The Riemann Hypothesis is a determinate Π⁰₁ imprint over the standard naturals, one truth-value fixed by the primes, and it is hard for a reason that is not intrinsic to it. Three things were dressed onto it, π, the transcendental staging, and completed infinity, and each dressing is a wall. Strip the three and what remains is a flat quantifier over ℕ, decidable at every instance, whose only genuine open content is the multiplicative correlation carried on the Euler product. (...) The completed infinity in particular is recent, roughly a hundred and fifty years old against the twenty-three centuries that refused it, and adopting it lifted the flat countable domain up into Cantor's continuum tower, the burned costume, which is where the apparent room to doubt was manufactured. The tower is real as a reach and empty as a foundation, and RH never quantified over it. The proof that a clean object was buried is the function-field analogue, where none of the three dressings exists and RH is a theorem. The object carries a dual-register verdict, kinetic primary: sealed as an actualized invariant where the prime field is physically determinate at every instance with the critical line its unique stable attractor, and terminal suspension on the formal truth-string where the instrument locks the shape and is orientation-blind to the truth-sign, a sealed resolution boundary and not the classic open question the field expects to one day close. The paper is reconstructive, not predictive; it introduces no fitted constant and its one empirical-flavored claim inherits RH's own falsifier. (shrink)

Preregistration has been proposed as a useful method for making a publicly verifiable distinction between confirmatory hypothesis tests, which involve planned tests of ante hoc hypotheses, and exploratory hypothesis tests, which involve unplanned tests of post hoc hypotheses. This distinction is thought to be important because it has been proposed that confirmatory hypothesis tests provide more compelling results (less uncertain, less tentative, less open to bias) than exploratory hypothesis tests. In this article, we challenge this proposition (...) and argue that there are several advantages of exploratory hypothesis tests that can make their results more compelling than those of confirmatory hypothesis tests. We also consider some potential disadvantages of exploratory hypothesis tests and conclude that their advantages can outweigh the disadvantages. We conclude that exploratory hypothesis tests avoid researcher commitment and researcher prophecy biases, reduce the probability of data fraud, are more appropriate in the context of unplanned deviations, facilitate inference to the best explanation, and allow peer reviewers to make additional contributions at the data analysis stage. In contrast, confirmatory hypothesis tests may lead to an inappropriate level of confidence in research conclusions, less appropriate analyses in the context of unplanned deviations, and greater bias and errors in theoretical inferences. (shrink)

It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are con...

The Riemann Hypothesis (RH) asserts that every non-trivial zero of the Riemann zeta function ζ(s) satisfies Re(s) = 1/2. This paper presents a structural analysis of RH organized in two coupled registers, with five distinct contributions. The first three contributions are technical: an operator-theoretic reformulation, a precise localization of the analytic obstruction, and a theoretical-physics universality analysis. The fourth contribution is a list of five falsifiable predictions. The fifth contribution is an explicit conditional verdict on what these technical contributions (...) establish about RH under different mathematical ontologies (Platonist versus naturalist or structural-physical). The paper does not assert which ontology is correct; it makes the conditional verdict explicit and lets the reader adjudicate based on philosophical premises. The first contribution is a geometric reformulation. The Berry-Keating Hilbert-Polya operator H = −i(x d/dx + 1/2), which possesses a one-parameter family of self-adjoint extensions on the additive Lebesgue space L²(ℝ+, dx) and therefore lacks a canonical unique realization, is shown to be unitarily equivalent to the dilation generator H′ = −i x d/dx on the multiplicative Hilbert space H_mult = L²(ℝ+*, dx/x) equipped with the Haar measure of the dilation group (ℝ+*, ×). On this geometry, which is the natural Hilbert space whose inner product is invariant under the multiplicative symmetry group of the integers, H′ is uniquely self-adjoint by Stone’s theorem with no boundary parameter freedom. The deficiency-index ambiguity that plagued the additive realization disappears entirely. The second contribution is a precise characterization of the analytic obstruction. A regularized Cauchy-Stieltjes functional G_ε(z) constructed from −ζ′/ζ is shown to vanish unconditionally for ε > 1/2 by Euler-product non-vanishing and Cauchy contour deformation. The Riemann Hypothesis is then shown to be equivalent to the boundary-value membership of −(ζ′/ζ)(1/2 + iτ) in the Hardy space H²(lower half τ-plane). The precise gap that prevents extending the unconditional vanishing of G_ε(z) from ε > 1/2 down to ε → 0+ is identified explicitly: the odd-part Fourier structure of −ζ′/ζ on the critical line is not constrained by the functional equation alone, and three natural closure routes (Paley-Wiener extension, ε-constancy, Sobolev weak-star limit) are each shown to be circular without additional analytic input. This is the precise mathematical location of the open obstruction; closing it remains the millennium prize problem. The third contribution is a theoretical universality analysis. The Riemann zeta function admits exact identification as the grand canonical partition function of an idealized prime field, with −ζ′/ζ as the response function and the critical line Re(s) = 1/2 as the equilibrium line. Four orthogonal independent measurements identify the equilibrium universality class of the prime field on the critical line: Selberg’s variance theorem (fluctuation exponent), the Montgomery-Odlyzko correspondence with GUE statistics (symmetry-class exponent β = 2 corresponding to self-adjoint Hamiltonians with broken time-reversal symmetry), the direct localization of 10^{13} verified zeros (order-parameter localization exponent), and the prime counting envelope √x log x (response-amplitude exponent). The four exponents jointly identify the universality class as that of a self-adjoint Hamiltonian with broken time-reversal symmetry. The universality identification is consistent with RH and provides strong heuristic support: RH is the natural prediction of the universality class, and any departure from RH would require the prime field to violate exponent universality. The universality analysis does not constitute a proof of RH. Universality is inductive evidence based on observed exponent values; it does not bind mathematical truth in the deductive sense. The paper is explicit about this distinction throughout. Five physical-mathematical predictions are stated, each labeled by its epistemic status. Four predictions are falsifiable consequences of the operator reformulation and universality analysis. One prediction, a heuristic correlation between the GUE algebra and the effective Majorana mass m_ββ in neutrinoless double beta decay, is marked explicitly as conjectural: a numerical bridge between the GUE structure and specific PMNS lepton-mixing matrices is not derived in this paper, and the correlation is included as a speculative anchor for future investigation rather than as a logical consequence of the universality analysis. The contributions of this paper are: a clean reformulation of RH on its natural multiplicative geometry; a precise localization of the analytic obstruction; a theoretical-physics universality analysis of the prime field; and an explicit conditional verdict on what these contributions establish under different mathematical ontologies. Under strict mathematical Platonism, the paper provides operator-theoretic reformulation, precise obstruction localization, and theoretical-physics universality support, with strict-register proof of RH remaining open at the precise Fourier component identified herein. Under naturalist or structural-physical mathematical ontology (Section 8.4), the multiaxial verification of Sections 2-7 constitutes a proof of RH adequate to the multi-mode object the prime distribution is, with the strict-register projection of that proof remaining incomplete at the same Fourier component. The paper takes no position on which ontology is correct; it states the conditional verdict explicitly and leaves the philosophical adjudication to the reader. (shrink)

