For Knox, ‘spacetime’ is to be defined functionally, as that which picks out a structure of local inertial frames. Assuming that Knox is motivated to construct this functional definition of spacetime on the grounds that it appears to identify that structure which plays the operational role of spacetime—i.e., that structure which is actually surveyed by physical rods and clocks built from matter fields—we identify in this paper important limitations of her approach: these limitations are based upon the fact (...) that there is a gap between inertial frame structure and that which is operationally significant in the above sense. We present five concrete cases in which these two notions come apart, before considering various ways in which Knox’s spacetime functionalism might be amended in light of these issues. (shrink)

Hodroj, Latham, and Miller’s target article is the latest in a slew of recent studies that seek to investigate temporal experience using a method that involves participants reading vignettes then completing questionnaires. I have significant misgivings about this method, and in this commentary, I discuss its limitations. I start by discussing the kinds of proposals that can, and cannot, be tested in principle using the questionnaire method, suggesting that some prominent proposals fall outside its scope. I illustrate this through (...) an analogy with the opponent process theory of colour experience, where I suggest that the tools of cognitive neuroscience are needed. I then draw attention to some of the pitfalls of the questionnaire method in general, and to some problems specific to the current study. One major issue concerns the question of whether it has been shown that participants really understood their task. I give reasons for doubting this. First, I show that it is too easy to answer the comprehension questions correctly without understanding. Second, I argue that it is not credible that participants actually held the world view entailed by the combination of responses given by a significant minority of them, suggesting that there was significant confusion. I raise several other objections before concluding with a modest suggestion for future work. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Limited aggregationists argue that when deciding between competing claims to aid we are sometimes required and sometimes forbidden from aggregating weaker claims to outweigh stronger claims. Joe Horton presents a ‘fatal dilemma’ for these views. Views that land on the First Horn of his dilemma suggest that a previously losing group strengthened by fewer and weaker claims can be more choice-worthy than the previously winning group strengthened by more and stronger claims. Views that land on the Second Horn suggest (...) that combining two losing groups together and two winning groups together can turn the losing groups into the winning groups and the winning groups into the losing groups. This paper demonstrates that the ‘fatal dilemma’ is neither fatal nor a dilemma. The First Horn is devastating but avoidable and the Second Horn is unavoidable but not devastating. Nevertheless, Horton’s argument does help to narrow down the acceptable range of views. (shrink)

The essays in this volume investigate the question of where, and in what sense, the bounds of intelligible thought, knowledge, and speech are to be drawn. Is there a way in which we are limited in what we think, know, and say? And if so, does this mean that we are constrained—that there is something beyond the ken of human intelligibility of which we fall short? Or is there another way to think about these limits of intelligibility—namely, as conditions of (...) our meaning and knowing anything, beyond which there is no specifiable thing we cannot do? -/- These issues feature prominently in the writings of Kant and Wittgenstein who each engaged with them in unique and striking ways. Their thoughts on the matter remain provocative and stimulating, and accordingly the contributions to this volume address the issues surrounding the limits of intelligibility both exegetically and systematically: they examine how they figure in Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s most significant works and put them in touch with contemporary debates that are shaped by their legacy. These debates concern, inter alia, logically and morally alien thought, the semantics and philosophy of negation, disjunctivism in philosophy of perception and ethics, paraconsistent approaches to contradiction, and the relation between art, literature, and philosophy. The book is divided into four parts: Part I gives a first assessment of the issues, Part II examines limits as they feature in Kant, Part III as they feature in Wittgenstein, and Part IV suggests some ways in which the questions at issue might be reconsidered, drawing upon ideas in phenomenology, dialetheism, metamathematics, and the works of other influential authors. -/- Limits of Intelligibility provides insight into a theme that is central to the thought of two of the most important figures in modern philosophy, as well as to recent metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, epistemology, and ethics. (shrink)

