This book focuses on a question issued from The Architectonic of Pure Reason, one of the most important sections of Kant's first Critique: what is the human being? It suggests that the answer to this question is tied to a particular account of the unity of reason - one that stresses its purposive character.

The Architectonics of Meaning is a lucid demonstration of the purposes, methods, and implications of philosophical semantics that both supports and builds on Richard McKeon's and other noted pluralists' convictions that multiple philosophical approaches are viable. Watson ingeniously explores ways to systematize these approaches, and the result is a well-structured instrument for understanding texts. This book exemplifies both general and particular aspects of systematic pluralism, reorienting our understanding of the realms of knowing, doing, and making.

This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

Aristotle rejected the idea of a single, overarching super-science or “theory of everything”, and he presented a powerful and influential critique of scientific unity. In theory, each science observes the facts unique to its domain, and explains these by means of its own proper principles. But even as he elaborates his prohibition on kind-crossing explanations (Posterior Analytics 1.6-13), Aristotle points out that there are important exceptions—that some sciences are “under” others in that they depend for their explanations on the principles (...) of a superior (more architectonic) science. In this paper, I explore how subordination relations and architectonic structures apply to Aristotle’s scientific practice—including not only the works of theoretical philosophy, which have already been discussed in this connection, but also in and between these and the practical and productive sciences. (shrink)

This is a thoroughly revised version of a paper that I originally presented at the "Kant in Asia" international conference on "The Unity of Human Personhood, held in Hong Kong in May of 2009. After explaining what Kant means by his "architectonic" form of reasoning, I argue that the Yijing (the Chinese "Book of Changes") exhibits the same type of reasoning. I contrast two uses of architectonic reasoning: divining the truth vs. divination. The article concludes with an illustration (...) of how the Yijing might be used as a guidebook for obtaining wisdom. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to have a better architectonic insight over the museum of Gjergj Kastriot Skanderbeg in the city of Kruja. The history for which Albanians are proud will be the focus of this paper from its genesis until now, always seeing its architectural perspective. The castle as the last resistance of Albanians at the time of Turkish occupation will be analyzed; together with the mode of implementation of the new Museum Gjergj Kastriot Skenderbeu at the (...) time of socialism. Who were the ideas of the ideologies of the time? What were the secrets of the building design? What were the secrets of the construction of the building? What were the motivations and inspirations of the architects and the design group? The paper will contain historical dating, direct interviews with architects of the building, and authentic architectural analysis of the building. Museum of Kruja is a work that belongs not only to Albanians but all of Europe and Balkan. Today it is one of the most visited works throughout the country. (shrink)

With this monograph on Kant and the problem of language, Raphaël Ehrsam develops a well-argued reconstruction of the architectonic place of language in Kant’s philosophy. The author terms his argument “genetic thesis”. On Ehrsam’s genetic thesis, in Kant’s philosophy the mastery of linguistic competences is indispensable to the acquisition of a priori theoretical and practical cognitions. The material of the book can be divided into three parts. In the first part (Introduction and Chapter One), Ehrsam frames the subject by (...) outlining his thesis and foregrounding Kant’s notions of acquisition and epigenesis. In the second part (Chapters Two - Five), he then articulates his thesis by reconstructing the functions played by specific linguistic instances in Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy. The third part (Chapter Six) is devoted to sketching Kant’s thoughts on how the human being, both as an individual and a species, acquires linguistic competences. (shrink)

In a Working Note to The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty uses the fine phraseology of an “architectonic past” and a “mythical time” to describe Proust’s remembrances of things past. This paper first considers how this architectonic past sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, and second how this results in a mythical time, which is an originary encounter with this past. Paying also attention to Merleau-Ponty’s final, completed reflections on “Swann’s Way,” Volume One of Remembrances of Things Past, I (...) suggest that by exposing the inner-connection between the two senses of time, Proust is highly significant for Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of “reversibility”. Proustian remembrances are used by Merleau-Ponty not to expose an inwardness, but something that is withdrawn and behind the sensible. The way in which these remembrances operate in myth time bespeaks of a memorial dimension of the past of being itself. (shrink)

