In this chapter, I argue for an activity-grounded conception of lifeform in Spinoza’s system. On this conception, lifeforms are constituted through agreement in activity—it’s not that human activities agree because they are grounded in a human morphology; rather, it’s that certain activities are human just insofar as they all agree. The activities at stake are multiply realizable through the morphological level, allowing for a notion of lifeform that’s compatible with Spinoza’s gradualism about morphology. Agreement in activity provides Spinoza (...) with a concrete (if, admittedly, underexplained) ground for lifeform, and avoids the issues that come from looking to morphology to do the job. I argue that an activity-grounded reading tracks Spinoza’s use of lifeform-related concepts, and that it results in a treatment of lifeforms as dynamic, mutable, and non-essentialist. (shrink)

The concept of form of life is simultaneously and inseparably overvalued and neglected in Wittgenstein’s work. The author aims to understand the concept of form of life, or lifeform (as Cavell proposes to translate Lebensform), as an alternative to the concept of rules in the exploration of ordinary language. Cavell shows at once the fragility and the depth of our agreements, and he seeks out the nature of the necessities that emerge from our forms of life. Ordinary language philosophy (...) as inherited by Cavell is thus anchored in an attention to language as it is commonly used, as part and milieu of our everyday interactions and conversations. Attention to ordinary language is also attention to neglected realities and to the constant risk of failure of conversation in everyday life. Recognizing the vulnerability of language - excuses, e. g., in their everyday recognition of human vulnerability and tragedy - allows us to recognize the human lifeform as itself vulnerable. Contemporary philosophy often sees recourse to the ordinary, to forms of life (as given), as a too-easy solution to skepticism. But the threat of destruction of forms of life (social and biological) in the present world gives the concept of Lebensform renewed reality and relevance: It is to turn us toward the unending political evaluation of the confrontation between need and rule, and to compare this with Emerson’s recurrence to the collisions of power and form, that I have urged noticing the key ambiguity in Wittgenstein’s concept of a form of life. The concept projects simultaneously, as I take it, an irreducibly horizontal ethnological or conventional axis crossing an irreducibly vertical biological axis,which is in effect to picture human existence as that life form which eternally criticizes itself - as it were from below and from beyond - or incessantly declines to. (Cavell 2010: 108). (shrink)

What is Leucippus and Democritus’ theory of the beginning of life? How, if at all, did Leucippus and Democritus distinguish different kinds of living things? These questions are challenging in part because these Atomists claim that all living beings – including plants – have a share of reason and understanding. We answer these questions by examining the extant evidence concerning their views on embryology, the soul and respiration, and sense perception, thereby giving an overview of life and lifeforms in early (...) Greek atomism. We show, first, that the generation of all living beings happens through the combining of miniature copies of their parents’ atomic structures. Second, we argue that the Atomists take respiration to mark the beginning of life. Yet they do not consider respiration nor being ensouled to distinguish humans, animals, and plants from each other. Finally, because Leucippus and Democritus make little distinction between sense perception and thought, these too cannot sharply distinguish between different kinds of living beings. We conclude that Leucippus and Democritus advocated a less anthropocentric and more holistic view of the cosmos. (shrink)

This volume gathers various contributions on the role of the human perspective and the human lifeform in Spinoza’s philosophy as well as on the resources that Spinoza provides for such a philosophy. Its aim is to draw attention to those parts of Spinoza’s philosophy where he is explicitly engaged in a reflection on human life or some peculiarity of it, and the texts collected here argue in various ways that notions such as ‘human being’, ‘human life’, and related notions (...) play an important role in his thought in non-trivial ways. These hitherto neglected perspectives on Spinoza’s philosophy result in accounts of a Spinozistic universe that is no longer completely devoid of particulars and of all those features of reality that are usually taken to be fundamental to the human condition and experience, such as subjectivity or perspectivity, temporality, and emotional salience. (shrink)

This article explores the essence of the human (insān) as it is understood in Twelver Shīʿī philosophy and mysticism. It presents a Shīʿī philosophical elucidation regarding the possible existence of extraterrestrial intelligent lifeforms and what their relationship with “humanhood” might be. This line of reasoning is presented with a general sketch of how, in Shīʿī Islamic thought, a “human being” is characterized by specific traits and the relationship of human beings with the archetype of the Perfect Human (al‐Insān al‐Kāmil). Following (...) this is a review of Shīʿī Imāmī traditions regarding extraterrestrial intelligent life and the plurality of worlds. This sequence ultimately allows for a unique analysis of humanhood according to the Shīʿī philosophical viewpoint and helps determine if the term “human” can be used for other intelligent beings with similar ontological features and intelligence levels. (shrink)

Humans are driving the planet toward catastrophe, and yet humans are the only species capable of taking positive actions on a global scale to prevent collapse. For N. Katherine Hayles, human hubris and the anthropocentrism that underlies it is one of the main drivers of our current planetary crises. So, if we are to take action to save the planet, we urgently need to re-think basic assumptions about agency, decision-making, control, and our relations to nonhuman and artificial cognizers. In Bacteria (...) to AI, Hayles develops an integrated cognitive framework (ICF) that includes humans, nonhuman lifeforms, and some computational media, including artificial intelligence. Bacteria to AI analyzes how the first-order emergences of physical phenomena, multicellularity, and technics are now interacting together to create second-order emergences that greatly accelerate technical developments. The book explores these entanglements through case studies ranging from gene editing to autopoiesis and Gaia theory, bacteria and xenobots to artificial intelligence. Spanning evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, and contemporary literature, Bacteria to AI recognizes the risks of contemporary technologies but insists a positive way forward, with ICF at its core, is possible for us and for the more than human world. (shrink)

