According to the causal theory of parenthood, people incur parental obligations by causing children to exist. Proponents of the causal theory often argue that gamete donors have special obligations to their genetic offspring. In response, many defenders of current gamete donation practices would reject the causal theory. In particular, they may invoke the ‘too many parents problem’: many people who causally contribute to the existence of children – for instance, fertility doctors – do not thereby incur parental obligations. This (...) article argues that the conclusions commonly drawn by causal theorists, and by their critics, are premature. Causal theorists have a promising response to the too many parents problem. This response, however, defuses the moral concern that many causal theorists have raised about gamete donation. A similar point, it is argued, applies to Rivka Weinberg’s ‘Hazmat Theory’. -/- . (shrink)

It is widely assumed that there is value in the biological tie between parent and child. An implication of this is that adoption is often considered a less desirable alternative to procreation. This paper offers a philosophical defence of adoptive parenthood as a valuable and authentic form of parenthood. While previous defences have suggested that society’s valorisation of the biological tie is unjustified, I argue herein that the conception of the biological tie that features in the normative discourse (...) on parenthood is too narrowly genocentric. Against this genocentric conception, recent work in the philosophy of biology has emphasised the roles of joint determination, dynamic construction, and extended inheritance in development, which I suggest can substantiate a more inclusive conception of the biological tie. Accordingly, I propose that adoptive parents form a rich variety of biological ties with their children, some of which are as heritable and formative as genetic relatedness. (shrink)

Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from (...) agreements or contracts between individuals. Accordingly, a man who consents to his wife's artificial insemination by donor (AID) and not the sperm donor, is the legal father of the child; in surrogacy agreements, the intending mother, and not the surrogate, has the right to raise the resulting child. While agreeing that biology should not form the basis for assigning legal parenthood, I argue that the theory of intentional parenthood, despite being put forward as a liberal theory, is geared toward or will have the function of protecting the nuclear family and inhibiting the formation of alternative family forms. (shrink)

In this paper I examine what I take to be the best case for reproductive human cloning, as a medical procedure designed to overcome infertility, and argue that it founders on an irresolvable tension in the attitude towards the importance of being ‘genetically related’ to our children implied in the desire to clone. Except in the case where couples are cloning a child they have previously conceived naturally, cloning is unable to establish the right sort of genetic relation to make (...) couples the parents of their cloned child. If anybody is the genetic parent of a cloned child it is the natural parent(s) of the DNA donor. Paradoxically, in order to resist the claims of the parents of the donor to the cloned child, the argument for human reproductive cloning must place more weight on the intention to parent a child, than we do in cases of ordinary reproduction. It must insist that the parental relation is established by the intentions of the couple who bring a clone into the world and not by their genetic relation to the child. The emphasis placed on intention as establishing the parental relationship works to undermine the justification for cloning in the first place. For cloning to play a useful role as a reproductive technology, it must allow couples to become parents who could do so no other way. However, to the extent that intention is sufficient to establish parenthood, adoption or surrogacy, which are existing alternatives to cloning, will serve equally well to allow couples to become parents. (shrink)

Parenting our biological children is a centrally important matter, but how, if it all, can it be justified? According to a contemporary influential line of thinking, the acquisition by parents of a moral right to parent their biological children should be grounded by appeal to the value of the intimate emotional relationship that gestation facilitates between a newborn and a gestational procreator. I evaluate two arguments in defence of this proposal and argue that both are unconvincing.

