In this provocative and original work, Slavoj Zizek takes a look at the question of human agency in a postmodern world. From the sinking of the Titanic to Hitchcock's Rear Window, from the operas of Wagner to science fiction, from Alien to the Jewish Joke, the author's acute analyses explore the ideological fantasies of wholeness and exclusion which make up human society. Linking key psychoanalytical and philosophical concepts to social phenomena such as totalitarianism and racism, the book explores the political (...) significance of these fantasies of control. In so doing, The Sublime Object of Ideology represents a powerful contribution to a psychoanalytical theory of ideology, as well as offering persuasive interpretations of a number of contemporary cultural formations. -- Back cover. (shrink)

Presenting no less than a history and critique of the concept of the aesthetic throughtout modern Western thought, The Ideology of the Aesthetic is a critical survey of modern Western philosphy, focusing in particular on the complex relations between aesthetics, ethics, and politics.

This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. Our focus is a defence of the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to consistently envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem we combine insights from three distant corners of the philosophical landscape: theories of legitimacy by Bernard (...) Williams and other realists, Frankfurt School-inspired Critical Theory, and recent analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology, and social construction. The upshot is a novel account of realism as empirically-informed diagnosis- critique of social and political phenomena. This view rejects a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so is an alternative to the anti- empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise. (shrink)

Drawing on empirical evidence from history and anthropology, we aim to demonstrate that there is room for genealogical ideology critique within normative political theory. The test case is some libertarians’ use of folk notions of private property rights in defence of the legitimacy of capitalist states. Our genealogy of the notion of private property shows that asking whether a capitalist state can emerge without violations of self-ownership cannot help settling the question of its legitimacy, because the notion of private (...) property presupposed by that question is a product of the entity it is supposed to help legitimise: the state. We anchor our genealogical critique in recent work on ideology in epistemology and philosophy of language, and in current debates on the methodology of political theory. But, unlike more traditional approaches that aim to debunk whole concepts or even belief systems, we propose a more targeted, argument-specific form of ideology critique. (shrink)

This essay outlines an empirically grounded account of normative political legitimacy. The main idea is to give a normative edge to empirical measures of sociological legitimacy through a nonmoralized form of ideology critique. A power structure’s responsiveness to the values of those subjected to its authority can be measured empirically and may be explanatory or predictive insofar as it tracks belief in legitimacy, but by itself it lacks normative purchase. It merely describes a preference alignment, and so tells us (...) nothing about whether the ruled have reason to support the rulers. I argue that we can close this gap by filtering the preferences of the ruled through a form of nonmoralized epistemic ideology critique, itself grounded in an empirical account of how belief in legitimacy is formed. (shrink)

In the wake of the nonideal theory turn in political philosophy, few have paused to ask: Is nonideal theory a form of ideology? And perhaps even fewer have paused to ask: Is the debate between ideal/nonideal theorists itself a form of ideology? To the first question, I argue that nonideal theory is ideological in virtue of the fact that it rules out more utopian ways of theorizing by methodological fiat, and in so doing, risks entrenching an unjust status (...) quo. To the second question, I argue that the debate between ideal/nonideal theorists is itself a form of ideology, one which serves to reinforce the status quo by convincing political philosophers/theorists that the most pressing problems are problems about what we should think about what we are doing. But this is false. An upshot of my argument is that we ought to abandon the ideal/nonideal theory debate and address the pressing problems of political philosophy head-on in pluralist fashion, oscillating back and forth between these two modes of theorizing without a decision procedure to tell us when we should take up one perspective or the other. (shrink)

The history of ideology and its definition continues to occupy scholars across a range of disciplines. Contrary to the vast volume of earlier work on ideology however, this books provides a challenging new theory of ideology, one that is capable of explaining not only the internal structures of ideologies, but also how ideologies function in society. In formulating theory that is capable of providing the first insights into the internal structures of ideologies while simultaneously explaining how discourse (...) structures may be used in the production and reproduction of ideologies, van Dijk offers a highly important theoretical bridge between the micro and macro structures of society. This book will be essential for all students of discourse studies, communication, social psychology, sociology, and political science. (shrink)

What is the point of ideology critique? Prominent Anglo-American philosophers recently proposed novel arguments for the view that ideology critique is moral critique, and ideologies are flawed insofar as they contribute to injustice or oppression. We criticize that view and make the case for an alternative and more empirically-oriented approach, grounded in epistemic rather than moral commitments. We make two related claims: (i) ideology critique can debunk beliefs and practices by uncovering how, empirically, they are produced by (...) self-justifying power, and (ii) the self-justification of power should be understood as an epistemic rather than moral flaw. Drawing on the recent realist revival in political theory, we argue that this genealogical approach has more radical potential, despite being more parsimonious than morality-based approaches. We demonstrate the relative advantages of our view by discussing the results of empirical studies on the contemporary phenomenon of neopatriarchy in the Middle East and North Africa. (shrink)