The explanatory challenge of sentience is known as the “hard problem of consciousness”: How does subjective experience arise from physical objects and their relations? Despite some optimistic claims, the perennial struggle with this question shows little evidence of imminent resolution. In this article I focus on the “why” rather than on the “how” of sentience. Specifically, why did sentience evolve in organic lifeforms? From an evolutionary perspective this question can be framed: “What adaptive problem(s) did organisms face in their evolutionary (...) past and how were those challenges met? I argue that sentience was a critical component of the adaptive solution (i.e., adopting an agentic stance) to increasingly complex and unpredictable demands placed on vertebrates approximately 500 million years ago (the so-called Cambrian explosion). One consequence of taking an agentic stance is that it freed the organism from its neural moorings, positioning it within phenomenal space outside its brain. (shrink)

We discuss how biosemiotics sheds light on a problem that characterizes the social reproduction system today in globalisation, how social and political systems threaten life on the planet. These reflections engage global semiotics developed as semioethics where “ethics” resounds as entanglement in the I-other relation. Like medical semeiotic at the origin of semiotics, semioethics elects life as a primary value. Biosemiotics reveals the condition of interconnectivity, co-implication, interdependency among all lifeforms. As such it is an important reference for semioethics which (...) in turn underlines how life in the social, political, economic and broadly cultural spheres is subject to the biological, thus how values, ideologies and responsibilities enter the same great semiobiosphere where bodies and signs are co-dependent and respond to each other in semiosis. Central notions for signs and society are questioned in this framework, firstly humanism of identity. I-other entanglement is global, the condition for life to flourish. Challenged by human and ecological emergency, semioethics considers the biocultural implications and appeals to global responsibility. (shrink)

Why we get the world wrong -- Intuitive theories of the physical world -- Matter : what is the world made of? How do those components interact? -- Energy : what makes something hot? What makes something loud? -- Gravity : what makes something heavy? What makes something fall? -- Motion : what makes objects move? What paths do moving objects take? -- Cosmos : what is the shape of our world? What is its place in the cosmos? -- Earth (...) : why do continents drift? Why do climates change? -- Intuitive theories of the biological world -- Life : what makes us alive? What causes us to die? -- Growth : why do we grow bigger? Why do we grow older? -- Inheritance : why do we resemble our parents? Where did we get our traits? -- Illness : what makes us ill? How does illness spread? -- Adaptation : why are there so many lifeforms? How do they change over time? -- Ancestry : where do species come from? How are they related? -- How to get the world right. (shrink)

The emerging field of synthetic biology aims to engineer novel biological entities. The envisioned future bio-based economy builds largely on “cell factories”: organisms that have been metabolically engineered to sustainably produce substances for human ends. In this paper, we argue that synthetic biology’s goal of creating efficient production vessels for industrial applications implies a set of ontological assumptions according to which living organisms are machines. Traditionally, a machine is understood as a technological, isolated and controllable production unit consisting of parts. (...) But modified organisms, or hybrids, require us to think beyond the machine paradigm and its associated dichotomies between artificial and natural, organisms and artefacts. We ask: How may we conceptualise hybrids beyond limiting ontological categories? Our main claim is that the hybrids created by synthetic biology should be considered not as machines but as metabolic systems. We shall show how the philosophical account of metabolism can inform an ontology of hybrids that moves beyond what we call the “machine ontology”, considering that metabolism enables thinking beyond the dominant dichotomies and allows us to understand and design lifeforms in a bio-based economy. Thus, the aim of this paper is twofold: first, to develop the philosophical ontology of hybrids, and second, to move synthetic biology beyond the problematically limiting view of hybrids. (shrink)

There is a pressing need for improved decision-making in a rapidly changing, unpredictable world. In response, we integrate ecocentric and technocentric perspectives to develop a more-than-human framework for understanding creative decisions that direct action in environmental governance, management, and design. Technocentric and ecocentric approaches often pursue distinct and incompatible goals but also share a commitment to amplifying power, reach, accountability, fairness, and beneficial consequences of decision-making processes. Current frameworks for urban and environmental management often prioritize human decisions and technologies at (...) the expense of nonhuman voices. This results in widespread harm to nonhuman lifeforms and, by extension, to human societies. This study introduces an integrated approach to decision-making, one that draws on the creative potential of both human and nonhuman agents. We argue that embracing a more-than-human perspective can foster just relationships, enhance care, promote resilience, and support wellbeing in multispecies communities. To evaluate this framework, we examine decision-making processes in nonhuman organisms, compare these with technical systems, and explore hybrid decision-making in diverse contexts. As a case study, we examine the challenges facing alpine dingoes in Australia. The goal is to assess the impact of smart technologies on these apex predators in three future human-altered landscapes. The outcomes illustrate how more-than-human decision-making can contribute to environmental design and management. This, in turn, offers actionable insights for building equitable and sustainable futures. Our work also contributes to research on more-than-human approaches to algorithmic management in relation to cities, landscapes, and the communities that inhabit them. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the issue of the “technologies of philosophy” into the philosophy of technology discourse. To this end, we rework some assumptions in the contemporary philosophy of technology, particularly postphenomenology, building on the idea that technology is essential to human existence. In Sect. 1, we outline three core roles technology plays in the human lifeform: technological support, mediation and constitution. In Sect. 2, we highlight the importance of extending this model from bodily to cognitive technologies, drawing (...) on recent approaches that advocate for this perspective. In Sect. 3, we propose to apply this framework to philosophical reflection itself, emphasizing the medial oblivion that has affected philosophical self-analysis and how it may foster implicit or explicit forms of technological determinism—particularly concerning the role of alphabetic writing. To address this neglect and counteract the deterministic tendency, we submit a classification of the technologies of philosophy, examining them from both a descriptive (Sect. 4) and a (moderately) normative (Sect. 5) standpoint. Descriptively, we suggest that not only words but also images, the body and things can be considered philosophical media proper. Normatively, we argue that digital technologies, which are nowadays deeply influencing our modes of knowledge production and transmission, challenge the idea that writing is the sole suitable medium for philosophical work, prompting a reconsideration of how philosophy could be done. Thus, our aim is to advocate for a more diverse, potentially “post-alphabetic” view of philosophy in the digital age, one that seeks to explore how engaging with various technologies could lead to new insights into the nature of philosophy itself. (shrink)

