Over the past decades, science funding shows a shift from recurrent block funding towards project funding mechanisms. However, our knowledge of how project funding arrangements influence the organizational and epistemic properties of research is limited. To study this relation, a bridge between science policy studies and science studies is necessary. Recent studies have analyzed the relation between the affordances and constraints of project grants and the epistemic properties of research. However, the potentially very different affordances and constraints of funding arrangements (...) such as awards, prizes and fellowships, have not yet been taken into account. Drawing on eight case studies of funding arrangements in high performing Dutch research groups, this study compares the institutional affordances and constraints of prizes with those of project grants and their effects on organizational and epistemic properties of research. We argue that the prize case studies diverge from project-funded research in three ways: 1) a more flexible use, and adaptation of use, of funds during the research process compared to project grants; 2) investments in the larger organization which have effects beyond the research project itself; and 3), closely related, greater deviation from epistemic and organizational standards. The increasing dominance of project funding arrangements in Western science systems is therefore argued to be problematic in light of epistemic and organizational innovation. Funding arrangements that offer funding without scholars having to submit a project-proposal remain crucial to support researchers and research groups to deviate from epistemic and organizational standards. (shrink)

Competing theories on the semantics of group pejorative terms (also known as‘slurs’)comprise both advocates and opponents to the Identity Thesis (IT), according to whichthese terms and their neutral counterparts do not differ in semantic value. In the oppo-nents’camp, Christopher Hom has offered an argument based on substitution of slurs andneutral counterparts that both supports his semanticist approach and cast doubts on all IT-based approaches to slurs. We aim to point to a dilemma triggered by this argument based on evidence showing (...) that substitution of some words (including but not restricted to slurs)for non-problematically co-referential pairs may fail to preserve truth-values in some linguistics contexts. (shrink)

In this chapter and the next, I apply the argument made in Chap. 2 specifically (but all chapters in general) to the ideas that body-brain-originated metaphors determine our cognition (this chapter), and to the postmodern deflation of rationality and the self in postmodernism (Chap. 7). The argument shows how these two movements overlook and bury too much of what they presuppose, and in that sense are incomplete, contradictory, and self-defeating.This chapter is specifically concerned with the reductionism of George Lakoff and (...) Mark Johnson. It will be argued that their rejection of objectivity and transcendental philosophy, which opens the door for their neurological determinism and their language-based “fuzzy logic” (Lakoff), has significant internal problems, enough to declare it as a self-defeating position, due to their physicalist presuppositions, their psychologism (Lakoff’s in particular), their devaluing of logic, and their misreading of Kant (Johnson in particular). (shrink)

Rationale Despite their inherently pervasive limitations, data from observational studies are increasingly relied upon by health car.

In everyday medical settings in Japan, physicians occasionally tell an elderly patient that their symptoms are “due to old age,” and there is some concern that patient care might be negatively impacted as a result. That said, as this phrase can have multiple connotations and meanings, there are certain instances in which the use of this phrase may not necessarily be indicative of ageism, or prejudice against the elderly. One of the goals in medical care is to address pain and (...) suffering that develops with age in elderly individuals, and whether or not aging is a disease is inconsequential. However, assuming that an individualized and thorough examination has been performed, there are some conditions that can be attributed only to age. Accordingly, physicians must acknowledge the merits and drawbacks of using the phrase “due to old age,” and exercise caution when using it. Both physicians and their elderly patients must share a common awareness of the incomplete and limited nature of modern medicine and its scope, and physicians must help their elderly patients accept and live with the aging phenomenon. (shrink)

The Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion mainly suggest that emotions can be reduced to evaluative beliefs or judgments. Specifically, evaluative beliefs are necessary but not sufficient conditions for evaluative judgments. And reducing emotions to evaluative judgments requires the subject’s conceptualizing ability. However, the Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion has many problems, including that evaluative beliefs are neither sufficient nor necessary for emotions; the evaluative judgment theory of emotion presupposes the subject’s conceptual content, but conceptual content is not a necessary and (...) sufficient condition for emotions; the requirement of conceptualization ability for evaluative judgments is too high, which makes emotions overintellectualize; and the add-on strategy of emotions cannot save the evaluative judgment theory of emotions as well. (shrink)

Determinations of the ethical acceptability of genetic therapy have relied on several distinctions in attempts to separate ethically acceptable genetic therapy from those possible therapies that could lead to genetic modifications of future human beings. One distinction that has been proposed is that genetic modifications of human somatic cells is ethically acceptable but that Germ-Line genetics modifications would be ethically objectionable. This paper examines several serious difficulties which call into question the ethical relevance of a somatic/Germ-Line distinction. Keywords: double effect, (...) future generations, Germ-Line modification CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