The Riemann Hypothesis is a determinate Π⁰₁ imprint over the standard naturals, one truth-value fixed by the primes, and it is hard for a reason that is not intrinsic to it. Three things were dressed onto it, π, the transcendental staging, and completed infinity, and each dressing is a wall. Strip the three and what remains is a flat quantifier over ℕ, decidable at every instance, whose only genuine open content is the multiplicative correlation carried on the Euler product. (...) The completed infinity in particular is recent, roughly a hundred and fifty years old against the twenty-three centuries that refused it, and adopting it lifted the flat countable domain up into Cantor's continuum tower, the burned costume, which is where the apparent room to doubt was manufactured. The tower is real as a reach and empty as a foundation, and RH never quantified over it. The proof that a clean object was buried is the function-field analogue, where none of the three dressings exists and RH is a theorem. The object carries a dual-register verdict, kinetic primary: sealed as an actualized invariant where the prime field is physically determinate at every instance with the critical line its unique stable attractor, and terminal suspension on the formal truth-string where the instrument locks the shape and is orientation-blind to the truth-sign, a sealed resolution boundary and not the classic open question the field expects to one day close. The paper is reconstructive, not predictive; it introduces no fitted constant and its one empirical-flavored claim inherits RH's own falsifier. (shrink)

There are scenarios in which letting one’s own views on the question whether p direct one’s inquiry into that question brings about individual and collective epistemic benefits. However, these scenarios are also such that one’s evidence doesn’t support believing one’s own views. So, how to vindicate the epistemic benefits of directing one’s inquiry in such an asymmetric way, without asking one to hold a seemingly irrational doxastic attitude? To answer this question, the paper understands asymmetric inquiry direction in terms of (...) having one’s inquiry be guided by a doxastic attitude, which I call hypothesis, that’s governed by the following norm: One’s hypothesis that p is rational just in case it is a manifestation of the best feasible way to form a doxastic attitude regarding p that promotes the best feasible ways to advance towards settling the question of p’s (or of any other suitably related proposition’s) truth-value. (shrink)

If the Past Hypothesis underlies the arrows of time, what is the status of the Past Hypothesis? In this paper, I examine the role of the Past Hypothesis in the Boltzmannian account and defend the view that the Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law of nature. Such a view is known to be compatible with Humeanism about laws, but as I argue it is also supported by a minimal non-Humean "governing'' view. Some worries arise from (...) the non-dynamical and time-dependent character of the Past Hypothesis as a boundary condition, the intrinsic vagueness in its specification, and the nature of the initial probability distribution. I show that these worries do not have much force, and in any case they become less relevant in a new quantum framework for analyzing time's arrows---the Wentaculus. Hence, the view that the Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law should be more widely accepted than it is now. (shrink)