In a recent publication Tom Douglas and Katrien Devolder have proposed a new account of genetic parenthood, building on the work of Heidi Mertes. Douglas and Devolder’s account aims to solve, among other things, the question of who are the genetic parents of an individual created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning): (a) the nuclear DNA provider or (b) the progenitors of the nuclear DNA provider. Such a question cannot be answered by simply appealing to the folk account (...) of genetic parenthood, according to which the genetic parents of an individual are those individuals who produced the egg and sperm, respectively, which fused to create the embryo. It cannot be so as in cloning there is no fertilization as such. In this article I critically examine Douglas and Devolder’s new account of genetic parenthood and demonstrate that it is vulnerable to counterexamples that exploit the lack of a condition specifying that genetic parents should cause a child’s coming into existence. (shrink)

Don Marquis is well known for his future like ours theory, according to which the killing beings like us is seriously morally wrong because it deprives us of a future we can value. According to Marquis, human fetuses possess a future they can come to value, and thus according to FLO have a right to life. Recently Mark Brown has argued that even if FLO shows fetuses have a right to life, it fails to show that fetuses have a right (...) to use their mother's body, evoking Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous violinist case. In the wake of Brown's conclusion, Marquis presents a new argument—the parenthood argument —which he believes shows that abortion is seriously morally wrong. Here I argue that the PA fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong for the same reasons FLO fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong. (shrink)

The experience of parenthood, and particularly motherhood, is often used as an example of a ‘transformative experience’ that cannot be understood by non-parents (the ‘non-understanding claim’). We argue against this interpretation of the epistemic challenges of parenthood, suggesting that there is instead a lack of communication caused by various epistemic injustices (the ‘non-communication claim’). Drawing on testimonies about parenthood, we grant that like all deeply embodied experiences, it has dimensions that are difficult to verbalise. But the greater (...) problem, also described in artistic testimonies about parenthood and especially motherhood, is that the dominant social script of the ‘ideal mother’, in combination with other epistemic blockades, often leads to a lack of communication, including about those dimensions of parenthood that are very well communicable. Moreover, this lack of communication may even be reinforced by an emphasis on the transformative dimensions of these experiences. We show that the non-understanding claim is harmful in various ways, perpetuating injustices in how parenthood is treated in society, and thus is in urgent need of address. (shrink)

Parenthood is a highly valued life goal, independent of one’s sexual orientation. However, the majority of studies exploring young adults’ parenthood plans have relied exclusively on samples of heterosexual individuals. This study aimed (i) to explore differences in parenthood intentions as a function of sexual orientation, (ii) to investigate to what extent sociodemographic and psychological characteristics predict parenthood intentions of lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB) and heterosexual individuals, (iii) to test the mediating effect of stigma between sexual (...) orientation and parenthood intentions, and (iv) to identify and characterize profiles of prospective parenthood (through cluster analysis). Data were gathered using an online survey from 375 self-identified LGB and heterosexual young adults without children in Portugal, with a mean age of 25.83 years old (SD = 4.49). Findings indicated that LGB individuals were less likely to intend to have children than heterosexual individuals; furthermore, among LGB individuals, lesbian women expressed stronger intentions to have children than did gay men. Similarities between heterosexual and LGB young adults were observed concerning the psychological determinants of parenthood intentions. Four distinctive profiles of prospective parenthood were identified: aspiring parents not anticipating stigma, aspiring parents anticipating stigma, childfree intent, and childfree ambivalent. Lesbian and bisexual women mostly populated the childfree ambivalent cluster, in contrast the aspiring parents anticipating stigma cluster contained an overrepresentation of men, including sexual minority men. Professionals may want to attend to communalities and specificities of prospective parenthood as a function of sexual orientation, in order to provide unbiased and culturally competent support to sexual minority individuals. (shrink)

Superior recognition of positive emotional facial expressions compared to negative expressions is well established. However, it is unclear whether this superiority effect differs between non-parents and parents, for whom emotion perception (EP) is an indispensable skill. Although EP has been shown to be modulated by the neuropeptide oxytocin, a central factor in the development of parental care, very little research has addressed the relationship between EP skills, the transition to parenthood, and plasma oxytocin levels. In the present study, we (...) assessed EP abilities with a test battery and measured plasma oxytocin in 77 non-parent and 79 parent couples and applied structural equation modelling to the data. The results showed increased happiness perception abilities in both parents and individuals with elevated oxytocin levels. Furthermore, non-parents showed superior abilities to recognise anger expressions. No significant associations were found regarding the perception of other basic emotion categories or with a general EP factor. The findings are consistent with previous research indicating that elevated oxytocin levels are associated with enhanced EP abilities. They also extend the existing literature by demonstrating that mothers and fathers, regardless of their oxytocin levels, exhibit increased EP superiority. (shrink)

Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nature of parenthood. -/- Certaines réponses aux analogies entre l'avortement et l'infanticide (...) font appel à l'argument de Judith Jarvis Thomson en faveur de la licéité morale de l'avortement pour désamorcer ces analogies. Je soutiens que ces réponses échouent parce qu'un argument parallèle peut être construit en faveur de la licéité de l'infanticide. Cependant, un argument reposant sur le droit de choisir de devenir parent permet de soutenir que l'avortement est autorisé mais que l'infanticide ne l'est pas en reconnaissant le sens et la nature normatifs de la parentalité. (shrink)

This co-authored contribution takes the form of a dialogue between Carmen Dell’Aversano and Florian Mussgnug. The two discussants explore the concepts of parenthood, reproduction and care in the context of the unfolding global environmental crisis. Arguing from the perspectives of queer theory, literary studies and climate justice, they call for new strategies and attitudes towards procreation, beyond the strictures of colonizing frames of knowledge and hegemonic cultural practices. More specifically, Dell’Aversano and Mussgnug move the debate around assisted reproductive technologies (...) in new, speculative directions that are centred on shared vulnerability and kinship, and which remain fully attentive to human and non-human relations and shared responsibilities on a warming planet. (shrink)

Biomedicine has opened up new possibilities for parenthood. Once resigned to remaining childless or pursuing adoption, infertile couples can now pursue options such as gamete donation, in-vitro fer...

We seek to develop a plausible conception of genetic parenthood, taking a recent discussion by Heidi Mertes as our point of departure. Mertes considers two conceptions of genetic parenthood—one invoking genetic resemblance, and the other genetic inheritance—and presents counter-examples to both conceptions. We revise Mertes’ second conception so as to avoid these and related counter-examples.

In Nigeria, reproduction is highly valued, with many people desiring to produce a child ‘in their own image and likeness’. Previously, aspiring parents often resorted to adoption. Today, the availability of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) has provided options other than adoption for those desiring to procreate. Through ARTs, aspirations for a family may be attained through an exchange of reproductive goods and services, and not necessarily through traditional heterosexual relationships. ARTs have altered the perception of parenthood as it exists (...) in Nigeria, and courts face a difficult task in defining parenthood within Nigerian jurisprudence, as they can only adjudicate based on extant law. Although ARTs provide greater individual choices for fulfilling the desire to procreate, they raise a number of ethical and legal issues that evolving legal systems, such as that in Nigeria, are ill‐equipped to manage. This paper describes the traditional assignment of parenthood under indigenous laws and other sources of law within the Nigerian jurisprudence. We carried out an in‐depth study of the Nigerian legislative framework and found that there are no laws directly regulating parenthood, procreation and ARTs in Nigeria. We also found that the extant laws are only tangentially related and do not answer the relevant questions sufficiently well, especially concerning succession, nationality and assignment of responsibility in collaborative reproduction. We conclude by highlighting the need for and recommending a regulatory framework on ARTs with a particular focus on providing a definition for parenthood achieved through ARTs in Nigeria. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of writers dealingwith questions over parenthood that arisein the context of reproductive technologies andsurrogate motherhood, have appealed to thenotion of ``intentional parenthood''. Basingtheir argument on liberal values such asindividual autonomy, the freedom to entercontracts, the right to privacy, and individualself-fulfilment, they argue that contractuallystated intentions, rather than genetic orgestational relationships, should form thebasis of parental rights. Against this I arguethat parental rights do not derive fromcontractual agreements, but are based in theirobligations towards the (...) child. I then examinethe nature of the obligations that the variousparties have towards the child both pre- andpostnatally. (shrink)