With the development of information technology and the Internet of Things, the distance between people has decreased. This has brought great convenience to people’s lives, but it has also greatly changed human life. Video games and short videos have become dominant forms of entertainment, significantly influencing children's attention and time allocation. Children should be learning and developing, but entertainment that primarily focuses on superficial engagement and instant gratification have invaded children’s lives, making it difficult for them to think deeply. This (...) has resulted in many social problems. As an emerging discipline, philosophy for children (P4C) invites us to investigate how to improve children’s mental lives, allowing them to engage in independent thinking and judgment in the era of the decline of critical thinking skills and reflective capacities. This paper introduces the origin of P4C, explores its educational principles and methodologies, and presents two case studies illustrating its application in fostering collaborative learning with children in a hyper-connected society, thus illustrating the potential of P4C in addressing societal challenges arising from technological development, including issues like existential meaninglessness, depression, social isolation, and excessive gaming. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractUsing the indices δ+ and δ* for assessing phylogenetic diversity may lead to spurious results and interpretations; it can bias recommendations for conservation and lead to inappropriate management decisions. Therefore these indices should be avoided and other indices based on quadratic entropy (Qδ+ and Q) should be used instead.

The perception theory of emotions mainly argues for the similarity between emotions and perception from different perspectives, including the argument for non-inferential structure, which proposes that emotions and perception share non-inferential structure and non-conceptual content; the argument from the epistemic role, which advocates for the similarity between emotions and perception from an epistemic perspective; and the argument from phenomenology, which argues for the similarity between emotions and perception from a phenomenal perspective. However, these arguments all have some problems. In the (...) argument for non-inferential structure, emotions not only follow the criterion of correctness but also the criterion of truth and are closer to beliefs, while perception only follows the criterion of correctness and is different from beliefs. The argument from the epistemic role overlooks the influence of individual differences on perception and emotions. The argument from phenomenology lacks reliable evidence for cognitively impenetrable emotions. (shrink)

Disappointing results from the last two chapters for alternative metatheologies can serve to make Worship-Worthiness Theology quite attractive, or at least more attractive than some would initially think it to be. On this approach, it is not merely a good idea to worship God, but it is our required response. Given this normative understanding of the nature of God, the question to be asked concerns the extent to which this viewpoint can sustain the starting points of alternative accounts, and here (...) I will argue that Worship-Worthiness Theology does a far better job at sustaining the starting point of Perfect Being Theology than it does of Creator Theology. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is shaping strategy, activities, interactions, and relationships in business and specifically in marketing. The drawback of the substantial opportunities AI systems and applications provide in marketing are ethical controversies. Building on the literature on AI ethics, the authors systematically scrutinize the ethical challenges of deploying AI in marketing from a multi-stakeholder perspective. By revealing interdependencies and tensions between ethical principles, the authors shed light on the applicability of a purely principled, deontological approach to AI ethics in marketing. (...) To reconcile some of these tensions and account for the AI-for-social-good perspective, the authors make suggestions of how AI in marketing can be leveraged to promote societal and environmental well-being. (shrink)

Traditional definitions of lying require that a speaker believe that what she asserts is false. Sam Fox Krauss seeks to jettison the traditional belief requirement in favour of a necessary condition given in a credence-accuracy framework, on which the liar expects to impose the risk of increased inaccuracy on the hearer. He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects. I argue, however, that Krauss's own account suffers from an identical drawback (...) of being unable to explain nearby cases; and even worse, that account fails to distinguish cases of telling lies from cases of telling the truth. (shrink)

What role does habit formation play in the development of sport skills? We argue that motor habits are both necessary for and constitutive of sensorimotor skill as they support an automatic, yet inherently intelligent and flexible, form of action control. Intellectualists about skills generally assume that what makes action intelligent and flexible is its intentionality, and that intentionality must be necessarily cognitive in nature to allow for both deliberation and explicit goal-representation. Against Intellectualism we argue that the habitual behaviours that (...) compose skilful action are accompanied by their specific, non-cognitive form of intentionality: this is motor intentionality, which is purposive and adaptive while involving no explicit deliberation or goal representation. Our account of habit based on Motor Intentionality explains why the formation of motor habits can sometimes act as the sole basis of skilful acquisition: Motor Intentionality is inherently purposeful because it is an embodied source of sensorimotor anticipation, pre-reflective motivation, and pragmatic know-how. Skill development through exercise always builds on a motor intentional component even when it is guided by Deliberate Practice to the point that, pace Intellectualism, Deliberate Practice is disclosed, not constrained, by habit formation. As suggested by the fact that repetitive exercises can play a major role in the development of flexible and intelligent sport skills, automatism is not a drawback for strategic control and improvisation but rather their pragmatic foundation. (shrink)

Kit Fine (2000) breaks with tradition, arguing that, pace Russell (e.g., 1903: 228), relations have neither directions nor converses. He considers two ways to conceive of these new "neutral" relations, positionalism and anti-positionalism, and argues that the latter should be preferred to the former. Cody Gilmore (2013) argues for a generalization of positionalism, slot theory, the view that a property or relation is n-adic if and only if there are exactly n slots in it, and (very roughly) that each slot (...) may be occupied by at most one entity. Slot theory (and with it, positionalism) bears the full brunt of Fine's (2000) symmetric completions and conflicting adicities problems. I fully develop an alternative, plural slot theory (or pocket theory), which avoids these problems, key elements of which are first considered by Yi (1999: 168 ff.). Like the slot theorist, the pocket theorist posits entities (pockets) in properties and relations that can be occupied. But unlike the slot theorist, the pocket theorist denies that at most one entity can occupy any one of them. As a result, she must also deny that the adicity of a property or relation is equal to the number of occupiable entities in it. By abandoning these theses, however, the pocket theorist is able to avoid Fine's problems, resulting in a stronger theory about the internal structure of properties and relations. Pocket theory also avoids a serious drawback of anti-positionalism. (shrink)

