This chapter explores two central questions in the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry. The first is whether to orient one’s normative inquiry around folk normative concepts (like KNOWLEDGE or IMMORAL) or around theoretical normative concepts (like ADEQUATE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION or PRO TANTO PRACTICAL REASON). The second is whether to orient one’s normative inquiry around concepts whose normative authority is especially accessible to us (such as OUGHT ALL THINGS CONSIDERED), or around concepts whose extension is especially accessible to us (...) (such as BETRAYAL). The chapter aims to make vivid and plausible a range of possible answers to these questions, and important forms of argument that can be used to favor certain answers over others. (shrink)

This paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects about epistemic thought and talk, which we call “systematic normative epistemology”, “metaepistemology”, and “the conceptual ethics of epistemology”. We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. This paper is motivated by the idea that the distinctions between these three projects matter for epistemological theorizing in ways that have been underappreciated in philosophical discussion. We claim that attention to the threefold distinction we (...) advance allows us to better understand and evaluate existing views and debates in the field; identify and appreciate new or underexplored theoretical options in the field; and avoid important defects and ambiguities in our research on epistemic topics. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics (...) and social/political philosophy. In this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics are branches of philosophy concerned with questions about how to assess and ameliorate our representational devices (such as concepts and words). It's a part of philosophy concerned with questions about which concepts we should use (and why), how concepts can be improved, when concepts should be abandoned, and how proposals for amelioration can be implemented. Central parts of the history of philosophy have engaged with these issues, but the focus of this volume (...) is on applications to work in contemporary philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, gender and race theory, ethics, philosophy of science, and philosophical logic. This is the first volume devoted entirely to conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. The volume explores the possibilities, benefits, problems, and applications of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. It consists of twenty chapters written by leading philosophers. (shrink)

Recent years have seen increasing attention to conceptual engineering, the enterprise of evaluating and improving our repertoire of representational devices (e.g., words, concepts, classificatory procedures). This paper contributes to the systematic investigation of the normative questions that arise within and about conceptual engineering. It does two things. First, it argues for a clear distinction between two normative domains that are often conflated: conceptual ethics and ethics of implementation. Conceptual ethics concerns what concepts we (...) ought to have, and the ethics of implementation addresses what means are permissible in promoting conceptual uptake. It is important to keep these domains separate, as we would otherwise risk conflating or obscuring what kinds of normative concerns are relevant at what stage and why. Second, the paper investigates how these two normative domains interact. Specifically, it asks whether what it is permissible to do to increase the uptake of a representational device matters to the question what representational devices people ought to have, or vice versa. The paper argues that conceptual ethics can directly influence the ethics of implementation, but that the ethics of implementation has much less relevance to conceptual ethics. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics (...) and social/political philosophy. In this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

If ethical reflection on which concepts to use has an avatar, it must be Nietzsche, who took more seriously than most the question of what concepts one should live by, and regarded many of our inherited concepts as deeply problematic. Moreover, his eschewal of traditional attempts to derive the one right set of concepts from timeless rational foundations renders his conceptual ethics strikingly modern, raising the prospect of a Nietzschean alternative to Wittgensteinian non-foundationalism. Yet Nietzsche appears to engage (...) in two seemingly contrary modes of concept evaluation: one looks to concepts’ effects, the other to what concepts express. I offer an account of the expressive character of concepts which unifies these two modes and accounts for Nietzsche’s seemingly bifurcating interests. His fundamental concern is with the effects concepts are likely to have going forward, and it is precisely this concern that motivates his preoccupation with what concepts express. He evaluates concepts by asking for whom they have a point, working back from a concept via the need it fills to the conditions that engender that need and thereby render the concept pointful. For a concept to be pointful is for it to serve the concerns of its users through its effects. But even when it is not pointful, a concept expresses the presuppositions of its pointfulness, which we can work back to by asking who would have need of such a concept. What emerges is a powerful approach to conceptual ethics that looks beyond the formal virtues and vices of concepts at the presuppositions we buy into by using them. (shrink)

Mollema’s reframing of my proposal as conceptual engineering is illuminating, and his emphasis on conceptual ethics is valuable. However, I argue that the Apt Curation Model (ACM) already provides substantial conceptual-ethical justification through its preservation of epistemic responsibility and compatibility with existing intellectual practices. Rather than demanding comprehensive conceptual ethics before adoption, we should recognize conceptual engineering as iterative: provisional adoption, practical testing, and refinement based on experience. This constructive exchange advances our understanding (...) of both the ACM’s strengths and the legitimate questions requiring further investigation. (shrink)

