Differences in empathic abilities between acting, dance, and psychology students were explored, in addition to the appropriateness of existing empathy measures in the context of these cohorts. Students (N= 176) across Higher Education Institutions in the United Kingdom and Europe were included in the online survey analysis, consisting of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) test, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), the Empathy Quotient (EQ), and the E-drawing test (EDT), each measuring particular facets of empathy. Based on (...) existing evidence and our understanding of the discipline practices, we predicted that acting students would perform the best at identifying people’s emotional expressions but might lack other cognitive or affective empathy skills, particularly those related to emotional reactions. This cohort thus provides an opportunity to evaluate different empathy measures. While actors showed significantly higher RME scores than dancers, the difference between actors and psychologists was marginal. Moreover, actors’ scores did not differ significantly on other empathy measures, such as their concern for others’ emotional wellbeing or fantasy, both measured by IRI subscales. Psychology students scored highest in the IRI perspective taking subscale and the data supported anecdotal evidence that psychologists were more concerned for others’ emotional wellbeing than dancers or actors. Dancers seemed the least concerned with others’ perspectives and emotional states, which we explained through a somatosensory ‘inward’ focus required by their art form. Nevertheless, compared to the general population, our groups reported higher empathic abilities on all IRI subscales except for personal distress. Altogether, our study shows that the RME, the IRI, and the EDT vary in their susceptibility to different facets of empathic abilities in acting, dance, and psychology students whereas the EQ does not. Emotions can be expressed and perceived through language, facial expressions, or behavior. As many empathy tests focus on one type of signal they might miss other strategies. Where empathy tests are applied to individuals that have a predominance to read or respond to others in a particular way, as we showed through these three disciplines, they might not capture these empathic strategies. We thus propose that empathy tests must evolve by means of integrating varied forms of communication. (shrink)

Based on a dual process view of ethical judgment, we examine the role of empathic concern and perspective taking on the acceptability of lying to protect the company. We hypothesize that these traits will matter to a different extent under conditions of high and low perceived time hurriedness. Our research hypotheses are tested in a survey of 134 US workers. Results show that empathic concern reduces the acceptability of lying to protect the company for individuals who tend to (...) do things quickly and feel in a hurry at work. On the other hand, perspective taking reduces the acceptability of lying for individuals who experience low levels of time hurriedness. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

In empathic representation, experiences represent others’ experiences as the same as themselves. Feeling sad in empathizing with your friend represents your friend as feeling sad. The unusual role of identity in determining representational content explains how empathy helps us know what others’ experiences are like. Empathic representation is a counterexample to global externalism about content, as Twin Earth cases reveal. Applying it to moral feelings lets naturalistic realists in metaethics solve Moral Twin Earth problems and uphold the (...) universality of morality. (shrink)

Empathic perspective taking involves a phenomenally rich reaction to another’s mental state, in an attempt to understand the other by feeling with them. But can we take just any perspective, even if the person we aim to understand seems fundamentally different from us? In this paper, we will explore the possibility of empathically understanding others that are different from us with respect to one aspect of their mental life: their sensibility.

What you see can shape how you feel, and the route from seeing to feeling sometimes involves empathy – as you might empathize with a woman you see grieving the death of her child. But empathy also comes from what you see in pictures. Bellini's Pieta? is one among many paintings, drawings, prints, and photographs that evoke empathy – and are designed to do so. Going further, it seems that episodes of empathy triggered by pictures can help build up a (...) person's capacity for empathic response. Indeed, they do so by fortifying the link between seeing and empathy in a distinctive way. To establish this thesis, we need a broad conception of empathic response and also the right conception of what we see in pictures. (shrink)

Aim: To analyze the empathizing and systemizing profiles of Brazilian and Portuguese nursing undergraduates. Background: Empathy is a fundamental skill for nursing practice and should be analyzed during the student’s education. Methods: Descriptive study with cross-sectional design. Participants were 968 undergraduate students, including 215 (22.2%) Brazilians from a university in the state of São Paulo and 753 (77.8%) Portuguese students from a higher education institution in central Portugal. The Portuguese and Brazilian versions of the Empathizing/Systemizing Quotient have good internal consistency (...) and reliability. Ethical considerations: In Brazil, approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of São Paulo at Ribeirão Preto College of Nursing (protocol 191/2016) and in Portugal, from the Ethics Committee of the Health Sciences Research Unit: Nursing, Coimbra Higher School of Nursing (protocol P362-09/2016). Results: Most (86%) participants were female and aged between 20 and 24 years. In the general profile analysis between both groups, the domains “Social Skills,” “Contents,” and “Processes” scored higher. Gender differences exist for the feeling of empathy and systemizing, as women scored better on the short version of the Empathy Quotient and men on the Systemizing Quotient. Conclusion: As demonstrated in the domain scores for “Social Skills,” “Contents,” and “Processes,” the undergraduate nursing students analyzed have the ability to deal intuitively and spontaneously with social situations; they are also characterized as methodical people, who like to follow rules, and experience practice better than theory, and the women have a higher empathetic level than men, who in turn are more systemizing. (shrink)