A textbook objection to consequentialism is that it is too demanding—on the assumption that a moral theory which is excessively demanding thereby loses plausibility. In this paper, I assess whether the mechanisms employed by two versions of rule consequentialism, those of Brad Hooker and Tim Mulgan, adequately meet the requirement of not being too demanding. I also examine whether the concept of human nature might help determine what should count as demanding for a moral theory. While this suggestion also faces (...) significant challenges, I contend that prescribing less partiality towards the present generation may not be a drawback for the consequentialist frameworks under consideration. (shrink)

Maureen Donnelly has recently argued that directionalism, the view that relations have a direction, applying to their relata in an order, is unable to properly treat certain symmetric relations. She alleges that it must count the application of such a relation to an appropriate number of objects in a given order as distinct from its application to those objects in any other ordering of them. I reply by showing how the directionalist can link the application conditions of any fixed arity (...) relation, no matter its arity or symmetry, and its converse(s) in such a way that directionalism will yield the correct ways in which it can apply. I thus establish that directionalism possesses the same advantage Donnelly’s own account of relations, relative positionalism, has over traditional positionalist accounts of relations, which do not properly treat symmetric relations. I then note some advantages that directionalism has over its closest competitors. This includes Donnelly’s relative positionalism, since directionalism is not, like relative positionalism, committed to the involvement of relative properties in every irreducibly relational claim. I close by conceding that, as Donnelly notes, directionalism is committed to the primitive relation of order-sensitive relational application. But I don’t find this notion as mysterious as Donnelly does. I conclude that, even if one construes this feature of directionalism as a drawback, the two views are at worst at a draw, other things being equal, since this drawback is mitigated by the advantage directionalism has over relative positionalism. (shrink)

In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual examples of kind change. The advocate of Four-Category Ontology is obliged to (...) resolve the tension between these mutually incompatible claims. In this article, we argue that the only viable option for the advocate of Four-Category Ontology is to bite the bullet and stick to the necessity of each of the most specific natural kind to the object instantiating it. As a major drawback, the four-category ontologist does not have any credible means to allow for kind change or determination of the identity conditions in a more general level. (shrink)

We address the moral importance of fish, invertebrates such as crustaceans, snails and insects, and other animals about which there is qualified scientific uncertainty about their sentience. We argue that, on a sentientist basis, one can at least say that how such animals fare make ethically significant claims on our character. It is a requirement of a morally decent (or virtuous) person that she at least pays attention to and is cautious regarding the possibly morally relevant aspects of such animals. (...) This involves having a moral stance, in the sense of patterns of perception, such that one notices such animals as being morally relevant in various situations. For the person who does not already consider these animals in this way, this could be a big change in moral psychology, and can be assumed to have behavioural consequences, albeit indeterminate. Character has been largely neglected in the literature, which focuses on act-centred approaches (i.e. that the evidence on sentience supports, or does not support, taking some specific action). We see our character-centred approach as complementary to, not superior to, act-centred approaches. Our approach has the advantage of allowing us to make ethically interesting and practically relevant claims about a wider range of cases, but it has the drawback of providing less specific action guidance. (shrink)

We explore Boolean-valued models of set theory with a class of urelements. In an existing construction, which we call UB, every urelement is its own B-name. We prove the fundamental theorem of UB in the context of ZFUR (i.e., ZF with urelements formulated with Replacement). In particular, UB is shown to preserve Replacement and hence ZFUR. Moreover, UB can both destroy axioms, such as the DCω1-scheme, and recover axioms, such as the Collection Principle. One drawback of UB is that (...) it does not permit mixing names, resulting in a lack of fullness. To address this, we introduce a new construction, UB‾, which is closed under mixtures. We prove that there is an elementary embedding from UB to UB‾. Over ZFUR with the Axiom of Choice, UB‾ is full for every complete Boolean algebra B just in case the Collection Principle holds. (shrink)

. Science at the interface with society is regarded with mistrust among parts of the public. Scientific judgments on matters of practical concern are not infrequently suspected of being incompetent and biased. I discuss two proposals for remedying this deficiency. The first aims at strengthening the independence of science and suggests increasing the distance to political and economic powers. The drawback is that this runs the risk of locking science in an academic ivory tower. The second proposal favors “counter-politicization” (...) in that research is strongly focused on projects “in the public interest,” that is, on projects whose expected results will benefit all those concerned by these results. The disadvantage is that the future use of research findings cannot be delineated reliably in advance. I argue that the underlying problem is the perceived lack of relevance and reliability and that pluralism is an important step toward its solution. Pluralism serves to stimulate a more inclusive research agenda and strengthens the well-testedness of scientific approaches. However, pluralism also prevents the emergence of clear-cut practical suggestions. Accordingly, pluralism is part of the solution to the credibility crisis of science, but also part of the problem. In order for science to be suitable as a guide for practice, the leeway of scientific options needs to be narrowed – in spite of uncertainty in epistemic respect. This reduction can be achieved by appeal to criteria that do not focus on the epistemic credentials of the suggestions but on their appropriateness in practical respect. (shrink)

