This paper articulates in formal terms a crucial distinction concerning future contingents, the distinction between what is true about the future and what is reasonable to believe about the future. Its key idea is that the branching structures that have been used so far to model truth can be employed to define an epistemic property, credibility, which we take to be closely related to knowledge and assertibility, and which is ultimately reducible to probability. As a result, two kinds of (...) claims about future contingents—one concerning truth, the other concerning credibility—can be smoothly handled within a single semantic framework. (shrink)

A credible fear test is an in-depth interview process given to undocumented people of any age arriving at a U.S. port of entry to determine qualification for asylum-seeking. Credible fear tests as a typical immigration procedure demonstrate not only what structural epistemic violence looks like but also how this violence lives in and through the design of asylum policy. Key terms of credible fear tests such as “significant possibility,” “evidence,” “consistency,” and “credibility” can never be neutral in the context (...) of colonial administrative violence. We argue that these terms function as mechanisms of exclusion and demonstrate that the capacity to be violent (i.e. to be an instrument of violence) is built into these tests, ready to be deployed when an administration wants to stop certain people from certain places from entering without regard to their own ongoing occupation of Indigenous lands. Not only are such practices instruments of violence, but the concept of ‘violence’ continues to be organized, defined, and conceived within settler colonial epistemologies so as to exclude these administrative forms of violence deployed against Indigenous peoples and people of color from recognition and nameability. We argue that this is an intentional strategy of colonial power preservation that is functionalized through social processes that remain structurally stable and self-regenerating across historical and political changes. (shrink)

Current frameworks for research misconduct recognize intellectual misappropriation, gift authorship, and honorary authorship as distinct ethical violations. However, these frameworks fail to capture a compound strategic behaviour that threatens research integrity: the systematic theft of intellectual contributions from subordinates, followed by their strategic redistribution to peers or superiors to build patronage networks and consolidate institutional power. This paper introduces credibility laundering and strategic patronage to describe this three-stage pattern: (1) intellectual misappropriation from a vulnerable subordinate, (2) credit transfer to (...) powerful colleagues, and (3) alliance building through this redistribution. The analysis identifies epistemic delegitimization as a continuous enabling mechanism that allows the pattern to persist while remaining largely invisible. Drawing on literature from authorship misconduct, organizational corruption, hierarchical power dynamics, and epistemic injustice, this paper demonstrates that while elements of this pattern appear across multiple research domains, the compound behaviour has never been formally named or analysed as a unified phenomenon. Through conceptual analysis and hypothetical case illustrations, this paper establishes both the empirical reality and theoretical distinctiveness of this pattern. The analysis reveals threats not only to individual researchers and institutional fairness, but to the epistemic reliability of the research record itself. The paper concludes with recommendations for updating research misconduct definitions and institutional policies to explicitly recognize and address this systemic pattern. (shrink)

This paper defends a contextualist approach to epistemic injustice according to which instances of such injustice should be looked at as temporally extended phenomena (having developmental and historical trajectories) and socially extended phenomena (being rooted in patterns of social relations). Within this contextualist framework, credibility excesses appear as a form of undeserved epistemic privilege that is crucially relevant for matters of testimonial justice. While drawing on Miranda Fricker's proportional view of epistemic justice, I take issue with its lack of (...) attention to the role that credibility excesses play in testimonial injustices. I depart from Fricker's view of the relation between credibility excesses and credibility deficits, and I offer an alternative account of the contributions that undeserved epistemic privileges make to epistemic injustices. Then, through the detailed analysis of To kill a mockingbird, I elucidate the crucial role played by the social imaginary in creating and sustaining epistemic injustices, developing an analysis of the kind of social blindness produced by an oppressive social imaginary that establishes unjust patterns of credibility excesses and deficits. (shrink)

What is the norm governing our credibility assessments of others? According to Miranda Fricker, the answer is “obvious”: we should match the level of credibility attributed to others to the evidence that they are offering the truth. In this paper, I will show that this evidentialist norm of credibility assessments is seriously wanting. In particular, I will identify and develop two kinds of testimonial injustice, which I call distributive and normative, and argue that this norm is fundamentally (...) incapable of ruling them out. Finally, I will develop and defend an alternative norm—what I call the Wide Norm of Credibility—that not only avoids the problems afflicting the evidentialist version, but also makes vivid both the relational and normative dimensions of our credibility assessments. (shrink)