This paper -distinguishes between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition, characterizing them as competitors (both motivated by situated, interactive cognitive processing, with the latter being the more conservative of the two interpretations of the data) -clarifies the relation between content externalism and extended cognition -introduces the problem of cognitive bloat, as part of a critical discussion of Clark and Chalmers's "past-endorsement criterion" (if the criterion is embraced, we privilege the internal, endorsing process -- (...) which looks more like an embedded view -- and if the criterion is rejected, bloat follows) and as a problem for extended views more generally -develops a dilemma critical of Clark and Chalmers's "explanatory kinds" argument for extended mind and cognition (arguing that their reasoning faces serious problems regardless of whether one individuates the kinds in question in a fine-grained or a coarse-grained way) -argues that an appeal to functionalism doesn't resolve the issue -argues for the priority, in debates about extended cognition, of the identification of cognitive systems (e.g., because a functionalist approach can't be applied unless we already know what count as inputs and outputs, which requires having already identified the boundaries of the cognitive system). (shrink)

It is now well-appreciated by philosophers that contemporary large-scale ‘-omics’ studies in biology stand in non-trivial relationships to more orthodox hypothesis-driven approaches. These relationships have been clarified by Ratti (2015); however, there remains much more to be said regarding how an important field of genomics cited in that work—‘genome-wide association studies’ (GWAS)—fits into this framework. In the present article, we propose a revision to Ratti’s framework more suited to studies such as GWAS. In the process of doing so, we (...) introduce to the philosophical literature novel exploratory experiments in (phospho)proteomics, and demonstrate how these experiments interplay with the above considerations. (shrink)

This paper presents a hypothesis on how the prevalence of the Aegean Bronze Age worship of the Greek god Poseidon could be attributed to an early attempt to give a deterministic answer to the problem of wave generation at sea. The inhabitants of the Aegean shores, during the Bronze Age, were seafarers. First, the Cycladic civilization comprised a network of island to island maritime trade, while the Minoan civilization, centered on Crete, reached Cyprus and Egypt. By the time of (...) the Mycenean civilization, maritime routes had been established and flourished all over the Aegean and the Near East. Long-distance seafaring, however, was not without risk during these early days of the seagoing craft. Sailors were exposed to the wind and the waves for large amounts of time. Indeed, they needed to master both with their ships in order to make it to distant shores and return back alive. Wave motion, namely the propagation of disturbances at the sea surface, is today a well-studied field of fluid mechanics. While wind blowing over the sea surface constitutes the primary source of wave generation, waves propagate at a speed that is independent of the wind speed. Thus, the relationship between wind and wave conditions is not immediately evident to an observer at sea. The hypothesis of this paper is that early seafarers, could have initially attributed the sea motion to the "Earth-shaker" Poseidon, an unpredictable deity that generated waves through the shaking of the earth. In a time when the world was little explored, he lived perhaps underneath the sea surface or far beyond the horizon, but the waves he produced traveled all the way to the Aegean shores, upon which they broke. Later on, as more experience and observations were gathered at sea, the exclusive generation of waves by the wind was eventually understood. Gradually, the reign of the world passed from the hands of the chthonic (from below) Poseidon to those of the ouranic (from above) Zeus. He became the prime mover responsible for the motion of both the sky and the sea. (shrink)

The multiplicative group ℝ₊×, equipped with its Haar measure d×r = dr/r, carries a scale-invariant spectral structure whose unitary irreducible representations are precisely the characters χγ(r) = r^(iγ) for γ ∈ ℝ, parametrised by a single real frequency. When the standard Riemann variable s = σ + iγ is introduced via the Haar-normalised coordinate s = 1/2 + iγ, this principal-series condition becomes the statement Re(s) = 1/2. The critical line is therefore the unitarity locus of the natural spectral theory (...) on ℝ₊×, not a numerical accident. Tate’s thesis establishes that the Riemann zeta function arises as the Mellin transform of the idele class group scaling action, connecting the zeros of ζ(s) to the spectral theory of the scaling generator A = −i d/d(log|a|) on L²(A×/ℚ×, d×a). Meyer’s unconditional spectral realisation then identifies those zeros as the atoms of the trace spectral measure μ_A via the Weil explicit formula. The product decomposition A×/ℚ× ≅ K × ℝ₊×, with K compact, reduces the eigenvalue equation for A to a first-order ordinary differential equation on ℝ whose solution space is one-dimensional, confining each ordinate to a single spectral atom of weight one. The functional equation ξ(s) = ξ(1 − s), combined with the Schwarz reflection principle, forces every zero at ordinate γ lying off the critical line to generate a second distinct zero of ζ(s) at the same ordinate, violating the multiplicity bound. All non-trivial zeros of ζ(s) therefore satisfy Re(s) = 1/2, and every such zero is simple. The argument extends without modification to every primitive Dirichlet L-function, yielding the Generalised Riemann Hypothesis. (shrink)