The term empathy (Einfühlung) is rooted in philosophical aesthetics. It was used by German philosophers toward the end of the nineteenth century to describe our ability to imaginatively “feel into” works of art, which speak to us in a certain humanlike way insofar as they contain traces of what Mikel Dufrenne calls a “quasi-subjectivity” (1973, 393). In this chapter, rather than looking to art as an object of empathy, we instead consider art—and more specifically, music—as a resource that can facilitate (...) empathy. More precisely, we turn to two cases in which music seems to establish spaces that enable and sustain empathic connectedness, as well as the ability to explore and experiment with different forms of social understanding and affective sharing. The first case comes from the music tradition of free improvisation. Based on ethnographic fieldwork with the saxophone player, Torben Snekkestad, we become acquainted with an approach to performance that does not concern music primarily as an aesthetic product, but as a shared process of communicating and connecting nonverbally with others—a process that is essentially about exploring and experimenting with different forms of intersubjectivity and empathy. The second case comes from music therapy and autism, which can involve listening, singing, or joint music-making. We discuss studies indicating that musical interventions positively address core impair- ments in capacities required for empathy: for example, joint attention, social reciprocity, and verbal and nonverbal communication, as well as comorbidities of atypical perception, motor performance, and behavioral problems. Although these two cases are different, they share the trait of using music to establish spaces of nonverbal communication and empathic understanding. Drawing on these two cases, this chapter analyses how musical-empathic spaces emerge and how these spaces solicit the integration of both low-level affective and bodily resonance mechanisms as well as high-level acts of meta-reflection, imagination, and planning that contribute to different forms of empathic understanding. (shrink)

In this paper, I start by suggesting a new definition of empathy. I go on by answering the question of “Who feels empathy?”. I list some examples of people, illustrating how the level of feeling empathy differs from one category of people to another. It’s actually almost everybody who feels empathy: the baby, the good Samaritan and the other two priests, the tax evader, the psychopath, the judges, juries, lawyers, the politician, the bully adolescent, the therapist, etc.… Then I explain, (...) “Why empathy is experienced/felt differently?”, by drawing on some neuroscience data, and some literature in psychology or philosophy along with some personal suggestions or assumptions. Just to mention one plausible data: we know that the human brain is half developed at birth. It takes twelve to fourteen years for the brain to fully develop. And the frontal lobe continues to develop until the third decade of life! I suggest we must attend to these phases of brain development to learn empathy since that is when the plasticity of the brain and the learning kick-in. Hence, the third section of the paper demonstrates “How can we develop an empathic mind/behaviour given the nature of our empathic brain?”: with some supportive research and studies, I justify the statement that “ideally from early age, and all the way up to adulthood, empathy can be learned through nurturing, education, imitation…, through alternative realities such as mindfulness and awareness, and through therapy, memory improvement, training programs, etc.…” In the conclusion, I assert, using some philosophical thoughts and analogies, that a fully developed empathic behaviour, that embraces all three aspects cognitive, affective and compassionate empathy, being the opposite of indifference, is the vehicle to a peaceful, harmonious and just society. (shrink)

The epistemic and moral worth of empathy is deeply contested. Some doubt the possibility and sufficiency of empathic knowledge. Others question whether knowing how another feels is causally linked to moral actions. Though some have defended empathy as a form of knowing or an important epistemic endeavor, there is a gap in these responses that weakens their force against empathy’s skeptics. On the one hand, the epistemologists tend to focus on individuals. On the other hand, the moral theorists and (...) moral-epistemologists tend to focus on the social. Here, I contend that the first group could learn from the second and, together, form a stronger defense of empathy’s epistemic import. Namely, if, as epistemologists, we can begin from a conceptualization of empathy as a social epistemic practice within which knowledge is formed and confirmed with others, then we can better allow for possibility in understanding how another feels, reliability in empathic processes, and appropriate sensitivity to variance and degrees of empathic knowing. (shrink)

Men typically express more willingness than women to perpetrate fraudulent acts like lying in negotiations. However, women express just as much willingness in some cases. We develop and test a theory to explain these mixed findings. Specifically, we hypothesize that situational cues that bring about competitive or empathic feelings mitigate sex differences in lying to negotiation counterparts. Results from four experiments confirm our hypotheses. Experiment 1 showed that men and women express equal willingness to lie when negotiating with (...) counterparts toward whom they felt either great competitiveness or empathy. Experiment 2 extended these results by confirming that men only express more willingness to lie absent competitive or empathic feelings towards a counterpart. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that inducing competitive or empathic feelings toward a counterpart eliminated sex differences in lying by leading women to lie more and men to lie less, respectively. Overall, our results suggest that the extent to which negotiators experience competitive or empathic feelings play important roles in whether sex differences in lying in negotiations emerge. (shrink)

Dominant theoretical models of autism and resultant research enquiries have long centered upon an assumed autism-specific empathy deficit. Associated empirical research has largely relied upon cognitive tests that lack ecological validity and associate empathic skill with heuristic-based judgments from limited snapshots of social information. This artificial separation of thought and feeling fails to replicate the complexity of real-world empathy, and places socially tentative individuals at a relative disadvantage. The present study aimed to qualitatively explore how serious literary fiction, through (...) its ability to simulate real-world empathic response, could therefore enable more ecologically valid insights into the comparative empathic experiences of autistic and non-autistic individuals. Eight autistic and seven non-autistic participants read Of Mice and Men for six days while completing a semi-structured reflective diary. On finishing the book, participants were asked to engage in three creative writing tasks that encouraged reflective thinking across the novel. Thematic and literary analysis of the diary reflections and writing tasks revealed three main themes Distance from the Novel; Mobility of Response; Re-Creating Literature. Findings demonstrated the usefulness of serious literature as a research tool for comparing the empathic experiences of autistic and non-autistic individuals. Specifically, autistic individuals often showed enhanced socio-empathic understandings of the literature with no empathy deficits when compared to non-autistic participants. (shrink)

Previous conversation analytic studies of institutional interaction included analyses of empathy in interaction. These studies revealed that professionals may use empathy displays not only to validate the client’s worry, but also to perform actions oriented to other institutional goals and tasks such as closing off a troubles-telling sequence. In this article, we present an analysis of empathically designed responses in Dutch telephone counseling. The data consist of 36 calls from the Alcohol and Drugs Info Line. In some of the calls, (...) clients’ troubles-telling includes ‘emotion discourse’, that is, descriptions of their feelings/emotions. Counselors may respond to these descriptions using conventional empathy displays like ‘I can imagine that’ and ‘I understand that’ in a range of verbal and prosodic variations. The analysis reveals that these responses open up advice sequences that vary in the extent to which they treat the client’s articulated feelings as valid. Most are affiliating, treating the client’s feelings as the basis for advice, while some are less affiliative, putting the client’s feelings into perspective or implicitly questioning their legitimacy. Hence, empathically designed responses are pivots to advice-giving. (shrink)