Open Access: This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, (...) criticisms of Fricker have pointed out that credibility is part of a more complex system that includes both deficits and excesses. I will use these points to argue that we should look closer at sources of credibility excess in cases of sexual assault. This means that in addition to considering sources of victim blaming by looking at ways in which “ideal” victims are constructed, we also need to consider ways in which “ideal” perpetrators are constructed. (shrink)

Credibility is unfairly deflated and inflated in relation to other power dynamics, including misogyny. Various techniques are used to discredit unwelcome truths of women and girls, including dismissing their knowledge as trivial, and discrediting them as too emotional (or hysterical) to be reliable sources. Social credibility deflation can lead to self-doubt; consider gaslighting, where one person erodes another’s confidence in their ability to accurately perceive reality, making them doubt their own credibility. The chapter concludes by discussing feminist (...) epistemologies of resistance, highlighting theories of Patricia Hill Collins, José Medina, and Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and inviting the reader to take part in a pluralistic dialogue reimagining credibility. This chapter is anchored by the story of Cassandra: the god Apollo gave her the gift of prophecy, then requested that she have sex with him. When she declined, he cursed her credibility: she would speak prophetic truths, but nobody would believe her. (shrink)

This paper asks how, in science in general and in economics in particular, theoretical models aid the understanding of real-world phenomena. Using specific models in economics and biology as test cases, it considers three alternative answers: that models are tools for isolating the ‘capacities’ of causal factors in the real world; that modelling is ‘conceptual exploration’ which ultimately contributes to the development of genuinely explanatory theories; and that models are credible counterfactual worlds from which inductive inferences can be made. The (...) paper argues that the ‘credible worlds’ account captures significant aspects of scientific practice, even if many modellers see their work as conceptual exploration. (shrink)

Prior research suggests that corporate credibility is associated with firm financial performance in developed countries. This article examines whether corporate credibility is related to firm performance using Economic Observer's rating of corporate credibility in China, the largest emerging market in the world. Based on a four-stage valuation model, we find that more reputable and credible firms outperform those with low ratings by almost 20% in 3-year stock returns and have better 3-year net profit margins, return on equity, (...) and sales growth. This study is the first to directly examine the relationship between corporate credibility and firm performance in emerging markets such as China, and our results confirm that firms with high credibility exhibit better financial and market performance at least in the following 3 years. (shrink)

Individuals with populist radical-right (PRR) attitudes seem particularly inclined to spread disinformation. However, it is unclear whether this is due to the large amount of disinformation with a PRR bias or a general tendency to perceive disinformation as credible and/or spread it further. This study explores (1) effects of a PRR bias on perceived message credibility and likelihood of spreading disinformation, (2) the extent to which perceived message credibility mediates the spread of disinformation, (3) effects of PRR attitudes (...) on the perceived message credibility of biased disinformation, and (4) whether a PRR bias of disinformation explains the spread of disinformation by individuals with PRR attitudes despite a lack of credibility. An online experimental study (N = 572) in Germany showed that the spread of disinformation is mediated by perceived message credibility of disinformation. PRR attitudes positively predict perceived message credibility regardless of whether it is biased or unbiased disinformation. (shrink)

Purpose Employees may feel overwhelmed with information privacy choices and have difficulties understanding what they are committing to in the digital workplace. This paper aims to analyze the role of different thinking styles for effort reduction, such as the use of intuition, when employees make decisions about the credibility and trustworthiness of workplace information privacy issues in Slovakia. While the General Data Protection Regulation sets precise requirements for valid consent, organizations are classified as data controllers and are subject to (...) credibility judgments by their employees. Design/methodology/approach Data was collected from 230 employees in Slovakia using a survey questionnaire. Quantitative analysis using SPSS was conducted to describe employees thinking preferences when judging the credibility of information privacy in their organizations. Findings The survey participants revealed their perceived credibility and trust in personal data protection and thinking preferences. Unconscious thinking is the type of effort reduction often reported by participants, who perceive high credibility and trust in personal data protection. This study can help managers and data controllers in small- and medium-sized enterprises in reflecting about the way in which people use different thinking processes for decision-making about information privacy in their organizations. Research limitations/implications This study set out to explore how decision-making processes at the workplace relate to credibility of data practices. Focusing on the use of different types of intuition, the authors explored whether the preference for a specific decision-making style can explain the perceived credibility of data practices. The part of the workforce in the sample did not have a strict predisposition to use either intuitive or rational thinking. Practical implications The contribution provides scholars with an overview of the field of intuition, a field that is likely to grow given the challenges of digitalization for organizations, such as shitstorms, cyberattacks and whistleblowing. Originality/value The most well-known concepts from intuition research, e.g. the dual process theory, and practice are tested simultaneously, therewith contributing to the applied literature on domain-specific preferences for intuition and deliberation in decision-making. (shrink)