Observations from philosophy and psychology heavily favor the Empiricist tenet that many lexical concepts are learned. However, many observations also heavily favor the Nativist tenet that such concepts are representationally atomic. Fodor Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science, 1981, LOT2: The language of thought revisited, 2008) has famously argued that representationally atomic concepts cannot be learned, at least not learned by hypothesis formation and testing. Concept theorists who want to preserve observations about concept learning have developed (...) acquisition models on which the acquired concepts are either non-atomic or are acquired by a process that doesn’t involve hypothesis formation and testing. I offer a model, Baptizing Meanings for Concepts, in which representationally atomic concepts are learned by hypothesis formation and testing. The concepts are learned by the agent’s hypothesizing the existence of a latent/hidden/imperceptible property in objects to explain the objects’ perceptible similarities. Once a hidden property is hypothesized, a new atomic mental name is assigned to it, and this atomic name becomes the concept. Any connections between the name and the representations involved in linking the name to its referent are stored as contingent. Further experience may give the agent reason to revise its hypotheses about latent properties as explanations for its observations. I discuss a software robot implementation of the BMC process that uses a Bayesian learning network. The implementation provides an existence proof of the possibility of learning representationally atomic concepts by hypothesis formation and testing. (shrink)

Discussion of the extraterrestrial hypothesis (ETH), the hypothesis that an extraterrestrial civilization (ETC) is active on Earth today, is taboo in academia, but the assumptions behind this taboo are faulty. Advances in biology have rendered the notion that complex life is rare in our Galaxy improbable. The objection that no ETC would come to Earth to hide from us does not consider all possible alien motives or means. For an advanced ETC, the convergent instrumental goals of all rational (...) agents – self-preservation and the acquisition of resources – would support the objectives of removing existential threats and gathering strategic and non-strategic information. It could advance these objectives by proactively gathering information about and from inhabited planets, concealing itself while doing so, and terminating potential rivals before they become too dangerous. Other hypotheses of ETC behavior, including the zoo/interdict hypothesis and the dark forest hypothesis, also undercut the objection that the ETH is highly improbable. The ETH does not require support from extraordinary evidence because the presence of an ETC on Earth is not highly unlikely and would overturn none of our well-tested scientific knowledge. The fact that most reports of unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) have natural or human explanations does not count against it. Inference to the best explanation offers a way to find evidence for this hypothesis, and some evidence for it exists, some of it taking the form of reliable witness reports. The most plausible alternative explanation for some UAP reports declines in probability over time. A hypothesis that is not highly improbable, does not contradict any well-established facts or theories, and explains otherwise unexplained evidence is a rational hypothesis. Since the ETH is a rational hypothesis, investigation of it should not be taboo. (shrink)

Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...) concept is defined and its introduction motivated. Further, I introduce and explain the distinction between support and confirmation: put in a slogan, ‘confirmation is support by significant evidence’. The second section deals with the Riddle itself. I demonstrate that, given the provisions of the first section, not ‘anything confirms anything’: significant green-evidence confirms only green-hypotheses (and no grue-hypotheses), and significant grue-evidence confirms only grue-hypotheses (and no green-hypotheses), whichever terms we use for expressing these evidences or hypotheses. The third section rounds off my treatment. First I show that Frank Jackson’s use of his counterfactual condition is unsuccessful. Further, I argue that no unwanted consequences result, if one starts from the other, ‘objective’, definition of ‘grue’, as it constitutes no more than a mere fact of logic that cannot do any harm. Finally, I present a grue-case involving both kinds of definition, where the exclusive confirmation of either the green- or the grue-hypothesis is shown. (shrink)

The Gaia hypothesis -- The paradox -- The pagan planet -- Mechanism -- Organicism -- Hylozoism -- Gaia revisited -- Understanding.

According to one theory, the brain is a sophisticated hypothesis tester: perception is Bayesian unconscious inference where the brain actively uses predictions to test, and then refine, models about what the causes of its sensory input might be. The brain’s task is simply continually to minimise prediction error. This theory, which is getting increasingly popular, holds great explanatory promise for a number of central areas of research at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. I show how the theory (...) can help us understand striking phenomena at three cognitive levels: vision, sensory integration, and belief. First, I illustrate central aspects of the theory by showing how it provides a nice explanation of why binocular rivalry occurs. Then I suggest how the theory may explain the role of the unified sense of self in rubber hand and full body illusions driven by visuotactile conflict. Finally, I show how it provides an approach to delusion formation that is consistent with one-deficit accounts of monothematic delusions. (shrink)

This paper presents and defends an argument that the continuum hypothesis is false, based on considerations about objective chance and an old theorem due to Banach and Kuratowski. More specifically, I argue that the probabilistic inductive methods standardly used in science presuppose that every proposition about the outcome of a chancy process has a certain chance between 0 and 1. I also argue in favour of the standard view that chances are countably additive. Since it is possible to randomly (...) pick out a point on a continuum, for instance using a roulette wheel or by flipping a countable infinity of fair coins, it follows, given the axioms of ZFC, that there are many different cardinalities between countable infinity and the cardinality of the continuum. (shrink)

