The process of chromatin diminution in Parascaris and Ascaris is a developmentally controlled genome rearrangement, which results in quantitative and qualitative differences in DNA content between germ line and somatic cells. Chromatin diminution involves chromosomal breakage, new telomere formation and DNA degradation. The programmed elimination of chromatin in presomatic cells might serve as an alternative way of gene regulation. We put forward a new hypothesis of how an ancient partial genome duplication and chromatin diminution may have served (...) to maintain the genetic balance in somatic cells and simultaneously endowed the germ line cells with a selective advantage. (shrink)

In the course of his dispute with Conington on the comparative merits of Catullus and Horace, Munro taxed the Augustans with having made the lyric of the heart impossible in Latin by their virtual exclusion of diminutives from the language of poetry; and, whether that is the result or no, the general fact that diminutives are rare in the serious poetry of the Augustan age is well known. The details, however, are less easy to come by. Stolz and Stolz-Schmalz devote (...) a few unilluminating lines to the Stilistik of diminutives: otherwise the grammars and the treatises on diminutives known to me concern themselves only with forms and meanings. Except for a note by Professor Housman which, at 4. 927, sets out Manilius's diminutives, I know of no collections for any Augustan poet, and it is perhaps worth while therefore to state the facts. I have not indeed read through Augustan poetry for the purpose, but for some time past I have been in the habit of noting such diminutives as I have come across in the course of reading, and these lists I have now checked and amplified from the indexes to the authors concerned. My lists are probably not complete, but I hope they are sufficiently near it to present a true picture of the position. (shrink)

The study aimed to investigate the functional-pragmatic and communicative-pragmatic use of morphological and syntactic diminutive resources of Kazakh and English in the example of artistic contexts. The following methods were used: comparative-comparative, morphological-syntactic, communicative-pragmatic, analytical-synthetic, and contextual. This paper analysed the main morphological and syntactic resources used for word formation of diminutive adjectives in Kazakh and English languages. In particular, the results of the study showed that synthetic means (use of suffixal morphemes with diminutive semantics) and analytical means (use of (...) special lexemes with diminutive semantics) are frequent in Kazakh. It was determined that suffixal morphemes to express the diminutiveness of adjectives were most often used to warn addressees about the properties of objects and phenomena, to soften categorical evaluation in Kazakh, to diminish the attributes of the object, to demonstrate the incompleteness of the attribute in English. This work can be used in the spheres of communicative linguistics, linguistic pragmatics, word formation, and morphology. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the diminutives in Miron Białoszewski’s Pamiętnik z powstania warszawskiego and how they are rendered in the English translation by Madeline G. Levine – A Memoir of the Warsaw Uprising. We adopt the semantic account of the category of the diminutive proposed by John Taylor (1989), which treats meanings of the diminutive as a radial network of interrelated senses. In Pamiętnik…, the diminutive seems to be used most commonly in the descriptions of highly stressful and dangerous (...) events, possibly to make those experiences less frightening (the meaning of low intensity and low quality) and more manageable (the literal meaning of smallness). At times it seems to help re-interpret a bad experience, or rather to mitigate the subjectively experienced impact of a negative event. The proliferation of diminutives is made possible by the productivity of the morphology of the Polish language and by Białoszewski’s linguistic creativity. In the English version, the translator employs compensatory strategies to address linguistic nuances, but often omits the diminutive altogether. This work aims to investigate the effect the diminutive has on the construal of the analysed texts and to highlight the problems it poses for translation from Polish to English. (shrink)

In a new era of regulatory oversight, the US Supreme Court upended traditional Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous Congressional provisions in Loper in June 2024. Federal courts were instructed to make their own assessments of statutory authorities amid an onslaught of public health agency challenges surfacing nationally. Even so, SCOTUS may be eyeing further limits on agency powers despite clear and substantial repercussions for the health of the nation.

