This paper articulates a dialectical method operative in the development of metatheoretical frameworks, distinguishing it from the Hegelian tradition that has dominated philosophical accounts of dialectic in scholarly discourse. The method is characterized by five move-types (clarification, correction, reduction, addition, integration), a dual-track initiation structure (revelatory and confirmatory), a rhythm of alternating accretion and sculpting phases, and a succession of individually open-ended movements that nonetheless converge onto something. The engine of the dialectic is not negation — as in Hegel — (...) but insufficiency and generative inner pressure; tension is one mechanism among several, not the sole driver of movement. The method is multidimensional, iterative, constructive-developmental in orientation, and keeps first-order commitments outside its structure — making it an uncommitted instrument capable of serving many different intellectual projects. Its emancipatory dimension is structural rather than teleological: multidimensionality itself enacts freedom by opening genuine possibility space that uni-dimensional methods foreclose. A genuinely novel feature is the role of AI as an always-on dialectical partner — a structural condition that makes a qualitatively different mode of dialectical practice possible. The method’s relationship to prior traditions is characterized as transcend-and-include: preserving what is genuinely valid in each tradition while going beyond its limitations. Partial resonances are drawn from Socratic maieutics, Peircean inquiry, Gadamerian hermeneutics, Lakatosian methodology, and Basseches’ dialectical thinking — the closest partial predecessor in structural conception. Thirteen structural departures from Hegel are identified. The paper did not emerge through philosophical reasoning but through reflexive examination of actual practice, and the method has no established lineage — a recurring structural feature of work that originates outside established traditions. The paper is itself an instance of the method it describes. (shrink)

Adequate and inadequate ideas play a central role in Spinoza’s system. A number of recent commentators have suggested that the internality or externality of an idea’s immediate cause is a necessary and sufficient condition of the idea’s adequacy or inadequacy, respectively. I show that this thesis is subject to counterexample and briefly explore the significance of this critique for recent interpretations. I offer an alternative interpretation on which adequate and inadequate ideas are characterized by the manner in which they grasp (...) their objects. Adequate ideas conceive of their objects as following from God. Inadequate ideas conceive of their objects as affecting the body at a time and place. (shrink)

We continue the study of adequate sets which we began in (Krueger in Forcing with adequate sets of models as side conditions) by introducing the idea of a strongly adequate set, which has an additional requirement on the overlap of two models past their comparison point. We present a forcing poset for adding a club to a fat stationary subset of ω 2 with finite conditions, thereby showing that a version of the forcing posets of Friedman (Set theory: Centre de (...) Recerca Matemàtica, Barcelona, 2003–2004, Trends in Mathematics. Birkhäuser Verlag, 2006) and Mitchell (Trans Am Math Soc 361(2):561601, 2009) for adding a club on ω 2 can be developed in the context of adequate sets. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive picture of when the premises of an argument are adequately connected to its conclusion. The author draws upon the familiar Toulmin model, Rescher's discussion of presumption and burden of proof, and L. Jonathan Cohen's presentation of the method of relevant variables. The book first assesses the warrant or inference rule connecting the premises to the conclusion. To analyzes this, the author asks a series of questions such as - should the warrant be evaluated by conclusive (...) or defeasible standards? Does the argument require that its premises, if acceptable, guarantee that the conclusion is acceptable also or does it allow the premises just to present a body of relevant evidence? Is the inference rule backed or supported a priori or a posteriori? These distinctions form four categories of warrants: conclusive a priori, defeasible a posteriori, defeasible a priori, and virtually conclusive a posteriori. The warrants in each category are evaluated differently for how strongly the premises support the conclusion of arguments instancing those warrants. After presenting the rationale for this division and discussing our nonprobabilistic approach, the author analyzes the connection adequacy for each of these types of warrants. This book is of interest to scholars of argumentation theory. (shrink)

This article identifies problems with regard to providing criteria that regulate the matching of logical formulae and natural language. We then take on to solve these problems by defining a necessary and sufficient criterion of adequate formalization. On the basis of this criterion we argue that logic should not be seen as an ars iudicandi capable of evaluating the validity or invalidity of informal arguments, but as an ars explicandi that renders transparent the formal structure of informal reasoning.