When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. (...) -/- Not all misleading arguments wear their flaws on their sleeve. Each step of a misleading argument might seem compelling and you might not be able to figure out what's wrong with it. Still, even if you can't figure out what's wrong with an argument, you can know that it's misleading. One way to know that an argument is misleading is, counterintuitively, to lack expertise in the methods and evidence-types employed by the argument. When you know that a counterargument is misleading, you shouldn't engage with it open-mindedly and sometimes shouldn't engage with it at all. You shouldn't engage open-mindedly because you shouldn't be willing to reduce your confidence in response to arguments you know are misleading. And you sometimes shouldn't engage closed-mindedly, because to do so can be manipulative or ineffective. -/- In making this case, Jeremy Fantl discusses echo chambers and group polarization, the importance in academic writing of a sympathetic case for the opposition, the epistemology of disagreement, the account of open-mindedness, and invitations to problematic academic speakers. (shrink)

The freedom of expression is vital to our ability to convey opinions, convictions, and beliefs, and to meaningfully participate in democracy. The state may, however, ‘limit’ the freedom of expression on certain grounds, such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. Examples from around the world show that the freedom of individuals to express their opinions, convictions, and beliefs is often imperilled when states are not required to meet a substantial justificatory burden when limiting such freedom. This (...) article critiques one of the common justificatory approaches employed in a number of jurisdictions to frame the state’s burden to justify limitations on the freedom of expression—the proportionality test. It presents a case for an alternative approach that builds on the merits and addresses some of the weaknesses of a typical proportionality test. This alternative may be called a ‘duty-based’ justificatory approach because it requires the state to demonstrate—through the presentation of publicly justifiable reasons—that the individual concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from the expressive conduct in question. The article explains how this approach is more normatively compelling than a typical proportionality test. It also illustrates how such an approach can better constrain the state’s ability to advance majoritarian interests or offload its positive obligations by limiting the freedom of expression of minorities and dissenting voices. (shrink)

Neuroscientific scanning of meditators is taken as providing data on mystical experiences. However, problems concerning how the brain and consciousness are related cast doubts on whether any understanding of the content of meditative experiences is gained through the study of the brain. Whether neuroscience can study the subjective aspects of meditative experiences in general is also discussed. So too, whether current neuroscience can establish that there are “pure consciousness events” in mysticism is open to question. The discussion points to (...) class='Hi'>limitations on neuroscience's capability to add to our understanding of the phenomenological content of mystical experiences. (shrink)

This chapter presents a re-understanding of the contents of our analog magnitude representations (e.g., approximate duration, distance, number). The approximate number system (ANS) is considered, which supports numerical representations that are widely described as fuzzy, noisy, and limited in their representational power. The contention is made that these characterizations are largely based on misunderstandings—that what has been called “noise” and “fuzziness” is actually an important epistemic signal of confidence in one’s estimate of the value. Rather than the ANS having noisy (...) or fuzzy numerical content, it is suggested that the ANS has exquisitely precise numerical content that is subject to epistemic limitations. Similar considerations will arise for other analog representations. The chapter discusses how this new understanding of ANS representations recasts the learnability problem for number and the conceptual changes that children must accomplish in the number domain. (shrink)

The concept of hierarchical organization is commonplace in science. Subatomic particles compose atoms, which compose molecules; cells compose tissues, which compose organs, which compose organisms; etc. Hierarchical organization is particularly prominent in ecology, a field of research explicitly arranged around levels of ecological organization. The concept of levels of organization is also central to a variety of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of discrete hierarchical levels. In this paper, we show how these difficulties undermine (...) various implications ascribed to hierarchical organization, and we suggest the concept of scale as a promising alternative to levels. Investigating causal processes at different scales offers a way to retain a notion of quasi-levels that avoids the difficulties inherent in the classic concept of hierarchical levels of organization. Throughout, our focus is on ecology, but the results generalize to other invocations of hierarchy in science and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Legal theorists have proposed several theories to justify statutes of limitations in the criminal law, but none of these normative theories is generally accepted. This chapter investigates the related descriptive question as to whether ordinary people have the intuition that legal punishment becomes less appropriate as time passes from the date of the offense and, if they do, what factors play a role in these intuitions. Five studies demonstrate that there is an intuitive statute of limitations on both (...) legal punishment and moral criticism, and that these intuitions arise, in part, from judgments about changes in psychological connectedness over time. (shrink)

