A new pragmatic approach, based on the latest developments in argumentation theory, analyzing appeal to expert opinion as a form of argument. Reliance on authority has always been a common recourse in argumentation, perhaps never more so than today in our highly technological society when knowledge has become so specialized—as manifested, for instance, in the frequent appearance of "expert witnesses" in courtrooms. When is an appeal to the opinion of an expert a reasonable type of argument to (...) make, and when does it become a fallacy? This book provides a method for the evaluation of these appeals in everyday argumentation. Specialized domains of knowledge such as science, medicine, law, and government policy have gradually taken over as the basis on which many of our rational decisions are made daily. Consequently, appeal to expert opinion in these areas has become a powerful type of argument. Challenging an argument based on expert scientific opinion, for example, has become as difficult as it once was to question religious authority. Walton stresses that even in cases where expert opinion is divided, the effect of it can still be so powerful that it overwhelms an individual's ability to make a decision based on personal deliberation of what is right or wrong in a given situation. The book identifies the requirements that make an appeal to expert opinion a reasonable or unreasonable argument. Walton's new pragmatic approach analyzes that appeal as a distinctive form of argument, with an accompanying set of appropriate critical questions matching the form. Throughout the book, a historical survey of the key developments in the evolution of the argument from authority, dating from the time of the ancients, is given, and new light is shed on current problems of "junk science" and battles between experts in legal argumentation. (shrink)

Academics across widely ranging disciplines all pursue knowledge, but they do so using vastly different methods. Do these academics therefore also have different ideas about when someone possesses knowledge? Recent experimental findings suggest that intuitions about when individuals have knowledge may vary across groups; in particular, the concept of knowledge espoused by the discipline of philosophy may not align with the concept held by laypeople. Across two studies, we investigate the concept of knowledge held by academics across seven disciplines (N (...) = 1,581) and compare these judgments to those of philosophers (N = 204) and laypeople (N = 336). We find that academics and laypeople share a similar concept of knowledge, while philosophers have a substantially different concept. These experiments show that (a) in contrast to philosophers, other academics and laypeople attribute knowledge to others in some “Gettier” situations; (b) academics and laypeople are much less likely to attribute knowledge when reminded of the possibility of error, but philosophers are not affected by this reminder; and (c) non‐philosophy academics are overall more skeptical about knowledge than laypeople or philosophers. These findings suggest that academics across a wide range of disciplines share a similar concept of knowledge, and that this concept aligns closely with the intuitions held by laypeople, and differs considerably from the concept of knowledge described in the philosophical literature, as well as the epistemic intuitions of philosophers themselves. (shrink)

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured by (...) a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge-does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed. (shrink)

Stories are an important indicator of our vision of the future. In the case of artificial intelligence (AI), dominant stories are polarized between notions of threat and myopic solutionism. The central storytellers—big tech, popular media, and authors of science fiction—represent particular demographics and motivations. Many stories, and storytellers, are missing. This paper details the accounts of missing AI narratives by leading scholars from a range of disciplines interested in AI Futures. Participants focused on the gaps between dominant narratives and the (...) untold stories of the capabilities, issues, and everyday realities of the technology. One participant proposed a “story crisis” in which these narratives compete to shape the public discourse on AI. Our findings indicate that dominant narratives distract and mislead public understandings and conceptions of AI. This suggests a need to pay closer attention to missing AI narratives. It is not simply about telling new stories, it is about listening to existing stories and asking what is wanted from AI. We call for realistic, nuanced, and inclusive stories, working with and for diverse voices, which consider (1) story-teller; (2) genre, and (3) communicative purpose. Such stories can then inspire the next generation of thinkers, technologists, and storytellers. (shrink)

Evidence-accumulation models (EAMs) are powerful tools for making sense of human and animal decision-making behavior. EAMs have generated significant theoretical advances in psychology, behavioral economics, and cognitive neuroscience and are increasingly used as a measurement tool in clinical research and other applied settings. Obtaining valid and reliable inferences from EAMs depends on knowing how to establish a close match between model assumptions and features of the task/data to which the model is applied. However, this knowledge is rarely articulated in the (...) EAM literature, leaving beginners to rely on the private advice of mentors and colleagues and inefficient trial-and-error learning. In this article, we provide practical guidance for designing tasks appropriate for EAMs, relating experimental manipulations to EAM parameters, planning appropriate sample sizes, and preparing data and conducting an EAM analysis. Our advice is based on prior methodological studies and the our substantial collective experience with EAMs. By encouraging good task-design practices and warning of potential pitfalls, we hope to improve the quality and trustworthiness of future EAM research and applications. (shrink)