Numerous studies show that language (in its grammatical forms or morphology) can influence both perceptual judgments, as well as the mental categorization of objects in memory. Previous research showed that using diminutive names of objects resulted in being less satisfied with owning said objects and lowering their perceived value. In the present studies, to explore this phenomenon, we decided to investigate whether the influence of a diminutive on the reduction in the subjective value of an object is determined by the (...) perceived size of the object, in accordance with the „bigger is better” heuristic. In Study 1 participants estimated a banknote to be smaller when it was presented with a diminutive label “banknocik” (banknote with diminutive) than “banknot” (banknote). However, this was not related to the perceived subjective value of the banknote. In Study 2 participants declared that they could buy less with a coin labeled as “pieniążek” (coin with diminutive) than “pieniądz” (coin), but the effect was not linked to the perceived size of the coins. In Study 3 a candy bar labeled as “batonik” (candy bar with diminutive) was evaluated worse than the same product labeled “baton” (candy bar), however, once again this was not related to the evaluation of its size (weight). Thus, we show that the effect of diminutives on the reduction in the subjective value of an object is independent of the evaluation of the size of the object and we consider other explanations for the occurrence of this phenomenon. (shrink)

In some cases our sensory organs are no longer capable of rendering processes in the external world perceptible to us. Their inadequacy expresses itself, for example, in phenomena that involve the kind of expansion of space and time in which the conditions for summary perception are no longer at all present. The resources that aid our immediate sense perception in these circumstances will thus be charged with the task of expanding or diminishing space and time to the extent that the (...) contiguity and succession of events is comprehensible to us. The microscope is thus essentially based upon the principle of spatial expansion, the map on that of spatial diminution. The pertinent contrivances for these purposes are largely derived from the graphic arts. How stereoscopy and instantaneous photography, which is based on temporal expansion, facilitate our perception! In spite of the multifarious applications of photography, one has yet to take the step of employing it in the opposite direction, namely as a means of temporal diminution. We demonstrate that phenomena that take place in too ephemeral and too rapid a succession for our eyes can, with the help of instantaneous photographs in series, be analyzed with our senses as the event passes in a comparatively longer time. Quite analogously, we could also compress into a small duration the moments of an event separated widely from one another in time and thereby give our perception an understanding of the nature thereof. (shrink)

