their authors endorse. I will review some of them and analyze their relevance. The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution lying inside the pure quantum formalism and not demanding any particular philosophical assumption. Nevertheless, a widely debated question is (...) to decide between two different interpretations. The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the same job as the reduction postulate. For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed, so explaining the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears. In this case, explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do. In this paper, I examine the arguments that have been given for and against both interpretations and defend a new position, the “Convivial Solipsism”, according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer, different but in close parallel to the Everett’s interpretation and sharing also some similarities with Rovelli’s relational interpretation and Quantum Bayesianism. I also show how “Convivial Solipsism” can help getting a new standpoint about the EPR paradox providing a way out of the seemingly unavoidable non-locality of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; The problem of the many and the vagueness of constitution, Analysis, Volume 55, Issue 3, 1 July 1995, Pages 179–182, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/.

The problem of evil is commonly presented as a challenge that uniquely arises for theists. I have argued elsewhere, however, that its roots lie in cognitive dissonance and the significant emotional weight associated with human suffering, which can generate anxiety and existential unease in anyone, regardless of religious beliefs. In this paper, I defend this claim from a new angle, drawing on psychological research that has not yet been integrated into philosophical debates on evil. I argue that empirical studies (...) of meaning-making and coherence in the face of existential threats exhibit a structural parallel to philosophical treatments of the problem of evil. This parallel shows that the issue is not confined to the traditional God–evil dichotomy that dominates the literature but instead calls for a more comprehensive approach. I conclude by suggesting that insights from psychology indicate that any adequate response to the problem of evil ultimately requires a form of optimism grounded in a supernatural framework. (shrink)

To solve the problem of induction we had first better know what it is. Some ways of formulating the worry about induction are underwhelming as they depend on assumptions that don’t survive much scrutiny. Perhaps the most disturbing argument for inductive skepticism appeals to the claim that we could not possibly be justified in taking our inductive methods to be reliable independently of our use of those methods. And the use of inductive methods cannot give us justification to suppose (...) that they are reliable. I argue for a new way to escape the first horn of this dilemma. (shrink)

This article examines the problem of the specificity and functions of mental control from two main perspectives: (1) from the standpoint of natural scientific explanation; (2) within a socio-psychological and socio-humanitarian context. The first approach employs an information-based framework to address the question of how phenomena of subjective reality can serve as causes of physical changes. The distinction between informational and physical causality is elucidated, providing a justification for psychic (mental) causality as a form of informational causality. Within this (...) context, the article discusses issues of information encoding and decoding, recent advances in neuroscience regarding the deciphering of brain codes for mental phenomena, and pertinent results from genomics. The author explores the significance of these developments for substantiating free will and self-determination processes, as well as for developing new artificial intelligence systems capable of emulating natural intelligence functions. Building upon these foundations, the second aspect of the discussion examines the role of mental control in interpersonal and mass communications, as well as in the functioning of institutional entities. To this end, the article investigates the relationships between individual consciousness and mass, institutional consciousness, the importance of national leadership in extreme situations, the phenomenon of polysubjectivity, and related questions concerning the optimal balance between centralization and autonomization of control mechanisms. The author demonstrates the inevitability of overcoming the principle of monopolarity, which inhibits autonomization functions and thereby undermines the foundations of global social self-organization. Finally, the article briefly addresses a number of salient issues pertaining to the meaning, objectives, and outcomes of mental control acts, as well as their socio-humanitarian implications and evaluation. (shrink)