Hubert Dreyfus argues that explicit thought disrupts smooth coping at both the level of everyday tasks and of highly-refined skills. However, Barbara Montero criticises Dreyfus for extending what she calls the ‘principle of automaticity’ from our everyday actions to those of trained experts. In this paper, I defend Dreyfus’ account while refining his phenomenology. I examine the phenomenology of what I call ‘esoteric’ expertise to argue that the explicit thought Montero invokes belongs rather to ‘gaps’ between or above moments of (...) reflexive coping. However, I agree that the ‘principle of automaticity’ does not adequately capture the experience of performing such skills. Drawing on examples of expert performance in sport and improvised music and dance, I argue that esoteric action, at its best, is marked by a distinct state of non-conceptual awareness- an experience of spontaneity, flow and ‘owned-ness’- that distinguishes it from the automaticity of everyday actions. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers of science hold that evaluative considerations ought to play a role in deciding scientific claims. We argue that this is a very bad idea, not least because it is likely to bring science into disrepute.

The term, “bioethics” was coined in 1970 by American cancerologist V. R. Potter. In the few decades since, the field of bioethics has emerged as an important discipline. The field has attained a remarkable degree of public recognition in a relatively short period of time. The “right to die” cases such as In re Quinlan placed bioethical issues on the front pages. Although the discipline is of recent vintage, the past quarter century has witnessed a flurry of scholarly activity, creating (...) a substantial body of bioethical literature. Moreover, the bioethics movement has manifested itself in institutional expressions. Universities and medical schools have added courses in bioethics to their curricula. In 1974, federal legislation and regulations mandated that federal grantees conducting human subjects research establish institutional review boards to safeguard subjects’ welfare, and even absent a legislative mandate numerous hospitals created ethics committees. Centers and institutes, devoted exclusively to the study of bioethical issues, have been founded. (shrink)

The law applicable to genomics in the United States is currently in transition and under debate. The rapid evolution of the science, burgeoning clinical research, and growing clinical application pose serious challenges for federal and state law. Although there has been some empirical work in this area, this is the first paper to survey and interview key scientific and legal stakeholders in the field of genomics to help ground identification of the most important legal problems that must be solved to (...) successfully integrate genomics into clinical care. The respondents in this study identified a wide range of interconnected issues, focusing specifically on the need for clear guidelines about how to use these data, fear of liability for those who use these data, and the need to protect patients from use of this information particularly by insurers, while endorsing data sharing. Developing legal strategies to support appropriate use of genomics now and in the future clearly will require making trade-offs, taking into account the full complexity of this legal ecosystem. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay examines drawings of antiquities in the context of the history of early modern scientific illustration. The role of illustrations in the establishment of archaeology as a discipline is assessed, and the emergence of a graphic style for representing artifacts is shown to be closely connected to the development of scientific illustration in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The essay argues that the production of conventionalized drawings of antiquities during this period represents a fundamental shift in the (...) approach to ancient material culture, signifying the recognition of objects as evidence. As has been demonstrated in other scientific fields, the creation of a visual system for recording objects was central to the acceptance of artifacts as “data” that could be organized into groups, classified as types, and analyzed to gain knowledge of the past. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to describe and reflect upon the concrete particulars of one academician's work as an expert ethics witness. The commentary on my practices and the narrative descriptions of three cases are offered as evidence for the thesis that it is possible to act honorably within a role that some have considered to be inherently illicit. Practical measures are described for avoiding some of the best known pitfalls. The discussion concludes with a listing of the (...) distinctive competencies and understandings that are useful in serving as an expert ethics witness. (shrink)