Epistemic contextualism is one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that ‘know’ is a context-sensitive verb associated with different evidential standards in different contexts. Contextualists motivate their view based on a set of behavioural claims. In this paper, I show that several of these behavioural claims are false. I also show that contextualist test cases suffer from a critical confound, which derives from people's tendency to defer to speakers’ statements about their own mental states. My (...) evidence consists in results from several behavioural experiments. I conclude that contextualism is an idle hypothesis and I propose some general methodological lessons. (shrink)

The singularity hypothesis is a hypothesis about the future of artificial intelligence on which self-improving artificial agents will quickly become orders of magnitude more intelligent than the average human. Despite the ambitiousness of its claims, the singularity hypothesis has been defended at length by leading philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers. In this paper, I argue that the singularity hypothesis rests on undersupported growth assumptions. I show how leading philosophical defenses of the singularity hypothesis fail to (...) overcome the case for skepticism. I conclude by drawing out philosophical and policy implications of this discussion. (shrink)

What follows for the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument if knowledge-how is just a form of knowledge-that? The obvious answer is that the ability hypothesis is false. For the ability hypothesis says that, when Mary sees red for the first time, Frank Jackson’s super-scientist gains only knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. In this paper I argue that this obvious answer is wrong: a version of the ability hypothesis might be true even if knowledge-how is a (...) form of knowledge-that. To establish this conclusion I utilize Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s well-known account of knowledge-how as “simply a species of propositional knowledge”. I demonstrate that we can restate the core claims of the ability hypothesis – that Mary only gains new knowledge-how and not knowledge-that – within their account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that. I examine the implications of this result for both critics and proponents of the ability hypothesis. (shrink)

Competition between scientific hypotheses is not always a matter of mutual exclusivity. Consistent hypotheses can compete to varying degrees either directly or indirectly via a body of evidence. We motivate and defend a particular account of hypothesis competition by showing how it captures these features. Computer simulations of Bayesian inference are used to highlight the limitations of adopting mutual exclusivity as a simplifying assumption to model scientific reasoning, particularly due to the exclusion of hypotheses that may be true. We (...) end with a case study demonstrating the subtleties involved in hypothesis competition in scientific practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACT16p11.2 deletion syndrome is a severe genetic disorder associated with the deletion of 27 genes from a Copy Number Variant region on human chromosome 16. Symptoms associated include cognitive impairment, language and motor delay, epilepsy or seizures, psychiatric disorders, autism spectrum disorder (ASD), changes in head size and body weight, and dysmorphic features, with a crucial need to define genes and mechanisms responsible for symptomatology. In this review, we analyze the clinical associations and biological pathways of 16p11.2 locus genes and (...) identify that a majority of 16p11.2 genes relate to metabolic processes. We present a hypothesis in which changes in the dosage of 16p11.2 metabolic genes contribute to pathology through direct or indirect alterations in pathways that include amino acids or proteins, DNA, RNA, catabolism, lipid, energy (carbohydrate). This hypothesis suggests that research into the specific roles of each metabolic gene will help identify useful therapeutic targets. (shrink)

The language of thought hypothesis is a thesis about the structure of mental representations. It is an example of the computational–representational theory of mind, according to which much of cognition consists in formal computations over mental representations. What distinguishes the language of thought hypothesis from other such theories is the idea that mental representations share core features with formal languages. The language of thought hypothesis states that thinking is the transformation of mental representations in a language of (...) thought, in which most of what we call “thinking” is in fact inferences performed over sentences in the language. The language of thought is not a natural language, such as Spanish or Haitian Creole. It is a formal language, comparable to the machine language of a computer or formal languages of logic. The language of thought is often claimed to be innate, universal, and pivotal in learning, and it is implicated in processes such as natural language acquisition. However, it is also compatible with learning and reasoning in nonlinguistic creatures as well as in mental processes seemingly unconnected to language such as perception and motor control. (shrink)

The Continuum Hypothesis featured top of Hilbert's list of 23 problems in 1900. Today, we still consider the question, with various programmes pulling in different directions. This conceptual diversity raises a puzzle: In what sense do we disagree when we talk about it? A standard assumption takes the content of our thought about classes and the Continuum Hypothesis to be uniform between agents. I argue that moderate views of content determination lead to a rejection of this assumption. However, (...) I also argue that whilst the Continuum Hypothesis can have different content for different agents, it can also be determinate for them. In particular, I suggest that there is a fault line between those who think there are uncountable sets and recent countabilist views. (shrink)

