Since the 1970’s there has been a major increase in adventure sports participation but it seems that engagement in such sports comes with a stigma: adventure sports participants are often regarded as reckless ‘daredevils’. We approach the questions about people’s perception of risk and recklessness in adventure sports by combining empirical research with philosophical analysis. First, we provide empirical evidence that suggests that laypeople tend to assess the danger of adventure sports as greater than more mundane sports and judge (...) adventure sports participants as more reckless than participants in non-adventure sports. We contextualise these findings within existing psychological risk perception paradigms and outline new philosophical explanations of the identified pattern in laypeople’s risk perception. (shrink)

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the (...) safety condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Kant’s real reason for rejecting a world state in practice is that a world state would be in greater danger of despotism than individual states. Kant hopes that public participation and self-enlightenment of the people in the public sphere could counter the despotic danger in individual states. However, in a world state, state affairs are too distant from the lives of individuals, making it difficult for individuals to maintain enthusiasm for public discourse (...) and political enlightenment. Moreover, the absence of external competition and the risk of war would eliminate the incentive of the ruler to preserve freedom for the development of industry and commerce and, consequently, for the enlightenment of the people. These defects make it more difficult for a world state to resist despotic danger. (shrink)

In September 1886, the poet and critic Josef Victor Widmann penned a review of BGE titled "Nietzsche's Dangerous Book,"1 observing that a keen sense of danger pervaded the work.2 Nietzsche, who often felt misunderstood and wrongfully attacked, responded enthusiastically to Widmann on June 28, 1887: Mainly, I have to thankfully inform you, after a year's time no less, that your review has been by far the most "intelligent" one that this uncongenial book has received until now. Poets are, after (...) all, "divinatory" beings: in the end, such a book of riddles will much sooner be deciphered and "cracked open" by a poet, than by a philosopher and "specialist."3 Indeed, Widmann identified a motif that runs not only... (shrink)

Un mot d'usage quotidien, "danger", est devenu concept chez Heidegger. L'usage heideggerien de "danger" n'est pourtant pas celui de ce livre, qui refuse de s'engager de front dans la "question de l'être" au profit des manières ou modes d'être, dont il explore un échantillon sans prétention exhaustive mais utilisé comme trame heuristique. Mode d'être de l'oeuvre d'art, mode d'être de la "chose" ou du sacrement, mode d'être comme "existence" et comme "vie", un danger est toujours présent : (...) l'existence, telle que décrite chez Heidegger, est déconstituée par des phénomènes auxquels elle ne peut rendre justice ; la vie abrite l'existence mais court le risque perpétuel de n'être que dans les frontières de l'existence, etc. Et si l'étant nous est toujours donné dans un comment - comment de son apparaître, donc comment de son être -, rien ne garantit la pérennité de cette donation : presque tout étant, et d'abord l'étant que nous sommes, est en danger d'apparaître autre qu'il ne nous apparaît maintenant. Aussi convenait-il, après avoir ajointé le concept de vie à celui d'esprit, après avoir dit que la vie est "spirituelle", de justifier le titre du livre en liant "être" et "danger" ; et il restait au final le temps de proposer, dans l'élément du possible, l'hypothèse d'une eschatologie de l'être, avant tout de notre être, sur laquelle le danger n'aurait plus de prise. (shrink)

