This essay argues that the new natural law theory (NNLT) propounds five errors that place it on a collision course with the traditional Thomistic understanding central to the moral magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church. These root errors are argued to be (1) the denial of the primacy of speculative over practical truth, (2) the negation of unified normative natural teleology expressed in the NNLT doctrine of the putative “incommensurability” of basic goods prior to choice, (3) failure to (...) affirm the transcendence of the common good, (4) negation of the essentially theonomic character of the natural law, and (5) the intentionalist construction of human action. The teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas is held to be a superior light for understanding Catholic moral life. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.1 (Spring 2013): 105–131. (shrink)

Gergely and Csibra's theory, known as "natural pedagogy theory", is meant to explain how infants fast-learn generic knowledge from adults. In this paper, my goal is to assess the explanatory import of this theory in a particular case, namely the phenomena known as "A-not-B errors". I first propose a clarification of natural pedagogy theory's fundamental hypotheses. Then, I describe Topál et al.'s (Science, 321, 1831-1834, 2008) experiments, which consist in applying natural pedagogy theory's framework to the A-not-B errors. (...) Finally, I show that natural pedagogy theory, in its actual stage of development, does not suffice to choose between various interpretations of Topál et al.'s experimental results. (shrink)

1As an editor of this journal, John Woods and his distinguished contributions to logic, reasoning, and argumentation need little introduction. However, this book is partly a fruit of his relatively recent collaboration with Dov Gabbay, which deserves some elaboration. They have co-edited some monumental reference collections, e.g.: Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn toward the Practical and Logic: A History of Its Central Concepts. And they are co-authoring an ambitious multi-volume work collectively entitled A Practical Logic (...) of Cognitive Systems. The first two volumes, Agenda Relevance: A Study in Formal Pragmatics and The Reach of Abduction: Insight and Trial, each contain contributions by both authors, such that Woods wrote the philosophical conceptual parts and Gabbay the formal mathematical parts. However, due to a change of publisher and the excessive length of the earlier volumes, they decided to publish the third volume as two separate single-authored bo. (shrink)

We describe an error type that we call the naturalizing error: an appeal to nature as a self-justified description dictating or limiting our choices in moral, economic, political, and other social contexts. Normative cultural perspectives may be subtly and subconsciously inscribed into purportedly objective descriptions of nature, often with the apparent warrant and authority of science, yet not be fully warranted by a systematic or complete consideration of the evidence. Cognitive processes may contribute further to a failure to (...) notice the lapses in scientific reasoning and justificatory warrant. By articulating this error type at a general level, we hope to raise awareness of this pervasive error type and to facilitate critiques of claims that appeal to what is “natural” as inevitable or unchangeable. (shrink)

Magic and superstition, we have long been told, governed popular mentalities in early modern England. Modern anthropology, however, suggests that semi-literate minds are more sophisticated in their understandings of the natural world. This paper explores iterations of English popular naturalism, or thinking about nature, in almanacs and household manuals from the late-sixteenth to the late-eighteenth centuries. All apply Aristotelian principles of substance and equilibrium to the observation and interpretation of natural phenomena. These range from the interpretation of dreams to (...) weather forecasting. From the mid-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth centuries, epistemological changes started to appear in these publications, thanks to market forces in the booktrade and shifting perceptions of admissible truth-claims on the part of printers and print-audiences. This is more complex than a simple replacement of convictions. Since older notions of legitimate experience and evidence were, for the most part, undisturbed, popular print culture was imbued with both at the turn of the eighteenth century, constituting an imperfect synthesis of ideas. (shrink)

Descartes first invokes the errors of the senses in the Meditations to generate doubt; he suggests that because the senses sometimes deceive, we have reason not to trust them. This use of sensory error to fuel a sceptical argument fits a traditional interpretation of the Meditations as a work concerned with finding a form of certainty that is proof against any sceptical doubt. If we focus instead on Descartes's aim of using the Meditations to lay foundations for his new (...) science, his appeals to sensory error take on a different aspect. Descartes's new science is based on ideas innate in the intellect, ideas that are validated by the benevolence of our creator. Appeals to sensory error are useful to him in undermining our naïve faith in the senses and guiding us to an appreciation of innate ideas. However, the errors of the senses pose problems in the context of Descartes's appeals to God's goodness to validate innate ideas and natural propensities to belief. A natural tendency to sensory error is hard to reconcile with the benevolence of our creator. This paper explores Descartes's responses to the problems of theodicy posed by various forms of sensory error. It argues that natural judgements involved in our visual perception of distance, size and shape pose a problem of error that resists his usual solutions. (shrink)