Our world has been and still is plagued by oppressive social and political systems. Why do these systems persist or why did they persist for as long as they did? Initially developed by Karl Marx, ideology explanations point to distorted beliefs among the oppressed. Favored by social scientists, collective action explanations point to an inability among the oppressed to coordinate resistance. This paper is about how to resolve the debate. Several philosophers look for a conclusive resolution, trying to show (...) that one of the hypotheses is fatally flawed, so the alternative must be embraced. These resolutions fail, I argue. Instead, we should decide which hypothesis best explains persistent oppression on a case-by-case basis through empirical investigation. I call this piecemeal resolution. After introducing and defending the piecemeal approach, I sketch an empirical strategy. (shrink)

Charles W. Mills developed an argument against ideal theorizing that is inspired by the early writings of Marx and Engels. He argues that the development and refinement of non-ideal theories contributes more to ending oppressive power structures than the development and refinement of ideal theories. For this reason, he concludes that ideal theories play the role of an ideology. In this article, I expose a yet undiagnosed weakness of this argument: I point out that history is rife with examples (...) of political organizations that struggle to identify an effective political practice because they find themselves in a situation of theoretical crisis. Thus, contra Mills, it turns out that ideal theorizing is sometimes a more viable strategy to end oppressive power structures than non-ideal theorizing. So, if we accept the basic premises of Mills’s argument, it turns out that non-ideal theorizing should be classified as an ideology as well. To further corroborate this claim, I point out some problems for Mills’s interpretation of Marx and Engels. If my assessment is right, then it turns out to be unclear if the intellectual authorities that Mills invokes actually lend support to his critique of ideal theorizing. (shrink)

Scholars addressing ideology acknowledge that ideology plays a key role in sustaining certain (often oppressive) social relations. Many take it to be the case that in critiquing unjust social relations, we must also critique the ideology responsible for producing and maintaining those unjust relations. This chapter proposes reconceiving standpoint epistemology—an epistemological methodology grounded in Marx and devised for the purpose of analyzing the epistemic influence of power relations—as a project of ideology critique. Standpoint epistemology, with its (...) invitation to start thought from the lives of the marginalized, can be a powerful tool for critique. Standpoint epistemology has much to offer in explaining how the development of a critical social consciousness can emerge and, moreover, how such a consciousness can allow one to envision alternatives to, and form judgments independent and critical of, the operative ideology. To motivate the analysis of standpoint epistemology as ideology critique, the chapter begins by examining the role of ideology in reproducing unjust social conditions. It then suggests that what is needed to dislodge ideology from this reproductive role is a form of ideology critique that analyzes the delusory impact of ideology in structuring our understanding of social reality. The chapter next develops an account of standpoint epistemology as one such tool for disruption. It concludes with what this analysis reveals about the historical project of ideology critique, focusing in particular on Marx and Hegel, ultimately suggesting that this project allows us to reimagine the dialectic between the social, the material, and the ideological. (shrink)

Much recent metaphysics points to certain features as being natural, or carving at nature’s joints. There are now various accounts, both primitivist and reductive, of what joint-carving is. But there has been comparatively little discussion of accounts which define joint-carvingness in normative terms. Several motivations have been suggested for such normative accounts, including parsimony and an explanation of the epistemic value of joint-carving. But I argue that normative accounts are especially useful for non-ontic joint-carving or structure. As introduced by Sider, (...) non-ontic structure can apply not only to predicates—as in traditional accounts of joint-carving—but to expressions of any grammatical category. This greater generality extends the theoretical utility of joint-carving. Still, non-ontic structure has proved perplexing to some, given the difficulties it faces in explaining how joint-carving expressions relate to the world’s structure. I argue that normative accounts of joint-carving obviate these difficulties, and thus remove an obstacle towards assigning non-ontic structure a central place in our theorizing. (shrink)

Most people don’t want their teachers, scientists, or journalists to be too ideological. Calling someone an “ideologue” isn’t a compliment. But what is ideology and why exactly is it a threat? I propose that ideology is fruitfully understood in terms of three ingredients: a basic moral claim, a worldview built on top of that claim, and the attempt to politicize this worldview by injecting it into social institutions. I further argue that the central danger of ideology is (...) that activating these three ingredients tends to undermine liberal social institutions. And yet a certain amount of ideology is both unavoidable and desirable, as I show, since it supplies us with important goods like social cohesion and mobilization. This means the best we can do is to try and set boundaries on ideology. (shrink)

Is there a political philosophy of conservatism? A history of the phenomenon written along sceptical lines casts doubt on the existence of a transhistorical doctrine, or even an enduring conservative outlook. The main typologies of conservatism uniformly trace its origins to opposition to the French Revolution. Accordingly, Edmund Burke is standardly singled out as the ‘father’ of this style of politics. Yet Burke was de facto an opposition Whig who devoted his career to assorted programmes of reform. In restoring Burke (...) to his original milieu, the argument presented here takes issue with 20th-century accounts of conservative ideology developed by such figures as Karl Mannheim, Klaus Epstein and Samuel Huntington. It argues that the idea of a conservative tradition is best seen as a belated construction, and that the notion of a univocal philosophy of conservatism is basically misconceived. (shrink)