Whereas the history of philosophy defines metaphysics as asking the question 'What is Being?'; here is asked 'Where is Being?' What is to be analyzed is indeed part of the tradition of metaphysics to inquire about Being qua being, but here the inquiry is into its structure, its position within the ontological whole. The concept of the 'architectonic' is borrowed from Kant... In this work, three philosophical structures are chosen for a more extensive examination: the three 'architectonics' are that (...) of Plato's Chora, Aristoteles' continuum, and finally Leibniz's labyrinth"--Back cover. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Architectonic, Truth, and RhetoricGlenn Alexander MageeScientists, we are often told, employ "aesthetic criteria" in their work: a scientific theory must be "simple" and "elegant" if it is to be a good candidate for truth.1 Is this also true of philosophers? Do philosophers rely (implicitly or explicitly) on aesthetic criteria in the development of their ideas, not simply in order to make their ideas accessible or palatable but also (...) as a guide to truth? This question bears on the relationship between art and philosophy, between art and truth, and between beauty and truth. If the answer is yes, then is there a point at which the line between art and philosophy becomes blurred? This is often claimed, though almost always in reference to the way in which philosophers use metaphor and rhetoric to express their ideas. However, I am suggesting in addition that the line may be blurred not just in the expression of their ideas but in the very form or structure they give to their philosophies. This aesthetic moment is not dispensable. On the contrary, philosophers make their thought into an aesthetic object because of a tacit, pre-reflective intuition that the beautiful is the true. In what follows, I will argue for this thesis and explore its implications.I.First of all, the philosophers I have in mind are philosophers in the classic sense: creators of systematic worldviews, those who aim at knowledge of the whole. I have in mind, therefore, thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, [End Page 59] Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, among others. All these thinkers are alike in that they do not approach philosophy piecemeal, as a set of disconnected "problems." Instead, they take the aim of philosophy to be to give a complete account of what is real. In the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit, for instance, Hegel writes that philosophy is "actual cognition of what truly is" (1977, 46). This is a definition one can imagine Plato and Aristotle—indeed almost all of the great philosophers—agreeing with. Philosophical knowledge, in this classical understanding, becomes a whole of ideas in which each element depends on every other and nothing of significance is left out. (Perhaps the best example of such a philosophy is, again, Hegel's.) It is only to "systems" of philosophy that our question about aesthetic criteria in philosophy is applicable,2 for it is only when a number of ideas are taken together into an overall structure and given a fundamental unity that a philosophy can become "beautiful" or "ugly."The Greek word sustema literally means "things which stand together or are made to stand together so as to form a whole" or "a whole compounded of several parts" (Klein 1985, 201). The Greeks applied the word to many things but never, it seems, to thought. Then, as Jacob Klein writes, "from about the year 1600 on there is a sudden and most remarkable shift: book after book appears under titles like 'System of Logic,' 'System of Rhetoric,' 'System of Grammar,' 'System of Theology,' 'System of Ethics and Politics,' 'System of Physics,' 'System of Jurisprudence,' 'System of Astronomy,' of Arithmetic, of Geography, of Medicine and even 'System of Systems' " (1985, 201). According to Klein, systematic philosophy is a response to the peculiar anxiety of modernity expressed so well by Yeats: "Things fall apart"—and we need a philosophical system to put them back together again.The idea of a system of philosophy cannot, however, be dismissed merely as a "modern invention," for it is a legitimate extension of the Greek concept of sustema. The Greek philosophers would not have reflected on their activity as "systematic" because they regarded themselves as describing a reality that was itself a sustema. Pressed to explain what philosophers are, Pythagoras, according to legend, compared them to the theoroi or onlookers at the Olympic Games. As Werner Jaeger writes of the legend, "The comparison depends on the ambiguity of the word theorein, which means both watching a spectacle and contemplation and research in the ' theoretical' sense" (1962, 432). Reality is a sustema; the philosopher's account of reality is a reflection of it and thus is itself a sustema... (shrink)

