The second volume in Joel Feinberg's series The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Offense to Others focuses on the "offense principle," which maintains that preventing shock, disgust, or revulsion is always a morally relevant reason for legal prohibitions. Feinberg clarifies the concept of an "offended mental state" and further contrasts the concept of offense with harm. He also considers the law of nuisance as a model for statutes creating "morals offenses," showing its inadequacy as a model (...) for understanding "profound offenses," and discusses such issues as obscene words and social policy, pornography and the Constitution, and the differences between minor and profound offenses. (shrink)

One criticism of medical aid in dying (MAID) is the expressivist objection: MAID is morally wrong because it expresses judgments about disabilities or persons with disabilities, that are offensive, disrespectful, or discriminatory. The expressivist objection can be made at the level of individual patients, medical providers, or the state. The expressivist objection originated with selective abortion, and responses to it in that context typically claim either that selective abortion does not express specific judgments about disabilities, or that any judgments expressed (...) are not offensive. This response is inadequate: MAID often does express negative judgments about disabilities, which could reasonably be seen as offensive. But, does this offensiveness make MAID wrong? Drawing on Joel Feinberg’s account of offense, I argue that it is unlikely that the offensiveness of the judgments expressed by individuals who seek MAID or through the state’s legalization of MAID is enough to make it morally impermissible. (shrink)

This paper introduces a streamlined taxonomy for categorizing offensive language in Hebrew, addressing a gap in the literature that has, until now, largely focused on Indo-European languages. Our taxonomy divides offensive language into seven levels (six explicit and one implicit level). We based our work on the simplified offensive language (SOL) taxonomy introduced in (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2021a) hoping that our adjustment of SOL to the Hebrew language will be capable of reflecting the unique linguistic and cultural nuances of Hebrew. (...) The study involves both linguistic and cultural analysis beyond Natural Language Processing (NLP). We employed manual linguistic analysis to understand the nuances of offensive language in Hebrew. An accompanying dataset, gathered on Twitter and manually curated by human annotators, is described in detail. This dataset was constructed to both validate the taxonomy and serve as a foundation for future research on offensive language detection and analysis in Hebrew. Preliminary analysis of the dataset reveals intriguing patterns and distributions, underscoring the complexity and specificity of offensive expressions in the Hebrew language. The aim of our work is to capture the complexity and specificity of offensive expressions in Hebrew beyond what automated NLP methods alone can provide. Our findings highlight the significance of considering linguistic and cultural variations when researching and correcting abusive language online. We believe that our streamlined taxonomy and associated dataset will be crucial in improving research in Hebrew language sociocultural studies, natural language processing, and offensive language detection. Our study also makes a substantial contribution to the study of low-resource languages and can be used as a model for future research on other languages. (shrink)

This study intends to contribute to the delimitation of selected offensive language categories based on an analysis of a corpus of contributions to discussion forums in Czech online national newspapers and news platforms called Czech Corpus of Offensive Language (CCOL). It endeavours to study three problematic areas (1) delimitation between the speech acts performed, (ii) lexical realisation of specific properties of the target and (iii) identification and categorisation of implicit offence (e.g. figurative semantic shifts) by exploring contextual cues for the (...) speech act identification, the keywords indicating the properties of the target and the types of semantic shifts in implicit expressions of offence. The findings indicate that annotation systems that do not use context information for the detection of offensive language may face problems with adequate interpretation of the language means under investigation. (shrink)