This article presents results of a critical review of the literature discussing the ethical issues arising in humanitarian work, following the method proposed by McCullough, Coverdale and Chervenak. Our aim was primarily to focus on how the ethical issues arising in humanitarian work are conceptualized within the literature we reviewed. We think that properly conceptualizing the ethical issues which humanitarian workers may face can provide avenues to better respond to them. We analysed 61 documents, as part of a literature review, (...) which revealed that there truly is a need, amongst the authors and in humanitarian work, to discuss ethics. Indeed, even if only a small number of authors define explicitly the words they use to discuss ethics, the great quantity that we have uncovered in the documents seem to suggest vast and rich grounds upon which to address ethical issues. We believe it to be important that the ethical issues of humanitarian work are increasingly addressed in the literature and argue that it would be helpful for the vocabulary used by authors to be employed and developed even more rigorously, so that their discussions show more precision, coherence, relevance, exhaustiveness, and sufficiency. The review of the literature, as well as the resulting analysis in this article, is part of a broader project to suggest a way to conceptualize the ethical issues of humanitarian work based on the strengths and innovations of this and other studies. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to conceptual ethics, Joshua Habgood-Coote argues that philosophers should refrain from using the term “fake news,” which is commonly employed in public discussions focusing on the epistemic health of democracies. In this short discussion note, I take issue with this claim, discussing each of the three arguments advanced by Coote to support the conclusion that we should abandon this concept. First, I contend that although “fake news” is a contested concept, there is significant agreement (...) among contemporary philosophers about its key feature. Second, I argue against the claim that “fake news” is an unnecessary concept by underlying that it is not reducible to other terms we customarily use to describe the epistemic dysfunctions of democracies. Lastly, I suggest that using the term “fake news” need not serve propagandistic aims, and that philosophers can use this concept without engaging in epistemic policing, that is, commanding their interlocutors not to believe specific news stories or sources. (shrink)

This paper argues for the value of distinguishing two projects concerning our normative and evaluative thought and talk, which we dub “metanormative inquiry” and “the conceptual ethics of normativity” respectively. The first half of the paper offers a substantive account of each project and of the relationship between them. Roughly, metanormative inquiry aims to understand actual normative and evaluative thought and talk, and what (if anything) it is distinctively about, while the conceptual ethics of normativity engages (...) in normative or evaluative reflection on normative and evaluative thought and talk. We explore how certain theories of content determination complicate the distinction between these projects, but argue that both the distinction and its significance survive these complications. The second half of the paper argues that attention to the distinction between these projects can promote progress in both projects in three ways. First, it can transform our understanding and evaluation of views that are routinely classified as part of “metaethics”. Second, it can help us to identify important theoretical options that otherwise tend to remain obscure. And, third, it can help us to avoid tempting but fallacious arguments which can easily arise if the projects are not distinguished. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that facts about the history or genealogy of concepts (facts about what I call “conceptual history”) can matter for normative inquiry. I argue that normative and evaluative issues about concepts (such as issues about which concepts an agent should use, in a given context) matter for all forms of inquiry (including normative inquiry) and that conceptual history can help us when we engage in thinking about these normative and evaluative issues (which I call (...) issues in “conceptual ethics”). My aim in making this argument is to develop a schematic framework for thinking about the relationship between conceptual history and normative inquiry. The framework puts pressure on those who, often unreflectively or implicitly, dismiss the potential relevance of conceptual history to normative inquiry. At the same time, the framework can be seen as presenting a challenge to those drawn to more radical views about the relationship between conceptual history and normative inquiry. The challenge is this: if one wants a more ambitious model of the relevance of conceptual history to normative inquiry than what I provide in this paper, one needs to explain what justifies such a model. (shrink)

Are there virtues that constitutively involve using certain concepts? Does it make sense to speak of rights or duties to use certain concepts? And do consequentialist approaches to concepts necessarily have to reproduce the difficulties that plague utilitarianism? These are fundamental orientating questions for the emerging field of conceptual ethics, which invites us to reflect critically about which concepts to use. In this article, I map out and explore the ways in which conceptual ethics might take (...) its cue from virtue-ethical, deontological, and consequentialist traditions of ethical thought, flagging the main difficulties facing each approach. I end by sketching how the various dimensions of evaluation singled out by these three traditions might be combined in a single approach. (shrink)