Great theoretical value has always been attached toBoveri's discovery as regards chromatin diminution inAscaris, for this discovery appeared to expose the mechanism causing the propagative cells, in which all chromatin remains, to originate an entirely new organism, whereas the soma cells of which the chromosomes have been diminished are only capable of specific differentiation.Boveri was further able to show that, not only do the soma and propagative nuclei differ from each other, but that rather the character of the cell-plasma (...) decides whether the nucleus diminishes or not. Considerations are brought forward to prove that the “diminisher” hypothesis as given byKing andBeams, is untenable. Diminution has always been supposed to result in the loss of the totipotence of the diminished nuclei. In the light of recent chromosome research this course of events does not seem probable. Therefore the following theory is brought forward: When the egg ofAscaris is split, blastomeres originate, which differ from each other as to the plasma. In proportion to the quality of the surrounding plasma, now these now other genes of the totipotent nucleus react in different cells, thus originating the specific differentiation of the cell in question. This cooperation between plasma and nucleus is, however, at first obstructed in the large collective chromosomes ofAscaris, by the presence of their thickened ends. In order to keep up this cooperation a certain quality of plasma is needed, situated in a certain horizontal zone of the egg. As soon as, in the course of the division, nuclei come to rest in different zones, a diminution occurs, and differentiation of the cells in question sets in. Towards the end of the embryonic development the ends of the chromosomes are lost in the propagative cells, and also in these cells differentiation occurs.On a toujours attribué une haute signification théorique à la découverte deBoveri, de la diminution des chromatines chez l'ascaris puisqu'elle semblait expliquer le mécanisme qui cause que les cellules propagatrices où séjourne, la totalité de l'effectif des chromatines, font de nouveau sortir d'elles-mêmes un organisme entier, pendant que les cellules somatiques, dont les chromosomes ont été diminués, ne sont plus capables qu'à produire une différenciation spécifique. De plus,Boveri a pu démontrer, que les noyaux somatiques et propagateurs ne sont pas, à peu de chose près, différents, mais que c'est bien plus la qualité du plasme des cellules qui décide si les noyaux qui leur ont été distribués, diminuent ou non. Des arguments sont apportés, qui démontrent que l'hypothèse du „diminisher” échafaudée parKing etBeams est insoutenable. En général on s'est représenté. l'action de la diminution de telle façon que la totipotentialité des noyaux diminués a été perdue. Cependant, le fait n'est pas acceptable quand on le considère à la lumière de la recherche moderne sur les chromosomes. Par conséquent, nous proposons l'opinion suivante: Dans l'œuf de l'ascaris, des blastomères différant plasmatiquement les uns des autres prennent naissance pendant le fendage. Selon l'état du plasme environnant, dans les cellules individuelles on voit réagir certain gène, dans les autres un autre gène du noyau totipotentiel, causant ainsi la différenciation des cellules visées. Cette collaboration entre le plasme et le noyau est cependant premièrement bloquée dans les grands chromosomes collectifs de l'ascaris par la présence des bouts de chromosomes épaissis. Pour leur conservation une certaine qualité de plasme est requise qui se trouve dans une zone horizontale déterminée de l'œuf. Dès que, dans le procès du fendage, des noyaux arrivent dans d'autres zones du plasme, la diminution a lieu, et la différenciation des cellules visées s'opère. Cependant, après la conclusion du développement embryonal, les bouts des chromosomes se perdent dans les cellules propagatrices et la différenciation a lieu aussi dans ces cellules. (shrink)

According to a prominent family of theories of blameworthiness, quality of will theories, a person is blameworthy for an action if and only if, and to the degree that, her will manifested in that action is bad. A puzzle for such theories is that (the degree of) blameworthiness appears to be affected by several factors beyond how bad the manifested will is. Among such factors are certain types of incompetence of the agent, the outcome of the action, the developmental history (...) of the agent (e.g., an unfortunate upbringing), and the time between action and blame. I defend a novel account of the nature of blame by appeal to its unique capacity to explain away these puzzling intuitions in a unified way. I argue that the account, in addition to being independently plausible, allows us to view those intuitions as products of a systematic yet understandable confusion between the issue of blameworthiness and some other separate issue. (shrink)

Arima argues that ‘double effect sedation (DES)’ carries the intention to diminish consciousness, and when such reduction has disproportionally negative moral valence, DES may be rendered impermissible by the doctrine of double effect (DDE).1 I have argued elsewhere for palliative general anaesthesia in the context of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments as the most effective and normatively justified means to safeguard against potential suffering at the end of life.2 I will not repeat that discussion, instead I focus on two points that (...) Arima makes to show that consciousness reduction is intended rather than merely foreseen. Following Anscombe and Davidson, intentional actions are actions done for reasons or actions that can be evaluated based on the supportive or grounding reasons for acting.3 In thinking about the DDE, intention can be interrogated by examining the underlying normative and motivating reasons for action. It is useful here to distinguish these two kinds of reasons. Dancy writes: When I call a reason ‘motivating’, all that I am doing is issuing a reminder that the focus of our attention is on matters of motivation… When I call it ‘normative’, again all that I am doing is stressing that we are currently thinking about whether it is a good reason, one that favours …. (shrink)