How does the monitoring of a testifier's credibility by recipients of testimony bear upon the epistemic licence accruing to a recipient's belief in the testifier's communications? According to an intuitive and philosophically influential conception, licensed acceptance of testimony requires that recipients of testimony monitor testifiers with respect to their credibility. I argue that this conception, however, proves to be untenable when confronted with the wealth of empirical evidence bearing on the ways in which testifiers and their interlocutors actually (...) interact. (shrink)

Evidence in medicine can come from more or less trustworthy sources and be produced by more or less reliable methods, and its interpretation can be disputed. As such, it can be unclear when disagreements in medicine result from different, but reasonable, interpretations of the available evidence and when they result from unreasonable refusals to consider legitimate evidence. In this article, we seek to show how assessments of the relevance and implications of evidence are typically affected by factors beyond that evidence (...) itself, such as our beliefs about the credibility of the speaker or source of the evidence. In evaluating evidence, there is thus a need for reflective awareness about why we accept or dismiss particular claims. (shrink)

This article defends the counterintuitive conclusion that public assignments of credibility – including statements, by hearers, of ‘that’s right’, ‘she is credible’, or ‘I believe you’ – can actually constitute a pernicious form of epistemic wrong. Sometimes referred to colloquially as ‘lip service’, the wrong occurs when, owing to ethically poisonous epistemic failures, hearers outwardly validate testifiers’ credibility despite not fully or duly believing them. To explain this wrong, I introduce a distinction between performed and internal credibility (...) assignments (PCA and ICA) and describe an epistemic dysfunction in which they misalign. I focus on cases in which misaligned PCA of ‘credible’ falsely – although sometimes non-deliberately – signal to testifiers and bystanders that testifiers have been believed; Republican hearers’ positive reception of Christine Blasey Ford’s 2018 testimony serves as a central case. Although some misaligned PCA are not wrongful, when epistemic and ethical failures including forms of identity prejudice and pernicious ignorance lead PCA of ‘credible’ to misalign, the PCA wrong testifiers in their capacities as knowers. These epistemic wrongs are particularly pernicious because the PCA conceal that testimony has not been efficacious, inflicting and exacerbating distinct harms. (shrink)

Music comprises a diverse category of cognitive phenomena that likely represent both the effects of psychological adaptations that are specific to music (e.g., rhythmic entrainment) and the effects of adaptations for non-musical functions (e.g., auditory scene analysis). How did music evolve? Here, we show that prevailing views on the evolution of music – that music is a byproduct of other evolved faculties, evolved for social bonding, or evolved to signal mate quality – are incomplete or wrong. We argue instead that (...) music evolved as a credible signal in at least two contexts: coalitional interactions and infant care. Specifically, we propose that (1) the production and reception of coordinated, entrained rhythmic displays is a co-evolved system for credibly signaling coalition strength, size, and coordination ability; and (2) the production and reception of infant-directed song is a co-evolved system for credibly signaling parental attention to secondarily altricial infants. These proposals, supported by interdisciplinary evidence, suggest that basic features of music, such as melody and rhythm, result from adaptations in the proper domain of human music. The adaptations provide a foundation for the cultural evolution of music in its actual domain, yielding the diversity of musical forms and musical behaviors found worldwide. (shrink)

I propose that testimony is subject to a norm that is backed by a credibility sanction: whenever the norm is violated, it is appropriate for the testifier to lose some credibility for their future testimony. This is one of a family of sanction-based norms, where violation of the norm makes it appropriate to lose some power; in this case, the power to induce belief through testimony. The applicability of the credibility norm to testimony follows from the epistemology (...) of testimony, in that false or unjustified testimony weakens the reason for belief that is provided by the speaker's future testimony. (shrink)

In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses” (instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to (...) correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability. (shrink)

Several philosophers of science claim that scientific toy models afford knowledge of possibility, but answers to the question of why toy models can be expected to competently play this role are scarce. The main line of reply is that toy models support possibility claims insofar as they are credible. I raise a challenge for this credibility-thesis, drawing on a familiar problem for imagination-based modal epistemologies, and argue that it remains unanswered in the current literature. The credibility-thesis has a (...) long way to go if it is to account for the epistemic merits of toy models. (shrink)