In this article, I offer an analysis of what it is to take offense and what doing so is like, on which a more nuanced and positive appraisal of this emotion becomes possible as compared to its popular reputation. First, I survey the shortfalls of the limited discussion of offense by philosophers, before proposing an alternative analysis. Second, I distinguish offense from nearby emotions, like anger, disgust, and pride. Third, I examine the implications not only for how (...) we conceptualize offense but also how we regard those who take it. On my account, offense tends to be a smaller-scale, more everyday emotion than those making claims about its threats to society suppose, and one ripe for a moral reassessment. While offense sometimes appears excessive, that is likely only in limited cases: namely, those requiring symbolic withdrawal or proxy forms of estrangement. Even there, the appearance of excess may be illusory, with the grander gestures of offense appropriate given the distance between the offended and offending parties. Furthermore, on my account, to take offense is to resist affronts to one's standing, rather than merely a reflection of hurt feelings. Concluding, I sketch a defense of this resistance as a sometimes valuable response to injustice. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive study of the nature and significance of offense and offensiveness. It incorporates insights from moral philosophy and moral psychology to rationally reconstruct our ordinary ideas and assumptions about these notions. -/- When someone claims that something is offensive, others are supposed to listen. Why? What is it for something to be offensive? Likewise, it’s supposed to matter if someone claims to have been offended. Is this correct? In this book, Andrew Sneddon argues that we (...) should think of offense as a moralized bad feeling. He explains offensiveness in terms of symbolic value. We tend to give claims of both offense and offensiveness more credence than they deserve. While it is in principle possible for there to be genuine moral problems of offense and offensiveness, we should expect such problems to be rare. -/- Offense and Offensiveness: A Philosophical Account will be of interest to scholars and students working in moral philosophy and moral psychology. (shrink)

Joel Feinberg’s Offense to Others is the most comprehensive contemporary work on the significance of offense in a liberal legal system. Feinberg argues that being offended can impair a person’s liberty, much like a nuisance, and that it is therefore legitimate in principle to regulate conduct because of its offensiveness. In this article, I discuss some overlooked considerations that give us reason to resist Feinberg’s conclusion, even while granting this premise. My key claim is that the regulation of (...) offense can inadvertently increase the incidence of offense, by nurturing offense-taking sensibilities. In the course of defending this claim and spelling out its implications, I explain why concerns about the inadvertent nurturing of offense are now more pressing, given the identity–political character of contemporary offense-based social conflicts, and I discuss why a reluctance to legally regulate offensive conduct need not be insensitive to the identity–political issues that animate those conflicts. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the linguistic concept of implicit offensiveness. On the one hand, implicitness will be juxtaposed with indirectness as the two concepts are not conceived of here as synonymous. On the other hand, a typology of offensiveness (vs offensive language and vs offendedness) will be proposed, as well as the overarching term ‘covert meaning’ that will span figurative implicitness and non-figurative implicitness. The gradability of various forms of covert meaning and its (...) overlap with overt meaning (subsuming explicit literal meaning and implicit literal meaning) will also be discussed. In the analysis, two sample implicit concepts will be examined (irony vs sarcasm) based on corpus data (of general English and dedicated offensiveness corpus) and using non-contextual embeddings. Theory-wise, the paper demonstrates that implicitness is a complex term which is fuzzy and gradable; methodology-wise, it shows how computational tools can be used to attest theoretical assumptions related to offensive covert terms. (shrink)

The aim of the current research is to investigate the feasibility of identifying offensive language in Lithuanian by utilising the Simplified Offensive Language Taxonomy (SOLT). The key principle behind this taxonomy is its ability to complement existing offensive language ontologies and tagset systems, with the ultimate goal of integrating it into publicly accessible Linguistic Linked Open Data (LLOD) resources. The dataset used in the current study is a publicly available corpus of user-generated comments collected from a Lithuanian portal (Amilevičius et (...) al. 2016). The study identified that offensive language predominantly focuses on collective derogatory language rather than individuals. The most common category of offensive language is related to physical and mental disabilities, followed by ideological offenses, xenophobic and sexist remarks, and less frequent categories like ageism, classism, homophobia, and religious discrimination. These results highlight the diverse range of offensive language online and underscore the need to combat discrimination and promote respectful discourse, particularly concerning marginalised groups. (shrink)