How persuasive are Rousseau’s and Diderot’s objections against Helvétius’s view that it is always interest that guides our esteem? Against Helvétius’s view that we always esteem ourselves in others, Rousseau objects that we can esteem the ideas that we recognize to be superior to our own ideas; against Helvétius’s idea that particu-lar societies and nations can only esteem ideas that are useful for them, Diderot objects that we can experience and esteem the feeling of universal benevolence. However, Rousseau and Diderot (...) overlook that Helvétius’s conception of moral luck explains why experiences of the kind that they describe can occur. At the same time, Helvétius’s conception of moral luck explains why these experiences occur so rarely. This is why he holds that what we esteem needs to be modified through republican constitution building—expresses itself a kind of opti-mism concerning the possibility of cultivating morally good qualities of individuals through political agency. (shrink)

Focusing on the broadly conceived principle of hospitality, the essay offers an analysis of Joshua Barnes's Gerania, a highly original but little-studied late seventeenth-century utopia set in India and featuring the Pygmies as utopians and Homer as their lawgiver. It is argued that Barnes's utopia offers a radical alternative to the policy of closure and isolation adopted in early modern utopian commonwealths. Its peculiar construction results in the unique openness of the narrator's discourse to an alien word and of the (...) ideal world to outsiders, their outlandish beliefs, rules and artifacts. (shrink)

Evaluative markers of diminution and augmentation typically express quantity or intensity. Prior evidence suggests that they also convey emotions, although it remains unexplored as to whether this function is mediated by their role in expressing quantification/intensification. Here we investigated the effects of evaluative suffixes on the assessment of word affective properties by asking participants (N = 300) to score valence and arousal features for augmentatives, diminutives and base words with negative, positive or neutral valence. Diminutives and, to a lesser (...) extent, augmentatives were assessed more positively than base forms in negative words and more negatively than bases in positive words. The capacity of diminution to express attenuated emotions is in line with its function in conveying quantity. By contrast, valence effects for augmentatives suggests a role in expressing pejoration and amelioration that is not mediated by quantification. With regard to arousal, negative, neutral and positive augmentatives showed higher scores than base words, which, in addition, were also rated higher than diminutives. These incremental effects suggest that suffixes which convey larger quantity are also associated with increased arousal. Thus, with the exception of valence effects in augmentatives, it seems that evaluative suffixes encode both valence and arousal through quantification. (shrink)

Across languages, lexical items specific to infant‐directed speech (i.e., ‘baby‐talk words’) are characterized by a preponderance of onomatopoeia (or highly iconic words), diminutives, and reduplication. These lexical characteristics may help infants discover the referential nature of words, identify word referents, and segment fluent speech into words. If so, the amount of lexical input containing these properties should predict infants’ rate of vocabulary growth. To test this prediction, we tracked the vocabulary size in 47 English‐learning infants from 9 to 21 months (...) and examined whether the patterns of growth can be related to measures of iconicity, diminutives, and reduplication in the lexical input at 9 months. Our analyses showed that both diminutives and reduplication in the input were associated with vocabulary growth, although measures of iconicity were not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that phonological properties typical of lexical input in infant‐directed speech play a role in early vocabulary growth. (shrink)

The diminution of emphasis on the arts and the humanities and the corresponding increased emphasis on business and STEM disciplines has resulted in a normative conception of national progress that excludes aesthetic education. Scholars in the arts and the humanities have responded to this marginalization either by calling for more esotericism or by underscoring the importance of aesthetic education to the future of democracy and humanity. These arguments have failed to capture the public’s attention. In this essay, I argue (...) that there is a third way: aesthetic educators should challenge the normative understanding of national progress. To this end, I return to the dawn of the split between scientific inquiry and humanist understanding to highlight French Enlightenment debates around the understanding of progress. Specifically, I call attention to the writings of the French philosopher Germaine de Staël because in the adaptation of her notion of progress lies possible hope for the future of the humanities and the arts. (shrink)