Purpose. The article is aimed to introduce Karol Wojtyła’s anthropological teaching into the philosophical discourse through the systematization of anthropological issues in his philosophical and theological works. Provision of insight into the peculiar features of his adequate anthropology implies the fulfillment of the following tasks: first, identification of the methodology and the meaning of the principal concepts; secondly, study of the thinker’s key ideas; thirdly, presentation of the periodization of his anthropological doctrine development. Theoretical basis comprises of Karol Wojtyła’s works (...) written before and during the pontificate, excluding his poetic writing. The fulfillment of tasks involves processing the substantial database of academic research devoted to Karol Wojtyła’s views. It will help identify less-explored issues in Karol Wojtyła’s legacy, as well as contradictory aspects in the interpretation of the thinker’s ideas. In view of the growing interest of philosophical anthropology to everyday life, this aspect of Karol Wojtyła’s teaching is an important point in the analysis of his philosophical and anthropological considerations. Therefore, general research methods and approaches will help study Karol Wojtyła’s views on the nature of a human being, as well as individual and social dimensions of a person’s life. Originality lies in systematizing Karol Wojtyła’s anthropological ideas. The disclosure of the methodology, the key concepts and their interpretations, and the periodization of the development of Karol Wojtyła’s anthropological views can reveal his connection with the philosophical trends and define his place in modern philosophy. Conclusions. Wojtyła justifies the need for a new anthropological doctrine with an inappropriate place of a human being in the value system of the modern world, as he or she has evolved from the aim of everything ever created to the means. The basis of the new doctrine of a human being, namely adequate anthropology, is, according to him, human identity, dignity and "moral greatness". Karol Wojtyła’s "new human being" is the result of an integrated approach to studying the anthropological issues of the present and the response to "cultural impoverishment" and "the decline of mankind". (shrink)

Lampert and Baumgartner (2010) critically discuss accounts of adequate formalization focusing on my analysis in (Brun 2004). There, I investigated three types of criteria of adequacy (matching truth conditions or inferential role, corresponding syntactical surface and systematicity) and argued that they ultimately call for a procedure of formalization. Although Lampert and Baumgartner have a point about matching truth conditions, their arguments target a truncated version of my account. They ignore all aspects of systematicity which make their counter-example unconvincing.

We develop a general framework for forcing with coherent adequate sets on [Formula: see text] as side conditions, where [Formula: see text] is a cardinal of uncountable cofinality. We describe a class of forcing posets which we call coherent adequate type forcings. The main theorem of the paper is that any coherent adequate type forcing preserves CH. We show that there exists a forcing poset for adding a club subset of [Formula: see text] with finite conditions while preserving CH, solving (...) a problem of Friedman [Forcing with finite conditions, in Set Theory: Centre de Recerca Matemática, Barcelona, 2003–2004, Trends in Mathematics, pp. 285–295.]. (shrink)

In the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume argues that, because we have adequate ideas of the smallest parts of space, we can infer that space itself must conform to our representations of it. The paper examines two challenges to this argument based on Descartes's and Locke's treatments of adequate ideas, ideas that fully capture the objects they represent. The first challenge, posed by Arnauld in his Objections to the Meditations, asks how we can know that an idea is adequate. The (...) second challenge, implicit in Locke's Essay, asks how an empiricist can characterize an idea as inadequate, as both picking out an object and yet failing to capture it fully. In showing how Hume responds to these challenges, his theory of perceptual representation is explained and his treatment of space is related to his scepticism. His conclusion is shown not to be a characterization of space as it exists wholly apart from our powers of conception. Instead, in an adumbration of Kant, his claim is restricted to space as it appears to us. (shrink)

This paper aims to discuss Spinoza’s theory of consciousness by arguing that consciousness is the expression of bodily complexity in terms of adequate knowledge. Firstly, I present the link that Spinoza built up in the second part of the Ethics between the ability of the mind to know itself and the idea ideae theory. Secondly, I present in what sense consciousness turns out to be the result of an adequate knowledge emerging from the epistemological resources of a body as complex (...) as the human one. Thirdly, I address a possible objection that might arise in considering our daily-life experience of consciousness. I conclude that understanding consciousness in terms of adequate knowledge is coherent with both our phenomenological experience and Spinoza’s texts. Such an interpretation permits to underline the overthrow of Descartes’ account of consciousness by Spinoza. (shrink)