Moral disagreement is often thought to be of great metaethical significance for moral realists. I explore what remains of that significance when we look at moral disagreement through the lens of a combination of two influential and independently plausible hypotheses about moral language. The Morality-As-Cooperation (MAC) hypothesis says that our capacity for and use of moral language is an adaptation to increase mutualistic cooperation. The Concepts-As-Tools (CAT) hypothesis says that we often engage in disputes about language use and that many (...) apparent moral disagreements are linguistic disagreements in disguise. The combined MAC-CAT view that I explore suggests that we frequently engage in linguistic disputes to find optimal means for mutualistic cooperation. I show that this perspective weakens sceptical claims based on moral disagreements, that is offers a novel way for moral realists to explain the apparent genuineness of moral disagreements without the need to accept theses borrowed from non-cognitivism. (shrink)

Conceptual ethics asks which concepts we ought to use. Matthieu Queloz’s recent book, _The Ethics of Conceptualization_, offers the most developed account to date. He argues that reasons for concept choice should be grounded in our conceptual needs, which he understands as reflectively endorsed concerns, capacities, and circumstances. His case proceeds through a two-tier argument that rejects foundationalism, ironism, and holism, as well as approaches that rely exclusively on epistemic or theoretical virtues. We argue that Queloz’s (...) dismissal of foundationalism is too quick. By relating his framework to the familiar distinction between applied, normative, and meta-ethics, we clarify the meta-ethical commitments implicit in his position. This, in turn, allows us to extract four desiderata that any plausible theory of conceptual ethics must meet: Non-Arbitrary Authority, Comprehensive Value Sensitivity, Context-Sensitivity, and Compatibility with the Modern World. We develop and defend an alternative foundationalist view that meets all four desiderata and avoids the objections Queloz levels against traditional foundationalism. This “proper foundationalism” grounds reasons for concept choice in objective values without assuming that all concepts must track metaphysical structure. The disagreement between Queloz and his foundationalist rivals, we argue, is best understood as a dispute within meta-ethics. Recognizing this clarifies the structure of conceptual ethics and expands the theoretical options available for guiding conceptual improvement. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative (...) and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities. (shrink)

This paper makes a prima facie case for abandoning use of the terms ‘ideal theory’ and ‘non-ideal theory’ in social and political inquiry (across a central range of contexts). Our argument begins by observing two sorts of striking variation. The first is variation in how inquirers characterize “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory. The second is variation in the theoretical significance of idealization. Here, there is striking variation across theoretical contexts in the targets that can be usefully idealized, the degree of idealization (...) that can be applied to those targets, and the ways that idealizations can be warranted or worrisome. Against the background of this variety, we argue both that central uses of these terms have the potential to obstruct inquiry, and that there is no theoretically appealing way to reform the existing usage. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper addresses an important but relatively unexplored question about the relationship between conceptual ethics and other philosophical inquiry: how does the epistemology of conceptual ethics relate to the epistemology of other, more “traditional” forms of philosophical inquiry? This paper takes as its foil the optimistic thought that the epistemology of conceptual ethics will be easier and less mysterious than relevant “traditional” philosophical inquiry. We argue against this foil by focusing on the fact (...) that that conceptual ethics is a form of normative inquiry. Because of the epistemic difficulties that face normative inquiry, we should not expect conceptual ethics to constitute an epistemic panacea. Instead, although the epistemological upshots can vary from case to case, there are systematic reasons why this shift may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the epistemic difficulties we face in pursuing philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

In recent years, David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have published a series of interesting articles that made an original use of resources from linguistics and philosophy of language to reply to arguments for legal antipositivism, the thesis according to which moral or value facts are part of what determines what the law is in a given jurisdiction at a given time. Plunkett and Sundell’s strategy for resisting antipositivism appeals to the notion of a metalinguistic negotiation, which incorporates the notion of (...) a metalinguistic or context disagreement. Sundell 2011 had argued that metalinguistic disagreements are a possible component of disputes about evaluative matters. A further notion deployed is that of conceptual ethics, an essential component of metalinguistic negotiations. This paper approaches a crucial concern about the deployment of both notions against disagreement-based arguments for legal antipositivism. Metalinguistic negotiations displace disagreements from the semantic to the metalinguistic level, but do not eliminate the appeal to moral or other normative reasons from legal disagreements. Conceptual ethics purports to be a normative activity, engaged with prescribing ways one ought to think and talk. On a broad understanding of legal reasoning and practice, metalinguistic negotiations and conceptual ethics are an integral part of it, and hence are consistent with evaluative and normative facts being essential to, and constitutive of, the law. Or so this paper argues. (shrink)