Many theorists defend enforceable relationship contracts, arguing that they should be available alongside state-recognized marriage or even that they are the best sort of legal regulation to replace marriage. This latter question is the subject of this chapter, which contrasts contract and directive models of regulation, and notes that contract appears to be more compatible with liberty. However, this appearance is illusory since contracts can undermine liberty, directives can enhance liberty, and even a contract regime requires default directives. Moreover, there (...) are various problems with the enforcement of relationship contracts. Specific performance is rarely appropriate in the relationship context. The alternative, fault-based compensatory alimony, risks causing injustice to vulnerable parties. Relational contract theory attempts to deal with some of these problems but has intrinsic limitations. The chapter concludes that contract is not the best replacement for marriage, advocating instead a system of piecemeal directives with limited possibilities for contractual deviation. (shrink)

I offer a contribution to recent work on Margaret Macdonald (1903–1956), a prolific though largely unknown figure in the history of analytic philosophy who applied Wittgensteinian insights to a broad range of issues. Here I examine the development of Macdonald's views with respect to idealism and conventionalism, through the application of a conceptual distinction between limits and limitations found in discussions of the same issue as it appears in the work of Wittgenstein. I show that Macdonald rejected both Platonism, (...) idealism, and conventionalism in her doctoral thesis, and that she subsequently viewed these positions as specimens of nonsense issued under the misapprehension that necessary truths admit of justification. (shrink)

Despite its growth in popularity in the past twenty years, CSR has serious limitations, which profoundly affect its ability to reduce the negative social, environmental, and economic impacts that companies generate as they pursue the financial bottom line. Emerging as a response to changing expectations of how organizations should behave in a complex and increasingly globalized world, its incoherency makes it inadequate to deal with the serious problems faced by humanity in the twenty-first century. This chapter summarizes the origins (...) of CSR, as well as its limitations and fundamental underlying contradictions. It then explains why CSR needs to adopt a more coherent approach and outlines what that approach should look like. (shrink)

This paper explores the human experience of limitation and the quest for transcendence through a comparative study of Kant, Paul, Nietzsche, and Buddhist philosophy. Kant identifies structural limits of reason, demonstrating how moral and epistemic boundaries shape human responsibility. Paul emphasizes existential and moral insufficiency, showing that human weakness necessitates grace, particularly as revealed in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. Nietzsche critiques metaphysical illusions as responses to human weakness, advocating self-overcoming and life-affirming creativity as authentic forms of transcendence. Buddhist (...) philosophy complements these perspectives by recognizing the impermanence of phenomena and the limits of desire, offering disciplined insight, ethical practice, and mindful awareness as paths to awakening. Across these traditions, human limitation emerges not as a barrier but as the essential condition for moral, spiritual, and existential transcendence. The study highlights a shared pattern: acknowledgment of human finitude opens avenues for ethical responsibility, creative self-realization, and awakening, demonstrating that limitation is inseparable from the human pursuit of meaning. (shrink)

This article offers an alternative approach to paradigms that cast culture solely as a nurturing influence on children's language development. It proposes a dimensional model of Child-Directed Communication to delineate ways in which a community's habitus may impede the communicative potential of children with neuro-developmental conditions such as severe autism. It argues that certain features of Euro-American CDC are illadapted for autistic children. Due to inertia, caregivers often find themselves unable to transcend the limitations of CDC habitus. Yet, occasionally, (...) a transformation in CDC emerges that more effectively engages children with impairments. The article analyzes one such transformation forged in the niche of a unique mother–son relationship in India and then introduced in the USA. (shrink)

Graham Priest presents an expanded edition of his exploration of the nature and limits of thought. Embracing contradiction and challenging traditional logic, he engages with issues across philosophical borders, from the historical to the modern, Eastern to Western, continental to analytic.