The concept of ideology is central to understanding the many political, economic, social, and cultural processes that have taken place over the past two centuries in our societies. Yet the very concept of ideology remains a vague, openended, and much debated question. In this chapter I try to answer the question of whether science is a form of ideology or not from a philosophical point of view, taking a materialist approach. I begin by characterizing ideology as (...) a complex, multifaceted concept. I then briefly discuss the material systems on which ideological movements operate, that is, societies and concrete human groups. I identify at least 11 different elements that seem to be present in most ideologies, and I compare these characteristics with those of contemporary science and technology. Although some superficial similarities can be identified, there are deep differences that make ideology completely different from science. With technology, however, the similarities are stronger. Ideologies are constantly evolving with technological advances, social changes, and even mere fashions. The current fragmentation of ideologies caused by the widespread use of new technologies and social networks has given rise to new phenomena of ideological diffusion that I think is very dangerous, especially for open societies. I discuss these processes in the context of the nature versus nurture debate, along with the question of whether we can get rid of ideologies. (shrink)

Is it possible to do ideology critique without morality? In recent years a small group of theorists has attempted to develop such an account and, in doing so, makes claim to a certain sort of “radical realism” distinguished by the ambition to ground political judgments and prescriptions in nonmoral values, principles, or concepts. This essay presents a twofold critique of this realist ideology critique (RIC) by first offering an internal critique of the approach and then arguing that the (...) very attempt to do political theory generally—and ideology critique more specifically—in a way that abjures morality is misguided. In doing so, I contribute both to current debates around “new” ideology critiques and to contested questions about what it means to do political theory realistically. (shrink)

Background: Moral philosophical positions and professional values have been shown to influence nurses’ practice behaviours. Understanding nursing students’ professional values and ethical ideologies, therefore, is important as they may help inform evidence-informed curriculum decisions and education strategies to develop students’ professional reflective competencies. However, there is a dearth in current empirical data on Canadian nursing students’ perceptions of professional values and ethical positions. Objectives: This study’s purpose was to examine undergraduate nursing student’s perceptions of professional values and ethical ideology (...) and explore relationships in data and selected participant demographic variables. Research design, participants and context: A descriptive cross-sectional research design was conducted with a convenience sample of undergraduate nursing students recruited from a university in Canada. An online encrypted survey consisting of two validated instruments was administered to participants who met study eligibility criteria. Descriptive and inferential statistics were employed to analyse the data and classify nursing students’ ethical ideologies into four categories based on mean scores for idealism and relativism. Ethical considerations: This study received ethical approval from the institutional Behavioural Research Ethics Board and was executed in-line with ethical principles for research involving humans. Findings: Nursing students scored high on professional values and ethical idealism and differed significantly on a measure of ethical relativism in terms of age and year of study. Professional values were significantly associated with ethical idealism. Based on mean scores for idealism and relativism, most nursing students in the study were classified as situationists. Discussion and conclusion: Findings suggest that faculty pay attention to influences of moral philosophical positions in facilitating nursing students’ professional values development. Implications for future research and curriculum are highlighted to strengthen nursing students’ professional values. (shrink)

Racism, sexism, and other forms of injustice are more than just bad attitudes; after all, such injustice involves unfair distributions of goods and resources. But attitudes play a role. How central is that role? Tommie Shelby, among others, argues that racism is an ideology and takes a cognitivist approach suggesting that ideologies consist in false beliefs that arise out of and serve pernicious social conditions. In this paper I argue that racism is better understood as a set of practices, (...) attitudes, social meanings, and material conditions, that systematically reinforce one another. Attitudes play a role, but even the cognitive/affective component of ideologies should include culturally shared habits of mind and action. These habits of mind distort, obscure, and occlude important facts about subordinated groups and result in a failure to recognize their interests. How do we disrupt such practices to achieve greater justice? I argue that this is sometimes, but not always, best achieved by argument or challenging false beliefs, so social movements legitimately seek other means. (shrink)

We propose an account of the subject’s cognition and its relation to the world that allows for an articulation of the phenomenon of ideology. We argue that ideology is a form of what we call ‘a priori activity’: it transcendentally conditions the intelligibility of thought and practice. But we draw from strands of post-Kantian philosophy of science and social philosophy in repudiating Kant’s view that the a priori is necessary and fixed. Instead, we relativize the a priori: we (...) argue that it is contingent, and therefore revisable. More precisely, it is conditioned materially, in that it is enmeshed with and shaped by material social practice. We conclude with some remarks about the possibility of agency over the relativized, materially conditioned a priori—that is, about the possibility of critique. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Ideology is one of the most controversial terms in the political vocabulary, exciting both revulsion and inspiration. This book examines the reasons for those views, and explains why ideologies deserve respect as a major form of political thinking. It investigates the centrality of ideology both as a political phenomenon and as an organizing framework of political thought and action. It explores the changing understandings of ideology as a concept, and the arguments of the main ideologies. By employing (...) the latest insights from a range of disciplines, the reader is introduced to the vitality and force of a crucial resource at the disposal of societies, through which sense and purpose is assigned to the political world. (shrink)