An important motivation for believing in the modal realist’s ontology of other concrete possible worlds and their inhabitants is its theoretical utility, centrally the reduction of ordinary modal talk to counterpart theory as showcased by David Lewis’s 1968 translation scheme. In a recent paper Harold Noonan, following the lead of John Divers, argues that Lewis’s scheme is not strictly adequate by the modal realist’s own lights, and that nothing short of jettisoning de dicto contingency will help. In this paper, I (...) argue that this is a serious overreaction. First, I show that Noonan’s problem does not touch Lewis’s proposal, since his translation scheme is not even concerned with the relevant sentences. Thus, Noonan’s problem only points to a limit in scope. I then go on to propose a straightforward extension of the translation scheme that provides translations for the allegedly problematic sentences, but does so endangering neither adequacy nor de dicto contingency. (shrink)

In The Varieties of Reference, Evans claims that thinking about an individual object requires satisfying what he calls “Russell’s Principle” by having an “adequate Idea” of the object. Acquiring an adequate Idea is intellectually demanding. By contrast, Evans agrees that acquiring a proper name, in the sense of coming to be able to use it to refer to its bearer, is easy. There is an apparent tension in these views that is made explicit if coming to use a proper name (...) to refer would enable one to think about its bearer. The present paper argues that this tension is real, so that consistency requires major modification of Evans’s views. Particular attention is paid to his accounts of proper names, and his criticisms of Kripke’s views on that topic. (shrink)

In Sweden, most patients are recruited into biobank research by non-researcher doctors. Patients' trust in doctors may therefore be important to their willingness to participate. We suggest a model of trust that makes sense of such transitions of trust between domains and distinguishes adequate trust from mistaken trust. The unique position of doctors implies, we argue, a Kantian imperfect duty to compensate for patients' mistaken trust. There are at least three kinds of mistaken trust, each of which requires a different (...) set of countermeasures. First, trust is mistaken when necessary competence is lacking; the competence must be developed or the illusion dispelled. Second, trust is irrational whenever the patient is mistaken about his actual reasons for trusting. Care must therefore be taken to support the patient's reasoning and moral agency. Third, some patients inappropriately trust doctors to recommend only research that will benefit them directly. Such trust should be counteracted by nurturing a culture where patients expect to be asked occasionally to contribute to the common good. (shrink)

This chapter describes a methodology for studying healthcare that is adequately human. Building off of the description of health given in Chap. 10.1007/978-3-030-21355-8_5, a method is explained that is directed at concrete experience of well-being and deficits to this. Two examples of this are shared: narrative medicine and existential phenomenology. Narrative medicine focuses on the stories that we tell about our lives and our experiences. Illness interferes with how we see our life moving forward and may be understood as a (...) confrontation between expectations and actualities. Rita Charon’s work in this area is presented as an example. Existential phenomenology carefully describes concrete experience as it unfolds in the person’s life. In existential health psychology, an existential phenomenological analysis would examine how an illness is lived and how their body is experienced throughout the course of the illness. (shrink)

I show that a theory may be empirically adequate according to van Fraassen's definition even though it can be observationally determined that the theory is false. I suggest a modification of empirical adequacy that avoids this result.

The different manifestations of negative relations to science exist in modern society that is revealed in broad spreading of antiscientific knowledge, fall the prestige of the fundamental science, reduction the interest youth to naturally-scientific education, reduction naturally-scientific component of school and highereducation. The search of the ways, allowing form the adequate attitude pupils to science in process of the education, is actual for getting over these trends. It means that the complex of values, which can be connected with a science, (...) must be revealed, and then these ideas should find the embodiment in educational practice. In paper it is shown that for forming adequate relations pupils to science and scientific picture of the world it is necessary in training to attract attention to value of the science and scientific picture of the world. Analysis of values connecting with science, including scientific picture of the world, is executed in these paper. (shrink)

In a dynamic (sequential) framework, departures from the independence axiom (IND) are reputed to induce violations of dynamic consistency (DC), which may in turn have undesirable normative consequences. This result thus questions the normative acceptability of non expected-utility (non-EU) models, which precisely relax IND. This paper pursues a twofold objective. The main one is to discuss the normative conclusion: usual arguments linking violations of DC to departures from IND are shown to be actually based on specific (but usually remaining implicit) (...) assumptions which may rightfully be released, so that it is actually possible for a non-EU maximizer to be dynamically consistent and thus avoid normative difficulties. The second objective is to introduce a kind of `reality principle' (through two other evaluation criteria) in order to mitigate the normative requirement when examining adequate moods for non-EU decision making. (shrink)