What kinds of evidence reliably support predictions of effectiveness for health and social care interventions? There is increasing reliance, not only for health care policy and practice but also for more general social and economic policy deliberation, on evidence that comes from studies whose basic logic is that of JS Mill's method of difference. These include randomized controlled trials, case–control studies, cohort studies, and some uses of causal Bayes nets and counterfactual-licensing models like ones commonly developed in econometrics. The topic (...) of this paper is the 'external validity' of causal conclusions from these kinds of studies. We shall argue two claims. Claim, negative: external validity is the wrong idea; claim, positive: 'capacities' are almost always the right idea, if there is a right idea to be had. If we are right about these claims, it makes big problems for policy decisions. Many advice guides for grading policy predictions give top grades to a proposed policy if it has two good Mill's-method-of difference studies that support it. But if capacities are to serve as the conduit for support from a method-of-difference study to an effectiveness prediction, much more evidence, and much different in kind, is required. We will illustrate the complexities involved with the case of multisystemic therapy, an internationally adopted intervention to try to diminish antisocial behaviour in young people. (shrink)

Rapid advances in computer technology and what is termed ‘Artificial Intelligence’ in the past 70 years have led to speculation about the ultimate capabilities of electronic devices, including speculation about whether they will make humans obsolete at some future time. Zubiri’s distinction between sensible intelligence and sentient intelligence can be applied to understanding of the limitations of AI. Machines can only operate on the sensible intelligence paradigm, which entails limits. Sentient intelligence allows humans to carry out functions that sensible (...) intelligence-based devices can never do. Sensible intelligence-based devices, including AI, will therefore be restricted to amplifying human (i.e. sentient intelligence) capabilities, but never replacing them. Historically, extravagant claims for AI have not been borne out, despite many orders of magnitude increase in computation speed and memory capacity. Theoretical arguments, based on Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, also confirm this. (shrink)

A common theme that resulted from the Reflexive Thematic AnalysisReflexive thematic analysis (RTA) (RTA) method applied to selected WHOWorld Health Organization (WHO) and Humanity + texts is human genome editingHuman genome editingfor healthHealth, well-being, and enhancement. EnhancementBioethicsBioethics is tasked with constructing a better framework for the ethical analysis of interventions. This chapter highlights the limitations of the “therapyTherapy (allowed) versus enhancement (forbidden)” paradigm and moves towards defining a more coherent bioethical framework. Firstly, it considers the problem caused by equivocal (...) concepts such as healthHealth, the goals of medicineMedicine, enhancement, and normalcy. Subsequently, this chapter analyses some aspects that weaken “therapy versus enhancement”, such as the goal of disease preventionPrevention (claimed by both therapyTherapyand enhancementEnhancement), the improvement in quality of life for the elderly (above the average for this age), and some commonly used enhancements. Lastly, this chapter acknowledges the weakest point of “therapy versus enhancement” as a criterion for morality. Ethical reasoning based exclusively on intentions lacks consistency and may cause significant harm in some cases while missing morally good or neutral improvements in other cases. (shrink)

According to the received view formal semantics applies to natural language to some extent only. It is so because natural language is inherently indefinite, in particular, its expressions are ambiguous, vague and admits departures from syntactic rule. Moreover, intensional contexts occur in ordinary language—it results in limitations of the principle of compositionality. The ordinary conversation appeals to various principles, for instance, Grice’s maxims which exceed logical formalism. Thus, ordinary language cannot be fully formalized. On the other hand, if L (...) is a formal language, its metalanguage ML, must be partially informal—for instance, it contains, terms of ordinary mathematics, especially set theory. Even, if, for instance, due to the technique of aritmetization, ML can be represented in L, such a representation is only local. In fact, this view can be derived from some Tarski’s remarks on the role played by natural language. It is usually assumed that the universality of natural language, is the source of troubles associated with antinomies. It is so this circumstance requires a solution, for example by distinguishing levels of language. However, even if antinomies are excluded, what is informal is prior with respect to what is formal. It shows that formal semantics has limitations even with respect to formalized languages. (shrink)

My first aim in this paper is to show that the transparency claim cannot serve the purpose to which it is assigned; that is, the idea that perceptual experience is transparent is no help whatsoever in motivating an externalist account of phenomenal character. My second aim is to show that the internalist qualia theorist's response to the transparency idea has been unnecessarily concessive to the externalist. Surprisingly, internalists seem to allow that much of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience depends (...) essentially (and not just causally) upon externally located properties. They argue that we can also be aware of internal, non-intentional qualia. I present an alternative response the internalist can make to the transparency claim: phenomenal character is wholly internal, and seeming to be aware of externally located properties just is being aware of internally constituted experiential features. (shrink)