Ecological grief is a widely experienced response to the world’s rapidly intensifying environmental crises and motivates people to take environmental action. Experiences of ecological grief vary, however, depending on the wider values and attitudes of the groups experiencing it. This paper describes, for the first time, the experiences of ecological grief amongst environmental activist Christians. The paper draws on findings from a survey (n=319) and recent qualitative interviews (n=62) with Christian environmental activists from six organisations in the UK. Research with (...) these environmental activists shows that they understood ecological grief in relation to four main theological themes: (1) damaging creation, (2) wrecking a gift, (3) failing to steward well, and (4) harming divinity. This paper argues that these four areas can be gathered under the single theme of breaches in relationship with God and with extrahuman life. That is, ecological grief, for these environmental activists, involves a sense of rupture in relationship to God and other non-human lifeforms. This argument is developed and framed through theological and philosophical literature concerning gift-giving, environmental stewardship, creation theology, and divine immanence. The resulting account is a unique and relationally-focused description of the experience of ecological grief. (shrink)

This volume gathers various contributions on the role of the human perspective and the human lifeform in Spinoza’s philosophy as well as on the resources that Spinoza provides for such a philosophy. While significant parts of the current scholarship tend towards ascribing an acosmist view, more recent interpretations have begun to consider human life and specifically human attitudes as being of fundamental concern to Spinoza. The aim of this book to draw attention to those parts of Spinoza’s philosophy where (...) he is explicitly engaged in a reflection on human life or some peculiarity of it, and the texts collected here argue in various ways that notions such as ‘human being’, ‘human life’, and related notions play an important role in his thought and that they do so in non-trivial ways. These hitherto neglected perspectives on Spinoza’s philosophy result in accounts of a Spinozistic universe that is no longer completely devoid of particulars and of all those features of reality that are usually taken to be fundamental to the human condition and experience, such as subjectivity or perspectivity, temporality, and emotional salience. In doing so, this book provides new avenues for the study of Spinoza’s philosophy by highlighting the role of the human perspective for his metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and social as well as political philosophy. Thus, the volume contains highly original contributions from leading scholars that is going to have an impact on the full breath of Spinoza studies. (shrink)

The end of nature problem can be framed as a dilemma: either all human intentional actions are natural or they are all unnatural and destroy nature as an effect. Given the scope of human influence, the latter entails that there is no nature left on Earth. Therefore, the environmentalist project of protecting nature is either unnecessary or futile. Prevailing attempts to forge a middle path – by, for example, distinguishing natural from unnatural human activities – struggle to find metaphysical grounding. (...) I argue that the biological concept of human proper functioning can ground the relevant distinction between natural and unnatural human activities. Only unnatural activities can destroy nature; specifically, those activities that trace back to beliefs about value that diverge from the human lifeform. (shrink)

The object-oriented ontology group of philosophies, and certain strands of posthumanism, overlook important ethical and biological differences, which make a difference. These allied intellectual movements, which have at times found broad popular appeal, attempt to weird life as a rebellion to the forced melting of lifeforms through the artefacts of capitalist realism. They truck, however, in a recursive solipsism resulting in ontological flattening, overlooking that things only show up to us according to our attunement to them. Ecology and biology tend (...) to get lost in the celebration of “thingness,” which puts on par artifacts, trash, and living beings. Such abstractions fail to understand the political, ethical, and ontological implications of eliding the animate/nonanimate distinction, which from the opposite direction (of flattening) reproduce the same violences of historical colonialism (hierarchical humanism). I argue that ontological flattening entails epistemological narcissism, fails to take into account plural (interspecies) perspectives, and propose biosemiotics can address these shortcomings through becoming-with nonhuman knowledge. (shrink)

Design is a distinct form of practice with a typical focus on human aspirations for products, buildings, infrastructure, urban spaces, services and land use. As such, design affects all planetary environments, societies and the capabilities of individual humans. This chapter begins by establishing design as both a force responsible for the current situation and a primary concern of the future. Next, the chapter uses cities as a characteristic example of significantly modified habitats that are simultaneously biological and cultural. The cultures (...) within such habitats combine the behaviours and traditions of many lifeforms. Consequently, the chapter argues that design approaches to the management of future habitats – conceptualised as ‘interspecies design’ – must engage with non-human as well as human cultures. This has implications for theoretical and practical engagements with the Anthropocene, pointing to the significance of design and the need for a transformation of design practices. (shrink)

