In book one of the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius is portrayed as a man who suffers because he forgot philosophy. Scholars have underestimated the significance of this portrayal and considered it a literary device the goal of which is simply to introduce the discussion that follows. In this paper, I show that this view is mistaken since it overlooks that this portrayal of Boethius is the key for the understanding of the whole text. The philosophical therapy that constitutes the core (...) of the?Consolation? can in fact be properly evaluated only if we recognize the condition it is designed to cure. Through the portrayal of Boethius's forgetfulness, the?Consolation? illustrates that it is the very nature of philosophical knowledge that makes it susceptible to being forgotten. Philosophical knowledge can (i) turn into misology, when it appears unable to solve certain problems, and (ii) be overrun by strong emotions. The therapy offered in the?Consolation? is designed to make Boethius aware of the?fragility? of philosophical knowledge and show him how to?strengthen? it. He is taught how to more fully embody philosophy's precepts and that philosophy's inability to solve certain problems reveals not its failures but its limits. (shrink)

In thePhaedo, Socrates warns his listeners, discouraged by the objections of Simmias and Cebes, against becoming haters oflogoi. I argue that the ‘misologists’ are presented as a type of proto-skeptic and that Socrates in fact shows covert sympathy for their position. The difference between them is revealed by the pragmatic argument for trust in the immortality of the soul that Socrates offers near the end of the passage: the misologists reject such therapeutic uses oflogos. I conclude by assessing the relationship (...) of the positions of Socrates and the misologists in thePhaedoto those of later ancient skeptics. (shrink)

This paper aims to look at the ancient city of Athens and some of its political challenges through the eyes of Plato. I will do this by relating two concepts that permeate Plato's political concerns: democracy and misology. Beyond the tragic event of Socrates' death at democratic hands, there is perhaps something even deeper in Plato's struggle to see democracy as something that can work, so to speak. Plato no doubt has a profoundly pessimistic view of the human being. (...) And the city, who was traditionally supposed to educate men, is not delivering anymore (if ever). First of all, Plato clearly identifies the origin of political and social instability in the economic imbalance between πλοῦτος (richness) and πενία (poverty). Secondly, Plato's diagnosis, what his eyes are seeing, is even more perceptive and accurate. He outlines a second source of problem for democracy, one the probably resonate even more dramatically in our very present days: one that Socrates calls misology in the Phaedo: the hatred of discourses. Apart from the fact that there is a significant distance and a radical difference between the democracy of the 5th and 4th centuries, when Plato actually writes his dialogues, the most relevant question that emerges from the investigation is probably that a democracy itself is not something stable, an ontological object, not even today. And Plato was well aware of all this. (shrink)

In this article we examine the Phaedo section on misology. Socrates tries to identify the nature and origin of μισολογία, as well as its ruinous consequences for the philosophical life. Μισολογία has a disastrous effect on philosophical life, because it consists in hatred of argument and therefore bears the power to undermine the confidence in λόγοι which is the very basis of life devoted to philosophy. Since philosophy is based upon confidence in λόγοι and could consequently be termed a (...) kind of φιλολογία, hatred of argument or μισολογία can be equated with hatred of philosophy. Socrates endeavours to protect philosophy against the dangers of μισολογία. He does this by showing that confidence in λόγοι is the only way to conduct a meaningful life: the philosophical life. He performs an apology for λόγοι, which is an apology for philosophy and a fortiori for his own life: the life of a true φιλόλογος. Keywords: arguments, misology, Phaedo, philology, Plato. (shrink)

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from (...) trusting people to learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned. (shrink)