Understanding the nature of errors in a simple, rule‐based task—programming a VCR—required analyzing the interactions among human cognition, the artifact, and the task. This analysis was guided by least‐effort principles and yielded a control structure that combined a rule hierarchy task‐to‐device with display‐based difference‐reduction. A model based on this analysis was used to trace action protocols collected from participants as they programmed a simulated VCR. Trials that ended without success (the show was not correctly programmed) were interrogated to (...) yield insights regarding problems in acquiring the control structure. For successful trials (the show was correctly programmed), steps that the model would make were categorized as matches to the model; steps that the model would not make were violations of the model. The model was able to trace the vast majority of correct keystrokes and yielded a business‐as‐usual account of the detection and correction of errors. Violations of the model fell into one of two fundamental categories. The model provided insights into certain subcategories of errors; whereas, regularities within other subcategories of error suggested limitations to the model. Although errors were rare when compared to the total number of correct actions, they were important. Errors were made on 4% of the keypresses that, if not detected, would have prevented two‐thirds of the shows from being successfully recorded. A misprogrammed show is a minor annoyance to the user. However, devices with the approximate complexity of a VCR are ubiquitous and have found their way into emergency rooms, airplane cockpits, power plants, and so on. Errors of ignorance may be reduced by training; however, errors in the routine performance of skilled users can only be reduced by design. (shrink)

This paper considers whether and under what conditions a judge might take herself to be justified in overturning a precedent based on the nature of the precedent’s error, and regardless of the stare decisis factors, such as reliance interests, that typically structure and cabin the horizontal stare decisis analysis. I develop a theory of how judges approach this category of erroneous judicial decisions (following the US Supreme Court, I call them egregiously erroneous), which is meant to clarify and elucidate (...) judicial practice. I propose that an egregiously erroneous precedent involves a moral error of substantial magnitude. And I suggest that, when confronted with a decision she takes to be egregiously erroneous, a judge might experience a kind of imaginative resistance that prevents her from setting aside her moral convictions and treating an authoritative directive as an exclusionary reason in the Razian sense. The upshot is that the judge will decide to overrule the precedent based on her own assessment of its moral merits and shouldn’t be blamed for doing so (unless the judge holds false moral beliefs that were irresponsibly acquired or maintained). (shrink)

Experimental procedures routinely violate the cooperative principle of conversational conduct by presenting irrelevant information in a way that implies its relevance to the task at hand. This contributes to an overestimation of the prevalence of judgment errors relative to natural contexts. When research participants are aware that the usual norms of conversational conduct do not apply, the emerging errors are attenuated or eliminated.

In his late fragment, ‘Sources of Knowledge of Mathematics and Natural Sciences’ Frege laments the tendency to confuse functions with objects and says, ‘It is here that the tendency of language by its use of the definite article to stamp as an object what is a function and hence a non-object, proves itself to be the source of inaccurate and misleading expressions and also of errors of thought. Probably most of the impurities that contaminate the logical source of knowledge (...) have their origins in this.’ This paper applies Frege’s logical insights to a series of influential modal arguments for the existence of souls or minds, in order to demonstrate that they hinge on the error of treating functions as objects. Related arguments have also resulted in the claim that identity statements are necessary, and that apparent identities ‘really’ involve relations of constitution. Here it is argued that once we recognise that all these arguments involve the assimilation of objects and concepts (which Frege identifies with functions) they can be seen to be defective. (shrink)

Whenever justification of classroom punishment has been attempted it has usually been on grounds that punishment acts either appropriately pedagogically, teaching students how to behave morally, or is a necessary evil that enables the practical running of the school so that it may carry out its educational business. By itself the first justification leaves punishment in schools as only an extension of wider social attitudes about the virtue of punishing perceived moral wrongdoing, rather than providing any distinct argument for punishment (...) specific to the special circumstances of the school. By highlighting an entanglement between the moral and the conventional, and between discipline and punishment, within the context of the school, I shall argue that the essentially contested nature of education and its purpose, and the related question of the school’s suitability as a venue for it, means that the school’s most promising defence of its use of punishment—that punishment of students might somehow be necessary for enabling the important educative business of the school—becomes undone. Schooling and education are not necessarily synonymous, and as schools provide only one vision of education—and this vision is contestable—then upholding the business of any one school in order for it to achieve its particular unsettled and disputed purpose is not a morally sufficient reason to coerce a student’s compliance through regimes of ‘harm intended as harm’. (shrink)