The imperial expansion of bacteriology at the turn of the twentieth century led to the creation of new laboratories in the colonial world. Although employed as subordinates to colonial veterinarians, veterinary assistants contributed to scientific knowledge production and the development of new techniques for vaccine production. African veterinary assistants in the Gold Coast reworked techniques in bacteriology to produce vaccines to counter the devastating effects of rinderpest. The first vaccines produced in 1930 used serum from young bulls, some of whom (...) died during the production process. While veterinarians from the United Kingdom took credit for vaccine improvements in the colony, the African veterinary assistants performed the scientific work required to mitigate the number of animal deaths needed for vaccine production. When the veterinary department switched from cattle herds to rabbit colonies for vaccine production in 1951, the assistants reconfigured the laboratory to cater to rabbits and the production of a lapinized strain. While rinderpest itself presented the gravest danger to cattle in the colony, the assistants also recognized veterinary medicine and the use of a “living virus” as a threat to cattle. They developed rigorous scientific methods in the laboratory to protect animals from this threat. Their positioning as scientific practitioners during the colonial period prefigured their conception of veterinary medicine in the postcolonial context in which they protected Ghanaian cattle from animal diseases and new incoming vaccines. Decreases in funding after independence led to a “struggle for capacity” as the veterinary department sought to maintain its position as a scientific discipline in need of a fully functioning laboratory. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with self-understanding have often conceived of it as either a matter of immediate, unchallengeable introspective awareness or as a matter of gathering evidence about oneself scientifically and impersonally. In contrast, Gilbert Ryle rightly understood self-understanding as knowledge of one’s own commitments, desires, beliefs, wishes, and fears––all things that one has some share in forming and can to some extent alter. What Ryle misses or underplays, however, is the extent to which the forming and revising of commitments, desires, beliefs, (...) wishes, and fears are also social processes, as agents-in-formation are subject to the gazes, expectations, and evaluations of others. Jane Austen grasped all this very well, and in _Emma_ she gives us a picture of Emma’s partial, emotion-laden, and socially inflected—but also genuine—achievement of self-understanding from which we might do well to learn. (shrink)

How exactly is technology transforming us and our worlds, and what (if anything) can and should we do about it? Heidegger already felt this philosophical question concerning technology pressing in on him in 1951, and his thought-full and deliberately provocative response is still worth pondering today. What light does his thinking cast not just on the nuclear technology of the atomic age but also on more contemporary technologies such as genome engineering, synthetic biology, and the latest advances in information technology, (...) so-called “generative AIs” like ChatGPT? These are some of the questions this book addresses, situating the latest controversial technologies in the light of Heidegger's influential understanding of technology as an historical mode of ontological disclosure. In this way, we seek to take the measure of Heidegger's ontological understanding of technology as a constellation of intelligibility with an important philosophical heritage and a dangerous but still promising future. (shrink)

Neutrophil extracellular traps (NETs)—web‐like DNA structures extruded by neutrophils in response to various stimuli, including pathogens, sterile inflammation, and mechanical stress—play a dual role in immunity and disease. While NETs serve to trap and neutralize pathogens during host defense, excessive or dysregulated NET formation, known as NETosis, can amplify inflammation and contribute to thrombotic complications such as atherosclerosis and valve disease. Increasing evidence supports that NETosis is a regulated, signaling‐driven process, and that mechanical forces—including shear stress, tensile force, and matrix (...) stiffness—can act as noncanonical danger signals capable of inducing NETosis. Mechanosensitive ion channels such as Piezo1, have emerged as key transducers of these biophysical cues, enabling cells to convert changes in shear stress levels into intracellular calcium flux, cytoskeletal remodeling, and ultimately NET release. Furthermore, exposure to pathologically high levels of shear stress may improve the sensitivity of neutrophils to secondary stimuli, lowering their activation threshold and amplifying inflammatory and thrombotic cascades. This mechanosensitive framework highlights shear‐induced NETosis as a critical pathway by which neutrophils contribute to inflammation and thrombosis in mechanically stressed vascular environments. (shrink)

The article argues that Hobbes articulates a modern problematic of reason, where the shared rationality of human beings is an integral part of the danger they present to each other, and where reason suggests a solution, the social contract and the laws of nature, enforced and interpreted by absolute sovereign authority. This solution reflects a tension in modern reason itself, since it requires the alienation of self-determination of the rational human subject precisely to preserve the condition for the possibility (...) of the rationality of the rational human subject, i.e. one’s life, which is threatened by the very rationality of other human subjects. I discuss interpretations of Hobbes which stress the other motives of conflict, i.e. competition and vanity, and acknowledge that they play a role in the threat subjects present to each other, but argue that the danger presented precisely by shared rationality, which I discuss with some reference to the Hegelian dialectic of consciousness and mutual recognition, has been underplayed by Hobbes’ interpretation. (shrink)

We focus here on some familiar kinds of cases of conflict between friendship and morality, and, on the basis of our account of the nature of friendship, argue for the following two claims: first, that in some cases where we are led morally astray by virtue of a relationship that makes its own demands on us, the relationship in question is properly called a friendship; second, that relationships of this kind are valuable in their own right.