This paper addresses an important but relatively unexplored question about the relationship between conceptual ethics and other philosophical inquiry: how does the epistemology of conceptual ethics relate to the epistemology of other, more “traditional” forms of philosophical inquiry? This paper takes as its foil the optimistic thought that the epistemology of conceptual ethics will be easier and less mysterious than relevant “traditional” philosophical inquiry. We argue against this foil by focusing on the fact that (...) that conceptual ethics is a form of normative inquiry. Because of the epistemic difficulties that face normative inquiry, we should not expect conceptual ethics to constitute an epistemic panacea. Instead, although the epistemological upshots can vary from case to case, there are systematic reasons why this shift may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the epistemic difficulties we face in pursuing philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

The conceptual ethics of normativity involves normative reflection on normative thought and talk. One motive for engaging in this project is to seek to either vindicate or improve one’s existing normative concepts. This paper clarifies and addresses a deep challenge to the conceptual ethics of normativity, when it is motivated in this way. The challenge arises from the fact that we need to use some of our own normative concepts in order to evaluate our normative concepts. (...) This might seem objectionably circular, akin to trying to verify the accuracy of a ruler by checking it against itself. We dub this the vindicatory circularity challenge. If the challenge cannot be met, it would suggest that all normative inquiry (not just the conceptual ethics of normativity) rests on worryingly arbitrary foundations. We defend a way of answering the challenge that adapts anti-skeptical resources from epistemology. Along the way, we reject several alternative replies to the challenge. These include dismissing the challenge because it cannot be formulated with our concepts, answering it by appeal to a distinctive normative concept, and answers that appeal to certain metaphysical or metasemantic resources. (shrink)

In what they call their “manual of the sanities”—a positive psychology handbook describing contemporary research on strengths of character—Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman argue that “there is no true disadvantage of having too much self-control.” This claim is widely endorsed in the research literature. I argue that it is false. My argument proceeds in three parts. First, I identify conceptual confusion in the definition of self-control, specifically as it pertains to the claim that you cannot be too self-controlled. Second, (...) I consider disadvantages to having too much self-control, several of which point to the value of acting spontaneously from time to time, in a pointedly uncontrolled way. Third, I raise worries about the social and political values embedded in the science of self-control. Self-control as it is understood in the positive psychology literature benefits some people more than others, depending, for example, on their race and their socio-economic status. I conclude by briefly outlining an empirical framework for understanding self-control in traditional virtue theoretic terms as something that admits of deficiencies and excesses. (shrink)

The development of so-called personalized medicine (PM) has raised great hopes and expectations among researchers, patients, health-care providers, and politicians. This chapter explores firstly the terminology and conceptual premises of PM. In the second stage, there will be a brief review of the state of the art of PM and medical-technical challenges associated with this approach to medicine. The subsequent normative analysis will focus on two topics which have been given particular consideration in the philosophical and ethical debate around (...) PM: (1) the relation between PM, autonomy, and responsibility of the individual and (2) the setting of priorities in light of the PM approach to research and practice. (shrink)

Evolution - both the fact that it occurred and the theory describing the mechanisms by which it occurred - is an intrinsic and central component in modern biology. Theodosius Dobzhansky captures this well in the much-quoted title of his 1973 paper 'Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution'. The correctness of this assertion is even more obvious today: philosophers of biology and biologists agree that the fact of evolution is undeniable and that the theory of evolution (...) explains that fact. Such a theory has far-reaching implications. In this volume, eleven distinguished scholars address the conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological richness of the theory and its ethical and religious impact, exploring topics including DNA barcoding, three grand challenges of human evolution, functionalism, historicity, design, evolution and development, and religion and secular humanism. The volume will be of great interest to those studying philosophy of biology and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