In this chapter I analyse the reason behind the well-settled belief within the international arbitration community that arbitration exists thanks to the state and its infrastructures. This conceptual error has a bigger practical impact than we might think at first glance, but has no basis. The two erroneous starting points that could explain the reason behind this wrong and well-extended belief are: (i) the idea that law and justice are of a public nature; (ii) the unresolved practical problems posed (...) by the lack of imperium of the arbitrators. I analyse why neither of these points has any basis. Only if this initial conceptual error, which could be referred to as the intellectual error of socialism in arbitration, is dismantled will it be possible to build an appropriate legal theory of international arbitration. (shrink)

Technology is a specific form of human agency that yields to (an imperfect) realization of human control over a technological situation-that is, a situation not governed to an end by natural constraints but by specific human aims. In this view, technology can be considered the only way of producing artificial beings. However, all technology is finite by nature, which means that sooner or later, all technology will fail, break down, and go wrong. The fate of all technologies and artificial (...) beings produced by technologies is finitude. Human beings are artificial beings, in this way human existence is also finite. (shrink)

Contemporary versions of natural rights libertarianism trace their locus classicus to Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. But although there have been many criticisms of the version of political libertarianism put forward by Nozick, many of these objections fail to meet basic methodological desiderata. Thus, Nozick’s libertarianism deserves to be re-examined. In this paper I develop a new argument which meets these desiderata. Specifically, I argue that the libertarian conception of self-ownership, the view’s foundation, implies what I call the Asymmetrical (...) Value Claim: a dubious claim about the importance of choice relative to other valuable capacities. I argue that this misunderstands what is really valuable in life, and show how it causes libertarianism to generate counterintuitive public policy recommendations. (shrink)

Contemporary scholars have begun to document the extensive influence of the sixth to seventh century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti on Pratyabhijñā Śaiva thought. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta’s adaptation of Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory provides a striking instance of the creative ways in which these Śaivas use Dharmakīrti’s ideas to argue for positions that Dharmakīrti would emphatically reject. Both Dharmakīrti and these Śaivas emphasize that the formation of a concept involves both objective and subjective factors. Working within a certain perceptual environment, factors such as (...) a subject’s desires, habits, and conditioning lead him or her to form a concept based on excluding what is not relevant to the accomplishment of his or her goal. However, the two differ in their account of the relationship between concepts and subject/object duality itself. While Dharmakīrti claims that the division of a cognition into subject, object, and awareness is nonconceptual, the subtly shifted definition of a concept that these Śaivas employ allows them to claim that the error of subject/object duality is actually conceptual. This seemingly small difference in their respective evaluations of the nature of subject/object error has surprisingly large consequences. If, as these Śaivas claim, any awareness involving a duality is conceptual, then subject and object are concepts. Moreover, if the formation of a concept requires desire, then some kind of desire must be inherent to consciousness itself before the formation of a limited subject/object pair. In short, ultimate consciousness must be Śiva, who possesses the freedom to will any and all possible realities. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 12 Bart Streumer makes an interesting case for an error theory in ethics—and for an error theory for normativity more generally, but I will focus on the more restricted target. I offer a reply on behalf of naturalists in ethics. My case for resistance will involve identifying a three-fold ambiguity in his use of the term ‘guarantee’. I conclude with some observations about the implications of theories of reference for moral/ethical terms for the debate.

This paper critically examines five key theoretical errors in Thomas Aquinas' philosophy, particularly in his quinque viae (five ways) from the Summa Theologiae. The analysis begins with a discussion on translation issues regarding Aquinas' terminology, emphasizing the distinction between esse (being) and existence. The identified errors include: (1) the conflation of esse and essentia in God, leading to an incoherent notion of divine nature; (2) the contradiction arising from treating essence as distinct from being, rendering essence as (...) "nothing"; (3) the presupposition of a dimension beyond God's being, undermining His ultimate condition; (4) the misidentification of God with the supreme being (maxime ens) in the quinque viae, rather than as ipsum esse subsistens; and (5) the failure of the five ways to truly demonstrate the "Being of God" rather than a mere supreme entity. The study also critiques Aquinas’ use of actus purus (pure act) and causality, suggesting that these categories improperly constrain the concept of God. Ultimately, it argues that Aquinas partially reaches an understanding of Being but remains entangled in outdated Scholastic frameworks, leading to conceptual and methodological inconsistencies. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false (...) in virtue of being shown to be unjustified; truth having been defined epistemologically in terms of justification. By interpreting three recent error theoretical arguments in light of these strategies, the paper evaluates the epistemological and metaphysical relevance of empirical discoveries about morality as a naturally evolved phenomenon. (shrink)