In this paper we study predimension inequalities in differential fields and define what it means for such an inequality to be adequate. Adequacy was informally introduced by Zilber, and here we give a precise definition in a quite general context. We also discuss the connection of this problem to definability of derivations in the reducts of differentially closed fields. The Ax-Schanuel inequality for the exponential differential equation (proved by Ax) and its analogue for the differential equation of the j-function (established (...) by Pila and Tsimerman) are our main examples of predimensions. We carry out a Hrushovski construction with the latter predimension and obtain a natural candidate for the first-order theory of the differential equation of the j-function. It is analogous to Kirby's axiomatisation of the theory of the exponential differential equation (which in turn is based on the axioms of Zilber's pseudo-exponentiation), although there are many significant differences. In joint work with Sebastian Eterović and Jonathan Kirby we have recently proven that the axiomatisation obtained in this paper is indeed an axiomatisation of the theory of the differential equation of the j-function, that is, the Ax-Schanuel inequality for the j-function is adequate. (shrink)

In his Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, Robert Audi claims that citizens have a prima facie obligation to abstain from support of a public policy that restricts human conduct, unless they are sufficiently motivated in supporting it by adequate secular reasons. The paper argues that Audi fails to give a good justification of this claim. On the one hand, most parts of his justificaction are already covered by the more common claim that citizens should have adequate secular reasons if they (...) support a public policy, thus leaving aside the condition concerned with motivation. On the other hand, there are certain cases where we should not restrict political engagement to secular motivation, because doing so would clearly undermine the goals of a secular political philosophy. Nevertheless, Audi’s claim is correct after all, but for a reason he does not mention himself. Therefore, the paper concludes that it is important to maintain this claim in a restricted version, as religious motivation might lead to non-neutral majority decisions. (shrink)

The different manifestations of negative relations to science exist in modern society that is revealed in broad spreading of antiscientific knowledge, fall the prestige of the fundamental science, reduction the interest youth to naturally-scientific education, reduction naturally-scientific component of school and highereducation. The search of the ways, allowing form the adequate attitude pupils to science in process of the education, is actual for getting over these trends. It means that the complex of values, which can be connected with a science, (...) must be revealed, and then these ideas should find the embodiment in educational practice. In paper it is shown that for forming adequate relations pupils to science and scientific picture of the world it is necessary in training to attract attention to value of the science and scientific picture of the world. Analysis of values connecting with science, including scientific picture of the world, is executed in these paper. (shrink)

Kamm's approach to patient selection qualifies the notion that fairness makes need for scarce, transplantable organs inversely proportional to age. She defines need as how much adequate conscious life a person will have had before death. Length of adequate conscious life correlates highly with age. If so, then younger persons are usually needier than older ones. Since Kamm allows for past periods of non‐adequate conscious life, I argue that this correlation may be neither as close, nor as easy to apply, (...) as she wants it to be. Fairness should require assessment of experiential content in determining how long one's life has been adequately conscious. I argue that such assessments involve some of the goods of experience and quality of life judgements that Kamm thinks a reliance on adequate conscious life will avoid. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations was the breakthrough of phenomenology. What made it a breakthrough was the new way of explicating truth or evidence as self-givenness or adequacy. Husserl did however also have another interpretation of truth: evidence as indubitability or certainty of apodicticity. Originally Husserl thought that apodicticity increases the evidence of something already adequately given. Yet, in the first Cartesian Meditation Husserl differentiates the two modes of evidence. In this article the way to this split up of evidence is (...) elaborated with the help of some recent publications in Husserliana. It is also suggested that the fact that Husserl has two separate views on truth is one reason for the dispersed state of Husserl-research. This article argues that Husserl's early view on evidence adequacy is more original and interesting. The real philosophical challenge, however, is to be able to join the two modes of evidence under one strenge Wissenschaft. (shrink)