This paper studies the concept of form of life as central to ordinary language philosophy : philosophy of our language as spoken ; pronounced by a human voice within a form of life. Such an approach to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy shifts the question of the common use of language – central to Wittgenstein’s Investigations – to the definition of the subject as voice, and to the reinvention of subjectivity in language. The voice is both a subjective and common expression: it (...) is what makes it possible for my individual voice, or claim, to become shared and for our forms of life to be intertwined with a lifeform. (shrink)

This paper relates the concept of relevance to its biological foundations by combining Alfred Schutz’s social phenomenology and Helmuth Plessner’s theory of organic life and philosophical anthropology. Relevance interlinks human sign use with the human “lifeworld” (Husserl) as a whole. The biological foundations of relevance, in turn, interlink that lifeworld with the “world of life” that includes us among other lifeforms. I analyze human relevance as an interplay of two tendencies, termed “closedness” and “openness,” that underlies our production of “meaning” (...) (Schutz). Relevance in this general sense involves not only the mind, but also the body of homo sapiens. To provide a unified theoretical framework, I reconstruct Plessner’s “philosophical biology.” According to Plessner, organic life consists in a tension between closedness and openness. This tension unfolds through the “levels” of plants, animals, and humans. Plessner’s analysis of humans as “excentric” animals helps explain the two tendencies that drive human relevance and distinguish our experience from that of our closest animal relatives. At the same time, Plessner traces a robust continuity between us and other lifeforms. The human “level” merely makes “explicit” certain elements (including the Cartesian distinction between “mind” and “body”) that all organisms implicitly possess. (shrink)

Critics have argued that Husserl’s analysis of Europe, rationality, and the lifeworld in his groundbreaking 1936 work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology is ultimately Eurocentric. Others defend Husserl’s articulation of the cosmopolitan universalist aspirations of philosophy and a lifeform of individual autonomy and free rational inquiry in the context of his response to growing irrationalism and fascism. Both perspectives have their validity: Husserl’s genealogy addressed a unique Occidental history and ideal of rationality, identified with the idea (...) of “Europe” in contrast to specific national identities, and his analysis retained Eurocentric elements that restricted its universalist cosmopolitan intentions. The present contribution outlines a more comprehensive perspective by differentiating Eurocentric, cosmopolitan, and intercultural moments in Husserl’s works in a liberalizing or pluralizing immanent critique that interculturally modifies Husserl’s phenomenology of rationality, history, and the lifeworld. By drawing on modern Chinese philosophy, his contemporaries such as Georg Misch, and Husserl’s phenomenology, I critically reconstruct how Husserl’s philosophy already indicates a more pluralistic and critically intercultural understanding of the lifeworld and reason beyond the dialectic of pseudo-universalism and ethnocentric particularism that continues to confront contemporary thought. (shrink)

Synthetic biology is often seen as the engineering turn in biology. Philosophically speaking, entities created by synthetic biology, from synthetic cells to xenobots, challenge the ontological divide between the organic and inorganic, as well as between the natural and the artificial. Entities such as synthetic cells can be seen as hybrid or transitory objects, or neo–things. However, what has remained philosophically underexplored so far is the impact these hybrid neo–things will have on (our phenomenological experience of) the living world. By (...) extrapolating from Walter Benjamin’s account of how technological reproducibility affects the aura of art, we embark upon an exploratory inquiry that seeks to fathom how the technological reproducibility of life itself may influence our experience and understanding of the living. We conclude that, much as technologies that enabled reproduction corroded the aura of original artworks (as Benjamin argued), so too will the aura of life be under siege in the era of synthetic lifeforms. This article zooms in on a specific case study, namely the research project Building a Synthetic Cell (BaSyC) and its mission to create a synthetic cell–like entity, as autonomous as possible, focusing on the properties that differentiate organic from synthetic cells. (shrink)

In this research, I aim to enquire into the human relation to technology from an evolutionary perspective. To that end, I will elaborate on insights by two major contemporary thinkers, the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk and the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler. I will argue that both develop a fully-fledged philosophy of technology—although they are usually not recognized as philosophers of technology proper—and I will show the convergence and mutual complementarity of their respective approaches. I will highlight how Sloterdijk’s and Stiegler’s (...) stances critically diverge from contemporary philosophy of technology—the so-called empirical turn—and corroborate their claims through recourse to insights coming from twentieth-century philosophical anthropology, Science and Technology Studies (STS) and contemporary evolutionary biology, especially the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). Starting from this conceptual framework, I will submit the idea of human constitutive technicity, i.e., technology belongs to what Jacques Derrida would call the conditions of possibility and impossibility of our lifeform. According to this perspective, human technicity is constitutive, insofar as, first, we could neither survive nor have evolved as we are now without our relation to artefacts. Secondly, technology can also deprive us of our humanity, by altering our lifeform to the point that it could not be considered human anymore or by provoking the actual extinction of the lifeform it has, in turn, contributed to producing. Thirdly, we can develop self-representations, i.e., accounts of what we think it means to be humans, including through scientific practice, only thanks to and based on specific technologies. Fourthly, developments in our technical system may also inhibit our capability to think and, therefore, reflectively think about ourselves. Hence, with this research I set out to underscore the importance of a critical reflection about technology in order to understand the human condition. (shrink)