La diminution du poids institutionnel des religions dans notre société ne signifie pas pour autant que les hommes se détournent d'interrogations fondamentales touchant à leur identité profonde, à leur origine et à leur destination, au sens de leur vie ici-bas, à l'éventualité d'une vie après la mort. Que ces questions continuent d'occuper la pensée humaine, chacun est à même d'en faire le constat, et la science elle-même les a investies avec des moyens renouvelés. Ce qui a changé dans les (...) dernières décennies, c'est peut-être la manière d'appréhender ces interrogations fondamentales : on recueillait autrefois les réponses en se référant à sa religion d'appartenance ou en puisant dans un ensemble de discours et de pratiques proprement ésotériques ; aujourd'hui, la recherche de principes directeurs qui soient à même de donner un sens à l'existence n'échappe pas au mouvement général de sécularisation et de globalisation qui a radicalement transformé nos cultures. Anticipant cette tendance, Ostad Elahi s'était interrogé, il y a plus de cinquante ans, sur les conditions d'une sagesse contemporaine partagée, capable d'intégrer la dimension spirituelle, et fondée sur les principes fondamentaux communs aux différentes religions. Sous le titre Quelle sagesse pour notre temps?, cet ouvrage entend ouvrir une réflexion sur les modalités que peut prendre la recherche d'une telle sagesse adaptée à notre époque, à la fois conforme à l'idéal d'autonomie de l'individu moderne et ouverte à ses aspirations les plus profondes. Quels en seraient les principes? Parviendra-t-on à les dégager en s'accordant sur des valeurs éthiques et spirituelles universelles? Et si oui, comment est-il possible de les mettre en oeuvre? Une recherche de ce genre relève-t-elle d'une démarche strictement individuelle, ou peut-elle être également conduite de manière collective, à un niveau académique et plus généralement institutionnel? (shrink)

La diminution rapide du nombre des prêtres en nos régions pose avec urgence la question du gouvernement des communautés chrétiennes, et en particulier celle de la présidence de l’eucharistie qui en fait normalement partie. Le retour aux sources effectué en ecclésiologie et en théologie des sacrements depuis Vatican II invite à reprendre à nouveaux frais la question d’un élargissement des conditions d’accès au ministère de présidence : ordination d’hommes mariés, délégations à durée déterminée, voire cas-limite d’une présidence «charismatique» dans (...) les cas de nécessité. L’article recense les positions d’une série de théologiens qui ont envisagé positivement ce problème et plaide pour qu’on ne limite pas trop vite l’éventail des solutions théologiquement acceptables. (shrink)

Aphantasia, the strong diminution or complete absence of mental imagery, challenges long-standing views of imagery as central to cognition. Competing accounts variously explain the phenomenon as a failure of sensory reactivation or as unconscious mental imagery. Here, we propose a new framework, the integration model of aphantasia, which argues that reactivated sensory information must undergo multi-stage integration to yield imagery experience. Against unconscious imagery accounts, we argue that the neural activations observed in aphantasics are not imagery but sensory precursors: (...) rudimentary sensory codes that lack perceptual status. Only when sensory precursors are locally integrated do they become perceptual representations, and only when these are further integrated with interoceptive signals do they give rise to conscious imagery experience. We present the integration model as a dual-stream framework that unifies recent attention- and interoception-based accounts, situate it within existing theories of mental imagery and aphantasia, and highlight its clinical relevance. In doing so, we reframe the debate on unconscious imagery and draw attention to the role of multi-stage integration as a key mechanism underlying mental imagery and its absence across different subtypes of aphantasia. (shrink)

This chapter examines the first explicit reference to skepticism in the _Treatise_. It occurs in section 13 of book 1, part 3, where Hume contrasts proper modes of probabilistic reasoning (philosophical probabilities, as he calls them) with improper (or unphilosophical) modes of probabilistic reasoning. Though Hume accepts the former and rejects it later, he notes that both spring naturally from the associative principles of the imagination and further notes that they can come in conflict with one another. Because they will (...) play an important role in skeptical arguments found later in the _Treatise_, this chapter pays particular attention to Hume's discussion of prejudice, general rules, and what he calls reiterative diminution. (shrink)