On one standard philosophical position adopted by evolutionary naturalists, human ethical systems are nothing more than evolutionary adaptations that facilitate social behavior. Belief in an absolute moral foundation is therefore in error. But evolutionary naturalism, by its commitment to the basic valutional concept of fitness, reveals another, logical error: standard conceptions of value in terms of simple predication and properties are mistaken. Valuation has instead, a relational structure that makes reference to respects, subjects and environments. This relational nature is (...) illustrated by the analogy commonly drawn between value and color. Color perception, as recognized by the ecological concept, is relational and dependent on subject and environment. In a similar way, value is relational and dependent on subject and environment. This makes value subjective, but also objective in that it is grounded on facts about mattering. At bottom, values are complex relational facts. The view presented here, unlike other prominent relational and naturalistic conceptions of value, recognizes the full range of valuation in nature. The advantages of this relational conception are first, that it gets valuation right; second, it provides a framework to better explain and understand valuation in all its varieties and patterns. (shrink)

Is our science of the physical world a matter of theoretical description with predictive value, or is it instead a search for the productive causes of observed phenomena? Ancient astronomers such as Ptolemy maintained the former; ancient cosmologists such as Aristotle the latter. This debate is a central theme in Albert Magnus’s thirteenth-century Aristotelian commentaries. This paper shows how Albert defended the possibility of empirical science aimed at demonstrating the causes of observed phenomena. In the course of his defense, Albert (...) identifies a specific error committed by Ptolemy concerning the subject of physical theory. The identification and correction of this error provides the basis upon which a proper metaphysical foundation for the empirical sciences can be laid. This foundation is nothing other than the recovery of the Aristotelian notion of form as the immanent intelligibility of physical natures. (shrink)

Students systematically and deliberately apply rule‐based but erroneous algorithms to solving unfamiliar arithmetic problems. These algorithms result in erroneous solutions termed rational errors. Computationally, students' erroneous algorithms can be represented by perturbations or bugs in otherwise correct arithmetic algorithms (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Langley & Ohilson, 1984; VanLehn, 1983, 1986, 1990; Young S O'Sheo, 1981). Bugs are useful for describing how rational errors occur but bugs are not sufficient for explaining their origin. A possible explanation for this is (...) that rational errors are the result of incorrect induction from examples. This prediction is termed the “induction hypothesis” (VanLehn, 1986). The purpose of the present study was to: (a) expand on post formulations of the induction hypothesis, and (b) use a new methodology to test the induction hypothesis more carefully than has been done previously. The first step involved teaching participants a new number system called NewAbacus, a written modification of the abacus system. The second step consisted of dividing them into different groups, where each individual received an example of only one port of the NewAbacus addition algorithm. During the third and final step, participants were instructed to solve both familiar and unfamiliar types of addition problems in NewAbacus. The induction hypothesis was supported by using both empirical and computational investigations. (shrink)

Hobbes and Locke are commonly presented as intellectual opponents—one defending absolute sovereignty, the other limited government. Yet beneath their apparent disagreement lies a shared premise that shaped modern political philosophy: both began with the image of human beings as atomistic, self-interested individuals facing a coordination problem. This paper argues that this shared starting point is their foundational error. Human beings are not pre-social atoms who subsequently enter relationships; we are developmentally constituted within relationships and institutions from the beginning. Agency itself (...) is relational. Reason develops relationally. Moral capacities develop relationally. The self develops relationally. Therefore the primary question of political philosophy is not how self-interested individuals coordinate their behaviour, but what institutions enable interdependent persons to develop and exercise the capacities necessary for flourishing. Reconstructing the purpose of government from this correct anthropology reveals that government exists to create and sustain the conditions under which persons can develop and exercise informed agency—a teleological account that transforms how we understand legitimacy, rights, and the common good. (shrink)

BackgroundIn about one in 10,000 cases, a published article is retracted. This very often means that the results it reports are flawed. Several authors have voiced concerns about the presence of retracted research in the memory of science. In particular, a retracted result is propagated by citing it. In the published literature, many instances are given of retracted articles that are cited both before and after their retraction. Even worse is the possibility that these articles in turn are cited in (...) such a way that the retracted result is propagated further.MethodsWe have conducted a case study to find out how a retracted article is cited and whether retracted results are propagated through indirect citations. We have constructed the entire citation network for this case.ResultsWe show that directly citing articles is an important source of propagation of retracted research results. In contrast, in our case study, indirect citations do not contribute to the propagation of the retracted result.ConclusionsWhile admitting the limitations of a study involving a single case, we think there are reasons for the non-contribution of indirect citations that hold beyond our case study. (shrink)

Martin Rhonheimer and Michael Zuckert take me to task for what they argue to be the errors and flaws of my article "The Laws of Nature as Moral Norms in Hobbes' Leviathan. I respond to their criticisms, and my critics are afforded a second set of responses.

