This book is for all those-across philosophy, political theory, sociology, geography, and literature-interested in Marx's overall intellectual project. It explains the development of Marx's project, culminating in his mature magnum opus, Capital, in terms of the demand issued in his earliest works for the 'actualization of philosophy'.

We introduce a modal logic designed to capture directional modalities grounded in structural propagation. Unlike Kripke semantics, our logic interprets necessity not over accessible worlds, but over layers of actualization governed by constraint stability. The framework is non-normal, rejects the duality of □ and ♢, and supports asymmetric reasoning over stratified systems. We present the syntax, semantics, axiomatic foundations, and philosophical implications of this system.

Resumo: A relevância da pesquisa é predefinida pelo fato de a solidão ser uma das questões-chave, na filosofia contemporânea. A pesquisa visa a determinar o papel da solidão, na filosofia moderna, e as visões sobre o fenômeno. Na pesquisa, foram utilizados os seguintes métodos de conhecimento teórico: análise, síntese, comparação, abstração, concretização e generalização. Como resultado da investigação, foram obtidas várias conclusões. Em particular, foi determinado qual o papel desempenhado pelo tema da solidão, em diferentes períodos, como na Antiguidade, na (...) Idade Média, no Renascimento e na Modernidade. A classificação moderna da solidão foi considerada, tendo sido determinados quais de seus tipos são positivos e quais são negativos, bem como qual é a relação entre eles. Os fatores objetivos de prevalência da solidão, no mundo de hoje, são identificados. A pesquisa introduz uma nova perspectiva sobre a solidão, na filosofia moderna, demonstrando a inter-relação entre diferentes tipos de solidão e o estado espiritual de uma pessoa. (shrink)

This paper proposes a structural and stratified ontology grounded in the distinction between existence and being. Against both classical substance metaphysics and contemporary metaphys- ical deflationism, we argue that reality is not constituted by entities but by fields of actualization structured by constraints. We introduce a framework in which ontological differentiation emerges through dynamic processes of stabilization, without presupposing a metric or object-based sub- stratum. The paper articulates three key levels, pure existence, admissible tension-resolving structures, and individuated configurations, and (...) develops a logic of actualization based on this stratification. Drawing on insights from quantum theory, modal logic, and metaphysical struc- turalism, we show how this model accounts for indeterminacy, emergence, and plural ontological commitments within a unified theoretical architecture. The result is a conservative but non- reductive ontology, compatible with scientific realism and modal structuralism, while avoiding ontological inflation and empirical reification. (shrink)

We argue that the distinction between ontological and nomological past dissolves classical objections to presentism grounded in truthmak- ing. This shift enables a new presentist semantics without eternalist commitments, rooted in a stratified theory of actualization, and in- spired by recent work in ontic structural realism (French 2014; Lady- man Ross 2007). Whereas the ontological past is no longer existent, the nomological past remains inferentially reconstructible via struc- tural constraints in the present. This shift enables a new presentist semantics (...) without eternalist commitments, rooted in a stratified the- ory of actualization. (shrink)

The doctrine of the communication of natures has played a primarily descriptive role in the history of Christology, and so it is perhaps unsurprising that it has largely gone missing from contemporary theology. This is a serious oversight. But Karl Barth is a noteworthy exception to the reductionist trend, and he provides the Reformed tradition's most complete and substantive engagement with the communication of natures and its implications for dogmatic theology. Through a close reading of volume IV/2 of the Church (...) Dogmatics , this essay considers Karl Barth's vital emphasis upon the communicatio naturarum and the role it plays in his actualist Christology. Barth demonstrates that the traditional threefold communication (of attributes, graces, and operations) has material as well as formal importance. According to Barth, we see in Christ not the mere coincidence of two natures, nor an interpenetration, nor the transformation of one into the other – but mutual operation and interpretation, where divinity and humanity each acquires and has its determination in the other. (shrink)

It is increasingly evident that there is more to biological evolution than natural selection; moreover, the concept of evolution is not limited to biology. We propose an integrative framework for characterizing how entities evolve, in which evolution is viewed as a process of context-driven actualization of potential (CAP). Processes of change differ according to the degree of nondeterminism, and the degree to which they are sensitive to, internalize, and depend upon a particular context. The approach enables us to embed (...) phenomena across disciplines into a broad conceptual framework. We give examples of insights into physics, biology, culture and cognition that derive from this unifying framework. (shrink)