Between October 2023 and January 2025, the Israeli military's sustained attacks on Gaza resulted in an estimated 186,000 deaths and the systematic destruction of healthcare infrastructure. Despite the professed commitment to human dignity, justice, and the minimization of suffering within bioethics, major institutions and scholars in the field have largely remained silent or selectively engaged with the crisis. This paper argues that the Gaza genocide exposes a deeper crisis within bioethics: its growing detachment from urgent, real‐world ethical challenges. Such detachment (...) erodes public trust and raises fundamental questions about the discipline's relevance and credibility. The article interrogates the possible reasons and motivations for the silence and disengagement in the face of genocide in Gaza, and examines the institutional and disciplinary responsibilities that bioethics bears in response to health‐destroying state violence. Framing the inaction as a moral failure with far‐reaching implications, the article proposes alternative routes of ethical engagement and outlines steps toward a more inclusive and responsive bioethics. It calls for the urgent reorientation of the field toward a justice‐driven, politically conscious practice capable of confronting today's most pressing ethical issues. (shrink)

This paper develops a descriptive and normative account of how people respond to testimony. It postulates a default pathway in which people more or less automatically respond to a claim by accepting it, as long as the claim made is consistent with their beliefs and the source is credible. Otherwise, people enter a reflective pathway in which they evaluate the claim based on its explanatory coherence with everything else they believe. Computer simulations show how explanatory coherence can be maximized in (...) real-life cases, taking into account all the relevant evidence including the credibility of whoever is making a claim. The explanatory-coherence account is more plausible both descriptively and normatively than a Bayesian account. (shrink)

In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses” (instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to (...) correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability. (shrink)

Classroom discourse is structured by asymmetry: a knowledgeable party solicits responses from learners to assess their understanding and guide instruction. This paper argues that when the epistemic goods at stake in these exchanges — attention, interpretive effort, and evaluative uptake — are allocated on nonpedagogical grounds, learners suffer a formative epistemic wrong. It develops formative epistemic injustice as a category of epistemic injustice that requires its own analytical framework rather than extension from Miranda Fricker’s testimonial model. Fricker’s framework centres on (...) credibility deficits in exchanges between epistemic peers, but pedagogical contexts operate under constitutive asymmetries that render credibility unsuitable as an allocative principle. The just distribution of epistemic goods in classrooms adheres instead to pedagogical norms. When these norms are violated, the primary wrong targets learners’ developing epistemic agency, distorting the capacities on which mature knowledgeproduction depends. This account explains how unjust allocation can become entrenched even without identity prejudice. Concentrated authority limits correction, developmental vulnerability weakens contestation, and temporal stability transforms momentary skew into persistent practice. Remedies combine teacher virtues of pedagogical discernment and transparency with institutional design that diffuses authority and makes patterns of attention and evaluation visible and revisable. (shrink)

In a broad brush, biological models are often constructed in two general types: as a concrete model; as an abstract model. A concrete model is a material model such as model organisms, while an abstract model is a mathematical or computational model consists of equations or algorithms. Though there are types of biological models that cannot be strictly categorized as either concrete or abstract, they are falling somewhere in between this spectrum. In view of the fact that biological phenomena are (...) sui generis and distinct from physical phenomena in many respects, using the concepts in standard modeling fails to account for the differences between biological sciences and physical sciences. Drawing from the resources of a credible-world account of models in economic modeling, I propose to reinterpret abstract models and concrete models in the light of the credible world account of models. (shrink)

Several recent authors have argued that children are subject to testimonial injustice in the same way as are women, Blacks, and several other social identity groups. Testimonial injustice is standardly conceptualized, following Miranda Fricker’s seminal account, as a wrongful credibility deficit. I argue that this concept of testimonial injustice is too narrow to capture testimonial injustice against children. There is good reason to think that children are less reliable testifiers than adults, so it is not necessarily wrong to assign (...) a credibility deficit to a child speaker, in the way it is wrong in the case of a female or black speaker. However, I argue that children are nevertheless subjected to testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice against children is constituted primarily by a failure to actively inquire into assertions by children — that is, by a failure to patiently and reflectively engage in discourse with the child to discover what they may know. (shrink)

Failed replication attempts have raised concerns over the prevalence of publication bias and false positive results in the psychological literature. Using a sample of 65,970 test statistics from Cognition & Emotion and Emotion, this article assesses the credibility of results in emotional research. All test statistics were converted to z-scores and analysed with Z-curve. A Z-curve analysis provides information about the amount of selection bias, the expected replication rate and the false positive risk. Lastly, Z-curve is used to determine (...) an alpha level that lessens the false positive risk without unnecessary loss of power. The results show evidence of selection bias in emotional research, but trend analyses showed a decrease over time. Based on the z-curve estimates, we predict a 15% and 70% success rate in replication studies. Therefore, replication studies should increase sample sizes to avoid type-II errors. The risk of false positives with the traditional alpha level of 5% is between 5% and 33%. Lowering alpha to 1% is sufficient to reduce the false positive risk to less than 5%. In sum, our findings may alleviate concerns about high false positive rates among emotional researchers. However, selection bias and low power remain challenges to be addressed. (shrink)