This essay considers and rejects both the irrationalist and the supra-rationalist interpretations of Kierkegaard, arguing that a new category---Kierkegaard as “anti-rationalist”---is needed. The irrationalist reading overemphasizes the subjectivism of Kierkegaard’s thought, while the suprarationalist reading underemphasizes the degree of tension between human reason (as corrupted by the will’s desire to be autonomous and self-sustaining) and Christian faith. An anti-rationalist reading, I argue, is both faithful to Kierkegaard’s metaphysical and alethiological realism, on the one hand, and his emphasis on the continuing (...) opposition between reason and faith, on the other, as manifested in the ongoing possibility of offense (reason’s rejection of the Christian message) in the life of the Christian. (shrink)

The second volume in Joel Feinberg's series The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Offense to Others focuses on the "offense principle," which maintains that preventing shock, disgust, or revulsion is always a morally relevant reason for legal prohibitions. Feinberg clarifies the concept of an "offended mental state" and further contrasts the concept of offense with harm. He also considers the law of nuisance as a model for statutes creating "morals offenses," showing its inadequacy as a model (...) for understanding "profound offenses," and discusses such issues as obscene words and social policy, pornography and the Constitution, and the differences between minor and profound offenses. (shrink)

A central aim within criminal justice ethics is to give a plausible justification concerning which type of acts ought to be criminalized by the state. One of the principles of criminalization which has been presented and critically discussed in the philosophical literature is the Offense Principle. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that unless a rather special and implausible objective list theory of well-being is accepted, the Offense Principle should be subsumed in the Harm Principle.

This paper presents a streamlined taxonomy for categorizing offensive language in Arabic, specifically Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and the Levantine dialect. Addressing a gap in the existing literature, which has mainly focused on Indo-European languages, our taxonomy divides offensive language into seven levels (six explicit and one implicit). We adapted our framework from the simplified offensive language (SOL) taxonomy by (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara, Slavko Žitnik, Anna Bączkowska, Chaya Liebeskind, Jelena Mitrovic & Giedre Valunaite Oleškeviciente. 2021a. Lod-connected offensive language ontology and tagset (...) enrichment. In Shubert R. Carvalho & Renato R. Souza (eds.), Proceedings of the workshops and tutorials held at ldk 2021 co-located with the 3rd language, data and knowledge conference, Vol. 3064, 135–150. CEUR Workshop Proceedings), customizing it to reflect the unique linguistic and cultural nuances of Arabic. To validate this taxonomy, we created a new dataset from various social media platforms, primarily focusing on Twitter. This dataset was manually curated by human annotators and is described in detail within the paper, serving as both a validation tool for our taxonomy and a foundation for future research on offensive language detection in Arabic. Initial analysis of the dataset reveals complex patterns of offensive expressions in MSA and Levantine Arabic, underscoring the need to account for linguistic and cultural variations in studying online abuse. Our taxonomy and dataset are vital for advancing research in Arabic sociocultural studies, natural language processing, and linguistic analysis, and contribute to the study of low-resource languages. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a proposal of implicitness typology. The theoretical model we propose is compliant with neo-Gricean pragmatics and is explicitly designed to cover instances of offensive language on social media. The implicitness framework we propound has been empirically verified by means of a corpus-assisted analysis and computational method of word embeddings (Word2Vec and FastText), which, in principle, have supported the schema explicated here. This taxonomy is potentially applicable to the ontology of offensiveness and, thus, (...) to NLP-based research; in particular, it can be useful for automatic detection of implicit offensive language on social media. (shrink)

Essays on the ethics of monuments tend to focus on their morality in relation to domestic populations. In this article we turn our attention to how the principles we favor for the ‘ingroup’ apply to various ‘outgroups’, including foreigners and foreign governments, guest workers, visiting scholars, forcibly annexed or colonized peoples, and migrant communities. It argues that nations have a prima facie moral right to erect and maintain monuments offensive to foreigners and foreign governments or (in the case of institutions) (...) rivals. Furthermore, we hold that whereas prospective immigrants have little standing to advocate for the removal of monuments they find offensive in their receiving countries, those who have been forcibly annexed have a much greater claim to inoffensive memorialization, contingent on their willingness to be countrymen with the descendants of their former oppressors and principles of reasonably charitable interpretation. Lastly, the article advocates for the protection of heritage landscapes from foreign influence and highlights the responsibilities of migrant populations to avoid memorializing their old grievances in ways that undermine the interests of their adopted nations. (shrink)