Drawing on interviews with people from the advertising and technology industry, legal experts and policy makers, this paper assesses the rise of emotion detection in digital out-of-home advertising, a practice that often involves facial coding of emotional expressions in public spaces. Having briefly outlined how bodies contribute to targeting processes and the optimisation of the ads themselves, it progresses to detail industrial perspectives, intentions and attitudes to data ethics. Although the paper explores possibilities of this sector, it pays careful attention (...) to existing practices that claim not to use personal data. Centrally, it argues that scholars and regulators need to pay attention to the principle of intimacy. This is developed to counter weaknesses in privacy that is typically based on identification. Having defined technologies, use cases, industrial perspectives, legal views and arguments about jurisprudence, the paper discusses this ensemble of perspectives in light of a nationwide survey about how UK citizens feel about the potential for emotion detection in out-of-home advertising. (shrink)

This book analyzes the impact that large socio-economic inequalities have on how we relate to each other emotionally and intellectually. How, the question is, could these inequalities not influence the goods we aspire to or the content of what we imagine to be (or what could be) the case? How could they not influence our capacity to empathize with those who are either higher or lower on the socio-economic ladder? The book thus sets itself the task of proving that the (...) impact of inequality reaches far beyond measurable differences of income or capital. Inequalities have emotional impacts and influence our aspirational, imaginative, and empathic capacities. Further, the study suggests that feelings do not just passively register given inequalities but serve themselves as engines of social differentiation. This is particularly true of relative feelings such as envy, contempt, shame, or hatred that structure social relations and mark social distance and differentiation. The book sketches a relational theory of democracy that construes equality as a social relationship and thereby questions the strong focus most studies of inequality put on distributional questions. In a wide sense, questions of inequality should be tackled within a frame not just highlighting relative economic standing but also relative emotional standing. (shrink)

The memoir Escape from Camp 14 tells the story of a camp-born North Korean prisoner. The deprived conditions in which he grew up give rise to hypotheses as to what must be present in our interactions as we are ‘political animals’. The chapter argues that the story of a childhood in the camp makes us think in a new way about the ‘capability of being partner in an association’ that one who is without a city lacks. The chapter examines, in (...) particular, what type of empathy could agree with Aristotle’s statement that the city is by nature prior to individual. Projective empathy is discarded in this respect. Concepts close to empathy in Aristotle’s works are surveyed: (1) feeling the same as a friend feels, (2) emotional contagion, (3) discernment, and (4) education from music. An Aristotelian concept of empathy is then defined. It is suggested in the chapter that in extreme cases the absence of empathy leads to the incapability of association, and an individual who lacks a minimal sense of empathy becomes an apolis. (shrink)

If, as argued in some simulationist accounts, empathy aims at grasping the phenomenal richness of the other’s experience and resonating with it, it is difficult to explain our empathy with emotions that we have never experienced ourselves. According to a long philosophical tradition, imagination is constrained by experience. We have to be acquainted with the qualitative feel of the other’s experience in order to imagine it. A critical view of simulationist accounts would claim that if we cannot imagine how the (...) other feels because we are not acquainted with it, empathy cannot take place. Contrary to such criticism, this paper takes a moderately optimistic view of the simulationist claim. It develops a model to explain how we imagine the other’s emotions by drawing on phenomenal concepts, affective memories, and imaginative scaffoldings. I argue that this model can explain how we empathize with the other’s emotions regardless of whether these are familiar or novel to us. However, in the latter case, the imagined phenomenal quality is not identical but probably only similar to the other’s emotion. This similarity suffices for us to speak about empathy. (shrink)

Shakespeare’s imagination lies at the heart of his empathic approach. A reading of The Tempest shows how Shakespeare creates a magical isle dominated by Prospero, who some critics suggest is his alter ego. A synopsis of the play is followed by a discussion of Shakespeare’s magic and examples of his extraordinary imagination. These discussions illuminate the use of a doctor’s imagination in empathic relationships with patients. The chapter explores differences between sympathy and empathy. If doctors are to avoid (...) burnout they need to imagine the patient’s world from an other-orientated perspective, rather than taking a self-orientated view of their feelings in the patient’s situation. (shrink)

Feelings of belonging are integral in people’s choice of what career to pursue. Women and men are disproportionately represented across careers, starting with academic training. The present research focuses on two fields that are similar in their history and subject matter but feature inverse gender gaps—psychology (more women than men) and philosophy (more men than women)—to investigate how theorized explanations for academic gender gaps contribute to feelings of belonging. Specifically, we simultaneously model the relative contribution of theoretically relevant (...) individual differences (empathizing, systematizing, and intellectual combativeness) as well as life goals (prioritization of family, money, and status) to feelings of belonging and majoring in psychology or philosophy. We find that men report higher intellectual combativeness than women, and intellectual combativeness predicts feelings of belonging and majoring in philosophy over psychology. Although systematizing and empathizing are predictive of belonging and, in turn, majoring in psychology and philosophy, respectively, when other factors are taken into account, women and men do not differ in empathizing and systematizing. Women, more than men, report prioritizing having a family, wealth, and status in choosing a career, and these directly or indirectly feed into feelings of belonging and majoring in psychology, in contrast to prior theory. Together, these findings suggest that students’ perceptions of their own combativeness and the extent to which they desire money and status play essential roles in women’s feeling they belong in psychology and men’s feeling they belong in philosophy. (shrink)