How can humanist principles of respect, dignity, and care inform and improve design for non-human lifeforms? This paper uses ageing and dying urban trees to understand how architectural, urban, and landscape design respond to nonhuman concerns. It draws on research in plant sciences, environmental history, ethics, environmental management, and urban design to ask: how can more-than-human ethics improve multispecies cohabitation in urban forests? The paper hypothesises that concepts of dignity and respect can underline the capabilities of nonhuman lifeforms and lead (...) to improved designs for multispecies cohabitation. To investigate the implications of this ethical framework, we 1) indicate injustices of current management in relation to natural and cultural histories of trees; 2) outline a conceptual framework that includes large old trees as stakeholders in urban communities; and 3) use this framework in a thought experiment with urban trees in Melbourne, outlining comparative design outcomes. Our findings show that the expansion of dignity to include nonhuman life is possible and plausible. Such an extension can justify and encourage design innovation for multiple species and sites. The resulting design practices will lead to improvements by supporting communities of trees at all stages of their life-cycles, including old age, death, and rebirth. This approach requires substantial shifts in accepted thinking and practices including history, ethics, aesthetics, regulation, and education. Design can play a significant role in the necessary transitions by demonstrating tangible and positive outcomes. In this context, history emerges as an essential tool that can extend societal imagination by situating possible future places in the context of ancient and ongoing geological, evolutionary, ecological, and cultural processes. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)

This chapter presents a biosemiotic perspective on the basic situation for human beings and that of other organisms, with an emphasis on the subjective experience of sentient animals, and the sign use of all lifeforms. The human condition is portrayed as traditionally conceived, and then revisited in the new context of the current environmental crisis. A cornerstone of the text is an analysis of the materiality of the environmental crisis, and how the massive changes humans have caused in the physical (...) environment can be understood in light of the semiotic agency of humans and other living beings. Experiential aspects of the environmental crisis are highlighted. The aim of the text is to improve our understanding of our species´ place in the natural world, our historical role in causing a global crisis for life, and how we can move forward towards a more sustainable future. (shrink)

Aristotelian theory, as found in Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot, claims that to be good is to be good as a member of that kind. However, I contend that something can satisfy kind-relative standards but nonetheless be bad—I propose a hypothetical Ebola-like microbe that meets its kind-standards of being destructive for its own sake, but it would plausibly be bad for doing so. I anticipate an Aristotelian objection that evaluations should only be made from "within" the lifeform conception rather (...) than from without. (shrink)

Helmuth Plessner’s Levels of Organic Life and the Human [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928] is one of the founding texts of twentieth century philosophical anthropology (understood as philosophical reflection on the fundamental characteristics of the human lifeform). It is argued that Plessner’s work demonstrates the fundamental indispensability of the qualitative humanities vis-à-vis the natural-scientific study of man. Plessner’s non-reductionist, emergentist naturalism allots complementary roles to the causal and functional investigations of the life sciences and the phenomenological (...) and hermeneutic interpretation of the phenomenon of life in its successive levels and stages. Within this context, human agency can be understood as a higher-order property of organic life, which act by the selective activation of lower-level psychophysical powers. Plessner’s three ‘anthropological laws’ are used to situate the notion of practical self-understanding in between two extremes: deterministic views that deny human freedom and responsibility and views that ascribe an unrealistic amount of autonomy to human beings. (shrink)

Alien encounters produce a collision of worlds, where divergent lifeforms, carrying unique physical, cognitive, and epistemic capabilities, come into contact. They force humans to reconcile with a new reality, where existing worldviews are challenged, and the possibilities of civilisations redefined. Using this image as its entry point, this paper offers a reconceptualisation of human–AI relations, in which AI is understood as a producer of alien knowledge. An alternative concept to anthropomorphism is proposed, which moves beyond the projection of human traits (...) onto machines, to focus instead on the divergent powers of human and machine cognition. The concept, xenomorphy, describes a process of alien metamorphosis brought into motion when the power of AI's alien knowledge is recognised and embraced. By nurturing AI, by pushing its inhuman powers to their limits, the human itself takes on an alien form. Not only does this shift established worldviews, but it sets forth a process of augmentation, through which humans, machines, and the planet within which they are embedded, enter a co-evolutionary state. Although xenomorphy does not guarantee a pathway towards planetary harmony, it produces new modes of knowledge that enable the protection of both human and nonhuman life. As AI makes possible such insights, it becomes ever more pressing to contest and evolve the current sociotechnical infrastructures, to ensure they are being steered from acts of violence and repression, and guided towards more harmonious ends. (shrink)

This article reconstructs two identity theses in the Neo-Confucian thinker Wang Yangming. The first thesis concerns the identity of the human heart-mind and the principles of things or affairs. Wang rejects the idea that the principle of human activity pertains to a given content outside of us. Instead, the principle is in and through intentional awareness of the activity. I shall call this Wang’s anti-empiricism. The second thesis concerns the identity of an inherent reality of the heart-mind and the cosmic (...) principle. Wang argues that human activity is grounded in an unconditioned inherent reality, a sense of right and wrong, which is, at the same time, the principle of the cosmos itself. I shall call this Wang’s idealism. Unlike the bat’s echolocation, the human heart-mind does not pertain to the disposition of a circumscribable lifeform but to the unity of the myriad things—that is, the cosmos as a whole. (shrink)