Offense to Others, the second in Joel Feinberg's four volume series The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, provides the most extensive discussion to date of the problem of offensive conduct. Much that is here has been presented before in various places, which is not surprising as Feinberg has written as much, if not more on this subject than anyone else. But much that is here is new, and goes beyond just the discussion of whether the so called (...) class='Hi'>offense principle is a legitimate basis for legislation. (shrink)

Emily McTernan’s book, On Taking Offense, makes an original and important contribution to the moral psychology of offense. I argue that we may have reasons to question McTernan’s view that offense is best characterized as a single, discrete, emotion. Moreover, I argue that the account of fittingness that McTernan describes deepens concerns some have raised regarding an apparent shift in the culture of offense.

Simple acts of kindness that are performed sincerely and with evident good will can also, paradoxically, be perceived as deeply insulting by the people we succeed in benefiting. When we are moved to help someone out of genuine concern for her, when we have no intention to humiliate or embarrass her and when we succeed at benefiting her, how can our generosity be disparaging or demeaning to her? Yet, when the tables are turned, we sometimes find ourselves brusquely refusing assistance (...) from others or accepting it only grudgingly while trying to show that we do not need their charity. People with disabilities often find ourselves in situations of this sort, where we bristle at others who rush to open doors for us, for instance, while our kindhearted benefactors are surprised and hurt by the cold reception they receive for their efforts. My aim is to explain some of the ways in which well-intentioned and effective beneficence can be offensive, with special emphasis on cases in which someone provides assistance to a disabled person. (shrink)

According to the offense principle, the fact that wrongs are offensive makes them eligible for criminalization. Section “Introduction” unpacks this principle. Section “Offense and Offensiveness” discusses what it is for X to be offensive. Section “Offensiveness and Criminalization” argues that, whether we interpret offensiveness subjectively or objectively, the offense principle is not a sound principle. The fact that a wrong is objectively offensive does not bear on whether it should be criminalized. The fact that a wrong is (...) subjectively offensive is no reason to tackle it using the criminal law. Section “The Value of Offense” considers the conditions under which offense has value. It argues that, under some conditions, the fact that X is subjectively offensive counts against criminalizing X, while the fact that X is not subjectively offensive counts in favor of criminalization. Feinberg’s version of the offense principle—which holds that subjective offensiveness gives us reason to criminalize—is something close to the opposite of the truth. (shrink)

The offense principle requires that an unpleasant state of mind or offense be produced wrongfully by another party, but not that it be an offense in the strict sense of ordinary language. The legislative problem of determining when offensive conduct is a public or criminal nuisance could be expressed, with equal accuracy, as a problem about determining the extent of personal privacy or autonomy. The former way of describing the matter lends itself to talk of balancing the (...) independent value or reasonableness of the offending conduct against the seriousness of the offense cause, whereas the latter way lends itself to talk of drawing boundaries between the various private domains of persons, and between private domains of a person and the public world. (shrink)

Profound offenses are misleadingly characterized as simply “offensive nuisances” because of their perceived qualitative difference from mere nuisances, and because of their independence of actual perception. The nub of the offensiveness in the “profound” cases is not personal resentment over a disagreeable experience, but outrage at the offending conduct on grounds quite independent of its effect on oneself. Examples of profound offenses include voyeurism, Nazis and Klansmen, execrated but “harmless” deviant religious moral practices, desecration of venerated symbols, and abortion and (...) mistreatment of corpses. The offense principle does not warrant legal interference in a person’s private conduct on the grounds that those who know that the conduct is taking place need protection from the profound offensiveness of their own bare knowledge. (shrink)

Using data from user comments to the official social networking account of the Hubei Red Cross Foundation on a participatory web platform, this study attends to the offensive and hateful comments produced by ordinary Internet users to blame the elite authorities for their malfeasance in managing the donation during the COVID-19 in China. Drawing on Discursive Psychology, we focus on the rhetorical strategies that users employ to legitimise their actions as well-founded evidential blame against a norm-breaking act rather than radical (...) extremist speech. The associated hatred among discussants are moral, social judgements. That said, hate speech also helps construct the moral standards of a normalised society. (shrink)