How do adults acquire the right to parent a child? In Parenting and the Goods of Childhood, Luara Ferracioli proposes a moral commitment account of parenthood: “The parental role is best undertaken by those who morally commit to pursuing a parent-child relationship with a particular child.” In Ferracioli’s defense of the moral commitment account, she claims it can accommodate worries about whether ambivalent gestating parents count as moral parents (they should) and whether it licenses parental proliferation (it should not). (...) Here, I argue these worries are more worrisome than Ferracioli lets on. (shrink)

Most people believe that parents have moral rights and responsibilities regarding their children. These rights and responsibilities undergird the nuclear family and are essential to the flourishing of its members. However, their basis and contents are hotly contested. Do a child’s genetic parents have a right to parent her? Many people’s gut responses affirm the importance of genetic ties, but the moral justification for tying parental rights to genetics is unclear. Parents are permitted to make far-reaching decisions about their children’s (...) medical care, education, religious practice, and discipline. When can parental rights be limited by the interests of the child or of society? Matters are no more settled regarding parental responsibilities. A man who conceives a child through voluntary sexual intercourse is commonly thought to acquire parental responsibilities, even if he took every precaution against conception. Yet sperm donors are widely thought to have no responsibilities toward their progeny. What underlies these disparate judgments? Parents are expected to do a lot for their children. But there are surely limits. Sometimes parents must balance the needs of multiple family members or just want time for themselves. What is the extent of parental responsibilities? This book provides a philosophical account of the foundations of moral parenthood. It explains how parental rights and responsibilities are acquired, what those rights and responsibilities consist in, and how parents should make decisions for their children. In doing so, it provides a set of frameworks to help solve pressing ethical dilemmas relating to parents and children. (shrink)

Summary. Disputes about pediatric, educational, and other child-related matters may reflect more general concepts of parenthood, including parental rights and responsibilities. These concepts may be child-centered, focusing either on a child’s needs or on a child’s development. Needs and development are not wholly distinct or in competition, but some parents may emphasize one or the other and, in case of conflict, favor one over the other. Such emphasis and preference tends to distinguish parents as child-carers and parents as child-raisers (...) (in most cases, adult-raisers). So distinguished, these kinds of parental focus involve different temporal perspectives (present and future), as well of different categories of assessment and analogies (associated with nursing and teaching). (shrink)

_Procreation, Parenthood, and Educational Rights_ explores important issues at the nexus of two burgeoning areas within moral and social philosophy: procreative ethics and parental rights. Surprisingly, there has been comparatively little scholarly engagement across these subdisciplinary boundaries, despite the fact that parental rights are paradigmatically ascribed to individuals responsible for procreating particular children. This collection thus aims to bring expert practitioners from these literatures into fruitful and innovative dialogue around questions at the intersection of procreation and parenthood. Among (...) these questions are: Must individuals be found competent in order to have the right to procreate or to parent? What, if anything, can justify parents' special authority over, or special obligations toward, their children, particularly children they biologically procreate? How is the relationship between the right to procreate and the right to parent best understood? How ought liberal societies understand the parent-child relationship and the rights and claims it gives rise to? A distinguishing feature of the collection is that several of its chapters address these issues by drawing on philosophical work in the realm of education, one of the most controversial areas in the ethics of parenthood. This book represents a distinctive synthesis of topics and literatures likely to appeal to scholars and advanced students working across a wide range of disciplines. (shrink)