1. Lies, Error and Confusion 2. Lies 3. The Demarcation of Science: Historical 4. The Demarcation of Science: Recent 5. Observed Regularities and Laws of Nature.

This work presents a comprehensive philosophical, scientific, and civilizational critique of Claudius Ptolemy and the enduring legacy of geocentrism. It argues that Ptolemy’s cosmological system was not merely an astronomical error, but a foundational distortion that reshaped human cognition, political organization, religious ideology, economic behavior, ecological relations, and academic ethics for nearly two millennia. -/- Drawing upon the theoretical framework of Dr. Charles X. Yang’s Lao–Yang Genesis Cosmology and the paradigm of Natural Civilization, this study demonstrates how the geocentric model (...) institutionalized a monocentric worldview that generated intellectual stagnation, religious warfare, authoritarian governance, anthropocentric exploitation, and prestige-driven pseudo-science. -/- Through a systematic, interdisciplinary analysis spanning epistemology, systems theory, entropy science, political philosophy, and ecological ethics, the book identifies “centralization ideology” as the hidden operating system behind humanity’s recurrent civilizational crises. It further contends that modern environmental collapse, expert distrust, and systemic instability represent the terminal stage of this long-standing distortion. -/- The study concludes that humanity’s survival depends on a radical cognitive and institutional transformation toward decentralization, generative order, and epistemic humility. By embracing the Lao–Yang Genesis Cosmology and reconstructing society according to Natural Civilization principles, humanity may transcend predatory high-entropy development and transition toward a resilient, low-entropy, distributed civilization aligned with cosmic and ecological reality. (shrink)

Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense experience discussed in Chs. 4, 5 and 7, and a theory of natural reasons, discussed here. The theory of natural reasons, based on Descartes's notion of natural inclinations, is expressed here in terms of a series of warrant principles of which there are two main kinds: those that warrant action and those that (...) warrant claims for what is true. This chapter traces Descartes's epistemically ambivalent attitude to cognitive dispositions from the early treatment in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind through to the final treatment in The Passions of the Soul. The chapter focuses special attention on the appearance of one kind of natural reason, reasons of truth, in the proof of the external world in Meditation VI and the striking absence of same in the proof of the external world in the Principles of Philosophy II. The chapter also considers whether natural reasons apply to particular aspects of corporeal things, concluding with a discussion of the Cartesian Circle. (shrink)

Several errors in Stapp's interpretation of quantum mechanics and its application to mental causation (Henry P. Stapp, “Quantum theory and the role of mind in nature,” Foundations of Physics 31, 1465–1499 (2001)) are pointed out. An interpretation of (standard) quantum mechanics that avoids these errors is presented.

This chapter defends a mechanistic and teleosemantic view of naturalized intentionality that underlies the role of error detection via coherence checking. Representational mechanisms serve the biological functions of representing, which are related to the semantic value of representation: its truth or falsity, its being vacuous or satisfied, or its accuracy. If representational mechanisms contain (or interact with) error-detection mechanisms, the semantic value of representation is causally relevant. As long as semantic value is causally relevant in cognitive explanations, the content of (...) representation is arguably causally relevant, which vindicates the notion of mental representation in contemporary scientific research. Error detection is understood mechanistically in terms of coherence checking, which is purely computational and does not presuppose any semantic function. This chapter analyzes this conceptually and demonstrates that this account is descriptively adequate by citing a recent experiment on zebra finches, even though discrepancy detection is not always related to intentionality. (shrink)

SummaryIn a recent article published in NZSTh, Joshua Farris follows up on the previous discussion between James Arcadi and myself concerning the abstractist/concretist Christological distinction. While affirming the significance of my Divine Preconscious Model (DPM) of the Incarnation, he argues that I either misunderstand the abstractist/concretist distinction or have a novel take on it, and that I seem to confuse the metaphysical abstract/concretist distinction with a semantic distinction. His constructive proposal is that I should take up an abstractist Christology. I (...) respond to his criticisms and show that his proposal fails to note one of the most important contributions of DPM, viz. it demonstrates how Chalcedonian Christology can be affirmed without the error of Eutychianism on the one hand and Nestorianism on the other. (shrink)