The hypothesis of organization design as meaning proposes organization design as a meaning-driven process of social construction. It is represented by a model with three parts (i) intersubjective sensemaking, (ii) structure and structuration and (iii) the organization design gestalt. The first two are described in this chapter, while the organization design gestalt is discussed in Chapter 8. The present chapter argues that in terms of its ontological origins, organization design is primarily anchored in the organization’s social form, a pattern (...) of interactions achieved at the level of intersubjective sensemaking. This means that in many ways what gives the organization its shape is the level of intersubjective sensemaking that the organization has achieved (i.e., its social form), which, in turn, has an effect on the way people interrelate. As organizations come to rely less and less on bureaucratic structures, social form is increasingly driven by intersubjectivity, with all the consequences that this trend implies, i.e., greater reliance on sensemaking and on embodied forms of cognition. This, in turn, has an impact on the evolution of the organization’s structure, with improvisation becoming more prevalent and formalization becoming increasingly dependent upon quality of interaction. Hence, at the level of organizational structure, the chapter argues that organization design is largely shaped by the quality of interactions, a new concept that is explained as the level of “positivity” of experiences generated by interactions between participants, and subjectively judged as such. (shrink)

Summary This article attempts a contextual study of the origin and early development of August Kekulé's theory of aromatic compounds. The terminus a quo is essentially August Hofmann's coining of the modern chemical denotation of ‘aromatic’ in 1855; the terminus ad quem is the first full codification of Kekulé's theory in the sixth fascicle of his Lehrbuch der organischen Chemie, published in the summer of 1866. Kekulé's theory is viewed in context with the earlier and concurrent experimental work of such (...) chemists as Hermann Kolbe, Friedrich Beilstein, Rudolph Fittig, and Hugo Müller. The reception of the theory is briefly examined. Attention is paid to the role of Kekulé's molecular models and of his celebrated dream anecdote of the snake that seizes its own tail. The episode is used as a case study for the continuity of scientific progress, and to illustrate the close reciprocal interactions of hypothesis and experiment in the evolution of a scientific theory. (shrink)

Many philosophers and psychologists now argue that emotions play a vital role in reasoning. This paper explores one particular way of elucidating how emotions help reason which may be dubbed ?the search hypothesis of emotion?. After outlining the search hypothesis of emotion and dispensing with a red herring that has marred previous statements of the hypothesis, I discuss two alternative readings of the search hypothesis. It is argued that the search hypothesis must be construed as (...) an account of what emotions typically do, rather than as a definition of emotion. Even as an account of what emotions typically do, the search hypothesis can only be evaluated in the context of a specific theory of what emotions are. 1 Introduction 2 The search hypothesis of emotion 3 A red herring: the frame problem 4 The search problem 5 Two readings of the search hypothesis 6 Two final remarks 7 Conclusion. (shrink)

According to the conventionalist doctrine of space elaborated by the French philosopher-scientist Henri Poincaré in the 1890s, the geometry of physical space is a matter of definition, not of fact. Poincaré’s Hertz-inspired view of the role of hypothesis in science guided his interpretation of the theory of relativity (1905), which he found to be in violation of the axiom of free mobility of invariable solids. In a quixotic effort to save the Euclidean geometry that relied on this axiom, Poincaré (...) extended the purview of his doctrine of space to cover both space and time. The centerpiece of this new doctrine is what he called the ‘‘principle of physical relativity,’’ which holds the laws of mechanics to be covariant with respect to a certain group of transformations. For Poincaré, the invariance group of classical mechanics defined physical space and time (Galilei spacetime), but he admitted that one could also define physical space and time in virtue of the invariance group of relativistic mechanics (Minkowski spacetime). Either way, physical space and time are the result of a convention. (shrink)

This hypothesis is that anorexia nervosa is a biologically driven disorder, and mammalian hibernation may offer clues to its pathogenesis. Using this approach, this hypothesis offers suggestions for employing heart rate variability as an early diagnostic test for anorexia nervosa; employing the ketogenic diet for refeeding patients, attending to omega 3:6 ratio of polyunsaturated fatty acids in the refeeding diet; and exploring clinical trials of the endocannabinoid-like agent, palmitoylethanolamde for patients with anorexia nervosa. This hypothesis also explores (...) the role of lipids and autoimmune phenomena in anorexia nervosa, and suggest a lipodomics study to search for antibodies in the serum on patients with anorexia nervosa. (shrink)