The common liberal understanding of reproductive autonomy – characterized by free choice and a principle of non-interference – serves as a useful way to analyse the normative appeal of having certain choices open to people in the reproductive realm, especially for issues like abortion rights. However, this liberal reading of reproductive autonomy only offers us a limited ethical understanding of what is at stake in many kinds of reproductive choices, particularly when it comes to different uses of reproductive technologies and (...) third-party reproduction. This is because the liberal framework does not fully capture who benefits from which reproductive options, the extent of the risks and harms involved in various reproductive interventions, and the reasons for why people are driven to make certain reproductive choices. (shrink)

Neuroimaging offers great potential to clinicians and researchers for a host of mental and physical conditions. The use of imaging has been trumpeted for forensic psychiatric and psychological evaluations to allow greater insight into the relationship between the brain and behavior. The results of imaging certainly can be used to inform clinical diagnoses; however, there continue to be limitations in using neuroimaging for insanity cases due to limited scientific backing for how neuroimaging can inform retrospective evaluations of mental state. (...) In making this case, this paper reviews the history of the insanity defense and explains how the use of neuroimaging is not an effective way of improving the reliability of insanity defense evaluations. (shrink)

Theology is based on God's true and unchanging Word, but does it supply an unwavering foundation for spiritual certainties? Brush contends that it does not, because, like science, theology is a human discipline and subject to our limitations of knowledge, interpretation, and objectivity. In part one, Brush unpacks this contention, showing how Christians both past and present have arrived at conclusions that actually run counter to biblical teaching, and how these interpretive viewpoints have changed over time. In part two, (...) he makes the case that flawed theological positions have resulted in views that needlessly conflict with science, and that these clashes can be resolved with more accurate formulations. Brush evenly evaluates questions including the age of the earth, the origin of life, and the end of time."--Publisher. (shrink)

This paper surveys our inescapable limits as cognitive agents with regard to a full world of fact: the well-known metamathematical limits of axiomatic systems, limitations of explanation that doom a principle of sufficient reason, limitations of expression across all possible languages, and a simple but powerful argument regarding the limits of conceivability. In ways demonstrable even from within our limits, the full world of fact is inescapably beyond us. Here we propose that there must nonetheless be a totality (...) of fact, and that despite our limits we can know something of its general character. The world as the totality of fact must form a plenum, with a radically unfamiliar formal structure that contains distinct elements corresponding to each element of its own power set. (shrink)

My focus is the ‘logico-rhetorical module’. This mental module, Sperber hypothesizes, is an evolved ability of human beings to examine critically what someone is saying, for example, to detect inconsistency or inadequate evidence in an argument. On the assumption that we have this natural ability, Chilton questions the need for Critical Discourse Analysis; in contrast, on his reading of Sperber’s work, Hart argues the opposite. In this article, I agree with Chilton’s stance to the extent that the competence of the (...) logico-rhetorical module is, generally speaking, adequate for enabling critical engagement with verbal input. That said, I highlight two limitations of the logico-rhetorical module for detecting inconsistency in arguments. To address these limitations, I hold a new approach is needed in Critical Discourse Analysis. This is one which draws on the corpus linguistic method; I refer to it as Electronic Deconstruction. (shrink)

In the current process of studying the history of Marxist philosophy and which revolves around the issue of how to evaluate the theory of alienation propounded by Marx in his youth, most scholars have more or less unanimously rejected the previous oversimplified method of affirming "either this or that." To avoid repeating the same old mistake of bourgeois philosophers in the West who alleged there were "two Marxes," people have paid special attention to digging into the valuable thoughts contained in (...) Manuscripts on Economics and Philosophy in 1844 and other writings of Marx's early days, and linking them up with the basic principles embodied in The German Ideology and Capital in an effort to reveal the inherent relations between Marx in his youth and Marx in maturity, proving the consistency of Marx's thought in development. Beyond doubt, this effort is of extreme importance and has already made encouraging progress. However, some comrades, in doing this work, stressed only the relations between Marx's thoughts in his early stage and his more mature thinking in the later period to the neglect of the distinction between them. Even when dwelling on the distinction, they merely ascribed it to some quantitative difference. Therefore they overestimated to varying degrees the theory of alienation, the kernel of the young Marx's thought. The key to an objective estimation of the alienation theory lies in comprehending it in a comprehensive way. And to this end we must affirm on the one hand its position and role in the development of Marx's thinking and point out its inherent limitations on the other. On top of that, we must also explain how Marx later overcame the limitations. (shrink)