This paper differs from any previous view in discussing quantum pure possibilities as individuals, existing independently of any observer or mind. These pure possibilities are also absolutely independent of any metaphysical or logical view that endorses the notion of possible worlds. In my view, the relationship between quantum possibilities and classical physical reality is not between reality as such, as it is in itself, and its phenomena. It is rather between fundamental or primary reality, consisting of quantum pure possibilities, on (...) the one hand, and its actualization in what classical physics has discovered so far, on the other. As individual pure possibilities, quantum entities must be, at least ontologically, distinct and different from one another, regardless of the epistemological standing of quantum physics. Hence, quantum metaphysics is committed to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Finally, I analyze the two-slit experiment, interference, and entanglement in the light of my approach. (shrink)

Ancient Indian philosophies consider self-realization as a fundamental concept and aim of human life, which appears theoretically similar to the self-actualization concept of the West. This article compares and contrasts the self-actualization concept with the views of ancient Indian wisdom to create a model. Both ideas strive for a more elevated Self, unleashing our potential or the realization/actualization of the true Self. From the Indian Vedanta philosophy emerged the Panchakosha theory of personality, which provides a structural framework (...) for human states of consciousness leading to higher development and transcendental identity. According to the scriptures, any form of stress is due to an underdeveloped state of consciousness at these levels or due to disconnection from the true Self; once an individual comes in contact with the ‘true Self’, the problems of life are eliminated. Yoga is a systematic process and way of human development, and applying the principles of Yoga philosophy in life will help in transcending one from the lower Self to the higher Self, awakening human potential, and becoming self-actualized. Yogis, who practice Yoga, could be responsible for a positive shift towards sustainable communities or transformative environments through enhanced mindfulness, self-actualization, and social capital demonstrated by enhanced moral values, trust, engagement, and acceptance. This theoretical model from classical Indian thought has the potential to provide the needed guidelines to create more self-actualized people. The dimension of well-being and prescriptions on how to reach this state of highest well-being is the essence of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

In Freedom's Right Axel Honneth seeks to provide a theory of justice by appropriating Hegel's account of ethical substance in the Philosophy of Right, but he wants to do so without endorsing Hegel's more robust idealist commitments. I argue that this project can only succeed if Honneth can offer an alternative, comparatively robust demonstration of the rationality and normative coherence of existing social institutions. I contend that the grounds Honneth provides for this claim are insufficient for his purposes. In particular, (...) I argue that Honneth's claim that “justice and individual self-determination are mutually referential,” even were it to be accepted, would be insufficient to underwrite his more robust identification between the normative foundations of justice, autonomy and reciprocal self-realization. In the final section of the paper, I turn to Honneth's analysis of the “social institution” of friendship, which he, following Hegel, holds up as a paradigmatic instantiation of social freedom understood as, in Hegel's words, “being with oneself in another” . I argue that an analysis of the normative import of friendship wholly in terms of mutual recognition misses an important aspect of the kind of self-realization that friendship makes possible. (shrink)

Over 2,300 years ago, the Ancient Greeks gave us philosophy-the love of wisdom. From Socrates and Epicurus to Plato and Aristotle, they grappled with the big questions-who are we? Why are we here? What is a good life? How should we lead our life? Later, the natural sciences split away from philosophy, and then the humanities did as well, and fragmented into separate disciplines, all of which tell us something about human nature-the universal, the culture-specific, and the individuated. This ongoing (...) process was also forwarded by supporters of Aristotle's worldview, most notably, Thomas Aquinas and Ayn Rand, and we see much value in their neo-Aristotelian philosophies, too. In the light of all that that the new sciences and more recent philosophers tell us about human nature and ethics, is there a case for modernizing Aristotle (and thinkers like Aquinas and Rand, as well), as against starting afresh? We think so. The theme of this book is to arrive at a highly practical, "neo-Aristotelian" framework to facilitate creating a meaningful life and self-actualization (and thereby flourishing and happiness) by linking ethics (as an "ought") with the empirical sciences (that provide the "is"). A modernized ethic can be created using current scientific knowledge, and is also made easier in application, by specifying the psychological nature of the human (the internal, or the ontology of the modern human), and delineating that which is universal, from that which can be individualized. (shrink)