In this paper, I elucidate Friedrich Nietzsche’s ethics of danger as a development from an ethics of affirmation to posit a practical reading of his ethical theory. Gay Science 341 contains the hypothetical scenario of the eternal return, and the way this is interpreted redirects one’s total reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy. My argument is that there is a vulnerability latent in identifying one’s response to the eternal return through exposing oneself to the danger implicit in this return; from (...) simply affirming it, a more appropriate reaction I argue is the rage that is made explicit. This paper begins with the backdrop of our contemporary situation from the insights of Peter Sloterdijk and Nietzsche, followed by a review of Deleuze’s ethics of affirmation. I present the latter to situate the difficulty of articulating its practicality in the face of such a cynical condition. The last section develops Nietzsche’s ethics of danger. This I directly borrow from Tobias Kuehne, which I expound via other insights from Nietzsche’s philosophy. As a whole, my discussion of his ethics of danger is my attempt to articulate his ethical theory in a practical sense, away from the probable security offered by affirmation. (shrink)

What is the epistemological structure of situations where many small risks amount to a large one? Lottery and preface paradoxes and puzzles about quantum-mechanical blips threaten the idea that competent deduction is a way of extending our knowledge. Seemingly, everyday knowledge involves small risks, and competently deducing the conjunction of many such truths from them yields a conclusion too risky to constitute knowledge. But the dilemma between scepticism and abandoning MPC is false. In extreme cases, objectively improbable truths are known. (...) Safety is modal, not probabilistic, in structure, with closure and factiveness conditions. It is modelled using closeness of worlds. Safety is analogous to knowledge. It suggests an interpretation of possible worlds semantics for epistemic logic. To avoid logical omniscience, a relation of epistemic counterparthood between formulas is introduced. This supports a safety conception of knowledge and formalizes how extending knowledge by deduction depends on logical competence. (shrink)

Effective human–robot teaming increasingly requires humans to work with intelligent, autonomous machines. However, novel features of intelligent autonomous systems such as social agency and incomprehensibility may influence the human’s trust in the machine. The human operator’s mental model for machine functioning is critical for trust. People may consider an intelligent machine partner as either an advanced tool or as a human-like teammate. This article reports a study that explored the role of individual differences in the mental model in a simulated (...) environment. Multiple dispositional factors that may influence the dominant mental model were assessed. These included the Robot Threat Assessment, which measures the person’s propensity to apply tool and teammate models in security contexts. Participants were paired with an intelligent robot tasked with making threat assessments in an urban setting. A transparency manipulation was used to influence the dominant mental model. For half of the participants, threat assessment was described as physics-based ; the remainder received transparency information that described psychological cues. We expected that the physics-based transparency messages would guide the participant toward treating the robot as an advanced machine, while psychological messaging would encourage perceptions of the robot as acting like a human partner. We also manipulated situational danger cues present in the simulated environment. Participants rated their trust in the robot’s decision as well as threat and anxiety, for each of 24 urban scenes. They also completed the RoTA and additional individual-difference measures. Findings showed that trust assessments reflected the degree of congruence between the robot’s decision and situational danger cues, consistent with participants acting as Bayesian decision makers. Several scales, including the RoTA, were more predictive of trust when the robot was making psychology-based decisions, implying that trust reflected individual differences in the mental model of the robot as a teammate. These findings suggest scope for designing training that uncovers and mitigates the individual’s biases toward intelligent machines. (shrink)