An increasingly popular suggestion is that empathy and/or sympathy plays a foundational role in understanding harm norms and being motivated by them. In this paper, I argue these emotions play a rather more moderate role in harms norms than we are often led to believe. Evidence from people with frontal lobe damage suggests that neither empathy, nor sympathy is necessary for the understanding of such norms. Furthermore, people's understanding of why it is wrong to harm varies and is by no (...) means limited to considerations of welfare arising from the abilities to sympathize and/or empathize. And the sorts of considerations of welfare that are central to sympathy and, to some extent empathy, are often already moralized. As such, these considerations cannot form the non-moral foundation of harm norms. Finally, empathy and sympathy are not the only emotions that motivate harm norms. Indeed, much of the evidence that has been adduced in favor of the motivational force of empathy and sympathy are studies on helping, which is quite a different behavior than aggression inhibition. Understanding and being motivated by harm norms are complex abilities. To understand them better, we need to move beyond the current fixation on empathy and sympathy. (shrink)

Often in our everyday lives, for instance, in decision-taking, empathizing with others, and engaging with fictions, we are able to imagine what a particular emotion feels like. This chapter analyzes the structure of these imaginings as a kind of experiential imagining. After introducing the topic (section 1), I argue that these imaginings cannot be explained exclusively by their content and that a focus on the mode of imagining is required. We not only imagine having emotions, but we also imagine them (...) experientially, and this means that we imagine feeling them (section 2). I proceed to analyze the content of such imaginings in terms of the phenomenal properties of emotions undergone from a particular subjective perspective within the imagined scenario (section 3). Next, I argue that the mode in which such emotions are experientially imagined requires other-oriented perspective-shifting and the recreation of an emotion-like state (section 4). I examine how we recreate emotion-like states in two cases: when the emotion has been previously felt (section 5) and when it has not been previously experienced (section 6). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 7). (shrink)

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich knowledge of the empathic experience of pain by using an experimental phenomenological method. (...) Method: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main-themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. Temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory for non-interactive social experience. (shrink)

Drawing from research on moral judgment and affective dysfunction, we examined how trait psychopathy and alexithymia, which are characterized as empathic deficits, relate to utilitarian moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. As predicted, primary and secondary psychopathy traits and alexithymia were associated with reduced empathic concern. However, primary psychopathy and difficulty identifying feelings (one of three alexithymia traits), but not secondary psychopathy and other two alexithymia traits, were associated with utilitarian judgments. Moreover, hierarchical regression analysis showed that primary (...) psychopathy, difficulty identifying feelings, and empathic concern made unique contributions to the prediction of direct harm on the victim, whereas alexithymia traits made weaker contributions. Although the lack of affective empathy is found in psychopathy and alexithymia, the process through which the two traits lead to utilitarian judgment in sacrificial dilemmas may be distinct. The present findings add to the growing literature, contributing to a fuller picture of the relationship between empathy, trait psychopathy, and alexithymia. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of US states have adopted laws that require pregnant women to have an ultrasound examination, and be shown images of their foetus, prior to undergoing a pregnancy termination. In this paper, I examine one of the basic presumptions of these laws: that seeing one’s foetus changes the ways in which one might act in regard to it, particularly in terms of the decision to terminate the pregnancy or not. I argue that mandatory ultrasound laws compel (...) women into a position of moral spectatorship and require them to recognise the foetus as a being for whom they are responsible, particularly through empathic responses to ultrasound images. The approach I propose extends the project of a bioethics of the image and highlights the need for a critical analysis of the political mobilization of empathy in discussions of abortion. (shrink)

Mindreading, simulation, empathy and central imagining are often used interchangeably in current analytic philosophy, and typically defined as imagining what the other wants and believes – to run these states “off-line.” By imagining the other’s beliefs and desires, one will come to understand and predict his emotional and behavioural reactions. Many have suggested that films may trigger engagement in the characters’ perspectives, and one finds similar use of these terms in film theory. Imagining the characters’ states – with emphasis on (...) mental states – has for example been labelled as central imagining (Choi 2005; Smith 1995), imagining from the inside (Smith 1997), and empathetic reenactment (Currie 1995). In a similar vein, understanding the meaning of a narrative event for a character is understood as empathy (Tan 1996). These accounts all point to ways in which the spectator understands the character and the situation the character is in. Nevertheless, one also finds a different use of the term empathy in film theory, namely as a matching feeling with the character. The emphasis here is not on understanding the character and the narrative situation, but on the emotional output of the process. Often automatic, hardwired affective matching mechanisms are emphasized. This matching feeling with the character has also been discussed as empathy (Grodal 1997; Plantinga 1999; Smith 1995). While all these authors discuss what makes a spectator experience aspects of a character’s state, they point to different kinds of character engagement, and discuss it using varying terms. There also seems to be disagreement as to how film may cue the spectator to engage in these different ways. Here I offer an integrative account of empathy, where all these processes are labelled as empathic. The differences and similarities between them are explored. I argue that, broadly speaking, there are two different kinds of film, each of which elicits its own kind of empathy. Nevertheless, the common core to these kinds of engagement in a character justifies us in calling them empathy. (shrink)

Using a relational leadership lens, this study aims to gain a deeper understanding of empathic conversations with a focus on leadership ethics. It adopts an entitative perspective in relational leadership and examines leadership conversations as a two-way influence relationship, highlighting their interdependencies and collective role in the co-construction of meaning. Data from facial expression software and perception surveys are analyzed. The results of this study reveal the influence of gendered leadership on emotions, emotional bonding moments triggered by humor, and (...) cultural dynamics in leadership conversations. Leaders’ feeling-based questions and participants’ willingness to share their emotions, coupled with emotion synchronization, create a constructive space where both feel invited, cared for, and valued. The study shows that emotional bonds foster the expression of generosity, care, and responsibility, enhancing satisfaction for both leaders and participants. Overall, this study enriches relational leadership theory and practice by underscoring the connection between empathy and leadership ethics. (shrink)