Future artificial reproductive technologies, including mitochondrial replacement therapy, in vitro gametogenesis, and ectogenesis raise important legal and ethical questions, such as: Who should be considered the parents of children born from these technologies? The concept of biological parenthood is commonly used as a basis for answering this question. Therefore, this study assesses the use and meaning of biological parenthood in relation to these future artificial reproductive technologies. Searches were conducted in six databases, including PubMed, PsycINFO, Web of Science, (...) HeinOnline, Westlaw Classic, and Philosopher’s Index. Articles were included only if they met one of the following conditions: 1) a definition of biological parenthood, 2) a definition of genetic parenthood, 3) a definition of gestational parenthood, 4) a definition of biological, genetic, or gestational parenthood combined with either mitochondrial replacement therapy, in vitro gametogenesis, or ectogenesis. Of the 6,304 studies retrieved, 131 results were included for analysis. The review found multiple meanings of biological parenthood, encompassing different biological ties (genetic, gestational, and postnatal) and diverse conceptual methods of interpreting its meaning. The definition of gestational parenthood appears to be less univocal than the term initially suggests, and that of genetic parenthood has evolved. The lack of consensus on the meaning and definition of biological parenthood leads to inconsistent determinations of biological parenthood in relation to future artificial reproductive technologies. This raises serious doubts about whether biological parenthood can continue to play the fundamental role in ethical and legal perspectives on parenthood that it has held for a long time. (shrink)

An extensive body of research documents that women experience a motherhood penalty at work whereas men experience a fatherhood premium. Yet much of this work presupposes that employers are aware of a worker’s parental status. Given the different consequences that parenthood has on outcomes such as pay and promotions, it is conceivable that men and women may deploy their status as parents differently when interacting with employers. Drawing on in-depth interviews with a racially diverse sample, this article examines how (...) mothers and fathers working in the service sector use their parental status when negotiating work and child care responsibilities. Mothers, particularly black mothers, were less likely to openly discuss their children at work. In some cases, women purposefully concealed from their employers the fact that they were mothers or found other ways of signaling their commitment to their jobs. Fathers, on the other hand, were more likely to discuss their children with their employers and overwhelmingly characterized their managers as understanding of their parenting obligations. Together, these findings help us understand how mothers and fathers navigate the consequences of parenthood in the workplace and add nuance to previous studies of motherhood penalties and fatherhood premiums. (shrink)

I am grateful to James Cordeiro, Timothy Murphy, Heloise Robinson and Teresa Baron for their perceptive and stimulating comments on my article in this journal. 1 In what follows, I seek to respond to some of the main points raised in each commentary. Cordeiro examines the implications of various forms of ectogestation for the gestational versus moral parenthood debate by contrasting it with in vivo (natural) gestation. 2 His analysis considers the gestating mother’s and biological father’s parenthood claims (...) in light of various outcomes and the burdens and harms ectogestation may impose on them and on the fetus and newborn. I think his analysis helps to illustrate that—even if gestation does not necessarily give rise to a non-instrumentally valuable good in the form of an intimate relationship—corresponding pro tanto claims to moral parenthood might be settled by appeal to harms of ectogestation itself or voluntaristic considerations. Murphy... (shrink)

Cases of non-traditional family-making offer a rich seam for thinking about normative parenthood. Gamete donors are genetically related to the resulting offspring but are not thought to be normative parents. Gestational surrogates are also typically not thought to be normative parents, despite having gestated a child. Adoptive parents are typically thought to be normative parents even though they are neither genetically nor gestationally related to their child. Philosophers have paid attention to these kinds of cases. But they have not (...) paid attention to what the people who have engaged in these forms of family-making have to say about what they’re doing and, more specifically, how they answer the questions: “Who is the normative parent? And why?” Paying attention to their answers reveals two things. First, accounts of parenthood from people involved in two forms of non-traditional family-making – reproduction with gestational surrogacy and reproduction with donated eggs – are mutually inconsistent. This is not surprising. What is surprising is that the contradictory aspects of the views evince a common commitment to, as I shall put it, naturalizing parenthood. The central goal of this paper is to explain what that means, but rough idea is that in naturalizing parenthood, prospective parents aim to put the features that make someone a normative parent beyond the reach of human agency. I conclude by briefly suggesting that we should think of the grounds of normative parenthood – and the very task of theorizing about the grounds of normative parenthood – in a way that avoids the need to naturalize altogether. (shrink)

We argue that early parenthood temporarily reverses the relationship interdependence patterns described by Wahring et al. Western mothers typically rely on partner support as new caregiving demands restrict their access to external support networks. What begins as heightened maternal dependence sets in motion gendered role divisions that crystallize over time, ultimately allowing men to derive greater benefits from romantic relationships.