In this paper we show that an essential aspect of solving the problem of uncritical acceptance of expert opinions that is at the root of the ad verecundiam fallacy is the need to disentangle argument from expert opinion from another kind of appeal to authority. Formal and computational argumentation systems enable us to analyze the fault in which an error has occurred by virtue of a failure to meet one or more of the requirements of the argumentation scheme (...) from argument from expert opinion. We present a method for enhancing this capability by showing how arguments from expert opinion are related to, but different from, arguments from deontic authority. (shrink)

The standard of proof in criminal trials should require that the evidence presented by the prosecution is robust. This requirement of robustness says that it must be unlikely that additional information would change the probability that the defendant is guilty. Robustness is difficult for a judge to estimate, as it requires the judge to assess the possible effect of information that the he or she does not have. This article is concerned with expert witnesses and proposes a method for (...) reviewing the robustness of expert testimony. According to the proposed method, the robustness of expert testimony is estimated with regard to competence, motivation, external strength, internal strength and relevance. The danger of trusting non-robust expert testimony is illustrated with an analysis of the Thomas Quick Case, a Swedish legal scandal where a patient at a mental institution was wrongfully convicted for eight murders. (shrink)

Over recent years, science and technology have been reassessed increasingly in ethical terms. Particularly for life science governance, ethics has become the dominant discourse. In the course of this ‘‘ethical turn’’ national ethics councils were set up throughout Europe and in the United States to advice politics in ethically controversial issues such as stem cell research and genetic testing. Ethics experts have become subject to traditional warnings against expertocracy: they are suspected to unduly influence political decision-making. However, any reliable ethics (...) expertise has to reflect societal disagreements in moral issues. Therefore, expert dissent is a normal feature of legitimate ethics expertise. Based on theoretical considerations we argue that in principle, expert dissent does not cause problems for political legitimacy; rather, it enhances the salience of politics: obviously decisions on ethical issues cannot be taken on the basis of expert knowledge alone. We therefore conclude that expert dissent, not consent, supports politics. Focussing on Germany and Austria, we show how politics deal with expert dissent in practice. While in Germany politics acknowledge dissent and use it to foster a fundamental political debate, Austrian politics attribute authoritative power to ethics expertise and try to construct an overall consensus. This illustrates how the drawing of boundaries between politic and expertise differs. (shrink)

Socrates’ expert-analogies is frequent both in Plato’s dialogues and in the Socratic writings of Xenophon, and is also ascribed to Socrates by Aristotle and Aeschines. Socrates makes an analogy from a non-controversial expert (or an expertise) like the cobbler or ship-captain, to another (often controversial) expert (or expertise) like the statesman. This paper defends an interpretation of the expert-analogy as valid deductions. It infers from one type of expert (such as the ship-captain) to another type (...) of expert (such as the statesman), and the attribute inferred (for instance ‘should not be selected by lot’) belongs to these types of experts because they are experts. The general logical form, which makes no mention of the expert and which is valid in virtue of its form, infers from one or more species to another species of the same genus, and the attribute inferred is presupposed to belong as such to the genus and only accidentally to the species. (shrink)

Responding to the call to provide guidance for incorporating diverse perspectives in science-policy debate, Collins and Evans’ normative model of expertise provides a useful starting point for deciding who gets to come to the table—expertise and experience. However, new materialist critiques highlight the epistemic challenges of such an approach. Drawing on the work of Annemarie Mol, I propose that the theory of multiple ontologies and a practise-based orientation can enrich conversations about expertise and inclusion in science-policy decision-making, particularly in matters (...) of concern. Specifically, I reread Collins and Evans’ normative model of expertise through multiple ontologies, resulting in an expertise of doing. Such an approach both productively resolves gaps in each while leading to the creation of something new. I will explore what this expertise of doing might mean for the long-standing problem of expertise and inclusion in scientific, technical, and health policy disputes. Specifically, I pr... (shrink)