This chapter critically examines the alleged threat of the Roman Catholic Church’s concept of “gender ideology” to the family as the basic social unit in society, using sociological perspectives and Pope Francis’s inductive synodal approach. It argues that the Catholic Church has gravely misunderstood gender in the sociological and feminist research literature and that its allegation of a threat to the family is conceptual rather than actual, constituting a moral panic or exaggeration rather than a real danger. It contends (...) that the real cause or “folk devil” is not gender but the epistemological threat posed by the sociological and feminist concept of gender and gender diversity to the natural law moral framework of the Catholic Church. It recommends inculturation and the adoption of a sociological moral framework to dissolve the alleged threat. (shrink)

Throughout his career Adam Ferguson made a series of conservative political pronouncements on contemporary events.This paper treats these pronouncements as having a solid basis in his social theory and examines his place in the conceptual development of the tradition of British conservatism.It examines Ferguson's distinction between two forms of human knowledge: book learning of abstract science acquired from formal education and capacity acquired from practical experience in real affairs. Ferguson's empiricism leads to a series of sustained warnings against the (...) class='Hi'>danger of excessive abstraction to the pursuit of science and these concerns are extended into the social and political realm as he cautions against reliance on abstract philosophy and defends the superiority of practical politicians. (shrink)

In “Knowledge Under Threat” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2012), Tomas Bogardus proposes a counterexample to the safety condition for knowledge. Bogardus argues that the case demonstrates that unsafe knowledge is possible. I argue that the case just corroborates the well-known requirement that modal conditions like safety must be relativized to methods of belief formation. I explore several ways of relativizing safety to belief-forming methods and I argue that none is adequate: if methods were individuated in those ways, safety would fail (...) to explain several much-discussed cases. I then propose a plausible externalist principle of method individuation. On the one hand, relativizing safety to belief-forming methods in the way suggested allows the defender of safety to account for the cases. On the other hand, it shows that the target known belief of Bogardus’s example is safe. Finally, I offer a diagnosis of a common error about the kind of cases that are typically considered potential counterexamples to the necessity of the epistemic condition: proponents of the alleged counterexamples mistake a strong condition that I call super-safety for safety. (shrink)

It is widely held that the current refugee Convention is inadequate with respect to its specification of who counts as a refugee and in its assignment of responsibility concerning refugees to states. At the same time, there is substantial agreement among scholars that the negotiation of a new Convention would lead states to extricate themselves from previously assumed responsibilities rather than sign on to a set of more desirable legal norms. In this paper, I argue that states should ultimately negotiate (...) a new Convention, but that first they must alleviate the institutional and motivational constraints that make progress currently unattainable. (shrink)

Descartes's approach to practical judgments about what is beneficial or harmful, or what to pursue or avoid, is almost exactly the opposite of his approach to theoretical judgments about the true nature of things. Instead of the cautious skepticism for which Descartes is known, throughout his ethical writings he recommends developing the habit of making firm judgments and resolutely carrying them out, no matter how doubtful and uncertain they may be. Descartes, strikingly, takes irresolution to be the source of remorse (...) and repentance, of vice, and of a weak soul. In order to explain its dangerousness, this essay offers an analysis of irresolution as a failure of the will to determine itself to follow a judgment in the face of ignorance or uncertainty. This analysis connects irresolution to weakness of will and explains why Descartes regards resolution as an essential component of virtue. (shrink)

In this essay, I will outline the adjustments in Heidegger’s account of technicity that are necessary to address the danger ( Gefahr ) that revolves around recent advances, including cybernetics. These adjustments that Parvis Emad was among the first to pioneer, are hermeneutic guidelines that delineate the wholesale appearance of beings through the prism of a “mathematical project”. The mathematical project of ‘nature’ creates a platform on which cybernetics can arise in two ways: 1). by converting the linear sequencing (...) of ‘time’ (as “making present”) into a universal form of calculation and 2). by subdividing ‘space’ into infinite points. The danger, then, does not lie in the ominous effects of technicity, but as a throwback to the metaphysical distortion of the reciprocity between being and time in which the former is confined to the presencing of beings through a model of calculability and the latter is reduced to the “digitizing” of a linear sequence of units. The hermeneutic guidelines allow for the “retrograsping” ( zürckgenommen [Emad’s translation] of the danger of technicity (including its transmutation into cybernetics) as a “throwback” to the abandonment of and by being ( Seinsverlassenheit ). (shrink)