Einleitung. A. Das Problem eines Systems der Philosophie als solchen - B. Das System der Philosophie von 1800 bis 1804 im Grundriss - C. Methodischer Ausgangspunkt und sachliche Problematik der Darstellung dieses Systems Erster Teil. Logik und Metaphysik als Grundlegung des Systems - A. Die Einleitung - B. Die Logik - C. Die Metaphysik Zweiter Teil. Philosophie der Natur als sachlicher und methodischer Schwerpunkt der Entfaltung des Systems - A. Der Naturbegriff als Grundbegriff des Systems nach den Ausserungen der (...) Jahre 1801-1802 - B. Die zusammenhangende Entfaltung der Naturphilosophie von 1803/04 und von 1804 - C. Die Begrenzung der systematischen Bedeutung der Naturphilosophie auf Grund ihrer zusammenhangenden Entfaltung Dritter Teil. Die Entwicklung von der Philosophie der Intelligenz zur Philosophie des Geistes als Ausgangspunkt fur den Umbildungsprozess des Systems im ganzen - A. Der Plan der Philosophie der Intelligenz als in sich begrenzter Gegenseite zur Philosophie der Natur in den Jahren 1800-1801 - B. Die Entfaltung des praktischen Teils der Philosophie der Intelligenz als Naturrecht (1802-1803) - C. Die Entstehung der Philosophie des Geistes aus der Philosophie der Intelligenz und der Philosophie des Absoluten in den Fragmenten des Systementwurfs von 1803/04 Vierter Teil. Philosophie des Absoluten als Abschluss des Systems in sich selbst - A. Die spekulative Erfassung der Wahrheit der Religion als Voraussetzung fur die Philosophie des Absoluten (1800-1801) - B. Die Anschauung des sich selbst gestaltenden Absoluten in Kunst und Spekulation im Anschluss an Schellings Systemkonzeption (1801-1803) - C. Das Sichbegreifen des Absoluten als absolutes Bewusstsein innerhalb der Philosophie des Geistes (1803/04) Schluss. A. Das System von 1800-1804 als Entwicklung zur Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens in sich selbst - B. Die Philosophie als System und die Frage nach der Philosophie uberhaupt Anhang. Zum Verhaltnis von Geschichte und Philosophie im D". (shrink)

The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires—what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie’s argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine (...) desires. To this aim I will show that the same sort of puzzling phenomenon involved in our responses to tragic fictions arises also in a non-fictional case, and I will offer a solution to the problem of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. The key to the explanation is in the notion of condition-dependent desires triggered by fictions. (shrink)

The Measurement problem and Non-locality are classical problems in Quantum Mechanics and still unsolved in spite of the many proposed solutions. A new interpretation is proposed here, based on the idea that they are closely related problems. But it requires that we consider space and time not as objective mediums but as features of our representation of reality, as Kant explained more than two centuries ago.

There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal (...) to another paper. (shrink)

There is no single problem of universals but a family of difficulties that treat of a variety of interwoven metaphysical, epistemological, logical and semantic themes. This makes the problem of universals resistant to canonical reduction (to a ‘once-and-for-all’ concern). In particular, the problem of universals cannot be reduced to the problem of supplying truth-makers for sentences that express sameness of type. This is (in part) because the conceptual distinction between numerical and qualitative identity must first be (...) drawn before a sentence is eligible to be supplied with truth-makers. The case is made through a consideration of a recent argument by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. (shrink)

This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge.

In "A Problem in Possible-World Semantics," David Kaplan presented a consistent and intelligible modal principle that cannot be validated by any possible world frame (in the terminology of modal logic, any neighborhood frame). However, Kaplan's problem is tempered by the fact that his principle is stated in a language with propositional quantification, so possible world semantics for the basic modal language without propositional quantifiers is not directly affected, and the fact that on careful inspection his principle does not (...) target the world part of possible world semantics—the atomicity of the algebra of propositions—but rather the idea of propositional quantification over a complete Boolean algebra of propositions. By contrast, in this paper we present a simple and intelligible modal principle, without propositional quantifiers, that cannot be validated by any possible world frame precisely because of their assumption of atomicity (i.e., the principle also cannot be validated by any atomic Boolean algebra expansion). It follows from a theorem of David Lewis that our logic is as simple as possible in terms of modal nesting depth (two). We prove the consistency of the logic using a generalization of possible world semantics known as possibility semantics. We also prove the completeness of the logic (and two other relevant logics) with respect to possibility semantics. Finally, we observe that the logic we identify naturally arises in the study of Peano Arithmetic. (shrink)