The article starts from the questions: what is it to be an inhabitant or citizen of a globalised world, and how are we to think of education in relation to such inhabitants? We examine more specifically the so–called ‘European area of higher education’ that is on the way to being established and that can be regarded as a concrete example of a process of globalisation. In the first part of the paper we try to show that the discursive horizon, and (...) the concrete techniques and strategies that accompany the establishment of this space of higher education, invite the inhabitants of that space to see themselves as entrepreneurial and autonomous entities. In the second part we show how this specific kind of subjectivation (this production of subjects), related as it is to this globalised space, involves what we call an immunisation that also affects our thinking and our ideas in and about education. To refer to this as a kind of immunisation implies that globalisation could in fact be considered a closing or enclosing rather than an opening up. We argue, therefore, that this immunisation needs to be refused in favour of the invention of other kinds of subjectivity, other ways of speaking and writing about the world and about education, such that we relate to ourselves in a different way. (shrink)

In this paper we show how to introduce a conditional to Kripke’s theory of truth that respects the deduction theorem for the consequence relation associated with the theory. To this effect we develop a novel supervaluational framework, called strong Kleene supervaluation, that we take to be a promising framework for handling the truth-conditions of non-monotone notion in the presence of semantic indeterminacy more generally.

Straipsnyje analizuojama baudžiamosios teisės doktrinoje labiausiai paplitusi – adekvataus priežastinio ryšio (priežastingumo) teorija ir jos nustatymo procese kylanti problema: priežastinis ryšys, kaip objektyvusis nusikalstamos veikos sudėties požymis, dėl netinkamai pasirinktos teorijos, neretai siejamas bei turinio prasme tapatinamas su subjektyviuoju nusikalstamos veikos sudėties požymiu – kalte. Darbe detalesnės analizės sulaukė priežastinio ryšio, kaip nusikalstamos veikos sudėties požymio, priskyrimas objektyviesiems požymiams. Todėl pagrįstai gilinamasi į priežastinio ryšio objektyvų pobūdį bei adekvataus priežastingumo teorijos turinį. Pateikiama skirtingų nusikalstamos veikos sudėties požymių analizė – priežastinio (...) ryšio ir kaltės sugretinimas ir palyginimas. Jais siekiama pateikti šių, unikalų turinį turinčių, požymių takoskyrą. Straipsnyje taip pat analizuojamos baudžiamosios ir civilinės teisės reguliavimo priežastinio ryšio tematika alternatyvosnetinkamai teorijai pakeisti. (shrink)

In this critical notice we review Bozickovic's recent attempt to settle two interrelated issues: (i) the issue of the cognitive significance of indexical thoughts expressed at a time in the face of difficulties posed by cases in which the subject either mistakes two objects for one or one for two different objects; (ii) that of the cognitive dynamics of temporal indexical thoughts in the face of difficulties posed by cases in which the belief seems to be retained while the proper (...) adjustments fail to be made (that is, in cases such as Rip Van Winkle's). We argue that, despite its elegance and merits, the proposal falls short of accounting for the problematic cases in their full complexity. For one thing, the intended non-modal construal of Frege's Criterion of Difference promoted by Bozickovic does not block, in our view, the "proliferation" of senses brought about by the occasion-sensitivity of the individuation of demonstrative thoughts. For another, the proposal fails to appreciate the need for the subject to have an adequate conception of the object of her thought when it comes to orienting herself in space and time. That being so, we conclude that neither (i) nor (ii) is settled. (shrink)

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.” I shall refer to the right postulated here as “the right to an adequate standard of living” or “The Right.”.

Observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific practice have a long pedigree in writings on science. There has, however, been little attempt to delineate observation and experiment with respect to analysing scientific practice; in particular, scientific experimentation, in a systematic manner. Someone who has presented a systematic account of observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific experimentation is Ian Hacking. In this paper, I present a detailed analysis of Hacking’s observation versus experiment account. Using a range of cases (...) from various fields of scientific enquiry, I argue that the observation versus experiment account is not an adequate framework for delineating scientific experimentation in a systematic manner. (shrink)

Neil Levy argues in a recent JME ‘Current controversy’ paper that responsibility is not an adequate authorship requirement for human researchers, which makes it unjustified to require it from artificial intelligence contributing to research and scientific paper production, although he softens his stance towards the end and accepts that a limited responsibility requirement might after all be reasonable. The main argument provided by Levy against a more extensive responsibility requirement in science is that there are many cases where not all (...) researchers listed as coauthors can assume responsibility for the entire paper or even the central research questions. In this reply, we argue that the more limited responsibility requirement is the ethically reasonable one to ask of all authors, considering the conditions for and value of collaboration, and that this should also have ramifications for the legal regulation of scientific misconduct. (shrink)