The potential of ChatGPT looms large for the practice of medicine, as both boon and bane. The use of Large Language Models (LLMs) in platforms such as ChatGPT raises critical ethical questions of w...

While it isn't clear that we are right to value integrity — or so I shall argue — most of us do. Persons of integrity merit respect. Compromising one's integrity — or failing completely to exhibit it — seems a serious flaw. Two influential accounts suggest why. For Bernard Williams, integrity is ‘a person's sticking by what [she] regards as ethically necessary or worthwhile.’ To this Cheshire Calhoun adds a helpful negative gloss:To lack integrity is to underrate both formulating and (...) exemplifying one's own views. People without integrity trade action on their own views too cheaply for gain, status, reward, approval or for escape from penalties, loss of status, disapproval. Or they trade their own views too readily for the views of others who are more authoritative, more in step with public opinion, less demanding of themselves, and so on. (shrink)

Volume 34, Issue 2, May 2026, Page 235-239.

This paper argues that Jacques Derrida provides a compelling rebuttal to a secularism that seeks to exclude religion from the public sphere. Political theorists such as Mark Lilla claim that religion is a source of violence, and so they conclude that religion and politics should be strictly separated. In my reading, Derrida’s work entails that a secularism of this kind is both impossible (because religion remains influential in the wake of secularization) and unnecessary (because religious traditions are diverse and multivalent). (...) Some attempt to contain the disruptive force of religion by excluding it from the public sphere, but Derrida argues that one may endure instability for the sake of something more important than safety. Although Derrida admits that religion is dangerous, he demonstrates that it is nevertheless an indispensable resource for political reflection. (shrink)

This paper aims at explaining and defending some of Cora Diamond's thinking about the role of a kind of guides to thinking about ethics. Aids to thinking of this type can take a very general form but can also be applied in context‐sensitive ways. Maria Balaska has raised the question whether Diamond manages to avoid relativism. Oskari Kuusela also criticises Diamond, focussing on whether talk of human equality can be said to correspond to reality. I will consider these objections in (...) turn and try to show that Diamond is not committed either intentionally or otherwise to relativism. (shrink)

We investigate Scottish end users' and professional forecasters' risk perception in relation to the 5-point European Avalanche Danger Scale by eliciting numerical estimates of the probability of triggering an avalanche. Our main findings are that neither end users nor professional forecasters interpret the avalanche danger scale as intended, that is, in an exponential fashion. Second, we find that numerical interpretations by end users and professional forecasters have high variance, but are similar, in that both groups tend to overestimate (...) the probability of triggering an avalanche and underestimate the relative risk increase. Finally, we find significant differences in the perceived probability of triggering an avalanche relative to a low or moderate avalanche danger level, and in the numerical interpretation of verbal probability terms depending on whether respondents provide their estimates using a frequency or a percentage chance format. We summarize our findings by identifying important lessons to improve avalanche risk understanding and its communication. (shrink)

Anthropogenic climate change poses a significant threat to the environment and society, requiring comprehensive Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) to promote sustainable thinking and action. Philosophy education faces the challenge of balancing value-based teaching with fostering critical thinking skills. Additionally, educators must address issues such as climate-change-helplessness and the attitude-behavior-gap. This paper explores how philosophy education can support a reflective and action-oriented approach to climate change and evaluates the Future-Workshop-method through an empirical pilot study conducted at two schools in North (...) Rhine-Westphalia. (shrink)