The key problem for normative (or moral) cultural relativism arises as soon as we try to formulate it. It resists formulations that are (1) clear, precise, and intelligible; (2) plausible enough to warrant serious attention; and (3) faithful to the aims of leading cultural relativists, one such aim being to produce an important alternative to moral universalism. Meeting one or two of these conditions is easy; meeting all three is not. I discuss twenty-four candidates for the label "cultural relativism," (...) showing that not one meets all three conditions. In the end I conclude that cultural relativists have produced nothing that threatens universalism. (shrink)

In adversarial problem solving (APS), one must anticipate, understand and counteract the actions of an opponent. Military strategy, business, and game playing all require an agent to construct a model of an opponent that includes the opponent's model of the agent. The cognitive mechanisms required for such modeling include deduction, analogy, inductive generalization, and the formation and evaluation of explanatory hypotheses. Explanatory coherence theory captures part of what is involved in APS, particularly in cases involving deception.

Introduction : what's the problem? -- The problem may lurk in Aristotle's ethics -- Aristotle's akratic : foreshadowing a solution -- A negligent omission at the root of all sinfulness : Anselm and the Devil -- Negligent vs. non-negligent : a Thomistic distinction directing us toward a solution -- Can I have your divided attention? : Scotus, indistinct intellections, and type-1 negligent omissions almost solved -- I can't get you out of my mind : Scotus, lingering indistinct intellections, (...) and type-2 negligent omissions -- Scotus's affection-ate corrective : a possible final solution to a type-2 variant -- Neglected treatises help solve negligence : the action theory of Francisco Suarez -- An answer that cannot be neglected : the solution -- Appendix A : translation of Nicomachean ethics 1146b31-1147b19. (shrink)

This paper elaborates the problem of temporal unity for dynamic presentism and diagnoses the source of that problem in the dynamic presentist’s discarding the traditional C-series in its avoidance of McTaggart’s (1908, 1927) A-series paradox. This C-series provided the fixed structure of time which the transitory aspects of time then followed, and thereby unify those transitory aspects. It then considers ersatzer presentism as an ostensible solution to the problem of temporal unity by providing a new abstract C-series (...) (namely an ersatz-B-series) for dynamic presentism. However, after a closer examination of the details of this proposal, it is found that the ersatz-B-series itself needs to be temporally variable to capture the transitory aspects of time that it is meant to track. Consequently, it cannot provide the fixed structure of time required to unify the transitory aspects of time into a temporal series. It is therefore suggested that dynamic presentists look for a more course-grained determiner of temporal progression to construct the presentist-friendly C-series required to unify their transitory aspects of time. (shrink)

Excerpt from Das Problem der Geltung Systematischer Teil a) Einleitung Die Unterordnung der Metaphysik unter die Psychologie (die Metaphysik als verdinglichende Psychologie) b) Das Erlebnis. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection (...) in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The problem of the value of knowledge is one of the most discussed in epistemology in recent times. Why should we strive to acquire knowledge, and not just true beliefs or relevant information about the subject of our cognitive interest? It is not hard to show that knowledge has certain instrumental value; but defenders of the idea in question usually mean that knowledge is valuable regardless of its practical consequences. It is not easy to justify this position, though. Some (...) believe that knowledge is a better guide to truth than just true beliefs, or even that knowledge guarantees truth. Others try to identify intrinsic properties of knowledge which can give knowledge additional value due to having their own relevant value. Yet others deny that knowledge has special value that distinguishes it cognitively from true belief, at least universally. Many agree that it can be shown that the possession of knowledge of one kind or another is more valuable than just believing the proposition which is true. But it is much more difficult to show that knowledge is universally more valuable due to some of its own properties, rather than circumstances. But those, who talk about special value of knowledge, normally mean some intrinsic and universal value to be reflected in definition. The article examines several popular explanations of the special epistemic value of knowledge and identifies their shortcomings. The author believes that it is easier for some types of knowledge than for some others to show how knowledge is more valuable than just true belief. The most primitive as well as the most abstract types of knowledge are most often functionally indistinguishable from the corresponding true beliefs. Meanwhile, many types of knowledge have modal functional differences from the corresponding true beliefs, and it is possible to show why they may have additional epistemic value. However, in its universal form, this idea is most likely impossible to defend. (shrink)