Under what conditions is it epistemologically credible to appeal to considerations originating in one’s faith tradition to curb or reject dictates of one’s reason? I call these cases of theological encroachment upon philosophical inquiry. What makes theological encroachment epistemologically credible? I propose that the intellectual virtue, or intellectual vice, manifested in theorizing is epistemologically relevant. I focus on intellectual integrity: for theists who think God is worthy of worship, intellectual integrity demands that they only accept cases of theological encroachment that (...) are worthy objects of choice for a recognizably worship-worthy God. I rely on the thought of early 19th century Mexican Catholic Bishop Clemente de Jesús Munguía as a case study to illustrate the plausibility of this criterion. (shrink)

The book deeply analyses the bilateral relations between Switzerland and the European Union and their effect on the former's sovereignty in the context of Europeanisation. This touches on philosophical debates on the complexity of sovereignty. What sovereignty is at stake when talking about Swiss-EU relations? This issue not only faces the elusiveness of sovereignty as a concept, but also the proliferation of hypocrisy on its presence within states. The book encounters the deconstructionist hypothesis stating that there is nothing to worry (...) about but the belief there is something to worry about. Derrida's deconstruction of sovereignty allows indeed one to grasp the fictional essence of sovereignty based on the metaphysics of presence. The presence of self-positing sovereign inches per secondeity is fictional since absent in the present, but spectrally present in the belief of its presence to come. Sovereignty is a matter of credibility, or the credible promise of a normative statement to come. Hence, the book challenges the realist/neorealist argument stating that states are credibly sovereign until proven otherwise and explains that the debate on state sovereignty calls for the unveiling of this hypocritical epistemology cunningly disguised as an objective presence. Swiss-EU relations thus become the cornerstone to not only theorise but also test sovereignty and deconstruct the two ontological and epistemological sides of the same coin, or the modern hypocrisy of sovereignty. This deconstruction constitutes the very problématique of any attempt to understand whether and how a state can be sovereign and solve the problem as to how to neutralise the différance and identify the difference between credible and incredible claims of sovereignty. This problématique connects the theory and practice of sovereignty innovatively, providing positivist evidence on the arguable credibility of the Swiss claim of sovereignty and confirming the presence of a theological dimension within politics.<. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to the widespread use of online hearings in arbitral proceedings, raising questions about the impact of such proceedings on the determination of facts underlying a dispute. This article explores the extent to which online hearings may hinder arbitrators’ ability to assess witness credibility by drawing upon the cognitive psychology literature on truthfulness determination and lie detection. A survey of the literature suggests that the ability to differentiate truthful from dishonest statements through verbal and nonverbal (...) cues is limited, leading to the notion that observing behaviors like fidgeting, gaze aversion, vocal pitch, or body posture is not particularly relevant in assessing the credibility of a witness. Instead, focusing on the content of what is reported appears to be the most relevant strategy to determine credibility. Therefore, research does not support the idea that face-to-face contact with witnesses is essential to determine the facts of a dispute. Still, the use of in-person hearings may, in practice, continue to be preferred due to underlying cultural assumptions regarding the nature of hearings, the facilitation of communication between parties, counsel, and the tribunal, and a general sense of _Zoom fatigue_. (shrink)

Climate models don’t give us probabilistic forecasts. To interpret their results, alternatively, as serious possibilities seems problematic inasmuch as climate models rely on contrary-to-fact assumptions: why should we consider their implications as possible if their assumptions are known to be false? The paper explores a way to address this possibilistic challenge. It introduces the concepts of a perfect and of an imperfect credible world, and discusses whether climate models can be interpreted as imperfect credible worlds. That would allow one to (...) use models for possibilistic prediction and salvage widespread scientific practice. (shrink)