The moral error theory, it seems, could be true. The mere possibility of its truth might also seem inconsequential. But it is not. For, I argue, there is a sense in which the moral error theory is possible that generates an argument against both non‐cognitivism and moral naturalism. I argue that it is an epistemic possibility that morality is subject to some form of wholesale error of the kind that would make the moral error theory true. Denying this possibility has (...) three unwelcome consequences such that allowing for and explaining it is an adequacy condition on meta‐ethical theories. Non‐cognitivism and moral naturalism, I argue, cannot capture the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and so are false. My argument additionally provides independent reason to accept Derek Parfit's claim that if moral non‐naturalism is false then nothing matters. I conclude that whether wholesale moral error is epistemically possible may be, in Richard Rorty's words, ‘one of those issues which puts everything up for grabs at once’ and that even if so, and even if non‐cognitivists and moral naturalists remain unmoved by an argument based upon it, this only helps to highlight the significance of my argument. (shrink)

There are two kinds of logical errors. Either you use a non-valid scheme of an argument or your analysis of the premises is mistaken. No extensional or intensional theory can solve the following problem connected with analyzing NL expressions: The Leibniz principle of substituting identical for identical contains the condition a = b. Extensional as well as intensional systems (at least if intensions are defined as functions from possible worlds) analyzing this condition as formulated in natural language are happy (...) if a is contingently or logically or analytically equivalent with b, while this may be insufficient for applying Leibniz. Examples are adduced that show the absurdity of applying Leibniz in such cases. A following remedy is thinkable: one could try to formulate some axioms or perhaps meta-formulated rules that would eliminate the critical cases. This would mean however that a new theory came into being just to shield us from incorrectly applying Leibniz rule. Instead a procedural analysis of NL expressions is offered that makes it possible to unambiguously determine their sense and so their denotation in such a way that the above mentioned critical cases cannot set in. It is shown that the hyperintensional system defined by Transparent intensional logic is able to generally solve the main problems connected with using NL expressions. (shrink)

To establish philosophy on the right foundations, Thomas Hobbes began each of his successive attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of politics by examining human nature, so as to discover those characteristics that render human beings subject to natural law and deserving of natural rights. Often decried as misanthropic, the products of this exercise nevertheless shaped political thought in fundamental ways. Even those who disagreed with Hobbes’s conclusions felt the need to argue against them within the confines that he (...) had established. Thus, rather than reject the notion of the state of nature, or the natural condition of mankind, emulators and critics alike accepted it as the necessary starting point of any inquiry into politics. Among critics, Jean-Jacques Rousseau singled Hobbes out as one who had seen what others could not, but also one whose account of man contained grave errors that needed to be corrected. (shrink)