This paper argues that Husserlian philosophy offers a powerful methodology for feminist phenomenology and for any phenomenology with ethico-political aims. I will first explicate the widely spread notion that Husserlian phenomenology is fundamentally inadequate for such critical purposes and incurably distorted by Husserl’s supposedly ideological commitments. I will distinguish the main variants of this view recently put forward in the field of critical phenomenology. The second part of the paper argues that this widespread notion about inadequacy is based on selective (...) readings and misreadings of the sources, Husserl’s own explications as well as Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of them. In the third and final part of the paper, I will introduce the phenomenological method of _Besinnung_ to critically study two current strategies of revising Husserl’s philosophy for contemporary political ends. Both strategies use classical phenomenology for antinaturalistic purposes but delimit its operations on transformative grounds demanded by Critical Theory and/or Foucauldian analytics of power. I will demonstrate that, in addition to these two strategies, there is a third alternative, which does not submit Husserl’s philosophical aims to the neo-Marxist idea of world-transformation nor delimit these aims by such ideas but, in contrast, ventures to suspend the world thesis permanently and _in toto_ and, on this radical basis, proceeds to build its critical and transformative concepts anew. (shrink)

The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual (...) basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed. (shrink)

This paper presents a new interpretation of Michel Foucault’s critical project. It is well known that Foucault’s genealogical critique does not focus on issues of justification, but instead tackles “aspectival captivity,” that is, apparently inevitable limits of thought that constrain the agent’s freedom but that, in fact, can be transformed. However, it has not been recognized that, according to Foucault, critique can proceed along two distinct paths. In a key passage of “What Is Critique?,” Foucault states that critique is tasked (...) with questioning truth about its effects of power and with questioning power about its discourses of truth. We show that this “double movement” organizes Foucault’s critical project as a whole, giving it a significantly wider scope and a more complex structure than has been previously acknowledged. At the heart of the above-mentioned bifurcation lies an apparent tension between two contrastive roles Foucault assigns to truth-telling in the context of critique: on the one hand, truth-telling (as avowal) is a target of critique; on the other, truth-telling (as parrhesia) is one of critique’s methods. We argue that combining these two dimensions in a unified account is crucial for understanding and re-evaluating Foucault’s critical project as a whole. By showing that truth-telling remains an essential element of Foucauldian critique, this paper also rectifies some influential misinterpretations according to which Foucault’s critical project seeks to eliminate truth from the picture. (shrink)

This paper presents a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conceptual architectonics ofparticular justice. It has been noticed that Aristotle’s account of just/unjust action is not informed by an account of the character trait of particularjustice/injustice, and this has sparked serious concern about whether Aristotle’s treatment of particular justice is consistent with his general programme of ethics. In response, I propose that at least on one possible construal, the ‘definitional priority of virtue’ thesis is not prescribed by Aristotle’s agent-centred approach to ethics. Aristotle (...) is thereby justified in ascribing definitional priority to just/unjust states of affairs in his investigation of particular justice, and this conceptual architectonics is both internally coherent and compatible with his agent-centred approach to ethics. (shrink)

This paper defends Kant's conception of architectonic as furthering emancipatory reforms of critical philosophy. The author argues that while Lambert's reform of architectonic was the catalyst for Kant's attention to the term, Rousseau was important for Kant's conception of what architectonical thinking should be for philosophy. Kant's cosmopolitan meaning of architectonic requires that it not be based on an analogy to an architect, but on that of a "teacher in the ideal" who attempts to further essential ends (...) of human reason by discovering systems that can interrogate doctrines for their significance for the whole vocation of humanity. (shrink)

‘Human reason’, said Kant, ‘is by nature architectonic, that is, it considers all cognitions as belonging to a possible system’ (1998: 502). One task—maybe the task—of the Critique of Pure Reason i...