We propose a structural account of consciousness in which subjective presence arises not as a substance, emergent property, or representational function, but as a transient regime of local constraint equilibrium. A system is conscious, in this view, when the convergence of multistratal constraints reaches a metastable peak sufficient to sustain a unified and autonomous mode of stabilization. Consciousness does not persist in timeit becomes structurally effective at points where stabilization holds. This framework reinterprets presence as actualization and offers a (...) novel interface between mind, time, and physics. (shrink)

This article introduces a modal-tensed logic of actualization, grounded in a processual and non-metrical ontology of the real. Classical modal logics evaluate truth across pre-constituted possible worlds, treating modality as extensional and symmetric. In contrast, we propose that modality arises from the internal dynamics of stabilization within a field of tensions: configurations become possible, effective, or actual according to their capacity to resolve constraints. The logic defines five operators, present actualization, past trace, future projection, structural possibility, and necessity, (...) governed by axioms encoding irreversibility, fragility, and asymmetrical transition. We provide a semantic model based on dynamically accessible configurations with intensity-based stabilization. A case study in quantum measurement illustrates how actualization captures the transition from superposition to definite outcome without invoking collapse. This framework reconceptualizes modality, temporality, and ontology as emergent from internal dynamics rather than imposed from external metaphysical structures. It offers new perspectives on metaphysical logic and the foundations of physics. (shrink)

We propose a conceptual reinterpretation of quantum entanglement grounded in a non-metric field of ontological actualization. Rather than treating entanglement as a static, nonlocal feature of global quantum states, we argue that it can be understood as a regime of structural coherence induced by local cross-activation within a generative field. This approach dissolves several conceptual difficulties surrounding nonlocality, measurement, and the ontological status of the wavefunction. We assess how this perspective aligns with a dynamic, generative variant of ontic structural (...) realism and explore its potential to reframe foundational paradoxes in quantum theory without invoking Hilbert space formalism. (shrink)

I discuss Aquinas’s view of habit—the genus to which virtue belongs. The first article in both of Aquinas’s sustained treatments of the virtues in general (STh I.II.55-67 and QDV 1) asks whether virtues are habits. Thus, Aquinas’s pedagogical strategy is to elucidate the virtues in terms of their nature as habits. Following this strategy, I explore Aquinas’s discussion of habits in Questions 49-54 of the prima secundae by tracing three important topics: the essence of habits, the cause of habits, and (...) the increase of habits. By the end of this paper, the reader will have a strong grasp of the nature and types of habits and the different ways in which they can increase. (shrink)

This book is a joint effort of like-minded researchers to define the concept of process within a psychological setting. Although minor differences exist as regards choice of background theory, their common focus is on personality in a broad psychodynamic context. Their definition of personality rests on a series of test instruments that have been validated during decades of thorough and vigorous empirical work. These were originally designed to open up micro-processes underlying the adaptation to or construction of reality, and have (...) subsequently proven diagnostically efficient. Coming from both sides of the Atlantic, the contributors have their background in psychological as well as medical institutions. The contributions in the book are examples of a vital source sustaining our efforts to get a more profound understanding of the vicissitudes of the human mind. (shrink)

IN RETURNING again and again, over the years, to the same topics in first philosophy, I have tried on each occasion to justify what I was doing by reassessing our cognitive authority for dealing with such topics. By doing so, I allied myself with an old and familiar tradition: the one that takes it for granted that first philosophy is always under an obligation to justify itself. Its substantive topics, according to this tradition, can be legitimately pursued only if it (...) is also shown in that very pursuit by what right, by what authority, one does so. If, proceeding in this way, we should ever manage to achieve a first philosophy that commanded general respect, it would then be seen to be first not just in its substantive findings but in its rational authority as well. That prospect is enough to make me wish to persuade all those who are interested in bringing the discipline into being to call it, as I do here, by its earliest and most illuminating name. And to say "bring it into being" is no mere flourish, for the discipline has never become fully actual--has never, that is, achieved the pervasive and living authority that continues to be our deepest intellectual need. (shrink)