Alston begins his exposition of the realist conception of truth in chapter 1 with a roughly Aristotelian formulation: “A statement is true if and only if what the statement says to be the case actually is the case”. This condition has the drawback that it defines truth via illocutionary acts; yet, as Alston argues, propositions are the most basic truth-bearers. Alston therefore turns to the universalized T-schema for a condition that characterizes the truth of propositions without mentioning illocutionary acts: (...) “ The proposition that p is true iff p”, where “” is a substitutional rather than objectual quantifier over propositions. Later Alston avers that this account of truth is equivalent to another that is overtly realist in characterizing truth in terms of facts, a minimalist correspondence theory: “ The proposition that p is true iff it is a fact that p”. (shrink)

Clinical ethics support for health care professionals and patients is increasingly seen as part of good health care. However, there is a key drawback to the way CES services are currently offered. They are often performed as isolated and one-off services whose ownership and impact are unclear. This paper describes the development of an integrative approach to CES at the Center of Expertise and Care for Gender Dysphoria at Amsterdam University Medical Center. We specifically aimed to integrate CES into (...) daily work processes at the CEGD. In this paper, we describe the CES services offered there in detail and elaborate on the 16 lessons we learned from the process of developing an integrative approach to CES. These learning points can inform and inspire CES professionals, who wish to bring about greater integration of CES services into clinical practice. (shrink)

The objects called cubes of opposition have been presented in the literature in discordant ways. The aim of the paper is to offer a survey of such various kinds of cubes and evaluate their relation with an object, here called “Aristotelian cube”, which consists of two Aristotelian squares and four squares which are semiaristotelian, i.e. are such that their vertices are linked by some so-called Aristotelian relation. Two paradigm cases of Aristotelian squares are provided by propositions written in the language (...) of the logic of consequential implication, whose distinctive feature is the validity of two formulas, A $$\rightarrow $$ → B $$\supset \lnot $$ ⊃ ¬ (A $$\rightarrow $$ → $$\lnot $$ ¬ B) and A $$\rightarrow $$ → B $$\supset \lnot $$ ⊃ ¬ ($$\lnot $$ ¬ A $$\rightarrow $$ → B), expressing two different forms of contrariety. Part of section 1 is devoted to define the notions of rotation and of r-Aristotelian square, i.e. a square resulting from some rotation of an Aristotelian square. In section 2 this notion is extended to the one of a r-Aristotelian cube, i.e. of a cube resulting from some rotation of some square of an Aristotelian cube. This notion is used in the sequel to analyze various cubes of oppositions which can be found in the literature: (1) the one used by W. Lenzen to reconstruct Caramuel’s Octagon; (2) the one used by D. Luzeaux to represent the implicative relation among S5-modalities; (3) the one introduced by D. Dubois to represent the relations between quantified propositions containing positive predicates and their negations; (4) the one called Moretti cube. None of such cubes is strictly speaking Aristotelian but each of them may be proved to be r-Aristotelian. Section 5 discusses the assertion that Dubois cube was anticipated in a paper published by Reichenbach in 1952. Actually Dubois’ construction was anticipated by the so-called Johnson–Keynes cube, while the Reichenbach cube, unlike Dubois cube, is an instance of an Aristotelian cube in the sense defined in this paper. The dominance of such notion is confirmed by J.F. Nilsson’s cube, representing relations between propositions with nested quantifiers, and also by a cube introduced by S. Read to treat quantifiers with existential import. A cube similar to Read’s cube, introduced by Chatti and Schang, is shown to be r-Aristotelian. In section 6 the author remarks that the logic of the formulas occurring in the cubes of Chatti–Schang and Read have the drawback of not satsfying the law of Identity. He then proposes a definition of non-standard quantifiers which satisfies Identity, are independent of existential assumptions and such that their interrelations are represented by an Aristotelian cube. (shrink)

Classical real-valued probabilities come at a philosophical cost: in many infinite situations, they assign the same probability value—namely, zero—to cases that are impossible as well as to cases that are possible. There are three non-classical approaches to probability that can avoid this drawback: full conditional probabilities, qualitative probabilities and hyperreal probabilities. These approaches have been criticized for failing to preserve intuitive symmetries that can be preserved by the classical probability framework, but there has not been a systematic study of (...) the conditions under which these symmetries can and cannot be preserved. This paper fills that gap by giving complete characterizations under which symmetries understood in a certain “strong” way can be preserved by these non-classical probabilities, as well as by offering some results to make it plausible that the strong notion of symmetry here is the right one. Philosophical implications are briefly discussed, but the main purpose of the paper is to offer technical results to help make further philosophical discussion more sophisticated. (shrink)