Although several studies propose that the integrity of neuronal assemblies may underlie a phenomenon referred to as awareness, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated dynamics and functional interactions among neuronal assemblies as a function of consciousness expression. In order to address this question EEG operational architectonics analysis (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2008) was conducted in patients in minimally conscious (MCS) and vegetative states (VS) to study the dynamics of neuronal assemblies and operational synchrony among them as a function (...) of consciousness expression. We found that in minimally conscious patients and especially in vegetative patients neuronal assemblies got smaller, their life-span shortened and they became highly unstable. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the extent/volume and strength of operational synchrony among neuronal assemblies was smallest or even absent in VS patients, intermediate in MCS patients and highest in healthy fully-conscious subjects. All findings were similarly observed in EEG alpha as well as beta1 and beta2 frequency oscillations. The presented results support the basic tenets of Operational Architectonics theory of brain-mind functioning and suggest that EEG operational architectonics analysis may provide an objective and accurate means of assessing signs of (un)consciousness in patients with severe brain injuries. Therefore this methodological approach may complement the existing “gold standard” of behavioral assessment of this population of challenging patients and inform the diagnostic and treatment decision-making processes. (shrink)

Тheoretical framework for peace agreements represents a paradigmatic shift in understanding their nature, function, and impact in conflict resolution theory and peacebuilding practice. Moving beyond viewing agreements as mere endpoints or procedural instruments, Bell conceptualizes them as dynamic, constitutive, and inherently legal-political processes that fundamentally reshape conflict landscapes and state-society relations, often acting as de facto constitutions that generate a unique hybrid legal order—the lex pacificatoria. This paper critically analyzes Bell’s core theoretical propositions, highlighting their profound relevance for reframing scholarly (...) understanding and transforming practice. It examines her concepts of peace agreements as constitutional moments, lex pacificatoria, process dynamics, and so on.phase constitutionalism. The paper then analyses the theory’s impact on conflict resolution scholarship, challenging liberal assumptions about peace and reframing the role of law, as well as its transformative impact on peacebuilding practice, particularly in relation to the design, implementation and inclusiveness of agreements. In a critical engagement section, the paper addresses significant limitations, including state-centrism, elitist bias, normative ambiguity within the lex pacificatoria, challenges to phase constitutionalism, gender-related blind spots and operational complexity. The paper concludes by acknowledging Bell’s contribution, and arguing for its continued refinement and contextual adaptation, particularly in relation to non-state actors, local action, digital mediation, climate conflicts and shifts in global power. The extended list of references includes scholars who deal with and criticize the theoretical Bell’s frame. (shrink)

The article analyzes John Searle's famous "Chinese Room" thought experiment, which denies the ability of artificial intelligence to achieve genuine understanding. The study aims to deconstruct this argumentation step by step to clarify exactly how it is structured, what makes it persuasive, and where its weaknesses lie. For this purpose, a model is applied that examines the text at four levels. The first level clarifies the historical background: specifically, whose ideas and computer programs the author opposed. The second level demonstrates (...) how Searle constructs the experiment's scenario to subtly impose discussion rules that favor his position on the audience. In the third stage, the relevance of comparing a computer's operation to the actions of a person mechanically sorting incomprehensible characters is examined. The analysis reveals that the persuasiveness of the argumentation relies heavily on the assumption that only a biological brain is capable of generating consciousness. At the fourth level, the experiment is tested for robustness using the most well-known objections from critics. The conducted analysis shows that Searle successfully proves a machine's inability to understand meaning solely through the mechanical manipulation of symbols. However, his thought experiment proves vulnerable to the assumption that consciousness can emerge as an entirely new property of highly complex systems. Using modern Large Language Models (LLMs) as an example, the study concludes that the "Chinese Room" argument remains relevant, as it proves that machines do not grasp the physical connection between words and the real world. At the same time, this does not rule out the possibility that artificial intelligence is capable of successfully operating with syntactic connections between words within the language itself. (shrink)