In what follows, I will argue that racist ideology should be understood in terms of racist social norms that constitute certain incentive structures. To this end, I will motivate my position by examining two existing accounts of ideology: those of Tommie Shelby and Sally Haslanger. First, I will begin by reconstructing Shelby’s account of racism as ideology. After analysing three dimensions of ideology (epistemic, genetic and functional), I will argue that his view is too cognitivist. In (...) this regard, Shelby’s view is doxastic in viewing that racist ideologies consist in misguided beliefs. Rather, what is essential in ideology is its functional dimension. Here, ideologies persist because they function to stabilize and reinforce the unjust status quo of subordination and oppression. Then, I will turn to Haslanger’s account of ideology as cultural technēs. Her view is more functional than Shelby’s since the former is based on the account of social practice and culture. While Haslanger is right about her critique of Shelby’s cognitivist view of ideology, I argue that what she calls nonideal moral epistemology weakens her overall insight. The problem is that without considering how to intervene in concrete social mechanisms, merely knowing certain moral truths may not practically motivate subjects under ideologies. Taken together, both Shelby and Haslanger narrowly understand ideology in terms of epistemic deficiency. Even though Shelby and Haslanger deal with the discursive superstructure of ideology, both underestimate the functional substructure of ideology such as social and psychological motives, desires and needs. Ultimately, I will argue that ideology is better understood in terms of a racist social norm. This account is explanatorily superior to Shelby and Haslanger’s views in its stress on the nonepistemic, nonmoral and functional aspects of ideology. (shrink)

Directing attention to racial ignorance as a core dimension of racialized social systems, this article advances a process-focused Theory of Racial Ignorance (TRI), grounded in Critical Race Theory and the philosophical construct white ignorance. TRI embodies five tenets—epistemology of ignorance, ignorance as ends-based technology, corporate white agency, centrality of praxis, and interest convergence. TRI’s tenets explain how racial ignorance reinforces white domination, attending to mechanisms of white knowledge evasion and resistance that facilitate racial reproduction—in everyday life, through institutions, and across (...) societies more broadly. I illustrate TRI’s assets by comparison to an extant theory of racial cognition—color-blind theory (CBT). I argue TRI generates returns by shifting from racial ideology to racial ignorance, and from era-defined structures to ongoing historical processes; and demonstrate TRI’s unique capacity to explain and predict changes in dominant logics, supporting more strategic resistance. (shrink)

Since its 2007 publication, Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice has sparked a vigorous conversation in analytic philosophy about how social power corrodes individual’s epistemic capacities and distorts collective meaning-making in unjust ways. Yet for all its normative insights into social silencing, I argue that Fricker’s theorization of epistemic dysfunction remains too individualized, cognitivist, and dematerialized to account for racialized imaginaries. Rather than view racisms as normal and normative in racist cultures, Fricker frames identity-driven prejudice as a troubling aberration from otherwise unblemished (...) epistemic and moral norms. This leads her into adopting an overly voluntarist and idealist theory of social change that centres training better knowers rather than unmaking racialized worlds. Ultimately, I contend that we should return to a materialist theory of ideology, following the work of Stuart Hall. Doing so jettisons the narrow focus on individual epistemic failures and instead problematizes how certain social ideas consolidate and reproduce racial hierarchies. (shrink)

Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11%) were underrepresented. Moreover, and strikingly, across the political spectrum, from very left-leaning individuals and moderates to (...) very right-leaning individuals, participants reported experiencing ideological hostility in the field, occasionally even from those from their own side of the political spectrum. Finally, while about half of the subjects believed that discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals in the field is not justified, a significant minority displayed an explicit willingness to discriminate against colleagues with the opposite ideology. Our findings are both surprising and important, because a commitment to tolerance and equality is widespread in philosophy, and there is reason to think that ideological similarity, hostility, and discrimination undermine reliable belief formation in many areas of the discipline. (shrink)

Unravels the many different definitions of ideology, explores the history of the concept from the Enlightenment to postmodernism, and interprets the works of ...

The rise of global populism reveals a tension in Western thinking about democracy. Warnings about the "populist threat" to democracy and "authoritarian" populism are now commonplace. However, as Emily B. Finley argues in The Ideology of Democratism, dismissing "populist" as anti-democratic is highly problematic. In effect, such arguments essentially reject the actual popular will in favor of a purely theoretical and abstract "will of the people." She contends that the West has conceptualized democracy--not just its populist doppelgänger--as an ideal (...) that has all of the features of a thoroughgoing political ideology which she labels "democratism." As she shows, this understanding of democracy, which constitutes an entire view of life and politics, has been and remains a powerful influence in America and leading Western European nations. Through a careful analysis of several of history's most vocal champions of democracy, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, John Rawls, and both American neoconservatives and liberal internationalists, Finley identifies an interpretation of democracy that effectively transforms the meaning of "rule by the people" into nearly its opposite. Making use of democratic language and claiming to speak for the people, many politicians, philosophers, academics, and others advocate a more "complete" and "genuine" form of democracy that in practice has little regard for the actual popular will.A heterodox argument that challenges the prevailing consensus of what democracy is and what it is supposed to be, The Ideology of Democratism offers a timely and comprehensive assessment of the features and thrust of this powerful new view of democracy that has enchanted the West. -- Dust jacket. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the relationship between the study of ancient Greek philosophy and white supremacy. I argue that the problem goes deeper than the misappropriation of ancient Greek texts by white supremacists. Instead, I suggest, the everyday ways we as scholars think, teach, and write about these texts promotes a colorblind ideology that is in the service of white supremacy. Specifically, I argue that a dominant norm in scholarship, namely the principle of charity, encourages us to treat (...) a thinker’s views largely in abstraction from both their historical context and our own, in a way that risks distorting how we understand certain questions in the world we live in now. If this is right, the two dominant strategies for addressing worries about white supremacy—i) to show how the texts have been misinterpreted to support racist ideology and ii) to uncover the proto-racism of ancient Greek thinkers as part of a genealogical story for the origins of modern-day racism—do not go far enough in grappling with the field’s relationship to white supremacy. I will argue that the way forward is not an exclusively critical orientation, but instead a radical pluralism in our methodological orientations. (shrink)

Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (Notes towards an investigation) -- Reply to John Lewis -- Freud and Lacan -- A letter on art in reply to André Daspre.

Forst’s theory of noumenal power is designed to model power relations as driven by reasons. In this chapter, I maintain that it fares well with both agential and structural powers, yet contend that adjustments are needed to meet two demands it places on critical theory. First, a demand for diagnosing domination. Forst advances a conception of domination as arbitrary power that answers this demand, yet it is unclear how noumenal power can accommodate arbitrariness. I suggest that introducing a distinction between (...) first-order and second-order noumenal powers allows understanding how noumenal powers can be arbitrary and licenses a consistent account of domination. Second, the demand for a theory of ideology that suitably sorts out ideologies from contingently flawed justifications. The crux here is that ideologies trade on merely apparent reasons and causally depend on the power relations they function to undergird. I suggest that, in order to take ideology critique on board, a critical theory of power must make room for a sharp distinction between real and apparent reason, as well as for functional explanations and causal mechanisms that noumenal powers can hardly deliver. (shrink)

This essay explores the range of phenomena that can be explained by application of a suitably broad but contentful concept of ideology. According to this concept, an ideology is an evaluative map of the social world, typically featuring an ingroup-outgroup distinction, at least in the case of political ideologies. This concept allows for ideologies that support the existing order and those that challenge it, including revolutionary ideologies. I refute the claim that the concept of ideology is not (...) needed because “voluntary servitude” can be explained as a failure of collective action. I show that ideologies can inhibit revolutionary action as well as stimulate and guide it. They can inhibit revolutionary action by convincing the oppressed that their predicament is natural or inevitable or that they are not being oppressed. They can stimulate and guide revolution by debunking oppression-supporting ideologies and by supplying moral motivation that avoids the calculation of costs and benefits that cause failures of collective action. (shrink)

A major contribution to the social scientific understanding of how people make sense of their lives, Ideological Dilemmas presents an illuminating new approach to the study of everyday thinking. Contradictory strands abound within both ideology and common sense. In contrast to many modern theorists, the authors see these dilemmas of ideology as enabling, rather than inhibiting: thinking about them helps people to think meaningfully about themselves and the world. The dilemmas within ideology and their effects on thinking (...) are explored through the analysis of what people say in specific key situations: education, medical care, race and gender. The authors identify common ideological themes running through the common-sense discourses they analyse. They highlight the tensions between themes of equality and authority, freedom and necessity, individuality and collectivity. Time and again, the contradictions between these ideological themes crop up as respondents argue and puzzle over their social worlds. Written with refreshing clarity, the discussion cuts across the boundary which often separates sociology from social psychology. Sociologists are reminded that the reproduction of ideology involves individual processes of thinking; social psychologists are urged to recognize the ideological nature of thought. (shrink)

A translation of a Japanese text written by philosopher Tosaka Jun in 1935, at the moment the country had begun to embark upon a course of fascist authoritarianism that led to war and total destruction. Titled The Japan Ideology, the text purposely recalls its derivation and kinship with Marx and Engels's The German Ideology and expands on the role played by philosophic idealism in preparing the population for both the new politics of fascism and the demands of the (...) eventual war it brought. In its penetrating analysis of the relationship between philosophy and the formation of ideology in a politically critical and crucial historical time, this foundational work in the Japanese Marxist tradition remains accessible and timely, speaking forcibly to conditions that continue to persist in Japan and everywhere in today's world. (shrink)