In this chapter, the problem of evil is understood in a narrow, intellectual sense: as the problem of how a theist can best reply to various arguments for the non-existence of God that are based on the fact that the world contains evil. Two such arguments are examined. One proceeds from a general fact about the world: that it contains a vast amount of truly horrendous evil. The other proceeds from a particular horrible event. It is argued that (...) each of these arguments is a “failure” in this sense: ideally rational agnostics, having reflected on the argument, could, without any offense against reason, remain agnostics. (shrink)

Recent research on human problem solving has largely focused on laboratory tasks that do not demand from the subject much prior, task‐related information. This study seeks to extend the theory of human problem solving to semantically richer domains that are characteristic of professional problem solving. We discuss the behavior of a single subject solving problems in chemical engineering thermodynamics. We use as a protocol‐encoding device a computer program called SAPA which also doubles as a theory of the (...) subject's problem‐solving behavior. The subject made extensive use of means‐ends analysis, similar to that observed in semantically less rich domains, supplemented by recognition mechanisms for accessing information in semantic memory. (shrink)

Our account of the problem of the classical limit of quantum mechanics involves two elements. The first one is self-induced decoherence, conceived as a process that depends on the own dynamics of a closed quantum system governed by a Hamiltonian with continuous spectrum; the study of decoherence is addressed by means of a formalism used to give meaning to the van Hove states with diagonal singularities. The second element is macroscopicity represented by the limit $\hbar \rightarrow 0$ : when (...) the macroscopic limit is applied to the Wigner transformation of the diagonal state resulting from decoherence, the description of the quantum system becomes equivalent to the description of an ensemble of classical trajectories on phase space weighted by their corresponding probabilities. (shrink)

Problem of the Totality of Reality in Kant’s Philosophy. In this article I present the problem of the totality of reality in Kant's philosophy and, in connection with it, the different understandings of the world that appear in this concept: traditional (dogmatic), empirical and transcendental (proper). The classical concept of the world is subjected to criticism and rejected as a type of "thing-in-itself"; the empirical concept, in turn, refers to a certain narrow, private world surrounding the subject and (...) is insufficient, and the transcendental, proper and adequate concept of the world ("idea of ​​the world") is developed only at the level of reason. The main interpretative axis of the publication is the thesis that since in Kant's theory we have no access to the world outside of knowledge, and the only world given to us is the world represented in knowledge-about-the-world, the philosophical path to understanding the world must lead through knowledge. (shrink)

We present the problem of perceptual agreement (of determinate color) and submit that it proves to be a serious and long overlooked obstacle for those insisting that colors are not objective features of objects, viz., nonobjectivist theories like C. L. Hardin’s (2003) eliminativism and Jonathan Cohen’s (2009) relationalism.

The problem of _de re_ modality is how, if at all, one can make sense of it. Most who have discussed this problem have assumed that modality _de dicto_ is relatively unproblematic. It is, rather, the interpretation of sentences involving, within the scope of modal operators, singular terms or free variables which is thought to give rise to grave—and in the view of some, insuperable—difficulties. Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of _de re_ modality: a “logical” and (...) a “metaphysical” one. That the “logical” argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. But my claim that it is his basic argument is, in effect, denied by Kit Fine. I can (and do) agree with Fine that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. The most important question, for my purposes, is whether he is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another. (shrink)