Appeals to human nature are ubiquitous, yet historically many have proven ill-founded. Why? How might frequent errors be remedied towards building a more robust and reliable scientific study of human nature? Our aim is neither to advance specific scientific or philosophical claims about human nature, nor to proscribe or eliminate such claims. Rather, we articulate through examples the types of errors that frequently arise in this field, towards improving the rigor of the scientific and social (...) studies. We seek to analyze such claims rhetorically, cognitively, and epistemically. Namely, how do we think about human nature? Claims about human nature, we show, are susceptible to widely exhibited deficits in cognitive tendencies such as framing, confirmation bias, satisficing, and teleological perspectives, as well as motivated reasoning. Such missteps foster methodological, empirical, and psychological mistakes and biases. Specifically, they promote the naturalizing error, whereby cultural ideology and values are projected onto an apparently objective description of nature. Concrete remedies are offered to aid scientists in conducting and reporting their research goals and findings more responsibly and effectively (relevant also to educators and other communicators who convey these findings publicly). Recommendations include acknowledging that human nature claims are often context-dependent, seeking multiple critical perspectives, and explicitly labeling uncertainties. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Adjudicating the Debate Over Two Models of Nature AppreciationSheila Lintott (bio)It seems commonplace to point out that we aesthetically appreciate a wide variety of objects: that is, art objects are not the only good candidates for aesthetic appreciation.1 We know from experience that one can aesthetically appreciate not only Georgia O'Keefe's White Trumpet Flower, but also a white trumpet flower. Similarly, we can aesthetically appreciate both a pictorial (...) representation of the human form and that form instantiated in certain prime specimens. We do so, moreover, without classifying either flowers or human beings as art objects. Yet, the paradigm of aesthetic appreciation today, in both everyday life and in educative contexts, is the appreciation of art, which explains why we tend to try to understand what makes aesthetic appreciation appropriate in terms of what makes art appreciation appropriate. This approach may not be entirely mistaken, for beginning with the familiar is always a good plan. However, it must be done with care, otherwise important differences between our relationships with the art we appreciate and with the nature we appreciate may be overlooked, thereby obscuring salient differences in the appreciation of each.In this essay, I focus on the issue of the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature and offer an overview of a contemporary debate on the topic. I begin with a general discussion of art and nature appreciation. I then summarize Kendall Walton's theory of appropriate art appreciation and explain his skepticism regarding the possibility of appropriate and inappropriate nature appreciation. Next, I discuss two models according to which Walton is mistaken, as the philosophers who present these models, Allen Carlson and Noël Carroll, do so to illustrate how nature appreciation can be properly considered appropriate or inappropriate. It may seem that given the recent proliferation of models of nature appreciation, the last thing we should seek is yet another model. However, in the end, I shall argue the need for a new and different kind of model, one that is a revisionist and extensionist model of nature appreciation. [End Page 52]Art and Nature AppreciationConcerning the perceptual activity of the audience, how we ought to appreciate artworks is largely uncontroversial. Perhaps this is why Carlson opens his attempt to understand the aesthetic appreciation of nature with a presentation of the aesthetic appreciation of art, explaining that "with art objects there is a straightforward sense in which we know both what and how to aesthetically appreciate."2 Although not all artworks offer "straightforward" examples of aesthetic appreciation, Carlson's general point is reasonably motivated. As Kendall Walton succinctly explains: "Paintings and sculptures are to be looked at; sonatas and songs are to be heard. What is important about these works of art, as works of art, is what can be seen or heard in them."3 That we ought to look at paintings and listen to sonatas seems obvious for at least two reasons. First, via formal education and informal interactions, we have grown familiar with the conventions of art appreciation; second, such conventions find experiential reinforcement when, for example, our auditory sense is tickled by a Mozart concerto.4Underlying our relative lack of confidence when it comes to nature appreciation is the obvious fact that nature, unlike art, is not an artifact. Nature was not made by beings like us; it was made neither for our use, nor for our entertainment, nor for our appreciation.5 As Carlson puts it, "art objects are our own creations; it is for this reason that we know what is and what is not part of a work, which of its aspects are of aesthetic significance, and how to appreciate them" (ANE, 41). We need, therefore, a model of nature appreciation that will serve as a source of education regarding how best to appreciate nature and will offer the confidence we lack and the guidance we seek.It might seem that we should simply apply our knowledge of art to nature appreciation — that is, appreciate nature as if it were art. However, as numerous philosophers have noticed, this approach is mistaken.6 The mistake is both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, it is a category error... (shrink)

Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality requires one to (...) act against one's self-interest while insisting on the categorical, inescapable, or overriding status of moral considerations: they argue that morality requires magic, then (rightly) claim that there is no such thing as magic. An alternate eudaimonist conception of morality is introduced which itself has an older provenance than the social point of view, dating to the ancient Greeks. Eudaimonism answers to the normative requirements of morality, yet does not require magic. Thus, the initial motivation for error theory is removed. (shrink)

The naturalization of logic aims at a revision of mainstream logic. In this article, I contend it is an urgent task to be completed. This new project will permit a new collaboration between logic and cognitive science. This can be accomplished doing for logic what many decades ago Quine and other philosophers undertook in the case of epistemology. First of all, this article analyzes how the naturalization can be achieved thanks to some insights provided by the recent John Woods’ book (...) Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference; important concepts that regard a naturalized logic are synthetically analyzed: errors, paradigm creep, third-way reasoning, consequence-having and consequence drawing, agent based reasoning. The article also takes advantage of my own studies, which are aimed both at exculpating the negative fallacious character of abduction and at illustrating the EC-model of it, I have recently proposed. Aiming at encouraging the project of naturalization of logic, the article specifically recommends the increase of logical research on abduction, and emphasizes how current philosophical and logical research on human inferences is indebted towards Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher whose importance and modernity are too often underestimated. The final part of the article will introduce an analysis of the importance of the so-called optimization of situatedness, a concept that is necessary to understand that maximization of “abducibility”, which characterizes modern science. (shrink)