Towards the conclusion of the First Section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant describes a process whereby a subject can undergo a kind of moral corruption. This process, which he calls a “natural dialectic”, can cause one to undermine one’s own or¬dinary grasp of the demands of morality. Kant also claims that this natural dialectic is the basis of the need for moral philosophy itself, since first-order moral reasoning is insufficient to protect against it. I show that (...) this passage is closely related to another in the First Section, one where Kant warns against the threat of “misology”, or the hatred of reason. I argue that both these passages must be read as engaging with specific claims from Rousseau’s writings. Uncovering the historical context and rhetorical function of Kant’s account of moral self-deception can re-orient the reader to his ambitions for the Groundwork itself. (shrink)

Das Thema der Misologie und Misanthropie lässt sich wie so viele anderen philosophischen Themen der europäischen Geistesgeschichte bis zu einem platonischen Dialog zurückverfolgen. In diesem Fall handelt es sich um Platons berühmten Dialog Phaidon. Nun handelt dieser Dialog bekanntlich von der Frage nach der Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele. Dennoch verweist Sokrates an einer bestimmten Stelle des Dialoges auf die für den Menschen drohenden Gefahren der Misologie und der Misanthropie hin, dem Hass auf die Vernunft und den Hass auf den Menschen, (...) die seiner Auffassung nach zusammenhängen. Die sokratische Warnung vor der Misologie und Misanthropie ist um so eindringlicher, als sie auf dem Hintergrund des existenziellen Problems des Todes und der religiösen Frage nach einem Jenseits des Todes diskutiert wird. (Einleitung). (shrink)

Since the seventeenth century, Western society has had a turbulent relationship with Reason. Descartes set out to reorganize all his opinions in the light of Reason, allowing, as Pascal bitterly reproached him, nothing else. In the course of the centuries which followed, the relationship with Reason became the object of a vigorous, often passionate debate. David Hume declared Reason to be impotent; Immanuel Kant observed that men suffered from "misology" as the result of their disappointed expectations of Reason; G. (...) W. F. Hegel declared that the main insight of philosophy consisted of the realization that reason masterminded and guided all history. The debate has not remained restricted to philosophy. Max Weber, the most influential modern sociologist, was obsessed with the distinctive role of Reason in Western society, and the part it played in engendering industrialism. Social anthropologists have been preoccupied both with the universality and the diversity of conceptual thought. Emile Durkheim taught them to ask why all men were rational, whilst Max Weber taught sociologists to ask why some men were more rational than others. This book brings together the philosophical, historical and sociological discussions of rationality and strives to make clear the underlying issues and the continuity of the debate under the various idioms. (shrink)

As Josef Pieper writes in his study “On Hope,” the virtue of hope is the virtue that completes the human being in its intermediary, temporal state (the “status viatoris,” or condition of being “on the way”). To be human is always to be “on the way” toward a fulfillment and completion not yet available to it (the “status comprehensoris”). Those who are hopeful direct themselves toward this end as to their fulfillment despite recognizing that it, in some sense, exceeds their (...) grasp, whereas those who are not hopeful either reject the possibility of such a fulfillment (despair) or prematurely suppose themselves to have attained it (presumption). While Pieper’s account of hope is largely based on the theologically-inflected account found in Thomas Aquinas, Pieper draws his conception of the nature of philosophy and philosophical reasoning ultimately from Plato. Philosophy, for Plato, on Pieper’s view, is essentially structured by the “not yet” condition that Pieper calls the status viatoris, as we see mythically depicted in Diotima’s account of Eros as being an intermediary daimon who, partaking of his parents’ opposed natures, is fundamentally characterized by poverty and lack (the “not”) on the one hand and by resourcefulness (the “yet”) on the other. The human soul, erotic at its very core, is structured by this twofold relation to the object of its greatest longing, Beauty Itself, which it doesn’t yet possess but for which it strives with all of its being. In this essay, I show that Plato has a “hopeful” sense of reason on account of the erotic condition (the status viatoris) that essentially characterizes the human soul’s spatio-temporal life during its incarnate, earthly state. If reason is, for Plato, to be true to itself, it must strive for the whole of wisdom even as it lacks that wisdom. Because reason is directed toward a fulfillment it can’t quite fathom, it must relate to that fulfillment essentially in the mode of hope. When, by contrast, reason becomes presumptuous, thinking that it already has a clear and secure cognition of the truth for which it seeks, it becomes dogmatic and runs the risk of falling into the misology diagnosed in the Phaedo when it inevitably comes up against some crack in its understanding. Likewise, when reason succumbs to despair—as we see, for example, in Meno’s eristic argument about the impossibility of learning—it becomes excessively skeptical and inert. Only when reason avoids the twin errors of presumption and despair can it continue in its pursuit of the whole of wisdom while remaining mindful of its limitations. (shrink)