In “The Apt Curation Model: An Epistemic Virtue Theory of AI-assisted Authorship” (Philosophy & Technology 39 (2026)) Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues argues that we should conceive of the author in AI-supported processes as an apt curator of texts. He pleads for extending the accurate-adroit-apt framework towards human-AI authorship and developing four curatorial virtues: dialogical, evaluative, integrative, and architectural. This ‘Apt Curation Problem’ solves the problems constituted by the lack of a locus for the epistemic and semantic properties of authorship in the (...) case of AI-assisted text production. In this commentary on Rodrigues’ article, I aim to do three things: (1) summarize and praise the article; (2) reframe the apt curation model as a possible move in the conceptual engineering of AI and authorship; and (3) I argue that the apt curation model stands in need of more conceptual ethics – the metaphilosophical practice of giving reasons for the (sustained) use of a concept. Before we can accept new models of authorship, we still have to weigh our concerns and goals associated with construing authorship in the context of AI in Rodrigues’ way, against other concerns and goals that might drive other conceptualizations, given our current capacities and circumstances. (shrink)

When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking (...) about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning of core pieces of legal terminology). The approach I explore asks questions about legal interpretation in a way that is tethered to what legal (or “legal-ish”) concepts people should deploy, as part of arguments on behalf of engaging in legal (or “legal-ish”) practices different from our current ones. In exploring this approach, I aim to help us better understand the landscape of philosophical issues about legal interpretation, including parts of it that I think have been underexplored. (shrink)

Forgiveness theorists focus a good deal on explicating the content of what they take to be a shared folk concept of forgiveness. Our empirical research, however, suggests that there is a range of concepts of forgiveness present in the population, and therefore that we should be folk conceptual pluralists about forgiveness. We suggest two possible responses on the part of forgiveness theorists: (1) to deny folk conceptual pluralism by arguing that forgiveness is a functional concept and (2) to (...) accept folk conceptual pluralism and focus on a revisionary conceptual ethics project. (shrink)

Social objects have become common subjects of interest to both social ontologists and conceptual engineers, but up to this point much of the philosophical work from these two fields has surprisingly been done in isolation from each field. I show how these prolific research fields—social ontology, conceptual engineering, and conceptual ethics—can mutually benefit each other through a unifying model I propose called the 2D-CE model that shows the dependence relations between a given concept, its instantiation conditions, (...) and whatever language represents such devices. This model combines a model from social ontology with insights from conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics into a powerful metaphilosophical tool that highlights the role of social agents for metaphysical and metalinguistic explanation. A major benefit of the model is its utility for not only social philosophy, but for other areas of research beyond the social world. (shrink)

Philosophy strives to give us a firmer hold on our concepts. But what about their hold on us? Why place ourselves under the sway of a concept and grant it the authority to shape our thought and conduct? Another conceptualization would carry different implications. What makes one way of thinking better than another? This book develops a framework for concept appraisal. Its guiding idea is that to question the authority of concepts is to ask for reasons of a special kind: (...) reasons for concept use, which tell us which concepts to adopt, adhere to, or abandon, thereby shoring up—or undercutting—the reasons for action and belief that guide our deliberations. Traditionally, reasons for concept use have been sought either in timeless rational foundations or in concepts’ inherent virtues, such as precision and consistency. Against this, the book advances two main claims: that we find reasons for concept use in the conceptual needs we discover when we critically distance ourselves from a concept by viewing it from the autoethnographic stance; and that sometimes, concepts that conflict, or exhibit other vices such as vagueness or superficiality, are just what we need. By considering not what concepts are absolutely best, but what concepts we now need, we can reconcile ourselves to the contingency of our concepts, determine the proper place of efforts to tidy up thought, and adjudicate between competing conceptions of things—even things as contested as liberty or free will. A needs-based approach separates helpful clarification from hobbling tidy-mindedness, and authoritative definition from conceptual gerrymandering. (shrink)

Habilitation thesis, book proposal in preparation.

Extant business ethics literature available for application to international business demonstrates some variety but no comprehensive principles. While the domains of both international business and business ethics are expanding, they are also becoming increasingly divergent. At the same time, the primacy accorded to the multinational enterprise in both fields ignores the socio-cultural and political embeddedness of economic activities, and multiple agencies in international business (individuals, firms, nations, etc.). Some international business theorists have offered the view that international exchange (...) should be the central building block for theories on international business. In this paper, it is argued that international exchange could be the fundamental unit of analysis for international business ethics as well. The potentially unifying features of exchange norms and ethical principles leads the author to develop some core exchange ethics principles that are tested on three recent international business practices. (shrink)