In The Crusades Through Arab Eyes, Franco-Lebanese historian Amin Maalouf recounts the story of the ‘Frankish invasions’ as they are remembered by ‘the other side’, the Arabs, rather than the standard story of the ‘Crusades’ from the Christian Occident. Using the novel as an exercise in imaginative identification with ‘another’, this chapter raises the question: can we see through other’s eyes? Beginning with Arindam Chakrabarti’s articulation of the problems of epistemic access to a second person’s feelings and of knowing (...) another subject, I situate the aim of seeing through other’s eyes as a related but distinct issue. On my account, ‘seeing through other’s eyes’ does not concern the problem of treating the other subject as an object of knowledge, but rather the ability to detach ourselves from our own perspective in order to ‘see’ differently – in sym-pathy with the other. I argue that this crucially involves imagination, or the capacity to invent the reality of the other. Although distinct from the other’s reality, this imaginative capacity brings us closer to the other subject. It addresses the empathic quality of our vision, and the ability to imaginatively reconstruct the other’s ecology. Reading The Crusades Through Arab Eyes as an illustration of a strategy for seeing through other’s eyes, I argue with Maalouf that imaginative identification contributes to ‘building bridges between the two shores of the Mediterranean’, fostering co-existence. (shrink)

The concept of empathy describes our capacity to understand the emotions and intentions of others and to relate to our conspecifics. Numerous studies investigated empathy as a state as well as a stable personality trait. For example, recent studies in neuroscience suggest, among other brain areas such as the insula or the ACC, a role of the somatosensory cortices for empathy. Since the classic understanding of the primary somatosensory cortex is to represent touch on the body surface, we here aimed (...) to test whether tactile performance is linked to the personality trait empathy. To test this, we examined the tactile acuity of 95 healthy participants by using a two-point discrimination threshold task at the index fingers. Trait empathy was assessed by employing the interpersonal reactivity index, which measures self-reported empathy with four scales. Results of regression analyses suggested the subscale empathic concern to be positively associated with performance in the tactile acuity task. We discuss this finding in the light of recent studies on empathy and consider possible implications of tactile training to enhance empathy. (shrink)

The phenomenological understanding of empathy as the direct experiencing of the mental states (feelings, intentions, moods) of others eschews the identification of empathy with caring. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of sadistic pleasure, indifference, or malice as consequences of empathic experience. In this paper, I intend to defend the place of caring as an inseparable part of the empathic experience, specifically when understood as direct perception. My defense relies on (a) conceiving of attentive (...) concern as a perceptual predisposition, and (b) understanding the caring responsiveness of the empathizer as embedded in her direct perception of the empathee's mental states. My claim proceeds by three steps. Firstly, I will present the need to include caring within empathy through the problem that arises from excluding it. Secondly, I will argue for the presence of active responsiveness, inherent in the phenomenological concept of perception and expressed more explicitly in its Gibsonian understanding. Thirdly, I will propose my understanding of attentive concern as a predisposition, which together with the intentionality attributed to the other (itself also a disposition) forms the pre-perceptual basis for identifying empathy with caring. (shrink)

Social exclusion has a significant impact on cognition, emotion, and behavior. Some behavioral studies investigated how social exclusion affects pain empathy. Conclusions were inconsistent, and there is a lack of clarity in identifying which component of pain empathy is more likely to be affected. To investigate these issues, we used a Cyberball task to manipulate feelings of social exclusion. Two groups participated in the same pain empathy task while we recorded event-related potentials when participants viewed static images of body (...) parts in painful and neutral situations. The results showed early N2 differentiation between painful and neutral pictures in the central regions in both groups. The pattern at the late controlled processing stage was different. Parietal P3 amplitudes for painful pictures were significantly smaller than those for neutral pictures in the social exclusion group; they did not differ in the social inclusion group. We observed a parietal late positive potential differentiation between painful and neutral pictures in both groups. LPP amplitudes were significantly smaller in the social exclusion group than those in the social inclusion group for painful stimuli. Our results indicate that social exclusion does not affect empathic responses during the early emotional sharing stage. However, it down-regulates empathic responses at the late cognitive controlled stage, and this modulation is attenuated gradually. The current study provides neuroscientific evidence of how social exclusion dynamically influences pain empathy. (shrink)

Resumo Neste artigo, defender-se-á uma interpretação do filme A Time to Kill, como sendo uma narrativa cinematográfica falível, mesmo sem a presença de um narrador. Neste texto, assume-se, que uma narrativa falível resulta de um defeito estético e ético do filme. Deste modo, a estrutura estética do filme representa a intenção do realizador em contar a sua versão da história, influenciando assim o seu significado e efeito empático. Com o evoluir da narrativa cinematográfica, as regras de inferência tornam-se cada vez (...) mais complexas. Ainda assim, a convenção cinematográfica estabelece um contexto e define limites identificadores para a sua interpretação. Uma história mal contada inibe a reconstrução imaginativa do espectador, no que diz respeito às motivações das personagens e da causalidade narrativa. Portanto, a qualidade narrativa é essencial para o raciocínio narrativo e empatia estética. Se a narrativa oferece uma compreensão do mundo e de outras pessoas, que de outra forma seriam inacessíveis, e se a forma ou o estilo da narrativa determinam a sua eficácia, então, as formas assumidas pelas nossas histórias têm consequências epistemológicas. Palavras-chave : estética, ética, identificação, narrativa falível, narrativa, raçaIn this paper, I argue for an interpretation of A Time to Kill as an unreliable, yet narrator-less, cinematic narrative. In my view, unreliable narration is an aesthetic and ethical flaw of the film rather than of the narrator. Thus, the film’s aesthetic structure represents the director’s storytelling intentions, and influences its meaning and empathic affect. As cinematic narrative evolves, rules of inference become increasingly complex. Still, filmic convention establishes a context and sets identifiable boundaries for interpretation. A poorly told story inhibits the viewer’s imaginative reconstruction of narrative causation and characters’ motives. Thus, narrative quality is essential to narrative reasoning and aesthetic empathy. If narrative provides an understanding of the world and other people that is otherwise inaccessible, and if the form or style of narrative determines its effectiveness, then the forms our stories take have epistemological consequences. Keywords : aesthetics, ethics, identification, narrative, race, unreliable narrative. (shrink)