The well-known Kantian passage on misology in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals starts making fuller sense when located within the framework of Kant writings on philosophy of history where he contrasts civilization with moralization as two different phases in the growth of humankind. In this context, the growth of commerce and manufactures plays a distinctive role, namely that of means of fostering civilization, while pursuing a deceptive goal, namely happiness. Deception plays a basic role in the growth (...) of mankind, in so far as it allows for a hidden twofold teleology in human action. Men, while following the dictates of self-love, are systematically mistaken about the results they actually contribute in bringing about. Commerce brings different peoples into mutual relationship and thus paves the way to a cosmopolitan society. The growth of the arts and sciences provides preconditions for the growth of learned institutions, a free press, and a public opinion that are the basis on which reason may start being used in its critical capacities. This, that is Enlightenment, is a preliminary step to moralization, that is the jump of individuals from a state of minority to a state where they are masters of themselves. The twofold teleology of human action makes room for a system of "pragmatic" ends, and of laws connected to the former, that may be studied rationally in themselves and yet are connected to the higher ends established by reason in its "practical" capacities. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines the role a promise can play in fashioning a moral commitment, instituting a duty where none existed before. In the process, it argues that promises can provide an antidote to misology, understood as a pernicious form of cynicism that deforms language, eliminating any touchstone for establishing a common and stable meaning, separating our words from their moral office.

The relatively recently introduced phrase “gender identity” is affecting language and thought to a profound degree, primarily via its impact on words possessing sexual significance or connotation. In this paper, while prescinding from controversy surrounding the term “gender,” and psychological and medical issues related to sexuality, I attend to the consequences of this impact on language and thought, and the ensuing disorientation this confusion of meaning is causing in a world where sexual dimorphism possesses foundational significance. I show in what (...) way the issue arises from selective disregard of the principle of identity in its application to words, and argue that this represents a particular form of misology that contains in itself a defined misanthropic threat. The threat is found in the impaired ability of the human person to think by way of understanding, and in the correlated incapacity of the human community to dialogue toward a common understanding. (shrink)

In writing his metaphysics in the form of “meditations,” Descartes specifically rejects two other forms: “synthesis,” the form of a deductive proof common in ancient geometry, and “disputation,” the form of a dialectical defense of a thesis against an antithesis. Both forms, Descartes argues, impede a reader’s ability to discover the material “as if for herself” and endanger instilling in her a cynicism towards philosophy. Descartes instead chose the form of “analysis” for the presentation of his metaphysics, which he asserts (...) is the “best and truest method of instruction.” What can philosophy teachers learn from these claims? We too rely on pedagogical forms that are broadly synthetic and disputative, and we too can recognize a student’s sudden suspicion of philosophy. I argue that Descartes’s pedagogical comments offer a solution to help us avoid this classroom danger of misology. (shrink)

The paper, although polemical for the most part, also presents a substantive thesis. The polemical part is directed at the claim that the Platonic Socrates held that philosophy as a practice is to be devoted to the care of self and others, and that the expression of emotion is an important aspect of the philosophic life. To undermine that claim, counter-examples from the autobiographical narrative in the Phaedo and the speeches of Diotima and Alcibiades in the Symposium are brought in. (...) Once analysed at the required depth, those passages show that, on the contrary, Plato’s Socrates remains consistently dispassionate both in his life, as he narrates it, and in the views he is made to express in the two dialogues. Rather than promoting self-expression, Socrates never ceased to warn us against misology. (shrink)