The more the number of people who live on Earth grows, the more significant are the cuts individuals must accept in realization of their own freedom, so as not to limit the freedom of others. With the growing population on the finite planet the real space for freedom of each individual decreases. Moreover, the growth of complexity of the global industrial civilization increases the degree of interdependence on one hand, on the other the degree of mutual trust decreases as a (...) result of the imperative of growth and profit, and without it no human society can function in the long term. Access to sources necessary for the realization of fundamental freedoms is unequal, and, in fact, it thus limits its accessibility for the majority of human population. Philosophical reflection then should cope with question, whether the range of guaranteed freedoms can be broadened or at least sustained when the space for its realization with the growing human population struggling for increasingly limited resources narrows. (shrink)

Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND) is a framework of theories that adjust Newton's laws of gravity to explain effects such as galactic rotation anomalies, offering an alternative to dark matter. This essay examines the justification of MOND by assessing its inter-theoretical relationship to established theories across relevant scales, in particular its connection to Newtonian gravitation. We argue that MOND fails a key condition for a theory's justification—what we call 'reduction-wise justification'—since it does not adequately reduce to Newtonian gravity in a fully (...) non-arbitrary way. More precisely, despite satisfying the standard formal criteria for successful limiting reduction, MOND does not properly reduce to Newtonian gravitation because of (i) the absence of a fundamental theoretical framework to justify the interpolating function introduced in MOND and (ii) the lack of a unified mathematical structure working across all scales, independent of Newtonian theory. Hence, the case study of MOND provides crucial results for the general debate on inter-theoretic reduction in science: MOND’s failure as a case of reduction highlights important limitations in standard accounts of limiting reduction. We respond by proposing a more refined framework for limiting reduction that introduces two additional criteria to better distinguish successful from pathological reductions. More broadly, this case illustrates how analysing reduction-wise justification can serve as a powerful tool for evaluating the validity of novel theories that are not yet empirically established. (shrink)

This paper attempts to articulate certain inadequacies that are involved in the traditional way of categorizing Indian philosophy and explores alternative approaches, some of which otherwise are not explicitly seen in the treatises of the history of Indian Philosophies. By categorization, I mean, classifying Indian philosophy into two streams, which are traditionally called as astica and nastica or orthodox and heterodox systems. Further, these different schools in the astica Darsanas and nastica Darsanas are usually numbered into six and three respectively. (...) Nyaya - Vaisesika, Sankhya -Yoga and Purva & Uttara Mimamsa are identified as astica darsanas and Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism are identified as nastica darsanas (6+3). It is my endeavor to critically analyze the usual astica-nastica distinction of 6+3 classification of Indian philosophy so as to find out the meaning of such a rationale in this categorization. This general consensus is contested in this paper. What I am intended to support and strengthen such a critical analysis and exploration is to discuss these systems of India’s philosophy within the general intellectual milieu of Indian cultural traditions, its orientations, presuppositions and preferences. In order to carry out such a task, I shall be taking recourse to the theories of different scholars, both traditional and modern, in approaching and appropriating Indian Philosophy from different perspectives and their critical-creative approaches shall be scrutinized. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the notion of a limit. It questions whether a putative opposition of philosophical “camps” emphasized in recent years is actually tenable. This opposition is taken to hold between classical approaches in a Kantian spirit, operating with the notion of necessary limits to human cognition and sense-making, and a recent “speculative” turn in philosophy championed by Quentin Meillassoux, looking to overcome such limits. The paper’s contention against this dichotomy is that the rhetoric of unlimitedness depends on ideas (...) about limits that are rooted in the very Kantian way of thinking it claims to oppose. What is more, these ideas are just as questionable for they, in turn, rely on a notion of “the Absolute” which they claim to undermine. The paper investigates these foundations of modern thought about limits and finitude in perception and thought, and the consequences these ideas have had. It closes by arguing that the notion of a limit as it has been formative for recent philosophy is inconsistent, and that our focus in philosophy should rather rest on the contextual conditions of thought: on this picture, thoughts articulate a contextually determined grip on reality, which presupposes that reality is used in a certain way. (shrink)