Adequate ideas are the fundamental element of Spinoza’s epistemological program. However, a recurrent worry among scholars is that Spinoza’s account of adequate ideas is inconsistent with any finite being ever having one. As I frame it, the problem is that for Spinoza an idea is adequate in a mind only if all its causal antecedents lie within the mind as well. However, it seems there can be no finite mind for which this is true; finite minds come to be and (...) exist within a deterministic causal nexus, and the causal antecedents of every idea in a mind will ultimately stretch far beyond it. I call this the External Cause Objection. I argue that Spinoza appreciated and explicitly answered this concern. According to this reply, adequate ideas do not have causes external to the mind because they do not fall into the category of what Spinoza calls “singular things.” In addition to showing that this coheres with his more specific claims about adequate ideas and his firm belief that finite minds are parts of nature, I argue that the resolution to this problem sheds light on Spinoza’s understanding of what I call absolute agency. Published on 2022-03-23 11:07:32. (shrink)

This Reply offers my answers to Cheshire Calhoun’s, Elizabeth Brake’s, and Monika Betzler’s wonderful contributions to the Criminal Law and Philosophy symposium on Being Sure of Each Other (2020). Their contributions focus respectively on the conceptual and normative foundations of my defence of our human rights to have adequate social inclusion, the harms that might flow from recognising such rights as human rights, and the impact such rights can have on our most intimate relations. My replies aim both to clarify (...) and solidify the argumentative basis for my account and to show that whatever harms and wrongs might dog the recognition of social human rights are nothing compared to the injustices that flow–and have long-flowed–from ignoring or attacking these rights. (shrink)

We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinfo...

Theistic religious believers should be concerned that the God they worship is not an idol. Conceptions of God thus need to be judged according to criteria of religious adequacy that are implicit in the ‘God-role’—that is, the way the concept of God properly functions in the conceptual economy and form of life of theistic believers. I argue that the conception of God as ‘omniGod’—an immaterial personal creator with the omni-properties—may reasonably be judged inadequate, at any rate from the perspective of (...) a relationship ethics based on the Christian revelation that God is Love. I go on to suggest that a conception of God as the power of love within the natural universe might prove more adequate, with God’s role as creator understood in terms of final rather than efficient causation. (shrink)

The analysis presented here lays out the ethical warrants for requiring community oversight of health research conducted in international settings. It reviews the inadequacies with the current standards of individual informed consent and research ethics committee review, and then, shows how a broader population-based public health perspective raises new demands on justice involving due consideration of the rights, harms and benefits to the community as a whole. As developed here, an ethical standard that requires community oversight of health research is (...) justified on three principled grounds: respect for community autonomy and their right to self-determination; due consideration of the consequences of the research for the community as a whole; and, a more complete understanding of human autonomy. The paper concludes with practical recommendations regarding the composition of Community Advisory Boards to ensure that they have legitimate decision-making authority in diverse socio-cultural contexts. (shrink)

Is knowledge definable as justified true belief? We argue that one can legitimately answer positively or negatively, depending on whether or not one’s true belief is justified by what we call adequate reasons. To facilitate our argument we introduce a simple propositional logic of reason-based belief, and give an axiomatic characterization of the notion of adequacy for reasons. We show that this logic is sufficiently flexible to accommodate various useful features, including quantification over reasons. We use our framework to contrast (...) two notions of JTB: one internalist, the other externalist. We argue that Gettier cases essentially challenge the internalist notion but not the externalist one. Our approach commits us to a form of infallibilism about knowledge, but it also leaves us with a puzzle, namely whether knowledge involves the possession of only adequate reasons, or leaves room for some inadequate reasons. We favor the latter position, which reflects a milder and more realistic version of infallibilism. (shrink)

It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known—and some lesser known—objections to credal reductivism turn on the (...) inability of standard credal reductivist views to get the latter, normative, results right. This paper presents and defends a novel credal reductivist view according to which belief is a type of “imprecise credence” that escapes these objections by including an extreme credence of 1. (shrink)

While Aquinas’s primary notion of truth as adequation is applied to God and man in somewhat different ways, it is apparent that it is not applicable to the angels, at least not in the same way. However, since truth is a transcendental, and as transcendentals are convertible, one may claim that the transcendental systems that apply to various beings differ. In order to consolidate the universality of the transcendental system, the study aims to show the manner truth as (...) class='Hi'>adequation can be applied to the angels. (shrink)