Common sense morality and legislations around the world ascribe normative relevance to biological connections between parents and children. Procreators who meet a modest standard of parental competence are believed to have a right to rear the children they brought into the world. I explore various attempts to justify this belief and find most of these attempts lacking. I distinguish between two kinds of biological connections between parents and children: the genetic link and the gestational link. I argue that the second (...) can better justify a right to rear. (shrink)

This chapter analyses the implications of findings in epigenetics for the ascription of moral responsibility for children. It contrasts shared understandings of procreative responsibility and discusses its extension to include all (individual or collective) actors who influence a child’s gene expression. It also problematizes the focus on biology in this process, using the example of epigenetics as a crossover between social and biological factors that contribute to a child’s life. Epigenetics blurs the boundary between biology and the environment, and thus (...) allows an analysis of contributions to children’s lives that goes beyond classical dualistic categories such as genetic versus environmental or biological versus social. The analysis is undertaken against the broader background of the determination of moral responsibility for children. (shrink)

The Ethics of Parenthood argues for original views about the right to raise one's biological children, about paternalism, about reacting differently to bad behavior because the wrongdoer is "only a child," about what raising a child requires, and about the obligations that parents and children have after the children are grown.

Bioethics, Volume 35, Issue 7, Page 680-687, September 2021.

Procreation and Parenthood offers new and original essays by leading philosophers on some of the main ethical issues raised by these activities.

Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from (...) agreements or contracts between individuals. Accordingly, a man who consents to his wife's artificial insemination by donor (AID) and not the sperm donor, is the legal father of the child; in surrogacy agreements, the “intending mother,” and not the surrogate, has the right to raise the resulting child. While agreeing that biology should not form the basis for assigning legal parenthood, I argue that the theory of intentional parenthood, despite being put forward as a liberal theory, is geared toward or will have the function of protecting the nuclear family and inhibiting the formation of alternative family forms. (shrink)

At what point do stepparents become moral parents to the children under their care? What are their rights and duties prior to that point? What are their rights and duties once moral parenthood has been established? In this paper, I argue that we must fundamentally re-think the role of stepparents in children’s lives. More specifically, I argue that our social norms around romantic and familial relationships make it very difficult for stepparents and their children to have their core interests (...) simultaneously protected. The upshot of my discussion is not only that we must rethink what stepparents owe children under their care, but that stepparents are often morally entitled to shared custody of a child irrespective of the status of the romantic relationship she enjoys with the child's biological or adoptive parent. (shrink)

Surrogacy is a type of medically assisted reproduction (MAR), which is considered to be a relatively simple medical procedure. However, psychosocially, ethically and legally, it is extremely complicated. There has been a significant increase in interest in the procedure lately. This is largely due to the fact that it is now available to groups of applicants other than traditional heterosexual couples of reproductive age. Its purpose is to examine various approaches to determining what is legally acceptable as parenthood after (...) surrogacy. Our conclusion is that the wishes and rights of the individual actors (intended parent(s), surrogate mother, future child, gamete donors and society as a whole) are incompatible and contradictory. None of the probable solutions suggested from different perspectives can ensure that the wishes and rights of all are fulfilled at the same time. (shrink)

Should involuntarily childless people have the same opportunities to access parenthood as those who are not involuntarily childless? In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, affirmative answers to this question are often cashed out in terms of positive rights, including rights to third-party reproduction. In this paper, we critically explore the scope and extent to which any such right would hold up morally. Ultimately, we argue for a departure away from positive parental rights. Instead, we argue that the state (...) has an imperfect duty to benefit involuntarily childless people in relation to their parental aspirations. (shrink)

Objectivist theories of the good life refer to lists of needs, goods or capabilities that must be realized in order to lead a good life. The purpose of such lists is to provide a better philosophical foundation for achieving social justice. This paper examines whether this is also possible with regard to gender justice and, in particular, to questions of reproduction and family. To this end, we will examine Martha Nussbaum's well-known objectivist theory of the good life and Angelika Krebs' (...) critical addition to it. We will show that both philosophers adopt a one-sided understanding of reproductive justice that unjustifiably excludes the ability to parent from the list of objective goods of a good life. (shrink)

Provides a philosophical analysis of the numerous and distinct conceptions of parenthood. This work considers such issues as the nature and justification of parental rights, the sources of parental obligations, the value of autonomy, and the moral obligations and tensions present within interpersonal relationships.