Background Ethical practice in healthcare organizations is influenced by leadership that embodies moral integrity, compassion, and a commitment to the well-being of others. Virtuous leadership may play a pivotal role in translating nurses’ ethical ideologies into advocacy behaviors that promote patient safety. Aim This study examined the mediating role of virtuous leadership in the relationship between ethical ideology and nurses’ advocacy for patient safety. Research design and participants: A cross-sectional descriptive design was employed. Data were collected using a structured (...) questionnaire distributed electronically via the Google Survey platform to a convenience sample of nurses working in Damietta hospitals between October and December 2024. Data analysis was conducted using SPSS. Ethical considerations Ethical approval was obtained prior to data collection, and informed consent was secured from all participants. Findings A total of 324 valid questionnaires were analyzed. Statistically significant positive correlations were found between nurses’ perceptions of virtuous leadership and ethical ideology, virtuous leadership and advocacy for patient safety, and ethical ideology and advocacy for patient safety. Mediation analysis indicated that virtuous leadership was positively associated with the relationship between ethical ideology and patient safety advocacy. Conclusion Ethical ideology was positively associated with both virtuous leadership and nurses’ advocacy for patient safety, and virtuous leadership appeared to serve as a potential mediating factor in this relationship. These findings highlight the relevance of ethical reasoning and virtuous leadership in supporting patient safety advocacy and promoting ethically grounded nursing practice. However, given the cross-sectional design, these results indicate associations rather than causal relationships. Future longitudinal or experimental research is recommended to explore potential causal pathways. (shrink)

This paper explores the persistent duplicity and moral inconsistency that characterize modern political ideologies by examining the deeper psychological roots of human motivation. Drawing on Arthur Schopenhauer’s diagnosis of the “objectification of the will,” I argue that many political ideals—whether progressive, conservative, or revolutionary—often conceal a fundamental self-interest that operates beneath the surface of public moral rhetoric. Yet Schopenhauer does not merely diagnose the problem; he also gestures toward a possible transcendence through the concept of the identity of the will, (...) most clearly embodied in the universalized experience of compassion. To illuminate this possibility, the paper presents the historical example of Admiral Yi Sun-sin, whose recorded reflections after the Battle of Myeongnyang reveal a rare psychological structure in which the suffering of the people is experienced as indistinguishable from one’s own. This case allows us to ground Schopenhauer’s metaphysical insight in an actual political and ethical practice. Finally, the paper suggests that integrating the Buddhist non-dual perspective—one that dissolves rigid self–other boundaries—provides a complementary philosophical framework for envisioning political action rooted beyond ideological self-interest. Together, these elements offer a proposal for a future political philosophy capable of overcoming the ideological hypocrisy that shapes much of contemporary political life. (shrink)

In this study, Joseph McCarney aims to break away from contemporary Marxist critical attitudes to reinstate the coherence and continuity of classical Marxism. He argues that the character of traditional Marxist thought on Marxist ideology is now generally misconceived. The author claims that this misconception stems from a failure to apprehend the nature of Marx's own position and that of major figures of classical Marxism such as Engels, Lenin, and the young Lukacs.

Thomas Piketty’s Capital and Ideology (2020) offers a powerful critique of ideological justifications for inequality in capitalist societies. Does this mean we should reject capitalist institutions altogether? This paper defends some aspects of capitalism by explaining the epistemic function of market economies and their ability to harness capital to meet the needs of the relatively disadvantaged. We support this classical liberal position with reference to empirical research on historical trends in inequality that challenges some of Piketty’s interpretations of the (...) data. Then we discuss the implications of this position in terms of limits on the efficacy of participatory governance within firms and the capacity of the state to levy systematic taxes on wealth. (shrink)

This thesis is a philosophical analysis of the trans panic (the ongoing moral panic about trans people in the UK) which utilises the philosophical tools of ideology and epistemic injustice. Drawing on the work of Sally Haslanger, I define ideologies as epistemically defective networks of social meanings that function to uphold oppression. I describe how dominant ideologies cause hermeneutical injustice by failing to provide sufficient hermeneutical resources. I argue that an ideology I name ‘cissexist ideology’ functions to (...) uphold the oppression of trans people and consists of social meanings about the supposedly binary nature of sex and gender, and stereotypes about trans people. I argue that notable features of the trans panic, such as its persistence and resistance to efforts to tackle it, and its wide scope, can be explained by a feedback loop between ideology and epistemic injustice. Although I don’t attribute ignorance with a substantial causal role in the trans panic, I also trace several ways that ideology leads to ignorance, including in the context of the trans panic. I continue my analysis of the trans panic by providing accounts of two phenomena that are occurring within it. The first is a type of epistemic injustice that I term ‘hermeneutical sabotage’. Hermeneutical sabotage occurs when dominantly situated knowers actively worsen the available hermeneutical resources for understanding the experiences of a marginalised group. They do this by distorting hermeneutical resources necessary for understanding marginalised groups’ experiences, and introducing new, prejudiced hermeneutical resources. I explain how this is taking place within the trans panic and how hermeneutical sabotage is used as a tactic to further the aims of harmful political movements. I also give an account of the phenomenon I name ‘ideological true beliefs’: true beliefs about the world which are made true by ideological social construction and function to uphold an ideology. Ideological true beliefs are often expressed as claims and used to provide faulty evidence for false ideological claims. Even though they are constructed by ideology, it is not in the interest of activists to deny ideological true beliefs because they reflect the reality of the unjust world that activists must acknowledge. Activists therefore need other strategies to tackle them. Finally, I turn to the question of how to tackle the trans panic. I argue that consciousness raising offers a method for generating warranted ideology critique. I then outline some tactics that activists can use to tackle the trans panic and explain how these intervene in the cissexist ideology/epistemic injustice feedback loop and tackle the phenomena I describe. Ultimately, I argue it will take a multiplicity of tactics to tackle the trans panic. (shrink)