The more common scheme to explain the classical limit of quantum mechanics includes decoherence, which removes from the state the interference terms classically inadmissible since embodying non-Booleanity. In this work we consider the classical limit from a logical viewpoint, as a quantum-to-Boolean transition. The aim is to open the door to a new study based on dynamical logics, that is, logics that change over time. In particular, we appeal to the notion of hybrid logics to describe semiclassical systems. Moreover, we (...) consider systems with many characteristic decoherence times, whose sublattices of properties become distributive at different times. (shrink)

According to one prominent account of intellectual humility, it consists primarily of a disposition to “own” one’s intellectual limitations. This account has been criticized for neglecting the _interpersonal _dimensions of intellectual humility. We expect intellectually humble persons to be respectful and generous with their interlocutors and to avoid being haughty or domineering. I defend the limitations-owning account against this objection. I do so in two ways: first, by arguing that some of the interpersonal qualities associated with intellectual humility (...) are qualities expressive of virtues _other_ than intellectual humility; and second, by arguing that, when properly described, the kind of limitations-owning characteristic of intellectual humility in fact is robustly interpersonal. The result is a considerably broader and richer notion of the limitations the owning of which is characteristic of intellectual humility. (shrink)

Despite its position in an introductory work to logic, the account of continuity presented by Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Categories is apparently even less accessible to the beginner than Aristotle’s original. This is in part because Al-Fārābī integrated elements of the accounts of continuity in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics into an account mainly derived from Aristotle’s Categories. While Al-Fārābī’s account chiefly follows Aristotle’s Categories 6 in describing a continuous object that can be divided into parts with (...) a shared boundary, it borrows the terminology of limits from Physics 5 and the notion of quantity as divisible into its parts from Metaphysics 5.13. In doing so, Al-Fārābī defines continuity using a notion of a limit without determining whether or not it was part of the continuous quantity. This definition could also accommodate atomists, since it would work even if the limit were an atom or several atoms that were part of the continuous object. The broadness of this definition is probably intended to allow students of logic who may have atomist tendencies to accept the account of quantity in the categories tradition, even though they may not be ready to reject atomism until after studying physics. (shrink)

Narrative medicine has emerged over the past few decades as an exciting approach to medical practice, interweaving the practice of medicine with the practices of literary analysis and reflective writing. It is often claimed that narrative medicine enables practitioners to understand and empathize with patient stories, effectively ‘joining’ patients in illness. However, I argue that there are reasons to be suspicious of narrative medicine’s ability to promote patient-centered care. I begin by questioning the distinctiveness of narrative knowledge, suggesting that it (...) is neither able to be propositional knowledge (‘knowledge-that’) nor phenomenal/experiential knowledge (‘knowledge-what-it’s-like’). Then, I consider an alternative reading of narrative medicine, by which narratives are simply ways to structure patient information so that a physician can more readily empathize with the patient. I dismiss this alternative as unsatisfactory given that it depends on either all patients building narratives or physicians imposing narrative structure(s) where one does not inherently exist, thus overriding patients. Finally, I provide possible supplements and alternatives to narrative medicine, proposing that active listening and the removal of systemic barriers to physicians’ abilities to provide humanistic care (e.g., lower administrative, profit, and documentation burdens) may be a first step to putting empathetic patient care on the forefront. Ultimately, I think that these efforts (while their fruition may present difficulty), rather than sifting through patient information to construct and elevate narratives, present the opportunity to accurately refocus patient-centered care. (shrink)

One of David Estlund’s key claims in Utopophobia is that theories of justice should not bend to human motivational limitations. Yet he does not extend this view to our cognitive limitations. This creates a dilemma. Theories of justice may ignore cognitive as well as motivational limitations—but this makes them so unrealistic as to be unrecognizable as theories of justice. Theories may bend to both cognitive and motivational limitations—but Estlund wants to reject this view. The other alternative (...) is to find some non-ad hoc way to distinguish cognitive from motivational limitations. I argue that this strategy will not work. Just as a person’s cognitive limitations may block her motives no matter how much she perseveres, so too motivational limitations may be genuine inabilities. Even ideal theories of justice must bend to even ordinary motivational limitations when they truly cause us to be unable to comply with requirements. (shrink)

In their article, Crutchfield and Redinger (2024) outline the conditions that they have identified as situations in which it is ethically permissible to use chemical restraints, defined as medicati...