This paper investigates the negotiation of offensive humour through ‘only joking’ claims made by participants on the social media platform Reddit. Metapragmatic claims of jocular intent can be added to a post containing offensive humour pre-emptively or after a reaction by another participant. In both cases, the participant making the claim tries to show that problematic humour in the post is not meant to give offence, and that they should not be held accountable for such an intention. Using corpus methods (...) and close analysis, we analyse indicators of jocular intent (e.g., “just kidding”, “take a joke”) to find out how offensive or problematic humour is presented, perceived and negotiated. The findings show how claims of jocular intent can be accepted or rejected after a negotiation of the offensiveness based on subreddit community norms. Offensive humour is negotiated verbally and through the upvote/downvote affordance of Reddit, indicating the ascription of accountability. (shrink)

The second volume in Joel Feinberg's series The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Offense to Others focuses on the "offense principle," which maintains that preventing shock, disgust, or revulsion is always a morally relevant reason for legal prohibitions. Feinberg clarifies the concept of an "offended mental state" and further contrasts the concept of offense with harm. He also considers the law of nuisance as a model for statutes creating "morals offenses," showing its inadequacy as a model (...) for understanding "profound offenses," and discusses such issues as obscene words and social policy, pornography and the Constitution, and the differences between minor and profound offenses. (shrink)

We encounter offense through various media: an intended facetious remark, a protester’s photographic image of an aborted fetus, an epithet, a stereotypical joke of a minority racial group. People say things that cause offense all of the time. And causing offense can have serious consequences, both personal and professional; the offending party is subject to termination, suspension, or social isolation and public opprobrium. Since the stakes are so high we should have a better understanding of the mechanisms (...) of offense involved in these media and how they work. In this dissertation I focus on two mechanisms for communicating offense—i.e. racial and ethnic slurs and racial humor. First, I lay out a few distinctions concerning the particular kind of offense being targeted, objective versus subjective offense, and when state involvement might be appropriate for penalizing offensive behavior. Next, I discuss racial slurs and the conditions of their offensiveness. I offer a non-content based view of slurs’ offense, which contradicts the consensus view held by most philosophers of language and linguists working on this issue. Also, I look more closely at a purportedly non-offensive use of slurring language, so-called linguistic appropriation, and determine that appropriated uses are permissible in certain settings only under certain conditions. And finally, I propose a tri-partite analysis of racial jokes that provides conditions for when they are merely racial, racially insensitive, or racist. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to present a Simplified Offensive Language (SOL) Taxonomy, its application and testing in the Second Annotation Campaign conducted between March-May 2023 on four languages: English, Czech, Lithuanian, and Polish to be verified and located in LLOD. Making reference to the previous Offensive Language taxonomic models proposed mostly by the same COST Action Nexus Linguarum WG 4.1.1 team, the number and variety of the categories underwent the definitional revision, and the present typology was tested in (...) the annotation on the publicly available offensive language datasets of each of the four languages. The results of the annotation are presented and as they are contained within the accepted statistical values on the inter-annotator agreement in the SOL categories and their aspects, we propose this taxonomy as a core ontology which represents the encoding of the supported offensive languages and justify its use on new data in terms of a more universal Linguistic Linked Open Data (LLOD) schema. (shrink)

A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends this body of results by providing direct evidence that the moral offensiveness of a scientific hypothesis biases explanatory judgment (...) along several dimensions, even when prior credence in the hypothesis is controlled for. Furthermore, it is shown that this bias is insensitive to an economic incentive to be accurate in the evaluation of the evidence. These results contribute to call into question the attainability of the ideal of a value-free science. (shrink)

van Els, Paul. "Tegen aanvalsoorlogen" (Against Offensive Warfare). Dutch translation of Mozi chapters 17, 18, and 19. Het Trage Vuur 40 (December 2007): 8–19.