This paper puts forth two claims. First, cancel culture accusations of censorship are components of a practice that embodies a flawed ideology. Second, as components of a practice that embodies a flawed ideology, these accusations contribute to cultivating a hostile epistemic environment. I spell out the first claim with the help of Jason Stanley’s research on flawed ideology. I highlight how a characterization of cancellation that the conservative, right-leaning demographic find problematic in terms of amounting to a (...) form of censorship, preserves desirable outcomes for the privileged group. Drawing on the work of C. Thi Nguyen on hostile epistemology, I spell out the second claim by showing how these accusations exploit our epistemic trust mechanism such that they undermine the uptake of epistemic goods. If the flawed ideology constrains the intelligibility of our actions, then the concept of cancellation becomes problematic. I close by offering a suggestive approach inspired by work in non-ideal epistemology to counteract the flawed ideology. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of ideology in terms of social meanings. Such meanings - constituting a cultural technē - are public, conflicting, and fragmented; yet because they guide our practices, they frame our agency and identities. A cultural technē is ideological when it perpetuates unjust subordination; ideology critique offers liberating alternatives.

This article explains tactical escalation by a Peruvian left-wing group during the 1980s and 1990s as an interaction effect between organizational ideology and the broader political and organizational environment. In 1980, Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) organization ended a decade of political organizing and launched armed struggle against a new civilian government. Peru had been governed since 1968 by military officers, but popular pressure, including strong left-wing protests, had forced the military to cede control. In responding to democratization with (...) revolution rather than electoral participation, Sendero broke with the rest of Peru’s Marxist left. In 1983, Sendero again escalated its tactics, initiating a campaign of violent intimidation against Peru’s legal left. By 1996, according to data assembled for this study, the group had selectively assassinated some 300 prominent Peruvian leftists. For theorists of revolutions and social movements, Sendero’s tactical trajectory poses two important puzzles. First, many revolutionary theorists believe that transitions from authoritarianism to elections decrease armed insurgency. Why, then, did Peru’s democratization provoke Sendero’s escalation? Second, Sendero might well have been expected to cooperate with other left-wing groups, rather than to attack them so brutally. Why did Sendero choose an alternative path? The group’s anti-left measures are all the more puzzling given the opposition they provoked among potential allies at home and abroad. This article explains Sendero’s choices by drawing on political opportunity theory, theories of organizational competition, and the concept of declining protest cycles. Democratization can promote greater levels of strife if small but violence-prone groups fear marginalization in electoral politics. A dense left-wing social movement sector, moreover, can stimulate internecine competitive fighting if only some of the movement’s members accept the legitimacy of national elections. (shrink)

In times characterized by the rise of far-right thought, in light of Rossi-Landi’s reflections on ideology this text reflects on the conditions of other possible worlds from a Semioethics perspective in dialogue with Brazilian authors such as Simas, Rufino and Krenak. To this end, we consider the possibility of a new humanism, recognizing practices, experiences and ways of living that are not disenchanted, preserved by cultures that have become marginal and that somehow recover the capacity of signs and signification (...) for alterity. (shrink)

In this article I advance the inquiry of democratic citizenship in the digital age or ‘digital citizenship,’ for short, through an ideology critique of what I refer to as the ideology of digital empowerment. According to this ideology, which was prevalent from the early 1990s until the early 2010s, digital technologies would effectively contribute to democratic citizens’ political empowerment. Following the introduction, I explain the basic ideas I explain the basic ideas of such an ideology critique (...) and distinguish between its empirical, genealogical, functional, and normative levels of analyses. Then, I identify Aristotelian, Machiavellian, Hobbesian, and Kantian understandings of this ideology to show its past existence across a broad range of conceptions of democratic citizenship. Following that, I empirically analyse these understandings, showing for each of them that the reality of digital citizenship did not hold up to the ideology’s promise. Subsequently, I provide a genealogical analysis of how the ideology came into being by describing the crisis of democratic citizenship at the end of the 20th century, and I complement this analysis by identifying the belief management mechanisms that supported the ideology’s dissemination. In the penultimate section, I pursue a functional analysis of the cultural, psychological, and social conditions that explain why citizens kept endorsing the ideology despite it being erroneous. Finally, I conclude by sketching, from today’s perspective, a normative analysis that addresses the technological oligarchs’ damage to democratic citizenship which this ideology facilitated. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers increasingly make reference to the concept of ideology to think about how representational structures can lead to oppression, and argue that the distinctively pernicious functioning of things like propaganda and generic generalizations need to be explained in terms of ideology. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it aims to serve as an introduction to (some of) the best contemporary work on ideology in the analytic tradition. Second, it proposes a novel challenge for any (...) such theory. The challenge turns on the nature of intersectionality: it is hard to see how to render consistent the claims that ideology creates or sustains oppression with the claim that oppression is intersectional, without making substantial modifications to extant theories. The conclusion will be that certain projects in contemporary philosophy of language need to further develop their theories of ideology. (shrink)