This contribution is a critical and constructive engage ment with discourse ethics. First, it clarifies why discourse ethics has difficulties with the grounding and application of moral norms. Second, it turns to a positive appropriation of the formal and proce dural aspects of discourse ethics. The goal is the elaboration of an ethics that is able to incorporate the material aspects of goods and the formal dimension of ethical validity and consensuability. Every morality is the formal application of some substantive (...) good. Every ethical perspective demands its evaluation in terms of its uni versability. In order to achieve this mediation, it is suggested that we must incorporate not only the historical dimension of moral systems, but also the role of critical consciousness and the negativity embod ied by those who are victims of the existing consensus. The essay con cludes with six points that need to be considered when formulating a material ethics that is universalizable and, most importantly, that can address the massive poverty and dehumanization of those excluded from the present community of communication. Key Words: application • consensual • corporeality • discourse ethics • formal • grounding • intersubjective • Kantian • liberation • ethics • material • phronesis • procedural • validity. (shrink)

I respond to Karin de Boer, Thomas Land, and Claudio La Rocca’s comments on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023). I first provide a quick outline of some of the main claims I make in the book. I then directly address their criticisms, which I group into three categories. The first group of comments raises doubts concerning my characterization of the central tasks of the critique of pure reason. The second targets the fact that (...) I downplay faculty analysis as an essential characteristic of the critique. The third has to do with my claim that the Critique of Pure Reason aims to show that metaphysics is capable of architectonic unity, where this unity is only achievable when we construe metaphysics according to the worldly concept of philosophy. (shrink)

After the virulent criticisms of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and much of the analytic tradition, systematic philosophy has for the most part gone into eclipse in contemporary European thought. The main target of these criticisms was often the daunting edifice of the Hegelian system which dominated so much of Nineteenth Century philosophy. Despite a small handful of scholars who try with might and main to salvage this edifice, the general belief among scholars today is that at bottom Hegel’s philosophical project as a (...) system is simply bankrupt and indefensible all around. Of all the texts in the Hegelian corpus, the Phenomenology of Spirit with it plethora of themes and troubled composition has been in particular singled out for criticism as a disunified and unsystematic text. Typical of this general belief is Kaufmann’s characterization: “the Phenomenology is certainty unwissenschaftlich, undisciplined, arbitrary, full of digressions, not a monument to the austerity of the intellectual conscience and to carefulness and precision but a wild, bold, unprecedented book.” The Phenomenology is thus seen simply as an eclectic and at times bizarre collection of atomic analyses on sundry topics. This preconception of the Phenomenology as a disunified text then leads to a predetermined and, in my view, erroneous interpretive approach. (shrink)

The first signs of historical settlements in Tirana date back to the year 1614. These settlements and their road system belongs to the Ottoman city structure. Nowadays this historic northeast area of Tirana consists of a conglomeration of buildings that date back to different historical periods. A good part of these dwellings are informal ones, which damage the morphology of the area. This paper is considering a genuine historical basis to create an intervention model in this specific area of Tirana. (...) The total surface of the area which is rigorously analyzed is 2.08 ha. Regulatory plans that will be considered for this analysis are the regulatory plans of 1917, 1921, 1937, 1953, 1980, up to today (the existing situation of the city of Tirana). The whole area will be analyzed including the typical road system; the typical structure of the dwellings, and the typical morphology of the area. All dwellings will be filed, according to historical dating situation and the existing situation. The current local general (PPV) plan provides a radical intervention in this area which seriously damages the historical heritage of the city of Tirana. This article aims and focuses on a territorial development model recovering it and not damaging it, (in contradiction with the current regulatory plan). The new model will be clearly detailed (up-to-level plans). The city of Tirana needs historical heritage and historical identity. How can one damage such treasure which the time took care so much to create and preserve? Such allusions are to be spoken out loudly! (shrink)