This chapter examines in detail Hume's most radical skeptical argument, one intended to show that reasoning, when allowed to pursue its own principles without restraint, will inevitably destroy all beliefs based upon reasoning. The key ideas in Hume's argument are, first, that reflections on the fallibility of our rational faculties will reduce all claims to demonstrative knowledge to questions of probability; second, that further reflections on human fallibility lower the level of probabilities themselves until, finally, through reiterating these diminutions, the (...) level of confidence in our original knowledge will be reduced, as Hume puts it, to nothing. The chapter spells out this argument, evaluates it, and, though rejecting it, points out its centrality in Hume's reflections. (shrink)

No, that diminutive but independent vocable, begins its great role early in human life and never loses it. For not only can it head a negative sentence, announcing its judgement, or answer a question, implying its negated content, it can, and mostly does, in the beginning of speech, express an assertion of the resistant will—sometimes just that and nothing more. Eva Brann explores nothingness in the third book of her trilogy, which has treated imagination, time and now naysaying.

Recognising a diminution in his emotional response to patients’ deaths, the author analyses in detail his internal reactions in an attempt to understand what he believes is a common phenomenon among doctors. He identifies factors that may erode the connection between patient and physician: an instinct to separate oneself from another’s suffering, professional unease in the case of therapeutic failure, the atrophying effect of perceived hopelessness, insincerities in the establishment of the initial relationship, and an inability to imbue the (...) sedated or unconscious patient with human qualities. He concludes that recognition of these negative influences, without necessarily changing behaviours that are natural, may be a first step towards protecting doctors against what might be an otherwise insidious process of dehumanisation. (shrink)

In the “diminution argument,” which Hume adduces in the Treatise section “Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” he infers from our universal fallibility that “all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.” My aim in this paper is, first, to show that on all extant interpretations of the argument, it turns out to be very weak, and, second, that there is in the vicinity a significant sceptical argument in (...) support of the conclusion that all our beliefs are totally unjustified, an argument that cannot be easily dismissed. (shrink)

The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. (...) However, I argue there are rationally self‐consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward‐looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions. -/- . (shrink)

This article contains reflections on the further structural transformation of the public sphere, building on the author’s widely-discussed social-historical study, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, which originally appeared in German in 1962 (English translation 1989). The first three sections contain preliminary theoretical reflections on the relationship between normative and empirical theory, the deliberative understanding of democracy, and the demanding preconditions of the stability of democratic societies under conditions of capitalism. The fourth section turns to the implications of digitalisation (...) for the account of the role of the media in the public sphere developed in the original work, specifically to how it is leading to the expansion and fragmentation of the public sphere and is turning all participants into potential authors. The following section presents empirical data from German studies which shows that the rapid expansion of digital media is leading to a marked diminution of the role of the classical print media. The article concludes with observations on the threats that these developments pose for the traditional role of the public sphere in discursive opinion and will formation in democracies. (shrink)

Suppose we suffer a loss, such as the death of a loved one. In light of her death, we will typically feel grief, as it seems we should. After all, our loved one’s death is a reason for grief. Yet with the passage of time, our grief will typically diminish, and this seems somehow all right. However, our reason for grief ostensibly remains the same, since the passage of time does not undo our loss. How, then, could it not be (...) wrong for grief to diminish? Or how are we to make sense of the diminution of grief? Do reasons expire? —The paper clarifies the puzzle and then considers four responses. It argues that all of them are inadequate and that there are principled reasons why this should be so: In experiencing grief we are apprehending a loss. Yet in our effort to understand the diminution of grief, we must apprehend ourselves. But because grief is not about ourselves, our apprehension of the diminution of grief is at odds with our apprehension of the object of grief. This gives rise to a kind of double-vision, which is why the puzzle eludes a solution. (shrink)