In this article I examine a recent approach to regulating assisted reproduction, whereby use of some kind of medical intervention ‘triggers’ laws governing legal parenthood that are more favourable to intending parents and sperm providers. I argue that although perhaps an improvement on the previous legal framework, these laws are problematic for three important reasons. First, they are prone to violating parental rights and unjustly imposing substantial burdens on individuals. Second, they are discriminatory. Third, even if we take a (...) pragmatic approach to the question of parenthood in these cases, these laws fail to properly consider the welfare interests of children. Finally, I conclude by showing that my argument does not entail adopting a laissez-fair attitude to conception using third-party sperm. (shrink)

This paper seeks to explore the limits of individualizing parenthood in Serbia, gleaned from the example of gender socialization of children. The main thesis is that the noted limits to individualization of parenthood in contemporary society have a particular Serbian manifestation due to the country’s familism. The study traces the ideology of familism through normative aspects of gender structures within contemporary Serbian society, that is, by analyzing the presence and forms of expression of the patriarchal matrix in upbringing (...) practices of parents, the most significant element of which is the ethics of good parenthood. The analysis shows that individualization of parenthood and more egalitarian patterns of gender socialization occur above all due to the dynamic within the marital relationship, one which abandons the concept of sacrificial parenthood. The analysis presented here is based on data collected in empirical research of upbringing practices in contemporary Serbia. (shrink)

In this book, Joseph Millum explains how parental rights and responsibilities are acquired, what they consist in, and how parents should go about making decisions on behalf of their children. In doing so, he provides a set of frameworks to help solve pressing ethical dilemmas relating to parents and children.

In China, neither reproduction and parenthood by lesbian couples nor their marital status are regulated or protected by law. In 2020, the first legal dispute in China involving a lesbian couple over custody of their joint baby was heard in court. This study examines the legal and ethical issues that lesbian couples confront when they decide to give birth to a child of their own. These challenges begin with regulatory restrictions on their lawful access to assisted reproductive technology and (...) extend to gaps in the legal establishment of parenthood. We found that the lack of access to legitimate reproductive assistance for lesbian couples in China has caused them to make efforts to circumvent laws and regulations to have a child. However, the legislative gaps later led to ethical dilemmas when resolving disputes over parenthood. This study discusses different accounts of establishing and determining natural parenthood in China and concludes by pointing out the urgent need for change in legislative and sociocultural attitudes toward both assisted reproductive technology and same‐sex relationships, mapping the way forward for lesbian couples to obtain better protection of procreation and parenthood before their marriage is culturally accepted and finally legalized. (shrink)

What exactly is it that makes someone a parent? Many people hold that parenthood is grounded, in the first instance, in the natural derivation of one person's genetic constitution from the genetic constitutions of others. We refer to this view as "Geneticism". In Part I we distinguish three forms of geneticism on the basis of whether they hold that direct genetic derivation is sufficient, necessary, or both sufficient and necessary, for parenthood. Parts two through four examine three arguments (...) for geneticism: the property argument, the causal argument, and the parity argument. We conclude that none of these arguments succeeds. (shrink)