It is the aim of my paper to explore the chances of a decidedly historical approach to Eugen Fink's involvement in Edmund Husserl's mature philosophy. This question has been subject to much debate recently; but I think that the recently published early notes of Fink have not been sufficiently evaluated by Husserl scholarship. I embed the investigation of Fink's ideas in the contemporaries reactions to them, and argue that Fink's very specific methodological ideas was already formulated in details before he (...) has composed the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and his other much researched assistant writings. Furthermore, I argue that, although it is not possible to draw a clear dividing line between Husserl's own position and the alleged influences by Fink, it is still possible to delineate a specifically Husserlian understanding of the methodology of phenomenological philosophy, especially in the light of Husserl's discussions of the circularity of phenomenological philosophy, which antedate his encounter with Fink. I think that the approach and results outlined here could serve as the basis of a larger investigation of Fink's involvement in the formation of Husserl's notion of philosophy. (shrink)

It is considerably easier to say that modern philosophy began with Descartes than it is to define the modernity and philosophy to which Descartes gave rise. In _Lines of Thought_, Claudia Brodsky Lacour describes the double origin of modern philosophy in Descartes’s _Discours de la méthode_ and _Géométrie_, works whose interrelation, she argues, reveals the specific nature of the modern in his thought. Her study examines the roles of discourse and writing in Cartesian method and intuition, and the significance of (...) graphic architectonic form in the genealogy of modern philosophy. While Cartesianism has long served as a synonym for rationalism, the contents of Descartes’s method and _cogito_ have remained infamously resistant to rational analysis. Similarly, although modern phenomenological analyses descend from Descartes’s notion of intuition, the “things” Cartesian intuitions represent bear no resemblance to phenomena. By returning to what Descartes calls the construction of his “foundation” in the _Discours_, Brodsky Lacour identifies the conceptual problems at the root of Descartes’s literary and aesthetic theory as well as epistemology. If, for Descartes, linear extension and “I” are the only “things” we can know exist, the Cartesian subject of thought, she shows, derives first from the intersection of discourse and drawing, representation and matter. The crux of that intersection, Brodsky Lacour concludes, is and must be the _cogito_, Descartes’s theoretical extension of thinking into material being. Describable in accordance with the _Géométrie_ as a freely constructed line of thought, the _cogito_, she argues, extends historically to link philosophy with theories of discursive representation and graphic delineation after Descartes. In conclusion, Brodsky Lacour analyzes such a link in the writings of Claude Perrault, the architectural theorist whose reflections on beauty helped shape the seventeenth-century dispute between “the ancients and the moderns.” Part of a growing body of literary and interdisciplinary considerations of philosophical texts, _Lines of Thought_ will appeal to theorists and historians of literature, architecture, art, and philosophy, and those concerned with the origin and identity of the modern. (shrink)

I argue that Kant has developed a broad systematic account of the architectonic functionality of pure reason that can be used and advanced in contemporary contexts. Reason, in the narrow sense, is responsible for the picture of a well-ordered universe of science consisting of architectonic ideas of science, sciences and parts of sciences. In the first section (I), I show what Kant means by the architectonic ideas by explaining and interrelating the concepts of (a) the faculty of (...) reason, (b) ideas (as principles), (c) method, and (d) sciences of reason. Thereafter (II), I think through his holistic understanding of science and scientific progress and suggest differentiating between four levels of use of architectonic ideas, drawing on the metaphor of a well-structured universe as imagined by Kant in his work on the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. I also claim that each possible idea of reason can be (apart from its primary function) additionally regarded as a fourth-level architectonic concept when explicitly conceived as an object of (e. g. philosophical) studies, i. e. from a mere methodological perspective. In the final section (III), I unveil the potential of Kant’s theory by pointing out how this architectonic methodological function of pure reason is tacitly used in Karl-Otto Apel’s contemporary philosophical research programme. You can get the official version of the paper and the whole issue (open access) by clicking on the attached link. (shrink)