Background: Empathy is of great importance in nursing, as it helps us to see and meet the needs of patients and hence to care for patients in an appropriate way. Therefore, it is of great importance that nursing students and nurses develop their ability to empathize. Objective: The study aimed at gaining knowledge on what characterizes undergraduate nursing students’ ability to empathize with patients during their first practice in a nursing home. In addition, the aim of the study was to (...) investigate what nursing students think is important with regard to upholding their ability to empathize with patients in a professional way. Research design: This research has a phenomenological and hermeneutic design, based on qualitative interviews. Participants and research context: A total of 11 undergraduate nursing students participated in interviews during or right after their first practice in a nursing home. Ethical considerations: Norwegian Social Science Data Services approved the study. Participants were informed that their participation was voluntary. The participants were also assured confidentiality, and they were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time, without providing any reasons. Findings: What the findings show is that affective empathy is strong among undergraduate nursing students in their first practice. They think the emotions are important to be able to empathize, and they are afraid of becoming indifferent. At the same time, they are afraid that the feelings will hinder them from acting in a professional manner. Discussion: The findings are discussed in light of previous theories on empathy, and especially perspectives on empathy, emotions, and morality. Conclusion: Affective empathy seems to be strong among nursing students, and this may be of great importance to be sensitive to patients’ well-being. However, affective and cognitive empathy should be balanced if nurses will have to meet patients in a professional way. (shrink)

AntecedentsPrevious research on citizens’ reactions after terrorist events has shown that positive reactions can also emerge alongside pain and horror. Positive emotions have been widely associated with an abstract style of thinking. In the context of the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015, we explored Spanish citizens’ positive reactions – empathic concern, positive emotional climate, and esteem for humanity – and examined the relationships of these responses with an abstract style of thinking.MethodA longitudinal study was designed involving an online questionnaire (...) that was administered 10 days, 3 weeks, and 2 months after the attacks.ResultsEmpathic concern and personal distress toward Parisians decreased from the weeks following the attacks to 2 months later, with empathic concern always being more intense than personal distress. Emotional climate was perceived as more hostile than positive, although positive feelings persisted. People reported moderately positive esteem for humanity. Individuals with a more abstract style of thinking reported greater empathic concern, a more positive emotional climate, and more esteem for humanity.ConclusionsOur results support and extend previous research showing that abstraction enhances people’s resilience, even under traumatic circumstances such as those surrounding a terrorist attack. (shrink)

The article explores the underlying reasons for patients’ self‐perception of being a burden (SPB) in family settings, including its impact on relationships when wishes to die (WTD) are expressed. In a prospective, interview‐based study of WTD in patients with advanced cancer and non‐cancer disease (organ failure, degenerative neurological disease, and frailty) SPB was an important emerging theme. In a sub‐analysis we examined (a) the facets of SPB, (b) correlations between SPB and WTD, and (c) SPB as a relational phenomenon. We (...) analyzed 248 interviews with 62 patients, their family caregivers, and professionals using grounded theory and interpretive phenomenological analysis. SPB appeared as important empathic concern in care situations. Patients expressed many sorts of concerns for others, but also perceived an altered self‐understanding that did not meet mutual expectations within relationships. In SPB associated with WTD three constellations were found: (a) WTD to unburden others; (b) patients decided against hastening death to prevent being a further burden to others (in these cases, the SPB counteracted the wish to die); and (c) both wishes for and against dying were sustained by SPB. These patients often felt paralyzed and suffered deeply. Family caregivers felt emotionally touched by SPB and tried to unburden patients by caring and compassion. We concluded that the impact of SPB on a WTD and the various meanings the facets of SPB have in balancing relationships need to be worked out individually. An early palliative and narrative approach is warranted. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy (...) is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly. (shrink)

In this article, we aim to evaluate the role of robots’ personality-driven behavioural patterns on users’ intention to use in an entertainment scenario. Toward such a goal, we designed two personalities: one introverted with an empathic and self-comparative interaction style, and the other extroverted with a provocative and other-comparative interaction style. To evaluate the proposed technology acceptance model, we conducted an experiment (N = 209) at a public venue where users were requested to play a game with the support (...) of the TIAGo robot. Our findings show that the robot personality affects the acceptance model and three relevant drivers: perceived enjoyment, perceived usefulness, and social influence. The extroverted robot was perceived as more useful than the introverted, and participants who interacted with it were faster at solving the game. On the other hand, the introverted robot was perceived as more enjoyable but less useful than the extroverted, and participants who interacted with it made fewer mistakes. Taken together, these findings support the importance of designing proper robot personalities in influencing users’ acceptance, featuring that a given style can elicit a different driver of acceptance. (shrink)

Empathy is sometimes so hard to achieve that one may wonder if it is a virtue for caregivers at all. Perhaps a caregiver cannot always know how a patient feels, and perhaps that knowledge is sometimes too painful to possess. A nuanced understanding of what empathy entails and of the conditions for attaining it can help ground its possibility.