Metaphysical realism is the view that most of the objects that populate the world exist independently of our thought and have their natures independently of how, if at all, we conceive of them. It is committed, in my opinion, to a robust form of essentialism. Many modern forms of anti-realism have their roots in a form of conceptualism, according to which all truths about essence knowable by us are ultimately grounded in our concepts, rather than in things 'in themselves'. My (...) aim is to show that conceptualist anti-realism is an incoherent doctrine and how we can support metaphysical realism and robust essentialism, while still properly acknowledging the cognitive role of concepts in mediating our grasp of the nature of mind-independent reality. (shrink)

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s approach to natural scientific research has unmistakable parallels to phenomenology. These parallels are clear enough to allow one to say confidently that Goethe’s delicate empiricism is indeed a phenomenology of nature. This paper examines how Goethe’s criticisms of Newton anticipated Husserl’s announcement of the crisis of the modern sciences, and it describes how Goethe, at a critical juncture in cultural history, addressed this emerging crisis through a scientific method that is virtually identical to the method (...) of contemporary empirical-phenomenological research in the human sciences. Goethe’s practice of science shares with phenomenology a participatory, morally-responsive, and holistic approach to the description of dynamic life-world phenomena. Delicate empiricism has its own version of the phenomenological epoché, and, like Husserl’s technique of imaginative variation, it strives to disclose the essential or archetypal structure of the phenomenon through the endowment of human imagination. However, a close reading of Goethe suggests that the tendency amongst some scholars to distinguish phenomenology as human science from the natural sciences is actually a costly error which unwittingly falls prey to implicit Cartesian assumptions. Goethe, however, manages to avoid these problems by performing from the first a phenomenology of nature’s sensibility. (shrink)

Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to these views, there seems to be conclusive evidence against the truth of our ordinary moral beliefs. Furthermore, many error theorists claim that, even if we accepted moral error theory, we could still in principle keep our first-order moral beliefs. This chapter argues that this last claim makes many popular versions of the (...) moral error theory incompatible with the standard philosophical accounts of beliefs. Functionalism, normative theories of beliefs, representationalism, and interpretationalism all entail that being sensitive to thoughts about evidence is a constitutive feature of beliefs. Given that many moral error theorists deny that moral beliefs have this quality, their views are in a direct conflict with the most popular views about the nature of beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how realist moral naturalists can provide an intra-theoretic explanation of the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This is a requirement on metaethical theories that has been recently defended by Akhlaghi (2021). After clarifying Akhlaghi’s argument and responding to Evers’s (2021) recent rebuttal, I argue that even under the assumption that moral facts are grounded in an appropriate subset of natural facts (N-facts), there is still a non-zero probability of wholesale moral error. This is demonstrated (...) by considering three types of epistemically possible scenarios: specifically, it could either be that N-facts do not actually exist, or that N-facts exist in a way that entails wholesale moral error, or that N-facts exist in a non-error theoretic way, but their existence is temporally restricted. (shrink)

Error is protean, ubiquitous and crucial in scientific process. In this paper it is argued that understanding scientific process requires what is currently absent: an adaptable, context-sensitive functional role for error in science that naturally harnesses error identification and avoidance to positive, success-driven, science. This paper develops a new account of scientific process of this sort, error and success driving Self-Directed Anticipative Learning (SDAL) cycling, using a recent re-analysis of ape-language research as test example. The example shows the limitations of (...) other accounts of error, in particular Mayo’s (Error and the growth of experimental knowledge, 1996) error-statistical approach, and SDAL cycling shows how they can be fruitfully contextualised. (shrink)

Any attempt to develop biosemiotics either towards a new biological ground theory or towards a metaphysics of living nature necessitates some kind of naturalization of its semiotic concepts. Instead of standard physicalistic naturalism, a certain kind of semiotic naturalism is pursued here. The naturalized concepts are defined as referring only to the objects of our external experience. When the semiotic concepts are applied to natural phenomena in biosemiotics, there is a risk of falling into anthropomorphic errors if the (...) semiotic concepts remain mentalistic. It is suggested that there really is an anthropomorphic error or “hidden prototype fallacy” arising from Peirce’s prototype for semiosis: the research process of an experimental scientist. The fallacy lies in the concept of the object of representation — it is questionable whether there are any objects of representation for bacteria and whether the DNA-signs have any objects. The conclusion is that Peircean semiotic concepts are naturalizable but only if they are based on some more primitive concept of representation. The causal origins of representations are not relevant, only their anticipative consequences (i.e. meaning). (shrink)