Following Snyderman and Rothman, we surveyed expert opinions on the current state of intelligence research. This report examines expert opinions on causes of international differences in student assessment and psychometric IQ test results. Experts were surveyed about the importance of culture, genes, education, wealth, health, geography, climate, politics, modernization, sampling error, test knowledge, discrimination, test bias, and migration. The importance of these factors was evaluated for diverse countries, regions, and groups including Finland, East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Europe, (...) the Arabian-Muslim world, Latin America, Israel, Jews in the West, Roma, and Muslim immigrants. Education was rated by N = 71 experts as the most important cause of international ability differences. Genes were rated as the second most relevant factor but also had the highest variability in ratings. Culture, health, wealth, modernization, and politics were the next most important factors, whereas other factors such as geography, climate, test bias, and sampling error were less important. The paper concludes with a discussion of limitations of the survey. (shrink)

This chapter looks at how scientific conclusions should be communicated to the public. It reviews evidence that communicating the scientific consensus on an issue can change public beliefs. However, some people reject the scientific consensus on issues like climate change and vaccine safety, because they do not trust scientists, basing this mistrust on the clash between their own values and the values inherent in the scientists’ consensus, and they may overestimate their own understanding of very technical areas. A possible way (...) forward is to educate people about the important role of consensus in science more generally, rather than focus solely on consensus messages about specific scientific issues. This would require a greater understanding of the role of consensus in science at all levels of science education from high school through to specialist postgraduate training. (shrink)

This chapter defines “expert consensus in science” as a high level of agreement among scientists with relevant expertise about a specific scientific claim, methodology or science-based practice or policy. In the not-too-distant past, the topic of expert consensus in science would only have been of interest to scientists and scholars in the history, philosophy and sociology of science. However, there is now a much broader interest in the topic from both scientists and non-scientists alike. A major reason for (...) this is that expert consensus is increasingly used to guide national policies based on scientific findings, but some of these policies may be at odds with people’s pre-existing beliefs and values, and they understand little about scientific consensus. Examples are the role of human activity in global warming, the use of genetically modified crops and the safety of vaccination of infants. The chapter surveys the range of sceptical opinion about the legitimate role of consensus in science. The book challenges the sceptical view, arguing that expert consensus plays a vital role in scientific processes. However, these processes could be improved, and the book proposes how this could be done. (shrink)

Information-seeking interactions in multi-agent systems are required for situations in which there exists an expert agent that has vast knowledge about some topic, and there are other agents (questioners or clients) that lack and need information regarding that topic. In this work, we propose a strategy for automatic knowledge acquisition in an information-seeking setting in which agents use a structured argumentation formalism for knowledge representation and reasoning. In our approach, the client conceives the other agent as an expert (...) in a particular domain and is committed to believe in the expert’s qualified opinion about a given query. The client’s goal is to ask questions and acquire knowledge until it is able to conclude the same as the expert about the initial query. On the other hand, the expert’s goal is to provide just the necessary information to help the client understand its opinion. Since the client could have previous knowledge in conflict with the information acquired from the expert agent, and given that its goal is to accept the expert’s position, the client may need to adapt its previous knowledge. The operational semantics for the client-expert interaction will be defined in terms of a transition system. This semantics will be used to formally prove that, once the client-expert interaction finishes, the client will have the same assessment the expert has about the performed query. (shrink)

This chapter discusses how consensus processes are used by scientists to agree on what research methodologies in their field are sound. Many methodological innovations are accepted by a spontaneous consensus. This is more likely where there is no existing method or existing methods can be improved. With such methods, the level of innovation is high and can be provided by an individual scientist or a small team. Other methodological innovations achieve consensus through a deliberative process. This more commonly occurs where (...) there are existing methods, but these need standardization or infrastructure for dissemination. It requires coordination of efforts across a larger number of scientists and may require creating a new organization to support the dissemination of the methodology. (shrink)

This chapter examines the most controversial area where consensus is involved—establishing scientific truths. It reviews the range of positions taken by philosophers, historians and sociologists of science, from those who take a strongly positive position through to those who are largely negative about the role of consensus in establishing truth. Despite the varying views, there is some agreement from these writers about the conditions under which consensus is more likely to indicate truth: (1) The consensus needs to be rational, empirical (...) and critically examined. (2) The group coming to the consensus needs to be diverse. (3) The group needs to be open-minded, and there is no coercion of dissenters. (4) The group needs to be sufficiently large to get reliable results. It concludes that consensus can be a strong indicator of truth under certain conditions. (shrink)