This paper advocates for an “evolutionary turn” in the philosophy of technology, emphasizing the biological dimension of our relation to technology. Rather than replacing the well-established empirical turn, this approach aims to enrich it by addressing overlooked aspects of the role played by technology in human evolution. First, I argue that adopting an evolutionary viewpoint strengthens the relationship between philosophy and scientific practice by both necessitating analyses that align with up-to-date scientific paradigms like the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis and scrutinizing how (...) technologies also constitute scientific insights into our evolution. Second, I show that technology shapes human biology even today and, therefore, this perspective also contributes to elucidating current debates about technological interventions in the human lifeform and the biopolitical implications of our evolutionary self-representations. Third, I emphasize the limitations of the human–technology relations approach exemplified by postphenomenology and, by drawing on Stiegler’s “general organology,” I propose to reconceptualize the human lifeform as the evolving negotiation between biological organs, technologies and social organizations and their historically situated reconstruction. (shrink)

My paper proposes a tentative framework of bio-existential semiotics based on a reading of Peirce, Darwin, Heidegger, Tarasti, and others. According to this view, there is an evolutionary continuum to life. Human beings are natural organisms and they exhibit many similar bio-existential phenomena. Natural evolution also produces the anthropological, societal and global semiotic processes that constitute cultural evolution as an outgrowth. In the bio-existential perspective, the world is composed of imperfect systems and imperfect consciousnesses where every lifeform must struggle (...) for its existence. Every “Dasein” must face the fact that it must die because it cannot comprehend or control the universe in its totality. This is why life and existence are “tragic” phenomena. Every bio-existential Dasein is a partial comprehension of the universe, and the only way the universe can comprehend itself is through these partial perspectives, which are born to imperfection and die in imperfection, but whose imperfection is of the essence of the universe. This is why bio-existentialism makes for a “tragic” perspective: we are mortals, and all mortals must die. Nonetheless, there is also hope and optimism in this view of life. In conceiving of existence as having certain universal principles that extend from biology to sociology, semioticians and philosophers can formulate new ways of looking at the world. Together with scientists and artists, they can hopefully work towards a better – or at least more refined – ethical attitude towards science, nature and society. (shrink)

The question of what distinguishes moral problems from other problems is important to the study of the evolution and functioning of morality. Many researchers concerned with this topic have assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, that all moral problems are problems of cooperation. This assumption offers a response to the moral demarcation problem by identifying a necessary condition of moral problems. Characterizing moral problems as problems of cooperation is a popular response to this issue – especially among researchers empirically studying the (...) beginnings and limits of moral psychology. However, demarcating the moral in this way severely restricts the domain of moral problems. There are plenty of moral problems that aren’t simply problems of cooperation. In this paper I argue that understanding moral problems as problems of cooperation is too restrictive and offer an alternative way of demarcating moral from non-moral problems. Characterizing what makes a problem moral in terms of cooperation excludes a variety of problems that are ordinarily understood and responded to as moral. The alternative characterization that I propose is based on the American Indian/Native American concept of harmony. Using the concept of cooperation to demarcate the moral removes moral agents from their surroundings or contexts by assuming moral agency applies only to humans or other similarly evolved lifeforms. In contrast, using the concept of harmony allows for moral consideration to be granted to non-humans as well (e.g., non-human animals, plant life, ecosystems, etc.). (shrink)

Many commentators have analyzed the Papal Encyclical on the care of the environment entitled “Laudato Si’” from various angles but relatively few have written on the philosophical presuppositions that inform the overall stance of the encyclical. It is becoming increasingly evident that, to appreciate the full impact of this work, we need to uncover its ontological and epistemological commitments. This paper makes a contribution in this neglected area by focusing on the nature of life. Two main points are explored: the (...) way all lifeforms depend on other lifeforms, implying that the biosphere often functions like one single unit of life, and the issue of the intrinsic value of each living thing. By situating the encyclical’s arguments within the history of ideas on the nature of life, the environment, and ecology, this research helps to better appreciate the originality of this document. (shrink)

Reasons-first theorists claim that facts about reasons for attitudes are normatively primitive, and that all other normative facts ultimately reduce to facts about reasons. According to their view, for example, the fact that something is good ultimately reduces to facts about reasons to favour it. I argue that these theories face a challenging dilemma due to the normativity of arational lifeforms, for instance the fact that water is good for plants. If all normative facts are, ultimately, facts about reasons for (...) attitudes, then reasons-first theorists must either (a) show that these facts do reduce to facts about reasons, or (b) concede that they do not and, instead, show that this is not a problem for their view. Both options, however, are riddled with difficulties—or so I will try to argue. (shrink)

This chapter argues that while Spinoza adheres to medieval Galenism as an explanatory framework for living bodies, he rejects it as a framework for human experience and motivation, resulting in a concept of the human lifeform that is at once medieval and modern. After an account of Galen’s concept of the living body and the medieval adoption of his ideal of proportional balance, the chapter discusses Spinoza’s Galenism in the Short Treatise and shows how he goes on to replace (...) the Galenic notion of essential proportion with the more mechanistic concept of the ratio of motion and rest in the Ethics. The chapter concludes by showing how the conatus doctrine marks Spinoza’s rejection of Galenism as an explanatory framework for what the living being feels, wants, and seeks. (shrink)