Plato’s Protagoras plays off the genre of Greek comedy in its expression of its philosophical meaning. This dialogue at points invites us to re-envision Socrates against the backdrop of Aristophanes’ criticisms of Socrates and the sophists. The Protagoras follows some of the conventions of Greek comedy but interrupts its form with moments of lengthier rational discussion absent in Greek comedy. The dialogue’s logos and antilogos lead to aporia, but this aporia shows a limit to reason that recognizes human incompleteness without (...) leading to misology. In contrast to performed drama, the written form of the dialogue both engages its audience’s emotions while allowing the reader to return to the text and to continue their rational assessment of the arguments. (shrink)

The relatively recently introduced phrase “gender identity” is affecting language and thought to a profound degree, primarily via its impact on words possessing sexual significance or connotation. In this paper, while prescinding from controversy surrounding the term “gender,” and psychological and medical issues related to sexuality, I attend to the consequences of this impact on language and thought, and the ensuing disorientation this confusion of meaning is causing in a world where sexual dimorphism possesses foundational significance. I show in what (...) way the issue arises from selective disregard of the principle of identity in its application to words, and argue that this represents a particular form of misology that contains in itself a defined misanthropic threat. The threat is found in the impaired ability of the human person to think by way of understanding, and in the correlated incapacity of the human community to dialogue toward a common understanding. (shrink)

Mill's defense of the open society is interpreted as the means toward a closed one. Mill himself is treated as the apostle of cultural solidarity--hostile to Christianity and the clergy which once provided it, and a militant advocate of the Religion of Humanity. The interpretation is defended with some force, but the vehement critique of Mill's position is launched from a fideistic position so radical that its relativism undercuts not only Mill, but Cowling himself. Carelessness of organization and style fit (...) the author's misology only too well.--M. W. (shrink)

The following little paper has a rather large scope. No particular issue or problem has occasioned this text; rather, it presents a mini-treatise on love, marriage, and parenting. The attempted method is quasi-Hegelian: to allow one topic to engender a further topic, and this in turn to engender a third, etc., while avoiding at any stage anticipations of later topics. If reasoning in accordance with this dialectical method is successful, the result is a system of topics, but it is contingent (...) whether or not these topics can be employed as knowledge of the historical world. Indeed, some of the topics considered below cannot be employed descriptively under present historical conditions. Thus, those who would execute this dialectical project must renounce any claim that the system of topics has more than a contingent relation to knowledge, but it would be utter misology to denigrate this project merely because it requires this renunciation. (shrink)

In this paper, I undertake to apply the de dicto/de re distinction familiar to philosophers of language from objects to properties. To do this, I come up with a new characterization of the distinction, and apply it to some cases in the literature to show how it deals with them, and how the phenomena are more common and varied than one might think. I discuss how it would apply to color-blind people’s understanding of color terms, to show its intuitiveness, and (...) how it would call for the use of Higher Order Logic, and then apply it to outstanding questions in Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Moore Studies, Metaphilosophy, Metaethics, and Philosophy of Science, in order to develop new and significant ideas and insights. By doing this, I hope not only to cast light on old problems, and support some common and traditional, and I hope, common sense, views by showing how the distinction has the potential to deal with some familiar objections, but also to provide support for accepting the view that the de re/de dicto distinction makes sense when applied to properties, and that we should therefor embrace it and Higher Order Logic, because of their fecundity. (shrink)