필자는 이 논문을 통해 칸트의 도식 논증에 있는 역동성을 체계적으로 추적한다. 첫째, 먼저 『순수이성비판』 내의 장에 나타나는 칸트의 도식논증이 다섯 단계로 나뉘어서 차례차례 분석된다. 둘째, 이어지는 절의 논의에서, 감성(직관)성과 지성(개념)성을 매개하는 표상으로 여겨지는 초월적 도식들의 표상성이 어떻게 규명되는 것인지가 검토된다. 필자는 칸트가 제3의 표상성 해명을 위해 초월적 도식들이 건축술적으로 수행하는 역할에 비추어서 그것들의 성격을 드러내는 전략을 취한다고 주장하며, 시간성에 더해지는 공간성을 그러한 전략의 핵심에 놓이는 것으로 살핀다. 셋째, 칸트의 물질개념의 선험적 구성 작업이 미처 완수되지 못한 상태에서 시간성에 추가적으로 공간성을 덧붙이는 (...) 것은 가능하지 않기 때문에 여전히 초월적 도식들의 표상성이 규명되기 어렵다는 사실이 강조될 것이다. 넷째, 필자는 칸트의 이러한 역동적 사유에 내재하는 의의와 한계를 짚으면서 논의를 마칠 것이다. (shrink)

Instead of using low-level neurophysiology mimicking and exploratory programming methods commonly used in the machine consciousness field, the hierarchical Operational Architectonics (OA) framework of brain and mind functioning proposes an alternative conceptual-theoretical framework as a new direction in the area of model-driven machine (robot) consciousness engineering. The unified brain-mind theoretical OA model explicitly captures (though in an informal way) the basic essence of brain functional architecture, which indeed constitutes a theory of consciousness. The OA describes the neurophysiological basis of the (...) phenomenal level of brain organization. In this context the problem of producing man-made “machine” consciousness and “artificial” thought is a matter of duplicating all levels of the operational architectonics hierarchy (with its inherent rules and mechanisms) found in the brain electromagnetic field. We hope that the conceptual-theoretical framework described in this paper will stimulate the interest of mathematicians and/or computer scientists to abstract and formalize principles of hierarchy of brain operations which are the building blocks for phenomenal consciousness and thought. (shrink)

This article rejects the claim made by other scholars that Plato in the Statesman, by employing the so-called ‘architect’ (ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων) in one of the early divisions leading to the definition of political expertise, prefigured and anticipated the architectonic conception of political expertise advanced by Aristotle. It argues for an alternative reading in which Plato in the Statesman, and in the only other of his works (Gorgias) in which the word appears, closely tracks the existing social role of the (...) architektōn, who was designated as such only in virtue of appointment by a city to a role that was crucially defined as epitactic, involving overseeing the workers on site engaged in constructing some civic building works. It is this epitactic dimension of the role on which Plato relies in the Statesman, as opposed to the kind of claim to overarching integrative expertise that Aristotle would use the figure of architectonic political knowledge to make. (shrink)

I. Science, myth, magic: three components of knowledge, in other words three types of activity in man who, in interaction with his surrounding environment seeks to accomodate himself to the constraints which this environment imposes on him while at the same time seeing to his own immediate or far-reaching needs.

Theatricality, as a methodological basis of Deleuze’s theory, insinuates a new thought of Being/beings by emancipating philosophy from its anthropological orientation. Despite the fact that the phenomenological methodologies attempted to link the transcendental with the empirical domain, the source of reflexivity was still the subject. Deleuze’s ontological repetition maintains the infinite reflection of the transcendental and the empirical domains into each other, yet it posits the symbolic order as the third order where the infinite reflexive expansion between concept and matter (...) becomes immanently transcended. By taking this formulation as its point of departure, this article analyzes how Deleuze’s notion of theatricality operates as the self-reflexive and excessive origin of thought. (shrink)

Reflecting on the fact of pluralism and the extent to which Christianity appeared to be fragmenting in the wake of the Second Vatican Council , the French Jesuit Michel de Certeau wrote that “in the past, everything that was not in agreement with the teaching of the magisterium was classed as ‘ignorance,’ ‘superstition,’ or even as ‘heresy.’ This state of absolute certainty is now wavering. An unknown world stands before us, which calls itself Christian and yet is quite unlike our (...) picture of what Christian is: ‘another country,’ one that is huge and many-sided beneath the forms of expression (whether…. (shrink)