The theoretical virtue of parsimony values the minimizing of theoretical commitments, but theoretical commitments come in two kinds : ontological and ideological. While the ontological commitments of a theory are the entities it posits, a theory’s ideological commitments are the primitive concepts it employs. Here, I show how we can extend the distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony, commonly drawn regarding ontological commitments, to the domain of ideological commitments. I then argue that qualitative ideological parsimony is a theoretical virtue. My (...) defense proceeds by demonstrating the merits of qualitative ideological parsimony and by showing how the qualitative conception of ideological parsimony undermines two notable arguments from ideological parsimony: David Lewis’ defense of modal realism and Ted Sider’s defense of mereological nihilism. (shrink)

The modern concept of ideology was established by the liberal politician and philosopher Destutt de Tracy, with the objective of creating an all-embracing and general science of ideas, which followed the sensualist and empiricist trend initiated by Locke that culminated in the positivism of Comte. Natural selection and immunity are two key concepts in the history of biology that were strongly based on the Malthusian concept of struggle for existence. This concept wrongly assumed that population grew faster than the (...) means of existence. This “natural” law contained implicitly the idea that the poor and least gifted would not survive. This idea led to the progressive development of the concept of natural selection, whose definitive version was given by Darwin. Mechnikov took the concepts of struggle for existence and natural selection and conceived infectious diseases as a struggle between a host and its invader, the so-called phagocytosis theory. This theory created the necessity to possess mechanisms to discriminate between the own and the foreign, and led to the conception of the immune self. These concepts were not developed from ideas coming from perceptions or sensations, but from ideas coming from their values: individual interest, inevitable inequality, property, utility and profit. Values are ideals that constitute an ideological matrix which exerts a numinous activity and influence the development of our future actions. In consequence, science and its practice cannot avoid and ignore the values that drive them and impulse them towards certain directions. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore and defend ideology critique as a method that is descended from the project of the critique of reason. Specifically, I interpret ideology critique as operating through what critical theory calls the dialectics of immanence and transcendence. Turning to Hegel and Marx, I further argue that the dialectics of immanence and transcendence must be more concretely understood as the dialectics of life and self-consciousness. Understanding the relation between life and self-consciousness is crucial for (...) class='Hi'>ideology critique because what ideologies distort is the relation between self-consciousness and life, a relation that is fundamental to the actualization of human freedom. I argue that ideologies are social pathologies, or wrong ways of living. I analyze two concepts that illuminate the method of ideology critique in particular: Hegel’s “Idea,” and Marx’s Gattungswesen (species-being). These two concepts provide the normative basis for reconsidering ideology critique in light of a non-reductive critical naturalism. (shrink)

Over a century of development, the Communist Party of China has effectively integrated its policies and practices, blending communist ideology with entrepreneurial spirit, and extending its influence into corporate management. However, the impact of communist ideology on business development, particularly on sustainable practices, has yet to be confirmed. Against this backdrop, this study uses data from publicly listed companies between 2011 and 2020 as the primary dataset, employing a double fixed-effects model to analyze the relationship between ideology (...) (Communist and non-Communist CEOs) and corporate sustainability. We found that, compared to non-Communist CEOs, Communist CEOs contribute to promoting corporate sustainability. Social and political capital exhibit a partially complementary effect in the relationship between communist ideology and corporate sustainability. Specifically, social capital strengthens the positive impact of Communist CEOs on corporate sustainability, while the role of political capital remains unclear. Notably, the political capital of Communist CEOs who have held positions at the department or bureau level is significantly effective. Communist CEOs who are older, female, highly educated, or have longer tenures tend to lead their companies toward stronger sustainable development outcomes. Party organization, the quality of information disclosure, and board governance were found to be potential pathways through which Communist CEOs influence corporate sustainability. These findings offer new insights into the enduring development of ideology and its integration with corporate sustainability. (shrink)

According to epistemic ideology critics, a belief or set of beliefs is ideological when it: (a) empowers those responsible for disseminating these beliefs and (b) lacks compelling independent justification. In their view, beliefs satisfying these criteria are defective and ought to be debunked. I contest this claim by showing how, under conditions of political crisis, it is often both epistemically unwarranted and pragmatically inadvisable to debunk seemingly ideological beliefs. I examine the types of beliefs that constitute what are commonly (...) called “emergency frames.” An emergency frame is a system of beliefs concerning the nature of a severe collective threat and the best way to combat that threat. I argue that, due to the uncertainty inherent in many crisis situations, emergency frames often lack independent justification. Because this lack stems from unavoidable epistemic constraints, it should not be seen as a flaw warranting the debunking of any given emergency frame. I begin by outlining the notion of epistemic ideology critique (Section 1). In Section 2, I explore how, when this notion is applied to emergency frames, they often appear ideological and thus seem to warrant debunking. In Section 3, however, I show why it is sometimes epistemically unwarranted and pragmatically inadvisable to debunk such frames. I conclude that, in certain cases, when confronted with ostensibly ideological emergency frames, an attitude of political trust is more suitable than one of radical critique. (shrink)