This special issue examines critical ethical, legal, and policy debates surrounding brain trauma in sport, focusing on challenges in concussion management practices and protocols. Brain injury concerns extend beyond traditional contact sports like boxing, encompassing sporting activities involving rapid acceleration, deceleration, and surface impacts, such as cycling and equestrian sports. Among such problems are the identification and management of brain injuries, the roles of officials and healthcare professionals, and the broader implications for sport integrity and athlete careers. The special issue (...) is organized into four sections: ethics of concussion medicine, socio-legal aspects, sport ethical dimensions, and public health policies. Contributions discuss concussion management in youth sport, sport federations’ and athletes’ duties involvement in concussion-related research, strategies to support and enhance athlete autonomy, public health-informed brain injury frameworks, conflict of interest in concussion management protocols, litigation and liability in concussion research and collaboration, race and genomics in brain-injury scientific discourses, rule changes in sport to reduce head impact, the contextual nature of brain injury and athlete decision-making, the ethical use of genetic testing in brain-injury related research, marketing strategies to advertise tackle football to children and adolescents, and policy purposes and evidence underpinning concussion management practices. This comprehensive exploration offers diverse disciplinary insights, making it a crucial resource for sport humanities scholars, policymakers, and medical professionals. Keywords: brain injury, sport ethics, concussion, sport law, sport policy. (shrink)

A set of basic static predicates, 'in itself, 'existing through itself, 'free', and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (λ (...) μβ?νω) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, 'The road to freedom through active emotion', introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including 'being in itself, 'freedom', etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems. (shrink)

Several authors in psychology and philosophy have recently raised the following question: when is it permissible to intentionally change the meaning and use of our words and concepts? I argue that an arguably prior question has received much less attention: Even if there were good moral or epistemic reasons for conceptual or semantic changes, this does not yet justify pushing or lobbying for such changes if they are socially and conceptually disruptive. In this paper, I develop the beginnings of (...) an ethics of conceptual disruption as well as a set of norms of linguistic interventions based on it. (shrink)

This chapter provides a theoretical lens on conceptual disruption. It offers a typology of conceptual disruption, discusses its relation to conceptual engineering, and sketches a programmatic view of the implications of conceptual disruption for the ethics of technology. We begin by distinguishing between three different kinds of conceptual disruptions: conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments. Subsequently, we distinguish between different mechanisms of conceptual disruption, and two modes of conceptual (...) change. We point out that disruptions may be induced by technology, but can also be triggered by intercultural exchanges. Conceptual disruptions frequently yield conceptual uncertainty and may call for conceptual and ethical inquiry. We argue that a useful approach to address conceptual disruptions is to engage in conceptual engineering. We outline what conceptual engineering involves and argue that discussions on conceptual disruption and conceptual engineering can benefit from closer integration. In closing, we discuss the relevance of studying conceptual disruption for technology ethics, and point to the promise of this line of research to innovate practical philosophy at large. (shrink)

Suppose our ordinary notion of truth is ‘inconsistent’ in the sense that its meaning is partly given by principles that classically entail a logical contradiction. Should we replace the notion with a consistent surrogate? This paper begins by defusing various arguments in favor of this revisionary proposal, including Kevin Scharp’s contention that we need to replace truth for the purposes of semantic theorizing. Borrowing a certain conservative metasemantic principle from Matti Eklund, the article goes on to build a positive case (...) for the opposite policy: retaining truth as-is. The thought is basically that bivalence for the bulk of what we say in the course of ordinary, scientific, and philosophical inquiry should suffice to justify keeping ‘true’. Two versions of the story are told: one more philosophical, drawing on an analogy to Lewis’ response to Putnam’s paradox; the other more technical, invoking a deviant stran.. (shrink)

Survivors' narratives are an invaluable source for the study of violence across academic fields. At the same time, they present several difficulties for academic research. Sources may be marked by the effects of trauma, the lasting impact of perpetrators' political power or blurred lines between reality and fiction. Ethical and legal problems, distances in time between a violent event and the moment of its narration, and the variation in linguistic phrasing chosen by survivors present additional problems. Based on several case (...) studies, the contributors explore typical problems in the study of violence through survivors' narratives, and possible ways of dealing with them. (shrink)