In the Consolation of Philosophy, Lady Philosophy leads Boethius through a series of obstacles that prevent him from finding happiness within his prison cell: the role that luck and misfortune play in our affairs, the false paths to happiness in comparison with the true journey, the problem of evil and the disproportion between people’s lives and eschatological deserts, and, finally, whether God’s providential order necessitates our outcomes or if we can choose freely to pursue the happy life. As the pair (...) discuss each problem, the same argumentative move and countermove play out. Boethius, forgetful of what he had learned from Philosophy long ago on account of his grief, blames the very nature of reality itself for each of the problems that beset him. He thinks that Fortune has taken from him all that is good and that God’s providence only extends to the non-human world. Philosophy, by contrast, argues in each case that the problem at hand is, in fact, no problem at all when we see reality rightly. In each case, Philosophy shows that it isn’t reality that’s to blame for the problem at hand but instead human ignorance’s misunderstanding of the true nature of reality. Boethius’s conversation with Philosophy showcases a puzzling feature of self-knowledge: on the one hand, too much attention to the world (e.g., fortune’s wiles) is the problem and self-inquiry (e.g., the nature of one’s desires) is the solution, but on the other hand, too much attention to one’s self (e.g., attention to passions and limitations) is the problem and turning toward recognizing the true structure of the world is the solution. Philosophy seems to indicate that both poles are true, and the task is to determine how best to clarify how. After showcasing the dialogue’s argumentative pattern, I argue that, in Boethius’s case, each of his problems, as well as his misery in general, are caused by his ignorance and self-deception. Boethius’s ignorance is, in this case, the more proximate cause of his misery, but underlying his ignorance is an act of self-deception that causes him to be ignorant in the first place. As Philosophy tells Boethius early on, he already knows what she plans to teach him (more accurately, of what she plans to remind him). Nevertheless, he has forgotten what he has known and, as a result, is more the architect of his own misery than is Fortune or any of the events that have befallen him. Wounded by grief, he has allowed his affective response to his misfortune to becloud his understanding. As Philosophy says, he is unhappy because he has “forgotten what he is.” He has forgotten himself precisely because of the way in which he has allowed his affective responses to rule in his soul. Hence, while the ultimate cure for Boethius’s misery will be a newly rediscovered knowledge that reality itself is providentially structured, Philosophy must begin by soothing Boethius’s passions and undoing the damage that they have wrought on his understanding of the world. Philosophy cannot turn Boethius’s intellect until she has first turned his passions (cf. Republic 518b-d), which, while still wrongly-turned and governing the soul, are liable to lead to tremendous intellectual mistakes precisely because they are blind to the true nature of reality (cf. Phaedrus 247c). I argue in conclusion that the Consolation is unified by the theme of self-deception as the primary cause of philosophical misery. Boethius is upset primarily because he has convinced himself that he is otherwise than he is and that reality is otherwise than it is rather than because of what has happened to him, contrary to his own view of things. Philosophy’s argumentative strategy suggests that self-deception can only be undone by attending to it as a problem besetting the whole soul, not just the intellectual part of the soul. We thus have good warrant for thinking that simply rational responses to ignorance will be fruitless when ignorance is caused by or accompanied by a moral failing. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Swan Song Hemlock Ultimate Disease Conclusion Further Reading.

This essay investigates the nature of evil through the symbolism attributed to the ring in both the Platonic corpus and the writings of J. R. R. Tolkien. It first explores the similarities between the two myths: in both narratives, rings grant their bearers the power of invisibility, freeing them from accountability for their actions. In this way, the study emphasizes the corrupting influence of power, even on individuals who were once morally upright. Through the examples of Gyges and Sméagol, it (...) illustrates how the allure of power can lead even virtuous individuals toward moral decay. The essay then turns to the question of the antidote to evil. In the eschatological Myth of Er, Plato suggests that a life governed by justice and virtue ultimately determines the soul’s fate after death. Similarly, Tolkien’s Frodo, who resists the temptation of evil, ultimately secures passage to the Undying Lands. Finally, the essay highlights both the timelessness and the importance of myths rooted in religious allegory, which continue to serve as guiding principles in both philosophy and literature — especially in times when the “rings of power” multiply. (shrink)