ArgumentWe expand upon the notion of the “credibility cycle” through a study of credibility engineering by the food industry. Research and development (R&D) as well as marketing contribute to the credibility of the food company Unilever and its claims. Innovation encompasses the development, marketing, and sales of products. These are directed towards three distinct audiences: scientific peers, regulators, and consumers. R&D uses scientific articles to create credit for itself amongst peers and regulators. These articles are used to (...) support health claims on products. However, R&D, regulation, and marketing are not separate realms. A single strategy of credibility engineering connects health claims to a specific public through linking that public to a health issue and a food product. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker has influentially discussed testimonial injustice: the injustice done to a speaker S by a hearer H when H gives S less-than-merited credibility. Here, I explore the prospects for a novel form of testimonial injustice, where H affords S due credibility, that is, the amount of credibility S deserves. I present two kinds of cases intended to illustrate this category, and argue that there is presumptive reason to think that testimonial injustice with due credibility exists. (...) I show that if it is denied that ultimately these cases exemplify testimonial injustice without credibility deficit, then either they must be taken to exemplify a novel kind of epistemic, non-testimonial injustice, or they bring to light a significant exegetical result. (shrink)

The prison system in the United States is a moral catastrophe. As Jennifer Lackey shows in this powerful book, the moral catastrophe extends to the criminal justice system that sends people to prison, and in particular to the ways that it handles testimony. In doing so, she also makes an important contribution to theoretical epistemology, especially to ongoing debates about epistemic injustice— making a case for a distinctive kind of testimonial injustice, agential testimonial injustice. The concept of testimonial injustice provides (...) a powerful lens through which to understand many of the cases on which Lackey is focused. Yet, like many conceptual frameworks in philosophy, it also has its limits. In this critical notice, I probe these limits in several ways. First, I ask whether the conceptual framework of epistemic injustice is apt or necessary for understanding the full range of cases in which Lackey is interested—making some general points about the category of epistemic injustice that I think are insufficiently recognized and then applying them to Lackey’s arguments. I then broach the question of the scale of the wrong of testimonial injustice relative to that of false conviction more broadly. Finally, I explore limits on the extent to which we can arrive at evidentially well-founded credibility distributions given the paucity of evidence that we typically have to go on in assessing speakers' credibility in the legal context. This questions whether the framework of testimonial (in)justice will provide much guidance in hard cases, beyond the flagrant injustices on which Lackey is focused. (shrink)

Credibility is particularly important in organic food systems because there are only marginal visual and sensorial differences between organic and conventionally produced products, requiring consumers to trust in producers’ quality claims. In this article I explore what challenges the credibility of organic food systems and I explore how credibility of organic food systems can be maintained, using the Danish organic food system as a case study. The question is increasingly relevant as the sale of organic food is (...) growing in Denmark as well as globally, and consumers’ expectations of organics continuously evolve. The inquiry is threefold, first I outline a conceptual framework for understanding trust and credibility in the food system, secondly I explore the developments in Danish organic food systems and thirdly discuss the challenges and opportunities for maintaining trust in the Danish organic food system. In the analysis I indicate eight key challenges: unrealistic expectations, blind trust and little motivation for extending their knowledge, consumers assess the overall credibility of organic products, ambitious ethical principles, new consumer groups introduce new expectations, frozen requirements in a changing world, growing imports and labelling and multiple versions of organics and the diversity is growing, as well as four aspects which may maintain the credibility of organics if implemented: coordinate expectations, communicate requested information, institutional reform and open communication of pros and cons of organic production. (shrink)

This paper examines the success of corporate communication in voluntary sustainability reporting. Existing studies have focused on the perspective of the communicators but lack an understanding of the perspective of information recipients to clearly evaluate this interactive communication process. This paper looks at the issue of a credibility gap perceived by external stakeholders when they doubt the authenticity of communicated information due to the reporting company’s governance structure. The paper uses family businesses to exemplify the emergence of such a (...) gap when outsiders become concerned about the potential agency problem of the integrated ownership and management controlled by a few members of the same family. Following source credibility theory, these concerns raise a credibility gap associated with a family firm’s trustworthiness and goodwill, even if the family has the expertise to carry out sustainability reporting. The findings of two experimental studies indicate that family businesses suffer a greater credibility gap than non-family businesses. An external and independent assurance service can mitigate such gaps, especially when the service is comprehensive and targets family businesses. The paper provides a complete view evaluating corporate communication by looking at the interaction between the communicating company and the information recipients. (shrink)

According to Fricker’s (2007) seminal account, an epistemic injustice is done when, based on prejudice, a hearer ascribes to a speaker a level of credibility below what they deserve. When prejudice results in credibility excess, however, Fricker contends no similar injustice takes place. In this paper, I will challenge the second of these claims. Using a modified version of Zollman’s (2007) two-armed bandit model, I will show how the systematic over-ascription of credibility within a dominant group can (...) produce epistemic advantages for that group relative to non-group members. (shrink)