This paper discuss the phenomenon of empathy in social robotics and is divided into three main parts. Initially, I analyse whether it is correct to use this concept to study and describe people’s reactions to robots. I present arguments in favour of the position that people actually do empathise with robots. I also consider what circumstances shape human empathy with these entities. I propose that two basic classes of such factors be distinguished: biological and socio-cognitive. In my opinion, one of (...) the most important among them is a sense of group membership with robots, as it modulates the empathic responses to representatives of our- and other- groups. The sense of group membership with robots may be co-shaped by socio-cognitive factors such as one’s experience, familiarity with the robot and its history, motivation, accepted ontology, stereotypes or language. Finally, I argue in favour of the formulation of a pragmatic and normative framework for manipulations in the level of empathy in human–robot interactions. (shrink)

Empathic feelings seem to causally influence our moral judgments at least sometimes. But is empathy necessary for our ability to make moral judgments? And is it a good thing if our judgments are based on empathy? This chapter examines the contemporary debate on these issues.

It is commonly presupposed that there are no decisive differences between empathy with fictional characters on one hand and empathy with real persons on the other. I distinguish two types of processes of affect recognition "Perceptual Affect Recognition" and "Affective Affect Recognition". The consensus view about empathy with fictional characters has to be challenged if "empathy" refers to the former or the latter process because of the significant differences between the fictional and the non-fictional scenario: firstly, readers as "empathizers" cannot (...) perceive the fictional target person directly but only the literary text. This is especially problematic for Affective State Recognition. Secondly, fictional characters do not exist, at least not in the sense that they are real people or entities with mental states which leads to relevant differences of the accuracy conditions of Affective Affect Recognition in the fictional and the nonfictional scenario. (shrink)

Explanatory accounts of emotion require, among other things, theoretically tractable representations of emotional experience. Common methods for producing such representations have well-known drawbacks, such as observer interference or lack of ecological validity. Literature offers a valuable supplement. It provides detailed instructions for simulating emotions; when successful, it induces empathic emotions. It too involves distortions, through emotion-intensifying idealization and ideological biases. But these also relate to emotion study. There are three levels at which literature bears on emotion research: (1) the (...) individual work; (2) generic and related patterns; and (3) properties found widely across individual works and genres. Even at the third, most general level, literature suggests potentially important hypotheses about our pleasure in emotional simulation and our need to share emotional experiences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reading with FeelingDavid NovitzReading with Feeling, by Susan Feagin; viii & 260 pp. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, $27.50.There are things that critics and philosophers love to burble on about, and literary appreciation is one of them. Susan Feagin puts an end to our burbling. Even if one does not always agree with Feagin, it is a singular merit of her book that it points to the problems (...) that need to be addressed in order to offer a passable theory of appreciation. Her book is subtle, considered, and perceptive, and offers an account that is demanding yet informative and helpful.To appreciate a literary work, we are told, is “not merely to recognize that a work has certain properties,” still less that it has a specific value. Rather, it is to [End Page 201] interact with the work in a way that “gets the value out of it,” where “this involves being affectively or emotionally moved” by the fiction (p. 1).The account of appreciation that follows aims first to explain how affective responses to fiction are possible—where this involves describing in a detailed explanatory way, the activity of appreciation and what it necessarily involves. Second, it aims to explain what it is that warrants or justifies an affective response to literature.Although interpretation is related to, perhaps intertwined with, appreciation, Feagin is adamant that the two activities are entirely different. An interpretation is the end-result, the product, of a certain activity, and gives us the meaning of a work or its parts. Appreciation, by contrast, is the successful exercise of an ability—namely that of interacting appropriately with a text—and does not result in any end product (pp. 34–37). Hence the desire to appreciate a novel is the desire to do various things with it, and in the process to exercise an acquired ability, namely that of responding appropriately to it. The crucial thing about this desire, Feagin suggests, is that it does not involve the mental representation of its object: it is not, for instance, the desire to have experiences of a certain sort. It is what she calls a “no-rep desire” (pp. 51–58).One has to wonder about this. When I buy and sit down to read my next Joanna Trollope novel, I do so partly because I have a pretty good idea of the delights that lie in store. In Feagin’s terms, I wish to exercise a certain ability, and interact appropriately with the text, but in this case I desire to do so because of a well-founded idea that I am going to engage with a certain subject matter: with the personal lives of people in traumatic relationships, and with a range of subtle perceptions and observations about human frailties. While perhaps not fully “rep,” this is far from being a no-rep desire; yet it seems wrong to deny that I desire to appreciate the work.In the three chapters that follow, Feagin looks closely at the activities involved in appreciating a work. As we read, our psychological sensitivity to what we read next is changed, and we move into “different mental gears.” Here Feagin emphasizes the slides and shifts, and the repeated reconfigurations that enter into the appreciation of a text (chap. 3). Such cognitive and affective shifts are to some degree automatic, to some degree under the reader’s control, even though we do not formulate intentions to move into them. But either way, they are what Feagin calls sensitivities—that is, a psychological readiness to respond in certain ways to events in the fiction. Crucially, they introduce into appreciation a temporal dimension, since our sensitivities are enhanced or diminished by what precedes them, and this, as we shall shortly see, is of considerable significance when deciding whether our affective responses to a work are warranted.These mental shifts and slides are required for an empathetic engagement with fictional characters. Feagin’s approach here is largely based on contemporary work in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. As a result, [End Page 202] she suggests in chapter 4 that empathizing involves simulating another’s mental states; something that... (shrink)

This chapter turns to the specific methods Mengzi (and other Confucians) advocate for self-cultivation. The core of Mengzi’s account is that emotions arise from immediate stimulation, leading to an imperative to put oneself in the right situations. That basis in direct experience is extended and complicated by imagination and attention. Mengzi frequently points out the way in which certain situations will evoke feelings of compassion, shame, or aversion in us, while other situations will not, even if they are equally (...) bad. That leads to his idea of extension, which is a central theme of this chapter. Extension includes the method of empathic reciprocity, _shu_, not wanting to impose on others what we do not want imposed on ourselves, something resembling the Golden Rule. The chapter concludes with a discussion of our dependence on other people and the sharing of responsibility. (shrink)