We are all familiar with claims about being offended. There is reason to think that taking offense is particularly characteristic of the moral psychology of our times. When someone claims offense, others are supposed to take notice. This suffices to make offense a topic of philosophical and practical interest. However, we lack a persuasive account of the nature of offense. The present partial theory of offense portrays typical offense experiences as negative feelings interpreted as (...) responses to something offensive. (shrink)

This chapter examines one intuitively appealing legal practice for which retributivist accounts struggle to find justification: multiple-offense sentencing discounts. It also considers several proposed strategies for justifying bulk discounts on the basis of retributivism. Three strategies are discussed: those that appeal to an absolute punishment maximum, those that appeal to interpersonal practices of blame and making amends, and those that suggest that perpetrators of multiple offenses sometimes have reduced culpability. The chapter argues that each of these strategies either is (...) implausible as a ground for bulk-sentencing discounts or is plausible only insofar as it incorporates nonretributivist considerations into its account — thus is in fact a hybrid view. It concludes by looking at hybrid theories as an alternative, suggesting that such approaches not only can provide justification for bulk-sentencing discounts, but are also more plausible in general than is generally assumed. (shrink)

Review of Hazard Adams, The Offense of Poetry. For the Comparative Literature Edition of MLN (2009).

Imprisonment imposes very substantial losses and deprivations on people convicted of crimes. The question for which crimes imprisonment is an appropriate sanction is addressed employing both retributive and crime reduction approaches to the justification of legal punishment. Although there is not complete convergence between what the two approaches imply about its use, it is argued that both would reserve imprisonment for serious offenses, ones that inflict or threaten significant harms with moderate to high levels of culpability. Thus, neither approach supports (...) the current use of imprisonment to sanction a range of lesser offenses. Key Words: crime reduction • imprisonment • retribution. (shrink)

My first chapter criticizes the prevalent understanding of offensive conduct as conduct that causes others mental distress and develops a normative view of offensive conduct as conduct that treats others without due consideration or respect. My second chapter examines the relationship between 'harm' and 'offense'. I analyze harm as a setback to an 'interest-as-claim' that reduces a person's resources or capacities to function. I argue that offensive conduct is sometimes a harm and sometimes not. ;My third chapter criticizes a (...) majoritarian 'empirical' approach to determining the relative seriousness of offensive conduct and sets out a 'normative' approach that involves judging whether people have 'good reasons' to take offense at a type of conduct. My fourth chapter examines the problems created by the role social conventions play in people's reasons for taking offense. I argue that such conventions can be morally evaluated by examining what interests of individuals they protect, and whether these interests warrant protection. Only when social conventions survive moral evaluation can they form part of a 'good reason' for taking offense. ;My fifth chapter criticizes the legal concept of a 'standard person' for inadequately considering 'non-standard interests'. I argue that 'nonstandard group interests' due to 'natural vulnerabilities' and to 'socially constructed vulnerabilities' should be routinely considered for protection under the Harm and Offense Principles. I argue that 'special cultural sensibilities' may be extended protection when special reasons are present. ;My last chapter argues that my analysis of offensive conduct narrows the kinds of conduct considered for legal protection compared to analyses such as Joel Feinberg's, and that this narrowing helps avoid the moral and political problems Feinberg's analysis creates. I argue that the compatibility of the Offense Principle with liberalism depends on the rationale one has for it and the scope one assigns it. I conclude that my understanding of offensive conduct, the rationale I have for the Offense Principle, and the limited scope I assign it, make my approach to offense more compatible with liberalism than Feinberg's approach. (shrink)

There is growing recognition of the need to understand societal impacts of nanotechnology. Global interest in nanotechnology implies many nations will see a need to seek out advantages for military use. Militarization will inevitably include consideration of both offensive and defensive goals. This presents emerging implications for military forces in the near future, and will greatly influence the nature of warfare and peacekeeping in the distant future. The development of nanotechnology creates possibilities for both beneficial opportunities and adverse consequences as (...) a result of application to the military strategies of both large and small nations.The promise of nanotechnology for military and security roles derives from several innate characteristics. For example, further improvements in sensors are expected and already there are numerous reports of successful developments in research and development. Material properties can be tailored on a fine scale through nanomachining, scanning force microscopy, molecular self-assembly, and other techniques. (shrink)