Hume’s famous argument against the credibility of testimony about miracles invokes two premises: 1) The reliability of the witness (the extent to which he is informed and truthful) must be compared with the intrinsic probability of the miracle. 2) The initial probability of a miracle is always small enough to outweigh the improbability that the testimony is false (even when the witness is assumed to be reliable). I defend the first premise of the argument, showing that Hume’s argument can (...) be applied to purported observations of miracles, as well. I then show that Hume failed to provide an adequate support for his second premise. A more cogent defence can be provided for a weaker premise. The resultant argument has, consequently, a less sweeping conclusion than Hume’s. (shrink)

The attention paid to the influence of organizational philanthropy on consumer responses has precipitated a shift in the role this practice plays in organizational dynamics—with philanthropy becoming an increasingly strategic marketing tool. The authors develop and test a model predicting that: (1) perceived organizational credibility will mediate the relationship between awareness of philanthropy and the outcomes of advocacy and financial sacrifice; (2) consumer social consciousness will moderate the relationship between awareness of philanthropy and firm credibility, and between (...) class='Hi'>credibility and the outcome variables; and (3) these moderated relationships will be mediated by perceived credibility. Data obtained from a sample of professional golf patrons support our assertions. Notably, the findings implicate perceived credibility as a key intervening variable in the hypothesized relationships for the PGA Tour. (shrink)

Miracle in a strict sense is to be discriminated from acts of special providence by its being radically unnatural in terms of prior expectation. The key issue in relation to credibility is theological in character, inasmuch as divine consistency must imply that miracles are capable of being understood as “signs,” affording deeper insight into the divine care for creation. These issues are explored by reference to scriptural miracles, particularly the virginal conception and the resurrection of Christ.

This study examines the use of names in the construction of “credibility” as a journalistic duty. Using the framework set forth by Tuchman (1972) of objectivity as a “strategic ritual,” the study discusses the ethical justifications put forth by the New York Times for the process through which it decided to identify a CIA interrogator who had been involved in questioning 9/11 captives. The examination concludes that the facticity of naming should ultimately be uncoupled from the concept of (...) class='Hi'>credibility. (shrink)

The policies of opening research data are based on arguments of transparency, innovation and democratization of knowledge. This article aims to make their implications intelligible for communities working with ethnographic data, confronted with a transformation of the criteria for recognizing the credibility of the knowledge they produce. While researchers who practice ethnography are engaged in situated forms of sharing materials with peers, other disciplines and “source communities”, the strengthening of external control over the conditions under which this sharing takes (...) place destabilizes the economies of credibility that structure these practices. More than a reluctance to the process of openness, the withdrawal of ethnographers from the movement appears at the end of our analysis to be the result of both the existence of alternative ecologies of empirical materials and an ethic of the margins embedded in often implicit professional norms. (shrink)

The sciences have historically secured social trust and authority through widely comprehensible performances of trustworthiness and of predictive and technological power. However, shifts in the structure and operations of the sciences; in the sociotechnical environment where public knowledge is constructed and contested; in the political goals of the sciences; and in the audiences to whom the sciences aim to speak have collectively left the sciences lacking public credibility concomitant to their public aspirations in areas like climate change and COVID-19 (...) vaccination. As an alternative to pining for a science-dominated past that never was, I investigate the performances by which the sciences have achieved public credibility in the past and by which they might do so in the present and future. I articulate a contemporary set of performances by which the sciences may be able to demonstrate their value to broad sectors of society, emphasizing humility, responsiveness to public values and concerns, openness of interest, and situated rather than general utility. I hope that, by pursuing such performances, scientific institutions could rebuild, and, indeed, merit the broad-based trust to which they aspire. (shrink)

Risk communicators often need to communicate probabilistic predictions. On occasion, an event with 10% likelihood will occur, or one with 90% likelihood will not – a probabilistically unexpected ou...

There is an undeniable tendency to dismiss women’s sexual assault allegations out of hand. However, this tendency is not monolithic—allegations that black men have raped white women are often met with deadly seriousness. I argue that contemporary rape culture is characterized by the interplay between rape myths that minimize rape, and myths that catastrophize rape. Together, these two sets of rape myths distort the epistemic resources that people use when assessing rape allegations. These distortions result in the unjust exoneration of (...) people we cannot conceive of as monstrous, while making it too easy to believe that some marginalized people could be rapists. I also argue that rape myths enable a novel kind of epistemic injustice. This injustice concerns how our assessments of trustworthiness and our assessments of plausibility interact. I argue that rape myths can result in runaway credibility deflations that can explain both why people fail to believe most women, and also why people may unjustly believe false allegations that white women have been raped by black men. (shrink)