Knowledge of causal laws is expensive and hard to come by. But we work hard to get it because we believe that it will reduce contingency in planning policies and in building new technologies: knowledge of causal laws allows us to predict reliably what the outcomes will be when we manipulate the factors cited as causes in those laws. Or do they? This paper will argue that causal laws have no special role here. As economists from JS Mill to Robert (...) Lucas and David Hendry stress, along recently with philosophers like James Woodward and Sandra Mitchell, they can do the job only if they are invariant under the manipulations proposed. But then, I shall argue, anything that is invariant under the proposed manipulations will do this job equally well. There seems to be nothing special about causal-law knowledge in and of itself that makes it particularly valuable for policy and technology prediction. What seems to matter is invariance alone, not causality. But what guarantees invariance and how do we know when it will obtain? Here certain kinds of causal laws do have a special place – those underwritten either by what I have called ‘nomological machines’ or by what I have called ‘capacities’. Capacities and nomological machines have a double virtue that makes them invaluable for policy planning. First, the causal laws they give rise to will be invariant so long as they obtain; and second, they typically have visible markers we can come to recognize that tell us when they obtain. The markers for nomological machines are shakier than those for capacities, though, since capacities are often tied to markers by well-established empirical laws. Capacities have their own drawback however, which is the final topic of this paper: the causal laws that are guaranteed by a capacity connect the obtaining of a capacity with its exercise. But Hume argued that no distinction can be made between the obtaining of a power and its exercise. (shrink)

When Wittgenstein started writing the Tractatus in June 1915, he was convinced that he was producing a theory. Accordingly, he chose a theoretical style of expressing his thought. Wittgenstein abandoned this stance only at the end of his work of composing the book. He realized that what he is producing in not a theory but a manual for improving our language and thinking. Unfortunately, it was too late to change the architecture and the style of the book: Wittgenstein simply had (...) no time to do that. This drawback makes the Tractatus notoriously difficult to understand and is apparently the major factor that caused the so called “Tractarian Wars”. (shrink)

Clinical ethics support (CES) for health care professionals and patients is increasingly seen as part of good health care. However, there is a key drawback to the way CES services are currently offered. They are often performed as isolated and one-off services whose ownership and impact are unclear. This paper describes the development of an integrative approach to CES at the Center of Expertise and Care for Gender Dysphoria (CEGD) at Amsterdam University Medical Center. We specifically aimed to integrate (...) CES into daily work processes at the CEGD. In this paper, we describe the CES services offered there in detail and elaborate on the 16 lessons we learned from the process of developing an integrative approach to CES. These learning points can inform and inspire CES professionals, who wish to bring about greater integration of CES services into clinical practice. (shrink)

It is perhaps our noblest cause, and certainly one of our oldest: to end suffering. Think of the Buddha, Chuang Tzu, or Marcus Aurelius: stoically composed figures impervious to the torments of the wider world, living their lives in complete serenity—and teaching us how to do the same. After all, isn’t a life free from suffering the ideal? Isn’t it what so many of us seek? Absolutely not, argues Todd May in this provocative but compassionate book. In a moving examination (...) of life and the trials that beset it, he shows that our fragility, our ability to suffer, is actually one of the most important aspects of our humanity. May starts with a simple but hard truth: suffering is inevitable. At the most basic level, we suffer physically—a sprained ankle or a bad back. But we also suffer insults and indifference. We suffer from overburdened schedules and unforeseen circumstances, from moral dilemmas and emotional heartaches. Even just thinking about our own mortality—the fact that we only live one life—can lead us to tremendous suffering. No wonder philosophies such as Buddhism, Taosim, Stoicism, and even Epicureanism—all of which counsel us to rise above these plights—have had appeal over the centuries. May highlights the tremendous value of these philosophies and the ways they can guide us toward better lives, but he also exposes a major drawback to their tenets: such invulnerability is too emotionally disengaged from the world, leading us to place too great a distance between ourselves and our experience. Rather than seeking absolute immunity, he argues most of us just want to hurt less and learn how to embrace and accept what suffering we do endure in a meaningful way. Offering a guide on how to positively engage suffering, May ultimately lays out a new way of thinking about how we exist in the world, one that reassures us that our suffering, rather than a failure of physical or psychological resilience, is a powerful and essential part of life itself. (shrink)

There has been growing interest in the idea that model descriptions should be thought of as similar to stories, and model systems should be thought of as akin to fictional characters. But if model systems were (like) fictional characters, what would they be? Two prominent approaches to fictional discourse have been pursued in the literature on models: realist approaches, which take models to be abstract objects that (in some sense) fit the model descriptions, and anti-realist approaches, which typically hold that (...) the relevant discourse involves pretense in a way that enables us to deny that we ever refer to models. Both of these views have problems well known in the literature on fiction. These problems have motivated a third, increasingly popular approach to the ontology of fiction: an artifactual approach, according to which our (external) discourse about fiction refers to abstract artifacts. This approach has been little considered in the literature on scientific models—but this chapter argues that it has important advantages over the familiar alternatives. Most notably, an artifactualist approach can retain the advantages of the pretense view while giving a far more straightforward account of external historical, theoretical, and critical discourse about models. In short, bearing in mind the full range of discourse about models gives us reason to accept that there are model systems, where these are considered as a kind of abstract artifact. The main perceived drawback to artifactualist views is their supposed “ontological costs.” In closing, the chapter suggests why ontological qualms of this sort should be discounted. (shrink)