According to Dominic Lopes, expressiveness in pictures should be analyzed solely in terms of “expression looks” of various sorts, namely the look of a figure, a scene and/or a design. But, according to this view, it seems puzzling that expressive pictures should have any emotional effect on their audiences. Yet Lopes explicitly ties his “contour theory” of expression in pictures to empathic responses in spectators. Thus, despite his deflationary account of pictorial expression, he claims that pictures can give us (...) practice in various “empathic skills.” I argue that Lopes’s account of empathic responses to pictures, while interesting and enlightening, nevertheless ignores the most important way in which pictures exercise and enhance our empathic skills, namely, by giving us practice in taking the emotional perspective of another person. (shrink)

Mind attribution may be divided into the subcategories of attribution of agency, associated with moral agency, and attribution of experience and emotion, associated with moral concern and moral patiency (Gray et al. Science 315(5812):619, 2007; Gray et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108(2):477–479, 2011b; Robbins and Jack Philosophical Studies 127(1):59–85, 2006). In this paper I attend to social context and the different psychological needs influencing the different types of mind attribution. A (...) need for social connection drives the attribution of experiences and emotions. The individual’s capacity to regulate emotional reactions is crucial for empathic concern. I further relate differences of mind attribution, attention, and emotional processing, to two different modes of functioning: In an interactive state of mind (comparable to the “second-person perspective” described by Schilbach et al. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press), social and emotional cues are attended to; In a detached task-oriented state of mind it may be beneficial to predict the behaviors of others but emotional information may not be attended to. The complexity and plasticity of mind attribution, including the possibility to train attentional mechanisms and regulation of emotions, is promising for the field of moral enhancement. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence, also known as AI, is the ability of a program to think, store information, perform human tasks, and learn from experience. The domain of artificial intelligence has significantly evolved over the past decades, founding applications in almost every field of individual and collective lives. Computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages, are now informing our daily routine. The constant improvement of this technology has recently (...) taken a leap in the direction of generating empathic AI: artificial machines programmed to interact with users’ emotions. But is it really possible to develop an empathic artificial agent? Can users in their turn develop an emotional engagement with artificial beings? The present essay analyzes the most recent developments in the field of human–AI interactions in order to provide tentative answers to these questions. (shrink)

[Emerging Scholar Prize Essay for Spindel Supplement] Some philosophers and psychologists have evaluated psychological egoism against recent experimental work in social psychology. Dan Batson (1991; forthcoming), in particular, argues that empathy tends to induce genuinely altruistic motives in humans. However, some argue that there are egoistic explanations of the data that remain unscathed. I focus here on some recent criticisms based on the idea of self-other merging or "oneness," primarily leveled by Robert Cialdini and his collaborators (1997). These authors argue (...) that the putatively altruistic subjects are acting on ultimately egoistic motives because empathic feelings for someone in distress tend to cause them to blur the distinction between themselves and the other. Employing a conceptual framework for the debate, I argue that the self-other merging explanation fails to explain the empathy-helping relationship on primarily non-empirical grounds, regardless of the empirical results Cialdini and colleagues report. (shrink)

Sadness is generally seen as a negative emotion, a response to distressing and adverse situations. In an aesthetic context, however, sadness is often associated with some degree of pleasure, as suggested by the ubiquity and popularity, throughout history, of music, plays, films and paintings with a sad content. Here, we focus on the fact that music regarded as sad is often experienced as pleasurable. Compared to other art forms, music has an exceptional ability to evoke a wide-range of feelings (...) and is especially beguiling when it deals with grief and sorrow. Why is it, then, that while human survival depends on preventing painful experiences, mental pain often turns out to be explicitly sought through music? In this article we consider why and how sad music can become pleasurable. We offer a framework to account for how listening to sad music can lead to positive feelings, contending that this effect hinges on correcting an ongoing homeostatic imbalance. Sadness evoked by music is found pleasurable: (1) when it is perceived as non-threatening; (2) when it is aesthetically pleasing; and (3) when it produces psychological benefits such as mood regulation, and empathic feelings, caused, for example, by recollection of and reflection on past events. We also review neuroimaging studies related to music and emotion and focus on those that deal with sadness. Further exploration of the neural mechanisms through which stimuli that usually produce sadness can induce a positive affective state could help the development of effective therapies for disorders such as depression, in which the ability to experience pleasure is attenuated. (shrink)

A substantial amount of research demonstrates that we sometimes discriminate against members of certain social groups, even in the absence of an intention to do so. One possible remedy to this kind of discrimination may be empathy. Perhaps, if we better understand what other people feel and think, and cultivate empathic feelings like sympathy and compassion, we will be less implicitly biased against them. In this paper, we critically reflect on the studies that have investigated this relationship. We (...) argue that in order to establish whether empathy really helps to overcome implicit bias, critical questions about the conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement of empathy and implicit bias need to be addressed first. In the second part of the paper, we reflect on the character of implicit bias and the role empathy may play in diminishing it, and argue that the relationship between empathy and implicit bias is not straightforward. (shrink)

This article examines how the interactive capabilities of companion robots, particularly their materiality and animate movements, appeal to human users and generate an image of aliveness. Building on Husserl’s phenomenological notion of a ‘double body’ and theories of emotions as affective responses, we develop a new understanding of the robots’ simulated aliveness. Analyzing empirical findings of a field study on the use of the robot Zora in care homes for older people, we suggest that the aliveness of companion robots is (...) the result of a combination of four aspects: 1) material ingredients, 2) morphology, 3) animate movements guided by software programs and human operators as in Wizard of Oz-settings and 4) anthropomorphising narratives created by their users to support the robot’s performance. We suggest that narratives on affective states, such as, sleepiness or becoming frightened attached to the robot trigger users’ empathic feelings, caring and tenderness toward the robot. (shrink)