In recent years, synthetic biology emerged as a potentially ground-breaking biotechnology, promising breakthroughs in healthcare, biodiversity conservation and bioremediation. Combining various technoscientific methods, synthetic biology consists in the application of engineering principles to biology, which is seen as unsatisfactory and perfectible. This methodology makes synthetic biology a postmodern technology of care, namely the political practice of refashioning biology to improve the condition of both human and more-than-human beings. Emphasising the disciplining dimension of care (in the Foucauldian sense of creating ‘docile (...) bodies’), I show that synthetic biology consists in the application of such a dimension to more-than-human lifeforms. That is, I critically highlight how synthetic biology, in its attempt to design novel and functional organisms, seeks to actually produce lifeforms that are ‘ontologically disciplined’ since they possess a simplified and controllable biological structure. The argument I advance in this paper sheds light on how care in the postmodern world is increasingly becoming associated with the simplification of complex biological systems, namely with the production of bioengineered organisms that are fitter to face current global challenges. Care, therefore, operates as a form of ontological disciplining by inscribing predetermined ways of being within the genetic code of more-than-human organisms. (shrink)

This article develops a Hegelian account of self-consciousness by grounding it in being animal. It draws on contemporary naturalist and rationalist philosophy to support a transformative picture of the relationship between self-consciousness and animal purposes, setting work by Danielle Macbeth, Terry Pinkard, Michael Thompson, and Matthew Boyle into dialogue with two passages from Hegel’s Aesthetics. Because we are conscious of them as such, the article argues, our ends are never simply given to us and must be determined, which means working (...) them out collectively. But this makes dependency a structural feature of human life, as attaining the right relation to our ends means finding ourselves through the eyes of others instantiating our lifeform. Grounding these Hegelian insights in a naturalistic understanding of organic norms, we see that we should not oppose the self-transparency afforded by rationality to the opacity of animal drives. The article concludes that the mark of rationality is not the capacity to transcend or control animal instinct but that we can be problems to ourselves. Spiritual life is just natural life: natural life finding itself problematic. (shrink)

The sense of precarity is specifically human. It accompanies the consciousness that “what is” is in becoming and can stop being. All lifeforms live through signs, but we humans are also endowed with a capacity for metasemiosis. As semiotic animals, we have self-consciousness, feel responsibility, and feel apprehension: we are consciously aware of our subjection to precarity. G. Semerari called it insecuritas, in relation to both self and others. Fear “of the other” entails a threefold genitive: object, subject, and ethical (...) (“for” the other) genitives. When concern for the other becomes overwhelming, the self may pass from non-indifference to indifference, an escape through identity: given competing identities, the other is not my concern. Yet the other remains inextricably involved, especially in globalization. Apprehension for the other cannot be eliminated. Semiotics explains this in terms of sign-network interconnectivity while “semioethics” develops the relations between signs and values. It insists that life can only flourish in relation to the other (including nonhuman life) and calls for responsibility. (shrink)

This article examines Stephen King’s Cujo and Adrian Tchaikovsky’s Children of Time series as examples of infection literature that explore the violence and potential of multispecies encounters brought about by zoonotic disease, using infectious agents as mediators in interactions between humans and nonhuman lifeforms. Both texts are interested in the interplay between violence and relationality: King’s horror novel uses an encounter between a woman and a rabid dog to deconstruct narratives of domestication and portray a different kind of intimacy, while (...) Tchaikovsky’s science fiction series uses war and infection as the groundwork for multispecies communication, cohabitation, and collaboration. Cujo, Children of Time, and Children of Ruin are thus useful for exploring “outbreak narratives” (Wald, 2008) from the perspective of human-animal studies. (shrink)

The first living beings, prokaryotes, were endowed with an extremely complex and dynamic individual organization: a compartmentalized metabolism in which diverse molecular components and transformation processes got functionally coupled, including a selectively permeable membrane, a set of energy currencies and a translation apparatus built upon a common genetic code. Each microorganism neatly distinguishes itself from the surrounding medium and is capable of generating and modulating its own rules of behaviour (i.e., it acts on its own behalf) so it can be (...) interpreted as autonomous in a fundamental biological sense. However, the autonomy theoretical framework only covers part of the explanation for the striking complexity observed in minimal lifeforms. In fact, all known living cells depend on other cells for their sustenance, so they engage in diverse ecological relationships without which their survival would not be feasible. Furthermore, all living cells have arisen from pre-existing cells, through reproduction, within a long-term, open-ended evolutionary process. As we will argue below, the constitution of any biological domain requires a strong –though deeply asymmetric– causal interweaving between individual (metabolic-physiological) and collective (ecological and evolutionary) dynamics, covering different spatial and temporal scales that unfold in the course of abiogenesis. (shrink)

By analyzing a 2015 Finnish court case on wolf poaching, we discuss how wild animals are categorized, gain legal status based on their species identification, and affect the categorization of humans either as poachers or hunters concerned about the genetic purity of the species. The court had to evaluate the reliability, accuracy, and relevance of scientific knowledge to distinguish “pure” wolves from hybrids. Dealing with complicated questions of canid species identification, the court decision took a position in the debate on (...) what to conserve in a world which escapes simple categorizations. Hence, we interpret the case as an example of biopolitics, addressing the challenges and tensions of governing life by differentiating between valued and less valued, killable and threatened lifeforms, and human responsibilities towards them. (shrink)