When listeners consider a speaker's social identity or standpoint as evidence of their credibility on questions related to social issues, this practice is usually epistemically counterproductive. Though people's standpoints are relevant for understanding what it's like to occupy a social position, the practice of boosting or blocking a speaker's credibility on the basis of their standpoint is often misleading. The expectation that speakers will reveal their standpoints and that listeners will consider the speaker's standpoints when evaluating their claims (...) is also burdensome for speakers who would rather conceal information about their standpoints. (shrink)

In 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, in Matter of A-B-, attempted to bar victims of non-state actors—such as intimate partners and local gangs—from obtaining asylum in the United States. This article focuses on domestic violence-based asylum claims that made it to the US Circuit Court of Appeals during the Trump administration and the first five months of the Biden administration. My interdisciplinary approach goes beyond analysing the effect that Matter of A-B- has had on the outcomes of cases and asks (...) how judges evaluate the credibility of petitioners, determine whether domestic violence can rise to the level of persecution, and decide whether a government was unwilling or unable to protect the victim. A systematic analysis of 83 appellate level verdicts shows that asylum decisions are fraught with inconsistencies and that many judges lack a sophisticated understanding of domestic violence, credibility, and trauma. (shrink)

Are autonomous arrangements that have ethnically distinct minority populations (hereinafter referred to as ethnoautonomy) better off dividing and sharing powers with a central government, or would it be better for them to sever their ties and become fully independent? The past two decades have produced a useful debate regarding this question. Pro-ethnoautonomy scholars emphasize the virtues of autonomy arrangements that have distinct minority populations. They stress their economic advantages, and their meaningful levels of self-determination. On the other hand, still other (...) anti-ethnoautonomy scholars reject the virtues of autonomy. They assert that ethnoautonomy is associated with poverty and violence. They also argue that autonomy can be unfairly exploited by one side or another given inevitable power differentials. This chapter seeks to explain why the pro and anti-ethnoautonomy literatures provide such starkly different assessments. The argument here will be that these distinct views can be explained by the presence (or absence) of constitutional entrenchment credibility mechanisms (which are capabilities that make allocated powers very difficult to change and take away). Even as anti-ethnoautonomy scholars assert their skepticism, they include within their assessment weak autonomy polities that have weak or nonexistent credibility guarantees; the powers of such polities can be taken away by executive fiat or the simple majority decision of a core state or central government legislature. As this chapter will demonstrate, the problems that such scholars observe do not come from autonomy itself. Instead, they emanate from the weakness of the credibility guarantees of the polities that they include within their assessment. By contrast to anti-ethnoautonomy scholars, scholars that accept the virtues of ethnoautonomy tend to exclude such weak autonomy cases and instead assess polities with meaningful constitutional entrenchment. (shrink)

Building on a view of both narration and argumentation as dynamic concepts, this paper considers ways of assessing the credibility of narrative arguments constructed in empirical examples of conversational discourse. I argue that the key in any such exercise is to pay close attention to both structural and pragmatic details, particularly how conversational storytelling gets embedded in the surrounding discourse and how the way this is discursively accomplished vis-à-vis the narrators’ multilayered audience may be reflective of their argumentative goals.

The need for a framework to justify that a model has sufficient credibility to be used as a basis for internal or external (typically regulatory) decision-making is a primary concern when using modelling and simulation (M&S) in healthcare. This chapter reviews published standards on verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification (VVUQ) as well as regulatory guidance that can be used to establish model credibility in this context, providing a potential starting point for a globally harmonised model credibility framework.

This study identifies citizen journalists' role conceptions regarding their news contributing activities and their perceptions of professional journalists' roles. Specifically, the ethical criterion of media credibility was assessed to identify predictors on their perceptions of roles. Analyses reveal citizen journalists perceive their roles to be generally similar to professional journalists and even rated certain roles more prominently for themselves. Further, their perceptions of media credibility were found to function as a core belief in how they assessed their roles (...) and also those of professional journalists, which has implications for a system of open ethics. (shrink)

In this article, I argue for the need of a credible concept of fatherhood in present-day Western culture. This claim is based on the belief that fathers and father figures play an important role in constructing unique identities, both in the context of childrearing and in a more general cultural sense. An existential concept of adoption is developed to clarify the notion of credible fatherhood, which is supported, on the one hand, by Dorothee Sölle's analysis of the shift from a (...) religious construction of identity to a post-religious self-construction of identity and, on the other, by Charles Taylor's concept of authenticity. (shrink)