Classification is one of the distinctive features of Paralympic sport. Despite the existence of classification rules and a well-defined classification process, some Paralympic athletes intentionally misrepresent their abilities to classifiers in order to be allocated to a lower performing competition class, in which they secure an unfair advantage over other athletes. Such deception undermines the integrity of the competition by exploiting a vulnerability in the classification process. Such manipulation is hard to mitigate and harder still to prove that an athlete (...) had; intentionally misrepresented their abilities or; failed for innocent reasons to make maximum efforts during the classification or; had acted under coercive pressure from others in their entourage or environment. These challenges are compounded in the case of Paralympic athletes that have an intellectual impairment or who are accompanied by a parent/guardian who acts as a proxy, rendering evaluations as to responsibility even more complex. This article presents a conceptual analyses of intentional misrepresentation of abilities in Paralympic sport, and the differentiation of responsibility for offence thereupon, as stipulated in the draft of the International Standard for Intentional Misrepresentation, accompanying the new 2025 Athlete Classification Code (IPC, Citation2024). Drawing on philosophical and legal analysis we (i) set out existing shortcomings associated with Paralympic classification; (ii) articulate the range of potential intentional misrepresentational acts with respect to classification manipulation; and (iii) articulate the range of negative effects on the integrity of Paralympic sport. (shrink)

The ethical climate is the perception of health professionals about the work environment, meaning the reflection on care practices and ethical-related decisions. There are extensive studies in the international literature about the ethical climate, but there are still theoretical gaps about it in health services. In this reflection article, the objective was to explore conceptual components about the ethical climate, proposing new elements of analysis of the construct. The starting point was the accumulated knowledge itself, the possibilities for expansion, (...) and the conceptual progress emerging from contributions from studies on nursing ethics. It was understandable that the ethical climate is considered in its procedural model and cyclically, being articulated with organizational elements, as established in the literature, and, expanding the concept, with the worker’s health and the ethical expressiveness at work. Regarding this last contribution, the suggestion is to think about the potential for work to allow, limit, or favor professionals to express their ethical and esthetic values in the most daily decisions and relationships, in care, management, and education. The conceptual framework of this study progressed by addressing the ethical climate as a process articulating several concepts and elements regarding the organizational aspect, ethics, and the workers’ well-being. (shrink)

Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics (...) and the philosophy of color. In this way the book not only offers a methodological program for philosophy, but also casts new light on some much-debated problems and their interrelations. (shrink)

An ethic of the fitting: a conceptual framework for nursing practiceNurses are expected to act within an ethos of care cognisant of duty, the right, and the good. Concepts of virtue theory, utilitarianism and deontology are used to outline a conceptual ethical framework for nurses in practice. This ‘Moebius’ framework aims to locate the virtues in a symbiotic relationship with the principles of utilitarianism and deontology. Under this framework, fitting ethical responses are sought. Within an ethic of the (...) fitting, rules and principles do not guarantee the most ethically justifiable outcomes. Within the Moebius approach, the nurse ought to respond with a sense of compassion that befits the moment rather than adhere to a rule at all costs. (shrink)

Behavioral public policy (BPP) has grown significantly since the rise of nudge, yet it remains conceptually fragile. This article argues that some of its epistemological and ethical challenges arise from persistent vagueness and terminological inflation. Terms like “nudges,” “boosts,” “sludges,” “budges,” and variants such as “nudge-plus” or “self-nudges” are often used inconsistently, blurring important distinctions in mechanism, normative intent, and policy impact. Against this backdrop, the article examines examples of the conceptual misuse that pervades BPP literature and argues that (...) clarity should not be a mere academic preference but an ethical, political, and epistemological necessity. Concepts, the article contends, are epistemic tools: they organize knowledge, enable ethical evaluation, and structure scientific inquiry. As in other disciplines, where frameworks like Mendeleev’s periodic table or Linnaeus’s classification of species helped organize, predict, and discover phenomena, conceptual clarity in BPP would enable more coherent epistemic theorization and ethically sound policy design. To illustrate this, the article offers a novel working ethical taxonomy of behavioral interventions evaluated across six dimensions: mechanism, epistemic foundation, locus of harm, primary normative logic, transparency/consent, and temporality. This framework is presented as one possible innovative model to demonstrate how disciplined conceptualization can support epistemic rigor and normative accountability. Ultimately, the article issues a call to action: for scholars, practitioners, and institutions to enforce a more rigorous conceptual infrastructure. Without such rigor, BPP risks devolving into rhetorical confusion; with it, the field can advance as a scientifically grounded and ethically responsible approach to governance. (shrink)