In the Realm of Criminal Law, Antony Duff seeks to defend the view that we should criminalize conduct only if it is wrongful. Skeptics of legal moralism argue that this occurs all the time in supposedly overinclusive offenses whose definitions capture not only the kind of conduct that constitutes the target wrong, but also a wider class of conduct that is not wrongful prior to prohibition. An example is statutory rape. Duff, in response, contends that such offenses need not violate (...) the requirements of legal moralism. Having exploitative sex with juveniles is obviously wrong even prior to its legal regulation. But having non-exploitative sex with juveniles is also potentially wrong, inasmuch as it involves a violation of a prohibition that society has decided is justified for instrumental reasons. While Duff’s analysis offers an ingenious explanation for why offenses like statutory rape need not violate the bare minimum requirements of legal moralism, it simultaneously exposes separate, largely unacknowledged, problems of fair labeling and proportionality. By combining in a single offense wrongs that are primarily malum in se with ones that are primarily malum prohibitum—a process referred to as “wrongfulness conflation”—we risk treating unlike wrongs alike, imposing disproportionate punishments, and blurring offense labels. And such problems occur not just in the context of statutory rape, but also with respect to a host of other supposedly overinclusive offenses, including various forms of sexual assault. (shrink)

Religiously offensive speech, i.e. speech that offends members of religious groups, especially religious minorities, is on the rise in western liberal democracies, particularly following the recent wave of right-wing populism in the UK, the US and beyond. But when is such speech wrongful? This paper argues that the wrongfulness of some religiously offensive speech does not depend on some intrinsic feature of it, or on the subjective reaction of its targets. Instead, such wrongfulness depends on the fact that religiously offensive (...) speech normally takes place against the background of enduring social injustices suffered by certain minorities, for example religious discrimination. In that context, we argue, religiously offensive speech is wrongful when it disables its victims from maintaining an adequately respectful relationship to themselves, and sets back their freedom through domination. Recognizing the wrongfulness of some religiously offensive speech, however, need not entail endorsing its legal regulation all things considered. The paper therefore illustrates different available forms of intervention, ranging from civil law action to state support for the victims of such speech and long-term programmes of citizenship education. (shrink)

The feeling of being offended, as a moral emotion, plays a key role in issues such as slurs, the offense principle, ethics of humor, etc. However, no adequate theory of offense has been developed in the literature, and it remains unclear what questions such a theory should answer. This paper attempts to fill the gap by performing two tasks. The first task is to clarify and summarize the questions of offense into two kinds, the descriptive questions (e.g., (...) what features differentiate offense from similar moral states like anger?) and the normative questions (e.g., what are the conditions for taking offense to be apt?). The second task is to answer these questions by developing what I call ‘the violated norm theory of offense’. According to this theory, feeling offended entails that the norm one endorses is judged to be violated by the offender. Appealing to the violated norm enables this theory to answer the descriptive questions (e.g., taking offense differs from anger because of features like not requiring victims and the difficulty of animal offense) and the normative questions of offense (e.g., taking offense is apt only if the violated norm is universalizable). (shrink)

This study explores the challenges and opportunities of using large language models (LLMs) for automatic annotation of offensive language in Hebrew. The analysis is based on a six-level taxonomy of offensive discourse – covering offensiveness, target, target presence, vulgarity, offense strength, and specific aspects – enabling systematic examination of nuanced Hebrew patterns. Several prompting strategies were tested, including few-shot, role-based prompting, chain-of-thought, and LLM-as-judge, and their outputs were compared to human annotations using standard evaluation metrics and inter-annotator reliability. Findings (...) reveal that salient categories such as explicit threats show strong interpretive stability, while ambiguous ones, such as discrediting attacks, require higher precision. The study also introduces a two-step classification method: first identifying the two most plausible categories, then selecting the more accurate one. This approach reduces the model’s bias toward general categories and improves fine-grained classification. Overall, the study contributes by (1) offering a methodological framework to assess LLMs’ interpretive limits compared to humans, and (2) laying groundwork for building more refined datasets to advance Hebrew offensive language research. (shrink)

With its provocative title, Blumenthal-Barby’s (2024) Target Article is an important addition to the critical work on using ‘personhood’ in bioethics. I suggest it bears on any philosophical discus...