In clinical research the giving of consent by the patient often lies within the context of illness or the doctor/patient relationship. On exploration of these issues it would appear unlikely that the patient's consent is free of substantial influences, some of which may be strong enough to be controlling. Five categories of consent are suggested: voluntary, involuntary, coerced, enforced and partially voluntary. It is argued that consent in clinical research is substantially influenced and thus only partially voluntary. Several practical strategies (...) are proposed to ensure adequately voluntary consent by reducing some circumstantial influences when consent to clinical research is obtained. (shrink)

According to Richard Swinburne, the principle of simplicity is of great importance to theory choice scenarios and theoretical changes in the sciences. In particular, he holds that the theory choice criterion of fit with background evidence can be reduced to the criteria of simplicity and of yielding the data. We will, however, rebut this reduction thesis and show that three central aspects of theoretical change (confirming power of empirical data, reliability of experimental methods, and truth of new theoretical proposals) cannot (...) be adequately reconstructed if simplicity is regarded as a key criterion of theory choice. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger devotes extensive discussion to medieval philosophers, particularly to their treatment of Truth and Being. On both these topics, Heidegger accuses them of forgetting the question of Being and of being responsible for subjugating truth to the modern crusade for certainty: ‘truth is denied its own mode of being’ and is subordinated ‘to an intellect that judges correctly’. Though there are some studies that discuss Heidegger’s debt to and criticism of medieval thought, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas, there is (...) no constructive reply to his assertions. As a result, Heidegger’s critique had an unprecedented effect on the credibility of medieval philosophy, whereby great portions of the philosophical community dismiss it altogether as an illegitimate Onto‐Theology. It is the aim of this study to offer a constructive reply that will fundamentally grapple with these allegations. By constructive reply we mean not only a reply that avoids the problems Heidegger raises regarding existence, essence and truth, but more importantly, one that uses Heidegger’s criticism in order to present a more insightful account of these notions. The present study is composed of two parts where the second serves as a sort of addendum. The first part, the core of this study, is an attempt to develop an understanding of the distinction between essence and existence that, on the one hand, accords with Heidegger’s criticism while on the other hand advances our understanding of how we think and understand reality. After presenting Heidegger’s depiction of Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence (esse) as a real distinction, the study will present several views propounded by scholars of Aquinas regarding the status of this distinction. It will be argued that it is not clear whether the distinction is real, formal or conceptual, and that different types of distinction are applied in different places, particularly in regard to the phantasm that Aquinas considers essential to the human act of thinking. The second part diverges from the first part and focuses on Heidegger’s criticism of Aquinas’s conception of truth as adequation, i.e., what it is that grounds the possibility of truth as adequation. This divergence is necessary in order to present a full metaphysical response to Heidegger’s criticism. Since the aim of the present study is to argue that Aquinas’s philosophical system can contend with Heidegger’s criticism, a partial reply would greatly diminish its effectiveness. (shrink)

Insider trading refers to the practice of buying or selling assets on the basis of information that is not public. This paper asks if stakeholder theory can adequately address the ethics of insider trading. It argues that this practice involves two types of unfairness between insiders and society. First, an unfair allocation of benefits and burdens. Second, insiders obtain an additional benefit, that cannot be justified to others, from their privileged position. The paper argues that stakeholder theory is superior to (...) shareholder primacy, since it considers these obligations of fairness of insiders with society. However, stakeholder theory also has weaknesses; it ignores both the legal dimension of insider trading and cases that involve politicians, central bankers, the partner of insiders, among others. The paper concludes that responsibility models in business ethics cannot address the whole moral wrong of insider trading, and hence, they should be complemented with models of responsibility in political theory. (shrink)

Christie is a member of the Department of Religious Studies at Baldwin-Wallace College, Cleveland, Ohio (U.S.A.).

Spinoza shared with his contemporaries the conviction that the passions are, on the whole, unruly and destructive. A life of virtue requires that the passions be controlled, if not entirely vanquished, and the preferred means of imposing this control over the passions is via the power of reason. But there was little agreement in the seventeenth century about just what gives reason its strength and how its power can be brought to bear upon the wayward passions.

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