Complex problem solving (CPS) is a key competency in a strongly interconnected and fast moving world. Problem solvers need to deal with dynamic systems and novel situations, where experience alone is often not enough. However, trainings so far were primarily focusing on practicing CPS with limited results. I introduce the concept of SRL to explain how individuals learn during CPS. Additionally, SRL offers motivational and metacognitive strategies that could support the CPS process to develop problem solvers’ competencies, (...) and ultimately accelerate their expertise. (shrink)

I present a problem for theories of explanation, concerning explanations involving disjunctive properties. The problem is particular acute for the explanatory non-fundamentalist, according to whom non-fundamental scientific explanations are sometimes superior to fundamental physical explanations. I criticise solutions to the problem due to Woodward, Strevens and Sober, and Lewis, and then defend a solution inspired by an account of non-fundamental laws recently defended by Callender and Cohen.

Complex problem solving (CPS) and related topics such as dynamic decision-making (DDM) and complex dynamic control (CDC) represent multifaceted psychological phenomena. In a broad sense, CPS encompasses learning, decision-making, and acting in complex and dynamic situations. Moreover, solutions to problems that people face in such situations are often generated in teams or groups. In turn, this adds another layer of complexity to the situation itself because of the emerging issues that arise from the social dynamics of group interactions. This (...) framing of CPS means that it is not a single construct that can be measured by using a particular type of CPS task (e.g. minimal complex system tests), which is a view taken by the psychometric community. The proposed approach taken here is that because CPS is multifaceted, multiple approaches need to be taken to fully capture and understand what it is and how the different cognitive processes associated with it complement each other. (shrink)

This paper examines the problem of vituperative feedback from peer reviewers. We argue that such feedback is morally unacceptable, insofar as it humiliates authors and damages their dignity. We draw from social-psychological research to explore those aspects of the peer-review process in general and the anonymity of blind reviewing in particular that contribute to reviewers’ humiliating comments. We then apply Iris Murdoch's ideas about a virtuous consciousness and humility to make the case that peer referees have a moral obligation (...) not to humiliate the authors whose work they review. (shrink)

Abstract – “Evil, Problem of” The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief The idea that at least some of the evil present in the world constitutes a problem for belief in the existence of God is both an ancient idea going back at least to job – and presumably beyond – and the very natural one. Whether evil is, however, a decisive objection to the existence of God has remained unclear, as various formulations of the argument from evil that initially (...) seemed plausible have proven problematic. This entry is concerned, accordingly, with how the argument from evil should be formulated, and with the various ways in which theists can respond to the argument. My discussion falls into the following sections: (1) Different ways of formulating an argument for evil. (2) Types of responses to the argument from evil: Refutations, Defenses, and Theodicies (3) Total Refutations. (4) Defenses. (5) Theodicies. (6) Inductive logic and the evidential argument from evil. (shrink)

I consider the problem of existence of virtual objects, mainly their mode of existence, while omitting the issue of the criteria of their existence. I present and analyze the concepts of modes of existence of virtual objects proposed in the literature of the subject, and then I demonstrate my own position on the issue. My position on the existence of virtual objects has certain points coinciding with the already postulated views, but at the same time it differs from them (...) in some basic aspects. In my view virtual objects are “born” in human individual consciousness as the objects of specific creative states of the mind. So initially they are private objects belonging to the individual subjective sphere. However, their final and ready forms emerge in complex processes of objectifying and autonomizing the respective private conscious states and their objects. In these processes the private objects are transformed into objects intersubjectively accessible and existing in the collective cultural sphere. In both their forms, initial and final, virtual objects are non-material entities: first subjective, then objective. The ontic status of virtual objects is very similar to the status of intangible ideas and all the non-material objects created by the human mind. The main difference consists in that virtual objects are expressed by the use computers programmes, while other non-material objects created by human beings are expressed by use of words, pictures, literature and art works, etc. (shrink)