In recent years the age-old question “what is the human?” has acquired a new acuteness and novel dimensions. In introducing the special issue on “Historical Thinking and the Human”, this article argues that there are two main trends behind the contemporary “crisis of human”: ecological transformations, and technological ones. After discussing the respective anthropocenic and technoscientific redefinitions of the human, the paper theorizes three elements in an emerging new historicity of the human: first, the move from a fixed category to (...) a dynamic and indeterminate concept, considering the human as a lifeform in movement; second, the extent to which the human is conceived of in its relational dependence on various non-human agents, organic and non-organic; and third, the reconceptualization of the human not as one but as many, to comprehend that we cannot speak of human individuality in the classical biological sense. In the final part, the article addresses the consequences of the redefinition of the human for historical thinking. It makes the case for the need to elaborate a new notion of history – captured by the phrase “more-than-human history”, and attuned to an emerging planetary regime of historicity in which historical thinking becomes able to affirm multiple temporalities: digital, technoscientific, sociocultural, human, biological and anthropocenic. The article concludes by recognizing the necessity to venture into a new transdisciplinary knowledge economy, appropriate for making sense of the contemporary constellation of the entangled human, technological and natural worlds. (shrink)

This chapter explores two models that Schelling employs in the 1804 System to clarify the ontological relationships between the most general forms of life (plants, infusoria, animals, and human beings). The first model is a more traditional model for thinking about these forms of life; it describes a unilinear, atemporal development from one form of life to another. The second model-which is largely implicit in the System’s philosophy of life-describes a bifurcated series of lifeforms in which more advanced forms emerge (...) from more simple forms in history along two lines of development. The chapter argues that this second model should be interpreted as a moment in Schelling’s intellectual development in which he begins to understand the history of nature as philosophically significant. (shrink)

The Expanse will develop “Beltalowda” into one of the most meaningful and complex linguistic inventions fiction has seen. George Orwell draws a distinction between the concepts of patriotism and nationalism, two terms synonymous with love of nation, and two terms that, up until that point, had been used almost interchangeably. The Expanse is a sprawling space opera about saving the universe from an alien lifeform; at its core, though, it is a study in what it means to love one's (...) nation the right way. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism is inseparable from the desire for power. According to Orwell, the foremost difference between patriotism and nationalism is the distinction between defensive and offensive attitudes, which is demonstrated in the different approaches of Camina Drummer and Marco Inaros. Evidence of Marco's obsession and Drummer's lack thereof is also on display in their differing treatment of Naomi Nagata. (shrink)

The Anthropocene is characterised by the weaving together of certainties and uncertainties, in relation to both geoscientific and political/social data. The reliable geoscientific data pertain to what we identify as the long term (i.e. at least the next few millennia): the climate will be warmer; the atmosphere denser in CO2 and methane; the oceans more acidic and covering a greater surface area; and consequently, there will be less land, meaning the ecumene (the space on Earth habitable to humans) will be (...) reduced; biodiversity noticeably diminished; heatwaves so severe that conditions become inhospitable to human life will be more frequent and more intense; and so on. The still uncertain data pertain to a change in the global state of the biosphere and a break in its systemic organisation, leading to the reorganisation of lifeforms; global food production potentially in jeopardy; the extent of the destruction of biodiversity; the level at which Earth’s surface temperature will eventually stabilise; and so forth. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the reader to the central themes introduced in the book, beginning with some historical vignettes and insights from the world of science fiction. These themes are introduced to help explain why it can at times be problematic to define what it means to be human or to establish which organisms merit full human rights or full Moral standing. Also introduced are the central themes of the transhumanist movement, the notion of artificial lifeforms and the implications for the (...) notion of Personhood. Finally, the chapter introduces the concept that some forms of Death are potentially reversible as well as introduces the cryonics movement that depends on this particular premise. (shrink)

This paper examines cancer through the lens of abjection. While cancer can be understood as an abject lifeform, we explore what we name the abject ontologies created through both cancer detection technologies/practices and cancer treatment, specifically the drug combination Adriamycin and Cytoxan. We ask: what are the abject ontologies produced through living with and living on from cancer diagnosis and treatment? Our concern is to map how cancer undoes our supposedly stable categories inherited from modernist logic, challenges our very (...) ideas of what it means to be human, and demands an ethical reorientation of public cancer discourse. (shrink)

This essay presents ecosemiotics as an approach to interpreting Heidegger in environmental philosophy. Comparisons between Heidegger’s philosophy and ecosemiotics have often focused on the 1929–1930 lecture course where Heidegger discusses Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt. These and other ecological interpretations reach an impasse with the sharp ontological boundary Heidegger places between Dasein and more-than-human lifeforms. This essay revisits the theme by focusing on a central concept from Heidegger’s later work: enframing [Gestell]. Enframing, it is argued, can be understood as (...) a rupture between human (cultural) and natural signs, which is a consequence of technological modernity. Although this interpretation diverges from Heidegger’s philosophy, such critical readings may be necessary if Heidegger’s work is to speak to today’s technologies and ecological issues. (shrink)

This article outlines three interlocking and mutually reinforcing registers in Giorgio Agamben’s work: the law, the apparatus, and the anthropological machine. While Agamben is clear that rules render inoperative laws and counter-apparatuses suspend the functioning of apparatuses, that which neutralizes the anthropological machine remains undisclosed. To explore this messianic opening, the author moves beyond Agamben and posits the possibility of a shift from an anthropological machine to a phytological machine. Whereas the former functions through the production of binary oppositions that (...) divide life from its form, the latter yields to the internally generative potentiality of lifeforms. In conclusion, the article proposes an alternative reading of several of Agamben’s key examples, including his references to Tiananmen Square, as manifestations of a phytological machine emerging from within the composting of anthropological divisions. (shrink)