This study suggests a conceptual proposal to analyse the ethics of resistance in organisations, drawing on Foucault’s practising self as a refusal and Schaffer’s ethics of freedom in opposition to the legitimacy of managerial control and the ethics of compliance. We argue that ethics is already part of such politics in the form of ethico-politics on the basis of participation in political action in organisations. Hence, the practising self as resistance in the face of the (...) status quo of managerial power in an ongoing dialectical process with others and for others comprises our conceptual proposal as an ethics of resistance. Acknowledging dialectics as the driver of the continuous reconstruction and co-construction of politics and praxis, we propose an ethics from the bottom up with a critical and radical perspective. Our contribution is based on opening up an ethico-political space for those who are ignored or suppressed in the ethics and organisations literature. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering, broadly speaking, involves improving our concepts via inclusion of new criteria, creating new concepts, and eliminating old concepts. However, what sorts of considerations count as improvements depends on the context. For example, some social concepts are also scientific concepts and play important roles in both domains. One way to engineer these concepts is to treat them as primarily scientific concepts answerable to scientific aims, but not answerable to ethical and social aims. Recently, however, philosophers have engaged in (...) some conceptual work on the scientific concept of sex, and some authors have included ethical and social aims in their conceptual work (Watkins, Aja, and Marina DiMarco. 2025. “Sex Eliminativism.” Biology & Philosophy 40 (1): 2. and Richardson, Sarah S. 2022. “Sex Contextualism.” Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 14 (0)), and philosophers of science more broadly have done conceptual work emphasizing the purpose-sensitivity of our scientific concepts (Intemann, Kristen. 2015. “Distinguishing between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2): 217–32, Brigandt 2020). I propose a conditional argument: if philosophers of science believe that scientific concepts (including sex) ought to be sensitive to nonepistemic aims such that they may be eliminated, then the purpose-sensitive approach fails to provide support for this claim. While other proponents of aims approaches and similar views have not argued that ethical considerations should ‘trump’ other considerations, I argue that in some circumstances, plausibly, that ethical considerations should at least be permitted to trump other considerations or constrain the options, given reasonably high moral stakes as well as some epistemic considerations. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the design, evaluation and implementation of concepts. Despite its popularity, some have argued that the methodology is not worthwhile, because the implementation of new concepts is both inscrutable and beyond our control. In the recent literature we see different responses to this worry. Some have argued that it is for political reasons just as well that implementation is such a difficult task, while others have challenged the metasemantic and social assumptions that underlie this skepticism about implementation. (...) In this paper, I argue that even if implementation is as difficult as critics maintain, there is at least one context in which conceptual engineering is extremely impactful and demonstrably so: the design of new technology. Different conceptions of control, freedom, trust, etc. lead to different designs and implementations of systems that are built to embed those concepts. This means that if we want to design for control, freedom, trust, etc., we have to decide which conception we ought to use. When we determine what the appropriate conception of a concept is in a technological context and use this conception to operationalize a norm or value, we generate requirements which have real-world effects. This not only shows that conceptual engineering can be extremely impactful, the fact that it leads to different design requirements means that we have a way to evaluate our conceptual choices and that we can use this feedback loop to improve upon our conceptual work By illustrating the direct impacts of different conceptions on technology design, this paper underscores the practical applicability and value of conceptual engineering, demonstrating how it serves as a crucial bridge between abstract philosophical analysis and concrete technological innovation. (shrink)

The value sensitive design (VSD) approach to designing transformative technologies for human values is taken as the object of study in this chapter. VSD has traditionally been conceptualized as another type of technology or instrumentally as a tool. The various parts of VSD’s principled approach would then aim to discern the various policy requirements that any given technological artifact under consideration would implicate. Yet, little to no consideration has been given to how laws, regulations, policies and social norms engage within (...) VSD practices. Similarly, how the interactive nature of the VSD approach can, in turn, influence those directives. This is exacerbated when we consider machine ethics policy that have global consequences outside their development spheres. What constructs and models will position AI designers to engage in policy concerns? How can the design of AI policy be integrated with technical design? How might VSD be used to develop AI policy? How might law, regulations, social norms, and other kinds of policy regarding AI systems be engaged within value sensitive design? This chapter takes the VSD as its starting point and aims to determine how laws, regulations and policies come to influence how value trade-offs can be managed within VSD practices. It shows that the iterative and interactional nature of VSD both permits and encourages existing policies to be integrated both early on and throughout the design process. The chapter concludes with some potential future research programs. (shrink)