John Milbank’s theology argues for a return to the participatory ontology of the pre-moderns in which actuality is understood as rooted in intimate relation to the divine. He rejects modernity’s notion that finite reality can be understood as occupying its own space independent of God. In this context he develops the notion of finite “making” as coincident with the finite realization of the divine. This paper develops how the notion of “coincidence” can be applied to Whitehead’s thought, allowing for an (...) identification of God with creativity and finite “making,” seeking to provide a more theologically satisfying account of God’s relation to creativity. (shrink)

Both Kant's architectonic and the Yijing can be structured as four perspectival levels: 0 + 4 + 12 + = 64. The first, unknowable level is unrepresentable. The geometry of logic provides well‐structured maps for levels two to four. Level two consists of four basic gua , corresponding to Kant's category‐headings . Level three's twelve gua, derived logically from the initial four, correspond to Kant's twelve categories. Level four correlates the remaining 48 gua to Kant's theory of the four (...) university faculties , and to four categorially organized domains comprising his philosophical system. (shrink)

The previous chapter provided not only concrete evidence that Kant's System is based on the principle of perspective [II.2-3], but also a general outline of its perspectival structure [II.4]. The task this sets for the interpreter is to establish in greater detail the extent to which the System actually does unfold according to this pattern. This will be undertaken primarily in Parts Two and Three. But before concluding Part One, it will be helpful to examine in more detail the logical (...) structure of the relationships between the various parts of Kant's System, and how they fit together to compose what we have called Kant's 'Copernican Perspective'. (shrink)

It is the aim of my paper to explore the chances of a decidedly historical approach to Eugen Fink’s involvement in Edmund Husserl’s mature philosophy. This question has been subject to much debate recently; but I think that the recently published early notes of Fink have not been sufficiently evaluated by Husserl scholarship. I embed the investigation of Fink’s ideas in the contemporaries reactions to them, and argue that Fink’s very specific methodological ideas was already formulated in details before he (...) has composed the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and his other much researched assistant writings. Furthermore, I argue that, although it is not possible to draw a clear dividing line between Husserl’s own position and the alleged influences by Fink, it is still possible to delineate a specifically Husserlian understanding of the methodology of phenomenological philosophy, especially in the light of Husserl’s discussions of the circularity of phenomenological philosophy, which antedate his encounter with Fink. I think that the approach and results outlined here could serve as the basis of a larger investigation of Fink’s involvement in the formation of Husserl’s notion of philosophy. (shrink)

It is the aim of my paper to explore the chances of a decidedly historical approach to Eugen Fink’s involvement in Edmund Husserl’s mature philosophy. This question has been subject to much debate recently; but I think that the recently published early notes of Fink have not been sufficiently evaluated by Husserl scholarship. I embed the investigation of Fink’s ideas in the contemporaries reactions to them, and argue that Fink’s very specific methodological ideas was already formulated in details before he (...) has composed the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and his other much researched assistant writings. Furthermore, I argue that, although it is not possible to draw a clear dividing line between Husserl’s own position and the alleged influences by Fink, it is still possible to delineate a specifically Husserlian understanding of the methodology of phenomenological philosophy, especially in the light of Husserl’s discussions of the circularity of phenomenological philosophy, which antedate his encounter with Fink. I think that the approach and results outlined here could serve as the basis of a larger investigation of Fink’s involvement in the formation of Husserl’s notion of philosophy. (shrink)

This is a revised version of a paper that was originally presented at the first Kant in Asia international conference (on the theme "The Unity of Human Personhood") in May of 2009. It was published as Chapter 64 in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), pp.811-821. I argue that Kant and the Yijing both employ a form of architectonic reasoning, though their respective understandings of the logical structure of human reasoning (...) are incommensurable. A more thoroughly revised version of the paper was later published in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy and was followed by a series of several other articles arguing that there is a way of arranging the Yijing's 64 hexagrams such that their form is compatible with the form of Kant's table of categories. (shrink)