The problem of human being, its essence, existence and destination, is one of the central themes in philosophical comprehension. The personality can estimate one's own moral qualities through consciousness and moral selfconsciousness. A certain personality reveals his morality or immorality depending on the criteria, functioning in certain surrounding (family, ethos, nation). Ukrainian thinkers (of the 2-nd half of the 20th c.) comprehended formation of moral virtues of an individual as distinct directions for achieving the highest national objectives. M. Hrushevs'kyj, (...) D. Dontsov, D. Vikons'ka, H. Vashchenko, Yu. Vassyian emphasized the importance of individual self-estimation, both personal and social ones. lt should be based on such features as honour, dignity, responsibility, honesty, nobility, disinterestedness. Key words: problem of a human, Ukrainian philosophy, ethic. (shrink)

A problem of the external and internal beauty in the works by a famous Ukrainian philosopher H. Skovoroda is considered in the given article. The doctrine of the dual nature interlaces very clearly with the problem of binary humans essence. The thinker's understanding of the correlation of spiritual and corporal is given in the investigation with preference of the former. But, as Skovoroda's works testify, he was a mundane man and was able to respect an environment, nature and (...) a human. Key words: internal and external beauty, true human, spiritual and corporal. (shrink)

A problem of a human being-and-the world in the existential-phenomenological concepts is considered in two main aspects: a person is comprehended as a being-in-the world; a person's life is recognized using analysis of his interaction with the existential factors (freedom, responsibility, sense of life and inanity, anxiety, guilty, time). The basic prerequisite for the health is the truth of existence: authenticity is related to the feeling of life creation/authorship, comprehension of the own way for the world's design and openness (...) to the world, understanding of the probable character of a being. Existential phenomenological approach reveals reasons for separating of the human health psychological component and such separation of concepts as mental health and psychological health. Key words: existential-phenomenological psychology, mental health, psychological health. (shrink)

There is evidence that problem-based learning (PBL) is an effective approach to teach team and problem-solving skills, but also to acquire content knowledge. However, there is hardly any literature about using PBL in philosophy classes. One problem is that PBL is resource intensive because a facilitator is needed for each group of students to support learning efforts and monitor group dynamics. In order to establish more PBL classes, the question is whether PBL can be provided without the (...) need for facilitators. We present a combination of five strategies—among them the collaborative argument visualization software AGORA-net—to replace facilitators. Additionally, we present evidence that these strategies are sufficient to provide a PBL experience that achieves intended learning goals in an ethics class and is satisfying for students without facilitators. (shrink)

A problem of Ukrainian intelligentsia presented from the point "of view" of its position and role in social political processes of the Ukrainian people. lntelligentsia is associated with national elite, it is to be a representative of a nation as well as its leader in the realization of national interests. Key words: intelligentsia, elite, nation, people.

A problem of a person, of the existential dimension of the spiritual contents, of the existential value as a phenomenon of life, freedom, equality, happiness, creation and struggle lakes an important place in Lesya Ukrayinka's works. The investigation of these problems in the existential dimension throws light on the new ideas and visions concealed in the creation of the Ukrainian poetess, gives the possibility to have new vision of the problem of some principal matters in the creative work, (...) of the outlook on the role of spirituality in social life and in the struggle of the Ukrainian people for the independence. Key words: a person, spiritual contents, creation, life, existence, outlook, idea, problem, existential dimension. (shrink)

A problem of defining the subject of political science is explored in the article. The idea of defining the subject as the « lessened» part of the object is critically thought our. The attention is also focused on the point that laws, methods, problems of theoretical and practical analysis of political reality can be considered as the subject of political science. In this meaning, the task of exploration of development of the subject of political science is important in the (...) aspect of its historical situation. Key words: subject of politology, object of politology, laws of political science, methods of politology, problems of political theory and practice. (shrink)

A problem of the woman's "otherness" is revealed through the images of country women in the works of Ol’ha Kobylians'ka and Marko Vovchok. A woman's deviant behaviour reveals recognition of one's "otherness", as the values status of femininity. Key words: gender, countrywoman, femininity, deviant behaviour, suicide.