During comedians’ performances, most of the usual norms around what we should and shouldn't say are, rightly, suspended. Yet there are still some offensive jokes that ought not be told. To mark such jokes out, some comedy nights and venues have adopted an ethic of ‘don't punch down’, ruling out jokes that target the disadvantaged, vulnerable, and oppressed. This article argues that such an ethic threatens to misdirect our attention. I begin by getting clear about the distinctive sense in which (...) some offensive jokes can punch. Rather than focusing on what discriminatory attitudes the joke reports, or conjectures about the true beliefs of the comedians who make the joke and the audiences who laugh, I draw our attention instead to what a joke does. In particular, the crucial question is whether, and how, an offensive joke contributes towards undermining anti-discriminatory norms, or towards reinforcing unjust hierarchies and damaging stereotypes. In order to track the offensive jokes that punch in this sense, I propose two revisions to the ethic of don't punch down. First, that ethic overemphasises the relative position of the comedian as compared to the joked-about party and the direct target of a joke. Instead, our focus should be on what a joke of this kind does, in the context in which it is told. Second, I argue that the joke's audience is a crucial, and often determining, factor in our ethical assessments. (shrink)

An analytic investigation of Antioch's "Sexual Offense Policy.".

Recently, an increasing number of scholars have been showing interest in old-fashioned racism again. While recent studies on old-fashioned racism apparently increase our knowledge of this psychological theory of racism, the studies actually shed light on a different type of racism, namely offensive racism. The aim of this text is to argue that psychological theories of racism, like old-fashioned racism and modern racism, depend on societies’ social norms. I will show that questionnaires are highly sensitive to social norms, and if (...) there is change in social norms, the original measurement object alters. The theory of old-fashioned racism implicitly assumes agents that follow (or conform to) the social norm to behave prejudiced. Today, however, this social norm does not exist in Western societies. If agents express the same prejudices today, they indicate their willingness to breach the social norm to behave unprejudiced. Thereby, classic old-fashioned racism measures reflect a new kind of racism today. (shrink)

Slurs are both derogatory and offensive, and they are said to exhibit “derogatory force” and “offensiveness.” Almost all theories of slurs, except the truth-conditional content theory and the invocational content theory, conflate these two features and use “derogatory force” and “offensiveness” interchangeably. This paper defends and explains the distinction between slurs’ derogatory force and offensiveness by fulfilling three goals. First, it distinguishes between slurs’ being derogatory and their being offensive with four arguments. For instance, ‘Monday’, a slur in the Bostonian (...) argot, is used to secretly derogate African Americans without causing offense. Second, this paper points out that many theories of slurs run into problems because they conflate derogatory force with offensiveness. For example, the prohibition theory’s account of offensiveness in terms of prohibitions struggles to explain why ‘Monday’ is derogatory when it is not a prohibited word in English. Third, this paper offers a new explanation of this distinction from the perspective of a speech act theory of slurs; derogatory force is different from offensiveness because they arise from two different kinds of speech acts that slurs are used to perform, i.e., the illocutionary act of derogation and the perlocutionary act of offending. This new explanation avoids the problems faced by other theories. (shrink)

This paper explores the Offence Principle. It discusses whether two constraints, additional to the criteria stated in conventional analysis, ought to be met before the Offense Principle can be satisfied: (i) that offensive conduct must be a wrong, and (ii) that the conduct must also lead to harm. The nature of the Harm Principle, and its relationship to the Offense Principle, are also considered. The paper suggests that, even if all cases in which offense should be criminalized (...) also involve harm, nonetheless there may be good reasons to retain a separate Offense Principle. (shrink)