A major question is what his embrace of fascism means for the future of ethics in the Continental philosophy he has so heavily influenced. Paper edition (unseen), $18.95. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

We investigate differences in perceived danger and recklessness judgements by experts (experienced skiers, N=362) and laypeople (N=2080) about participation in adventure sports across the same judgemental task using a third person perspective. We investigate the relationship between danger and recklessness and the extent to which fatality frequency, as well as other contextual factors such as gender, dependants, competence, and motivations of the sports participant affect expert and laypeople judgements respectively. Experienced skiers gave lower overall danger and recklessness (...) ratings than non-skiers. Experienced skiers’ judgements were also more sensitive than non-skiers’ to variations in the fatality rate of the activity and the competence level of the participant, yet were less sensitive to whether the event was done for external benefit such as a charity. Recklessness judgements were overall more sensitive to changes in activity descriptions than danger judgements. Our findings support the emerging picture of adventure sports participants as rational and sensitive to risk-relevant features rather than somehow pathological in their risk perception. (shrink)

Social scientists and data analysts are increasingly making use of Big Data in their analyses. These data sets are often “found data” arising from purely observational sources rather than data derived under strict rules of a statistically designed experiment. However, since these large data sets easily meet the sample size requirements of most statistical procedures, they give analysts a false sense of security as they proceed to focus on employing traditional statistical methods. We explain how most analyses performed on Big (...) Data today lead to “precisely inaccurate” results that hide biases in the data but are easily overlooked due to the enhanced significance of the results created by the data size. Before any analyses are performed on large data sets, we recommend employing a simple data segmentation technique to control for some major components of observational data biases. These segments will help to improve the accuracy of the results. (shrink)

The advent of the so-called Companion Robots is raising many ethical concerns among scholars and in the public opinion. Focusing mainly on robots caring for the elderly, in this paper we analyze these concerns to distinguish which are directly ascribable to robotic, and which are instead preexistent. One of these is the “deception objection”, namely the ethical unacceptability of deceiving the user about the simulated nature of the robot’s behaviors. We argue on the inconsistency of this charge, as today formulated. (...) After that, we underline the risk, for human-robot interaction, to become a hallucinatory relation where the human would subjectify the robot in a dynamic of meaning-overload. Finally, we analyze the definition of “quasi-other” relating to the notion of “uncanny”. The goal of this paper is to argue that the main concern about Companion Robots is the simulation of a human-like interaction in the absence of an autonomous robotic horizon of meaning. In addition, that absence could lead the human to build a hallucinatory reality based on the relation with the robot. (shrink)

I begin this paper with a survey of the textual evidence for a new Cartesian subject, a post-Cartesian Cartesian individual, for whom the life of the body, its passions, and its relationships are central. In the second section, I consider his remarks on hatred, which complicate his view embodied life. Even if Descartes’s study of the passions in his treatise as well as his correspondence calls for a more nuanced understanding of the Cartesian person, we will find in his attention (...) to embodiment a conflicted and wary human being for whom relationships can be nourishing and sweet just as easily as they can be noxious and bitter. (shrink)

In The question concerning technology, Heidegger explores actuality in terms of danger. In chapter 3.6 ‘Who has forgotten Being?’ of his We have never been modern, Latour typically ridicules Heidegger and rejects no less than his whole thinking path. I contend that this criticism stems from an inadequate interpretation of Heidegger. By reading the latter in a modern register, Latour turns Heidegger into a modern thinker. Leaving aside the matter of modern elements in Heidegger’s thoughts, these are certainly not (...) the elements that Latour brings forth. Indeed, to understand the danger that hides in actuality, if any, we should turn to Heidegger and read Latour from there. (shrink)