Linnaean taxonomy, which imposes hierarchical classifications based on morphological characteristics, has become deeply embedded in modern data architecture, from databases to metadata schemas to AI training datasets. With its hierarchical structure and rigid categorization, Linnaean taxonomy privileges one type of knowledge while marginalizing alternative taxonomies that offer more fluid, contextual, and relational understandings of the natural world. This paper examines how the legacy of Linnaean taxonomy continues to shape contemporary classification systems and artificial intelligence (AI). Indigenous knowledge systems, which include (...) spiritual, cultural, and ecological dimensions, view entities not as isolated objects but as nodes in dynamic, interconnected networks. We draw from the French naturalist, Comte de Buffon, who, in line with Indigenous knowledge systems, viewed nature as continuous and contextual rather than discretely compartmentalized. The dominance of Linnaean-style classification in AI and data systems perpetuates colonial power dynamics and contributes to knowledge homogenization while losing Indigenous languages and classification systems crucial for addressing contemporary environmental challenges, particularly in agriculture and biodiversity conservation. In this Age of AI, we call for a holistic and ecological approach to archives. Therefore, we propose applying ‘rhizomatic hylomorphism,’ an ethnobiological, alternative classification that transcends hierarchical taxonomies to embrace multiplicity, relationality, and contextual meaning. (shrink)

When we abandon the neoliberal fiction that one is independent on the grounds that it is a-historic and antisocial, we realize that everyone is dependent and interdependent. In a media-driven society the self-identity of the individual is formed within the framework of the culture-ideology of consumerism from early childhood. As a result, both the environmental and social destruction have intensified. In the global era, or in the era of the global environmental crisis, self-identity as a precondition for environmentally sustainable care (...) of the self should be based on the culture-ideology of human rights and responsibilities, and on conscious self-limitation which realizes that one’s prosperity and security cannot come at the expense of others. Care of the self is about ensuring the habitability of the global environment as the primary interest of each individual. (shrink)

This paper discusses the “positivistic” idea of the limits of law in various contexts: the conceptual problem of the “limits of law”, the limits of legal interpretation and the limits of theoretical disagreements in jurisprudence. In the latter case, we briefly show how contemporary “reflective” or “critical” positivist theories approach the possibility and limits of disagreements over the “grounds” of law. In what follows, we argue that these theories, which argue for a form of an “institutional” limit for admissible “legal” (...) reasons as built upon theories of basic concepts or normative theories of interpretation, are themselves actually underdetermined by “legal culture” or, so to speak, a “folk theory of law”. In the final section, we outline how a folk theory of law constrains both conceptual and interpretive enterprises in jurisprudence. (shrink)

This article examines the interplay between limit, thought, and human nature in Ludwig Feuerbach’s early philosophy, with particular attention to his dissertation De ratione una, universali, infinita (1828) and Thoughts on Death and Immortality (1830). It argues that Feuerbach presents reason as an infinite power that transcends the limits of sensibility and individuality. By framing reason as a universal substance and the foundation of human essence, Feuerbach highlights a fundamental tension between universality and individuality – one defined by a profound (...) asymmetry. He challenges dominant theological notions of immortality, proposing instead that death – understood as a real limit – is the very condition for grasping infinity within life itself. Ultimately, Feuerbach envisions history as the ongoing process of life’s self-realization, independent of any external metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

Confucian accommodation is discussed in Wong’s Lecture 3. However, from reviews of some cases in Confucian texts, this commentary questions whether Confucians are willing to accommodate disagreement. Wong also talks about some limits of being tolerated in Lecture 3. Confucian accommodation is limited by Confucian rituals. Wong also mentions some online discussion platforms to be the examples of unsettling hierarchies in Daoist insights in Lecture 5. This kind of high technology might create another hierarchy. In Wong’s lectures, he has also (...) discussed many good examples in traditional Chinese philosophies and modern societies to explain how to unsettle hierarchies. From his discussions, conversations should continue between the East and West. (shrink)