Conspiracy theorizing can sometimes have regrettable features that speak for suppressing it. Yet, given that an adequately knowledgeable citizenry is a prerequisite of a healthy democracy, the public should be informed about politically important events, including political conspiracies. In this article, I focus on the relationship between informing citizens about political conspiracies and the kind of conspiracy theorizing that arguably should be suppressed. More precisely, I maintain that informing citizens about political conspiracies threatens to lead to the kind of conspiracy (...) theorizing there is reason to suppress, and I examine how the potential drawback ought to be dealt with. I propose that informing citizens about political conspiracies should both proceed in light of pertinent research on conspiracy theorizing and pay heed to adequate knowledge about the circumstances in which conspiracies are publicized. (shrink)

The present study examines cross-cultural differences in people’s concept of lying with regard to the question of whether lying requires an agent to _say_ something they believe to be false. While prominent philosophical views maintain that lying entails that a person explicitly expresses a believed-false claim, recent research suggests that people’s concept of lying might also include certain kinds of deception that are communicated more indirectly. An important drawback of previous empirical work on this topic is that only few (...) studies have investigated people’s concept of lying in non-Western samples. In the present study, we compare people’s intuitions about lying with indirect deceptions (i.e., presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and non-verbal actions) in a sample of _N_ = 255 participants from Russia and _N_ = 300 participants from the United Kingdom. Our findings show a strong degree of similarity between lie ratings of participants from Russia and the United Kingdom, with both samples holding it possible for agents to lie with deceptive statements and actions that do not involve the agent _saying_ something they believe to be false. (shrink)

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics concerns the relationship between what we ought to do now and what we will freely do in the future. This paper presents a novel account of moral obligation which can effectively settle this debate. The proposed account has the following theoretical virtues: (i) it captures our actualist intuition that we are sometimes obligated not to do the best that we can; (ii) it captures our possibilist intuition that we are in some sense always obligated to (...) do the best that we can (and can be blameworthy for failing to do the best that we can); (iii) it never prescribes practically incompatible moral obligations; (iv) it posits only one kind of moral obligation (so it is not a hybrid account). The drawback of the proposed account is, however, that it requires us to adopt a non-standard formulation of the ‘ought implies can’ principle (OIC), according to which one's being obligated to ϕ does not imply that one is able to ϕ, but rather that one could have been able to ϕ. Although this is a relatively revisionary move, independent motivations for preferring this modified formulation of OIC over its standard formulation will be provided. (shrink)

The first section of the paper establishes the minimal properties of so-called consequential implication and shows that they are satisfied by at least two different operators of decreasing strength and \). Only the former has been analyzed in recent literature, so the paper focuses essentially on the latter. Both operators may be axiomatized in systems which are shown to be translatable into standard systems of normal modal logic. The central result of the paper is that the minimal consequential system for (...) \, CI\, is definitionally equivalent to the deontic system KD and is intertranslatable with the minimal consequential system for \, CI. The main drawback ot the weaker operator \ is that it lacks unrestricted contraposition, but the final section of the paper argues that \ has some properties which make it a valuable alternative to \, turning out especially plausible as a basis for the definition of operators representing synthetic conditionals. (shrink)

The article covers Erwin W. Straus’ views on the problem of time and temporal experience in the context of psychopathology. Beside Straus’ published scholarship, including his papers dealing exclusively with the subject of time, the sources utilized in this essay comprise several of Straus’ unpublished manuscripts on temporality, with the primary focus on the 1952 manuscript Temporal Horizons, which is discussed in greater detail and subsequently published for the first time in this journal. In the first part of the article, (...) the author introduces what he considers to be the central tension of the whole of Straus’ work on the issue of time, namely, the tension stemming from a dualistic account of time with its personal and impersonal dimensions. Interpretative developments of this tension are followed covering Straus’ early German works and his late American scholarship. The author presents Straus’ way of overcoming the dualistic account of time and his arguments in favour of what is termed here the “unified view of time”. Of critical importance for the unified view is Straus’ concept of “today”, which is extensively commented upon. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the psychopathological consequences of the unified view as seen by Straus. A clear-cut boundary between a normal and a psychotic experience of time is supposed to lie in breaking the bond between the personal and the impersonal orders of time, leading to a fundamental estrangement. This view, it is claimed, is already present in a nutshell in Straus’ earliest work, and is elaborated upon later. In conclusion, both the merits and the weaknesses of Straus’ account of temporality are presented. A major advantage is that Straus abstains from a dualistic conception of time and reappraises the often-devalued clock time. A fundamental drawback is that Straus does not venture to explore the pathological varieties of temporal experience and fails to specify the acknowledged differences between, on the one hand, psychotic elements in depressive disorders, and, on the other hand, such elements in schizophrenic disturbances. (shrink)