This paper reports on a particular aspect of a larger ethnographic study of nursing culture in an intensive therapy unit (ITU), accomplished through participant observation over a 12‐month period, followed by interviews with 15 nurses. The paper suggests that the ITU environment is perceived as ‘dangerous’, its dangerousness stemming from the ambiguity of its patients’ conditions. Drawing on anthropological concepts of liminality, pollution, anomaly and breaching of boundaries, the paper identifies various ambiguities inherent in ITU patients’ conditions. It then explores (...) the ways in which these anomalies are managed through sequestration and other ritual and symbolic practices. Notwithstanding the undoubted scientific reasons for particular nursing practices, the paper argues that there are also ritual and symbolic elements serving other more complex purposes, both protecting patients and staff and symbolising the highly valued phenomenon of keeping patients safe. The paper identifies a contradiction inherent in nursing work in this locale inasmuch as rituals and symbolism coexist with technical and research‐based elements of nursing care. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars have become wary of moralized accounts of love and friendship. They contend that these accounts distort the goods of special relationships and obscure the sui generis value inherent in these activities. Since the goods of friendship, these authors argue, lay outside the scope of the moral, it stands to reason that the pursuit and sustainment of friendships can lead one into moral danger. This paper asks whether we might understand friendship as inherently moral without committing (...) the sin of moralization. I suggest that within an Aristotelian virtue ethical framework, friendship, specifically “true and good” friendship, is inextricably linked with the moral. Therefore, true friends are those who lead us out of moral danger. (shrink)

La pensée merleau-pontienne n’a que rarement été mise en relation avec la pensée grecque, et encore moins avec les acteurs politiques de premier plan qui ont pris la parole à Athènes, devant le peuple assemblé, et dont les discours sont parvenus jusqu’à nous. Or, il s’avère qu’une approche comparative, et croisée, des harangues politiques de Démosthène et de certains textes de Merleau-Ponty sur des sujets précis tels la liberté, l’adversité, l’engagement, l’expression ou encore l’empiétement, nous permettent d’alimenter un dialogue constructif (...) entre ces deux styles d’investissement dans l’espace politique – direct et indirect –, afin de renouveler, de par cet échange même, au moins partiellement, la compréhension que nous pouvons avoir des prises de positions politiques de ces deux auteurs. Dans cet article nous allons tirer un certain nombre de conséquences éthiques de cette mise en dialogue, notamment via l’étude du concept d’engagement qui constitue un des points de contacts les plus riches entre les deux auteurs. Les analyses que nous menons sur l’adversité, le courage, sur l’engagement comme mode d’expression de la liberté politique nous conduirons à proposer les lignes directrices d’une éthique de l’expression ouverte – notamment au regard et à la honte qui lui est potentiellement coextensive – dont le fondement serait situé dans une reprise axiologiquement réorientée du sens proposé par la réalité à tout un chacun. (shrink)

Government, media, and medical accounts of Emma Goldman converged to create her public presence in the U.S. as a “dangerous individual.” The prevailing discourses constituted Goldman as violent, utilizing her alleged menace to distract attention from far more egregious violence against labor by state and corporate forces. Goldman responded by denying, confronting, and redirecting the alarmed gaze toward greater risks left underarticulated in hegemonic accounts. Goldman's bold confrontations with authorities constituted a kind of anarchist parrhesia, fearless speech, a relentless truth-telling (...) practice that risked her own security in pursuit of her “beautiful ideal.” The labor of remembering America's history of class violence hones our attention to the complex discursive processes by which some historical facts come to count in prevailing narratives, while others fade into obscurity. (shrink)

Just as he points to the power of egoism, so Friedrich Nietzsche is notorious for being a critic of pity. This chapter explores the dangers he detects in pity and its cognate emotions such as sympathy, empathy, and benevolence, in the middle period writings. The commonplace view that Nietzsche holds all such drives in contempt is questioned by a careful study of the middle period’s more nuanced portrayals of these emotions. While Nietzsche condemns the Christian-inspired morality of pity, he does (...) not see all manifestations of fellow-feeling as base or spurious. The influence of La Rochefoucauld’s analysis of pity is discussed, and Nietzsche’s reflections of how to react to the suffering of a friend are also explored. (shrink)