The problem I want to solve in this book is easy to formulate: How can we best save human civilization, and even all sentient life on earth, from imminent global existential threats? I will argue that we need to resort to a world government. It would have been terrific if it could have been established in the form of a global democracy. This is not possible, however. Therefore, we must put our hopeHope (in desperate situation) in a despotic world (...) government capable of laying the ground for a future global democracy. (shrink)

“The Problem of Divine Hiddenness” is an infelicitous phrase for two reasons. First, while it suggests that God both exists and hides, this phrase actually refers to a strategy of arguing that various forms of nonbelief in God constitute evidence for God’s nonexistence. Second, it suggests that there is only one problem for theistic belief here, while in fact this phrase refers to a family of arguments for atheism. This entry focuses on contemporary arguments from nonbelief to atheism. (...) The most important of these is defended by J. L. Schellenberg. Schellenberg claims that a loving God would ensure that there is no reasonable or inculpable nonbelief in his existence, since this belief is required for human beings to enter into a relationship with God, and since (according to theism) having such a relationship with creatures is a great good, and indeed is one of God’s most important goals. But, Schellenberg argues, since such nonbelief occurs among those capable of belief in God, theism should be rejected. The citations collected under General Overviews all concern Schellenberg’s argument. Other authors have independently constructed different arguments from nonbelief to atheism, and these are surveyed under Other Arguments from Nonbelief. The final five sections of this bibliography survey responses to arguments from hiddenness to atheism. Most of this literature explicitly concerns Schellenberg’s argument, but many of these replies could also be directed against the other arguments surveyed here. There are important connections between the problem of divine hiddenness and the problem of evil, and the relevant literature is discussed in a preliminary section entitled Divine Hiddenness in the Context of the Problem of Evil. (shrink)

The problem of evil is ordinarily understood as the attempt to reconcile the existence of a perfectly loving God with the realities of evil and suffering. Although this problem continues to receive much attention in philosophy of religion, an ecclesiological variant of the problem remains neglected. The ‘ecclesiological problem of evil’, as it will be called, consists in the attempt to reconcile the traditional attribution of ‘holiness’ to the church with the empirical reality of the church (...) as rife with sin and abuse. This chapter begins by clarifying the ecclesiological problem, principally by clarifying what it means to call the church ‘holy’ and ‘sinful’. The chapter then examines four possible solutions to the problem: exclusivism; an eschatological understanding of the church’s holiness; the notion that the church ‘as such’ is holy, even though its members are sinful; and Hans Küng’s view of the holiness of the church as something bestowed on it by God. Each of these four proposals is rejected as inadequate. In the final part of the chapter, an alternative solution is developed which remains committed to the idea of the church as both holy and sinful, but regards the sinfulness of the church, as much as its holiness, as integral to the church’s being or nature. (shrink)

What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider three problem solving settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals. More specifically, we single out two accounts of the (...) problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications. (shrink)

An overview of the problem of constructing extension combinatorially from qualities cum dispositional powers. In the model recommended here, Grassmann's algebra provides the combinatorial structure while Machian elements give the content.

The problem of closeness was posed by Philippa Foot in the article “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect”. Foot criticizes the classic version of the principle of double effect which distinguishes direct from indirect intention. On this basis, she considers it justified to cause bad effects which were foreseen but not intended. She believes that if we consider causing a bad effect to be justified then the way we do it is irrelevant, while the (...) reference to the direct/indirect distinction may lead to absurd solutions in some cases that allow us to distinguish two events in one action. These constitute, respectively, the object of direct and indirect intention and they are much too close for an application of the principle of double effect, such as when a doctor performs a craniotomy. The root of the problem of closeness is the question about the possible criterion that would allow us to determine which of the effects of an action are intended and which are merely foreseen. The starting point of the analysis of the problem of closeness in this article is the manner in which Foot outlines it in her article. In the second and more extensive part of the article, a number of contemporary attempts to solve the problem of closeness are presented, while the third section is an attempt to answer the question of why the discussion of the problem of closeness seems to remain deadlocked. (shrink)