In this paper, we compare the two Global Reporting Initiative reporting standards, G3.1, and the most current version G4.0. We do this through the lens of political corporate social responsibility theory, which describes the broadened understanding of corporate responsibility in a globalized world building on Habermas’ notion of deliberative democracy and ethical discourse. As the regulatory power of nation states is fading, regulatory gaps occur as side effects of transnational business. As a result, corporations are also understood to play a (...) “political role” to fill regulatory gaps and contribute to a global governance system by voluntarily engaging in self-regulation. Such corporate political action, however, is not always legitimate as it suffers from a democratic deficit. Consistent with scholars in the field of political CSR, this paper argues that only by means of communication and discourse can this drawback be avoided. That is why CSR reporting and guidelines for standardizing the disclosed CSR information is key for political CSR. By comparing the GRI standards from a political CSR perspective, one can see whether these often-used reporting guidelines fulfill the communicative requirements and whether they are adequate tools to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. We present results from a theory-derived and criteria-driven comparison of the two guidelines. Indication of the effectiveness of voluntary self-regulation is, for example, important considering the 2014 directive of the European Union to make CSR reporting mandatory. We offer a guideline-based view on current CSR theory as well as CSR reporting practice. We discuss implications for CSR theory, particularly the appropriateness of deliberation in the Habermasian sense, which is the basis of political CSR theory. We do so by introducing the notion of “uncommitted deliberation” with regard to the refined concept of materiality in GRI 4.0, which induces subjectivity and reduces data-driven comparability. Finally, we address the limitations of this research as well as research questions for future studies. (shrink)

It is our concern that European Union Directive 2010/63/EU with its current project evaluation of animal research in the form of a harm-benefit analysis may lead to an erosion of the credibility of research. The HBA assesses whether the inflicted harm on animals is outweighed by potential prospective benefits. Recent literature on prospective benefit analysis prioritizes "societal benefits" that have a foreseeable, positive impact on humans, animals, or the environment over benefit in the form of knowledge. In this study, we (...) will argue that whether practical benefits are realized is (a) impossible to predict and (b) exceeds the scope and responsibility of researchers. Furthermore, we believe that the emphasis on practical benefits has the drawback of driving researchers into speculation on the societal benefit of their research and, therefore, into promising too much, thereby leading to a loss of trust and credibility. Thus, the concepts of benefit and benefit assessment in the HBA require a re-evaluation in a spirit that embraces the value of knowledge in our society. The generation of scientific knowledge has been utilised to great benefit for humans, animals, and the environment. The HBA, as it currently stands, tends to turn this idea upside down and implies that research is of value only if the resulting findings bring about immediate societal benefit. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Contemporary thinkers studying biopolitics find little interest in Foucault’s “vague sketch of the pastorate”. Described by Foucault as an inherently “benevolent” “power of care”, the concept seems inadequate to describe the deadly forms of carelessness that characterize the current government of life. Sovereign power, as a power of decision over life and death that works by distinguishing populations whose lives are worth affirming from social groups whose lives are not, therefore takes precedence in the examination of the governmental connection (...) between care, violence, and biopolitics. Yet, what we might call the “sovereign turn” in the field of Foucault studies is not without a significant drawback. The focus on the logic of exclusion through which governments “care about” specific groups and “take care of” them, while actively producing subjects that cannot or must not be cared for, often overshadows the analysis of how care is currently given and received. More often than not, the post-Foucauldian critique of governmental concern for life neglects the long-standing feminist critique of how support for life, in the form of care work, has historically been organized along lines of gender, race, and class. In contrast, this article argues that delving into the relationship between pastoral power and governmentality enables the development of a framework that encompass both these critiques, shedding new light on the mechanisms at play in the current “crisis of care”. (shrink)

Aesthetic delight is a unique and paradoxical psychological experience of simultaneous emotional exaltation and a state of serenity towards a percept when an individual experiences the percept with the approach of an art-experiencer or artist. The primary drawback of neuro-scientific investigation of art is that it fails to trace the functional coherence of the entire process of generation of aesthetic delight. At least two recent seminal works by Vessel et al., and Cela-Conde et al., tried to resolve this deficiency (...) using two different neuro-imaging techniques (fMRI and MEG respectively) and assessed the relevance of the Default Mode Network (DMN) of the brain in the generation of aesthetic pleasure. However, their works are yet to precisely highlight what primarily separates aesthetic experience from similar psychological experiences. This article formulates the ‘dual phase oscillation’ hypothesis based on the neural correlate of the paradox of aesthetic delight, explaining the precise logic behind linking aesthetic delight and DMN activity. The hypothesis focuses on two seemingly paradoxical unique attributes of aesthetic delight: the phenomenon of suspension of disbelief (SOD) whereby the person experiencing art temporarily suspends the belief of surface reality and the phenomenon of introspective detached contemplation whereby the same person, while experiencing the same art, reflects on the artistic phenomenon and is simultaneously aware of the surface reality. The hypothesis proposes that aesthetic delight is the dynamic, oscillatory balance between SOD and introspective detached contemplation and is orchestrated by the functional coherence of the DMN. The article integrates the two previous works with the fundamentals of this proposal and thus offers a unique neuro-psychological solution to the problem of aesthetic paradox. Keywords: aesthetic delight; suspension of disbelief; introspective detached contemplation; Default Mode Network; ‘dual phase oscillation’ hypothesis . (shrink)