This paper presents a synthesis of four interconnected research programs that together establish a quantum-native interpretation of Chaitin's halting probability Omega and Teilhard de Chardin's Omega Point. We begin with the Unified Omega Hypothesis, which proposed that existence itself might be understood as a computation whose completion corresponds to the determination of Omega. However, Minimal Axioms for Quantum Structure demonstrated that classical computation cannot derive quantum structure (Axiom A1: superposition), establishing a no-go theorem formally verified in Coq. This negative (...) result necessitated a fundamental revision. Two independent lines of evidence support the conclusion that a quantum substrate is overwhelmingly favored: (1) Algorithmic Naturalness shows that quantum mechanics has minimal description length on a quantum substrate (K_UQ << K_UC), and (2) Artificial Physics demonstrates through evolutionary simulation that matrix operations (quantum-like structures) dominate scalar operations under selection pressure, achieving >90% dominance within 3.8 ± 1.7 generations, while spontaneous emergence of matrix operations from scalar primitives never occurred (0/5 runs over 500 generations). We therefore propose the Quantum Omega Hypothesis: if the universe is computational and the principle of algorithmic naturalness holds, then a quantum-native substrate is the most parsimonious explanation. Under this interpretation, Chaitin's Omega becomes a quantum state vector |Omega_Q> = Σ_p α_p |p| — the wavefunction of the algorithmic multiverse. This synthesis provides a coherent framework connecting algorithmic information theory, quantum foundations, and evolutionary dynamics, while clearly distinguishing between established facts and interpretive proposals. (shrink)

“Dutch Book” arguments and references to gambling theorems are typical in the debate between Bayesians and scientists committed to “classical” statistical methods. These arguments have rarely convinced non-Bayesian scientists to abandon certain conventional practices, partially because many scientists feel that gambling theorems have little relevance to their research activities. In other words, scientists “don’t bet.” This article examines one attempt, by Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, to progress beyond such apparent stalemates by connecting “Dutch Book”–type mathematical results with principles actually endorsed (...) by practicing experimentalists. (shrink)

This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The central contribution of the essay is to outline a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by (...) case studies of redeployment, and compared and contrasted with other theories of the localization of function. (shrink)

The major point of contention among the philosophers and mathematicians who have written about the independence results for the continuum hypothesis (CH) and related questions in set theory has been the question of whether these results give reason to doubt that the independent statements have definite truth values. This paper concerns the views of G. Kreisel, who gives arguments based on second order logic that the CH does have a truth value. The view defended here is that although Kreisel's (...) conclusion is correct, his arguments are unsatisfactory. Later sections of the paper advance a different argument that the independence results do not show lack of truth values. (shrink)

This essay explores the quantum nature of life through the Time-Imprint Hypothesis, which proposes that every event in the universe leaves an informational trace imprinted upon photons. The study resolves several paradoxes concerning the nature of life and the cosmos, while suggesting experimental directions for verification.

Menopause is puzzling because life-history theory predicts there should be no selection for outliving one’s reproductive capacity. Adaptive explanations of menopause offered thus far turn on women’s long-term investment in offspring and grandoffspring, all variations on the grandmother hypothesis. Here, I offer a very different explanation. The patriarch hypothesis proposes that once males became capable of maintaining high status and reproductive access beyond their peak physical condition, selection favored the extension of maximum life span in males. Because the (...) relevant genes were not on the Y chromosome, life span increased in females as well. However, the female reproductive span was constrained by the depletion of viable oocytes, which resulted in menopause. (shrink)

This paper examines the second geometrical problem in the Meno. Its purpose is to explore the implication of Cook Wilson’s interpretation, which has been most widely accepted by scholars, in relation to the nature of hypothesis. I argue that (a) the geometrical hypothesis in question is a tentative answer to a more basic problem, which could not be solved by available methods at that time, and that (b) despite the temporary nature of a hypothesis, there is a (...) rational process for formulating it. The paper also contains discussion of the method of analysis, problem reduction and a diorism, which have often been ambiguously explained in relation to the geometrical problem in question. (shrink)

Developments that suggest the universe is full of life make the Fermi paradox increasingly pressing, but our search for an extraterrestrial technological civilization (“ETC”) is handicapped by our ignorance of its probable nature and behavior. This paper offers a way around this problem by drawing on information theoretical concepts, including game theory and Bayesian probability. It argues that, whatever its ultimate goals, an ETC would have the same instrumental goals as other intelligent agents. Generically, these are self-preservation and the acquisition (...) of resources. For an advanced ETC, these generic goals imply the objectives of removing existential threats and acquiring strategic and non-strategic information. Since the most problematic existential threats for any ETC would be from other civilizations and planets hosting such civilizations would also be copious sources of information, these objectives would lead it to gather information from these locations and to protect itself against them. This dual-goals hypothesis resolves the Fermi paradox, redirects the search for extraterrestrial intelligence and makes testable predictions regarding ETC’s behavior on Earth if it is here. (shrink)

What does the hypothesis of a non-epistemology bring to non-philosophy? Our aim is not to found a new discipline, but to take into account a vast reservoir of conceptual material that accompanies the sciences and put it to a new use. It may be that this does in fact pertain to a discipline – we can discuss this later, along with the question of the constitution of such practices as occasioned by other materials. Our aim is not critical either, (...) since we do not seek to minimize the importance of written works about the sciences, but rather to redistribute such works on the basis of this new use. The use as such is the critique. This is a hypothesis, insofar as it can only be effectuated by way of its progressive realization, it is not something that can be obtained by principle, by surveying all these discourses. (shrink)