What is it that makes someone a parent? Many writers – call them ‘monists’– claim that parenthood is grounded solely in one essential feature that is both necessary and sufficient for someone's being a parent. We reject not only monism but also ‘necessity’ views, in which some specific feature is necessary but not also sufficient for parenthood. Our argument supports what we call ‘pluralism’, the view that any one of several kinds of relationship is sufficient for parenthood. (...) We begin by challenging monistic versions of gestationalism, the view that gestation uniquely grounds parenthood. Monistic and necessity gestationalism are implausible. First, we raise the ‘paternity problem’– necessity gestationalists lack an adequate account of how men become fathers. Second, the positive arguments that necessity gestationalists give are not compelling. However, although gestation may not be a necessary condition for parenthood, there is good reason to think that it is sufficient. After further rebutting an ‘intentionalist’ account of parenthood, in which having and acting on intentions to procreate and rear is necessary for parenthood, we end by sketching a pluralist picture of the nature of parenthood, rooted in causation, on which gestation, direct genetic derivation, extended custody, and even, sometimes, intentions, may be individually sufficient for parenthood. (shrink)

Should involuntarily childless people have the sameopportunities to access parenthood as those who are not involuntarily childless? In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, affirmative answers to this question are often cashed out in terms of positive rights, including rights to third-party reproduction. In this paper, wecritically explore the scope and extent to which any such right would hold up morally. Ultimately, we argue for a departure away from positive parental rights. Instead, we argue that the state has an (...) imperfect duty to benefit involuntarily childless people in relation to their parental aspirations. (shrink)

This study used two waves of the National Survey of Families and Households to examine the effect of the transition to parenthood on the division of labor among married couples, hypothesizing that parenthood would produce a more differentiated gender division of labor, but that attitudes and preparental division of labor would moderate parenthood. There were no effects of parenthood nor direct or moderating effects of gender attitudes on husbands' employment or housework hours, with the exception that (...) fathering more than one child results in slightly longer employment hours. Motherhood increases wives' housework hours and reduces employment hours. Wives' traditional gender attitudes reduce their employment, but not their housework. Women married to full-time breadwinners have the largest reductions in employment after motherhood. Last, wives' initial economic dependency increases wives' subsequent housework and husbands' employment. Parenthood crystallizes a gendered division of labor, largely by reshaping wives', not husbands', routine. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications of human reproductive cloning for our notions of parenthood. Cloning comes in numerous varieties, depending on the kind of cell to be cloned, the age of the source at the time the clone is created, the intended social relationship, if any, between source and clone, and whether the clone is to be one of one, or one of many, genetically identical individuals alive at a time. The moral and legal character of an act of (...) cloning may, moreover, differ in light of these distinctions. Surprisingly, however, reproductive cloning in all its variety seems to undermine the view of parenthood that is most popular among proponents of reproductive technology in the bioethics literature. This view, geneticism, has much to recommend it. I will show, however, that as commonly understood, geneticism is incompatible with the reproductive view of cloning. I then canvass alternative accounts of parenthood—namely, conventionalism, gestationalism, and intentionalism—but none succeeds in explaining reproductive cloning. I thus return to a reconstructed version of geneticism. I argue that the problem for geneticism rests not with the notion of genetic parenthood as such but with a particular, flawed, understanding of it, which I call informational geneticism. Informational geneticism should be rejected in favor of a “physicalistic” version of geneticism, which treats genes as particular objects, not abstract types, and takes seriously the essentially embodied character of reproduction. For these reasons, physicalistic geneticism survives the challenge represented by reproductive cloning. Additionally, physicalistic geneticism accommodates attractive aspects of competing views of parenthood, meeting some powerful objections in the process. (shrink)

This article explores how anticipations of parenthood differentially affect the career aspirations and choices of women and men who have not had children. Drawing from in-depth interviews conducted separately with 60 coupled young adults, I find that women in my sample were disproportionately likely to think and worry about future parenthood in their imagined work paths. Moreover, women were more likely than men to alter or downshift their present-day career goals in anticipation of the changes in preferences and (...) responsibilities that accompany new parenthood. Because men were unlikely to engage in the mental work of anticipating parenthood, they were also free from its emotional and behavioral consequences. In this way, gendered anticipations of parenthood, which begin relatively early in an individual’s career path, are likely to play a key role in reproducing patterns of labor market inequality even before the real constraints of parenthood have set in. (shrink)