ABSTRACT Doomsday is the last moment in time. Nothing comes after. In the recent literature on temporal metaphysics, several theories have recently been challenged by arguments invoking doomsday. A shared premise in these arguments is that it would be a problem or drawback for a theory of time, if it failed to allow for moments of undetermined doomsday. In such moments, time ends without being determined to do so by the laws plus the state of the world at that (...) moment. In this paper, I argue against this premise. In general, if a theory of time is incompatible with undetermined doomsday, that is just an interesting but neutral consequence of that theory. My argument also serves to illustrate a broader point: namely, that because doomsday is a complex and alien scenario, it is difficult to raise arguments against any particular theory of time premised on assumptions about how doomsday might occur. (shrink)

This article explores the substitution and complementary effects between political and social strategies on firm performance in the context of an emerging market (EM). Using in‐depth, historical case‐study approach, the article investigates how companies integrate political and social resources in this market. Corporate performance includes traditional measures, such as accounting performance and nonfinancial measures like the ease of doing business. The study finds that social strategies are stronger enablers of firm long‐term performance than political strategies. The latter have a short‐term (...) impact on performance, but their success over time is limited. The main drawback of reliance on political resources in EMs is the lack of political stability, fragmented polity, and weak political coalitions. We identify rather limited evidence of firms using these two strategies as complements. Thus, we suggest that firms should employ both these strategies in the EM. (shrink)

The ongoing coronavirus 2019 pandemic caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 has resulted in a severe ramification on the global healthcare system, principally because of its easy transmission and the extended period of the virus survival on contaminated surfaces. With the advances in computer-aided diagnosis and artificial intelligence, this paper presents the application of deep learning and adversarial network for the automatic identification of COVID-19 pneumonia in computed tomography scans of the lungs. The complexity and time limitation (...) of the reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction swab test makes it disadvantageous to depend solely on as COVID-19’s central diagnostic mechanism. Since CT imaging systems are of low cost and widely available, we demonstrate that the drawback of the RT-PCR can be alleviated with a faster, automated, and reduced contact diagnostic process via the use of a neural network model for the classification of infected and noninfected CT scans. In our proposed model, we explore the benefit of transfer learning as a means of resolving the problem of inadequate dataset and the importance of semisupervised generative adversarial network for the extraction of well-mapped features and generation of image data. Our experimental evaluation indicates that the proposed semisupervised model achieves reliable classification, taking advantage of the reflective loss distance between the real data sample space and the generated data. (shrink)

Dynamical systems are general models of change or movement over time with a broad area of applicability to many branches of science, including computer science and AI. Dynamic topological logic (DTL) is a formal framework for symbolic reasoning about dynamical systems. DTL can express various liveness and reachability conditions on such systems, but has the drawback that the only known axiomatisation requires an extended language. In this paper, we consider dynamic topological logic restricted to the class of scattered spaces. (...) Scattered spaces appear in the context of computational logic as they provide semantics for provability and enjoy definable fixed points. We exhibit the first sound and complete dynamic topological logic in the original language of DTL. In particular, we show that the version of DTL based on the class of scattered spaces is finitely axiomatisable, and that the natural axiomatisation is sound and complete. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a first account of a practice-based conception of normativity for the political domain. This standpoint is used to relocate the most sophisticated normative practices of justification and critique within an experience-based framework, that of the human being as a “normative creature.” I begin by discussing the two major paradigms in political theory, showing that their neglect of this broad framework of normativity is a serious drawback. I then proceed to articulate the central elements of (...) a practicebased account of normativity: the notions of normative practices and normative orders, and an account of the rationality potential of normativity as practice. (shrink)

This dissertation aims to provide a comprehensive account of set theory with urelements. In Chapter 1, I present mathematical and philosophical motivations for studying urelement set theory and lay out the necessary technical preliminaries. Chapter 2 is devoted to the axiomatization of urelement set theory, where I introduce a hierarchy of axioms and discuss how ZFC with urelements should be axiomatized. The breakdown of this hierarchy of axioms in the absence of the Axiom of Choice is also explored. In Chapter (...) 3, I investigate forcing with urelements and develop a new approach that addresses a drawback of the existing machinery. I demonstrate that forcing can preserve, destroy, and recover the axioms isolated in Chapter 2 and discuss how Boolean ultrapowers can be applied in urelement set theory. Chapter 4 delves into class theory with urelements. I first discuss the issue of axiomatizing urelement class theory and then explore the second-order reflection principle with urelements. In particular, assuming large cardinals, I construct a model of second-order reflection where the principle of limitation of size fails. (shrink)