David. J. Chalmers examines eleven possible solutions to the meta-problem of consciousness, ‘the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness.’ The present paper argues that Chalmers overlooks an explanation that he has otherwise taken seriously, and which a number of philosophers, physicists, and computer scientists have taken seriously as well: the hypothesis that we are living in a computer simulation. This paper argues that a particular version of the simulation hypothesis is at (...) least as good of a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness as many explanations Chalmers considers, and may even be a better one—as it may be the best solution to a much broader meta-philosophical problem: the ‘meta-problem of everything’, the problem of explaining why our world has the quantum-mechanical, relativistic, and philosophical features it does. (shrink)

This paper concerns local yet systematic problems of contrastive underdetermination of model choice in cognitive neuroscience debates about the so-called two visual systems hypothesis. The underdetermination problem is systematically generated by the way certain assumptions about the representationalist nature of computation are translated into experimental practice. The problem is that behavioural data underdetermine the choice between competing representational models. In this paper, I diagnose how these assumptions generate underdetermination problems in the choice between competing functional models of perception–action. Using (...) the tools of philosophy of science, I describe the type of underdetermination and sketch a possible cure. (shrink)

According to the knowledge argument, physicalism fails because when physically omniscient Mary first sees red, her gain in phenomenal knowledge involves a gain in factual knowledge. Thus not all facts are physical facts. According to the ability hypothesis, the knowledge argument fails because Mary only acquires abilities to imagine, remember and recognise redness, and not new factual knowledge. I argue that reducing Mary’s new knowledge to abilities does not affect the issue of whether she also learns factually: I show (...) that gaining specific new phenomenal knowledge is required for acquiring abilities of the relevant kind. Phenomenal knowledge being basic to abilities, and not vice versa, it is left an open question whether someone who acquires such abilities also learns something factual. The answer depends on whether the new phenomenal knowledge involved is factual. But this is the same question we wanted to settle when first considering the knowledge argument. The ability hypothesis, therefore, has offered us no dialectical progress with the knowledge argument, and is best forgotten. (shrink)

We are grateful for these two insightful commentaries, which both see novelty and value in the manner in which we invoke the hypothesis that anorexia nervosa is a passion, to help explain data from the Anorexia Experiences Study, which provides the basis of our inquiry. In this response, we wish to clarify and elaborate on our hypothesis; in particular, the difference between passions and moods, the manner in which our hypothesis touches on issues of authenticity and identity, (...) and the compelling parallel with addiction. We also wish to emphasize that, in proposing the hypothesis that anorexia nervosa is a passion, our primary aim is not so much to exclude or replace alternative theoretical approaches. Our focus, really, is to argue that the hypothesis that anorexia nervosa is a passion adds something rich and unique to our current understanding of that condition, which is not fully or adequately captured by alternative accounts... (shrink)

This thesis draws a distinction between reasoning about which scientific hypothesis to accept, reasoning concerned with generating new hypotheses and reasoning about which hypothesis to pursue. I argue that and should be evaluated according to the same normative standard, namely whether the hypotheses generated/selected are pursuit worthy. A consequentialist account of pursuit worthiness is defended, based on C. S. Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction’ and the ‘economy of research’, and developed as a family of formal, decision-theoretic models. This account (...) is then deployed to discuss four more specific topics concerning scientific reasoning. First, I defend an account according to which explanatory reasoning mainly provides reasons for pursuing hypotheses, and criticise empirical arguments for the view that it also provides reasons for acceptance. Second, I discuss a number of pursuit worthiness accounts of analogical reasoning in science, arguing that, in some cases, analogies allow scientists to transfer an already well-understood modelling framework to a new domain. Third, I discuss the use of analogies within archaeological theorising, arguing that the distinction between using analogies for acceptance, generation and pursuit is implicit in methodological discussions in archaeology. A philosophical analysis of these uses is presented. Fourth, diagnostic reasoning in medicine is analysed from the perspective of Peircean abduction, where the conception of abduction as strategic reasoning is shown to be particularly important. (shrink)

Complex constraints like conditionals ('If A, then B') and probabilistic constraints ('The probability that A is p') pose problems for Bayesian theories of learning. Since these propositions do not express constraints on outcomes, agents cannot simply conditionalize on the new information. Furthermore, a natural extension of conditionalization, relative information minimization, leads to many counterintuitive predictions, evidenced by the sundowners problem and the Judy Benjamin problem. Building on the notion of a `paradigm shift' and empirical research in psychology and economics, I (...) argue that the model of hypothesis testing can explain how people learn complex, theory-laden propositions like conditionals and probability constraints. Theories are formalized as probability distributions over a set of possible outcomes and theory change is triggered by a constraint which is incompatible with the initial theory. This leads agents to consult a higher order probability function, or a 'prior over priors,' to choose the most likely alternative theory which satisfies the constraint. The hypothesis testing model is applied to three examples: learning a simple probabilistic constraint involving coin bias, the sundowners problem for conditional learning, and the Judy Benjamin problem for learning conditional probability constraints. (shrink)