The ecological crisis is confronting humanity with a need to recognize the interconnectedness of all life, and the Akashic Field as formulated by Ervin Laszlo (2004a) has identified how a universal information field connects humans to a greater transpersonal consciousness. The Akashic Field could provide humanity with a focus to deepen its understanding of a holistic view of life. The global crisis will confront human beings with the need to develop their transpersonal potential and spiritual intelligence, which has the potential (...) to contribute to an ecological actualization of human beings' relationship to the world, and the development of a sustainable future. (shrink)

This paper enquires into a paradigmatic change concerning the concept of motion: from a phenomenological conception of motion understood as a continuous and finite process of translation, to a physical conception of motion as rectilinear, uniform and continuous, that is, as an inertial state that if unhindered, can extend infinitely – the former held by Aristotle, the latter by Koyré, a shift that is evidenced by their contrasting treatment of Zeno’s paradoxes. I argue that both ontologies of motion can be (...) understood in phenomenological terms: Motion is accomplished by the real itself. However, while Aristotle’s continuous motion as actualization of the form of a given body involves its formal determination and constitution of sense, Koyré’s conceives of motion and rest as kinds of being and motion itself as exemplifcation of the mathematization of nature that Husserl described in the Crisis. Taken together, these changes presuppose a transformation of metaphysical and epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

Despite its many possible interpretations, the Western tradition has restricted the act of knowing to disjunction from bodiliness, in a sort of detachment and contemplation of the world ascribable to the res cogitans and to the exclusion of mere fruition. The observer becomes an entity other than external reality, looking at the latter from the outside (albeit within their own perspective). Knowledge, as a neutral and objectivizing act, as something neither participating in, nor emerging from, the relational predicate, has marked (...) a sort of divorce between knowing and known: a dichotomy that is reflected in a fractal way and itself produces other dichotomies. Far from being interpreted as a particular and partial gaze on the world, the human perspective has acquired universal connotations: the perceived is suspended, and the perception and connotation of reality are taken to be separate things. This consecutio goes from the Cartesian doubt to the Kantian critique; then Konrad Lorenz operated a first conjunction by connecting the aprioris to the adaptive processes and making them phylogenetic aposterioris. Now we should ask ourselves: (1) whether we can consider the epistemological perspective as a state of approximation to reality, which has an ultimate configuration even though the latter is not necessarily knowable; (2) whether, on the contrary, we should accept a principle of absolute relativism to deny any conformation to reality and theorize the latter’s non-consistency, along with the total perspectival creativity-freedom of the subject. There is also another option, though: perhaps (3) we can chose a third path, one that presumes that reality per se is unknowable, not for a lack of conformability but for its virtuality, and the only observed datum acceptable as a starting point is the resistance to the actualization process. In this chapter, I shall try to elaborate on this third option, referring to Lorenz’s view on the adherence of cognitive tools to the configuration of reality. I will also try to understand how to conciliate an interpretation based on the animal being’s subjectivity, full of perspective protagonism in any interaction with the world, with an epistemological framework that accounts for the phylogenetic conjugation as a given dimension. This interpretation acknowledges specificity but also takes into consideration the homological, analogic and universal factors. I believe that Lorenz’s thought, and evolutionary epistemology in general, have left us a legacy we cannot ignore. Instead, we should avoid Kant’s disjunctive parallelism; indeed, in light of animal subjectivity, it is evident that we need to revise both the concept of perspectival approximation and that of perspectival passivity. (shrink)

The review introduces readers to a new monograph by the Norwegian historian of philosophy T.T. Tollefsen. In the new book, the author summarizes his many years of research into the legacy of St. Maximus the Confessor, one of the most important and sophisticated Byzantine thinkers. The metaphysics of St. Maximus is described as a large philosophical system, as coherent and rational as other systems of late Antiquity. Its distinctive feature is its emphasized dynamism, which consists in the movement of the (...) entire sensual and intelligible cosmos towards the goal of comprehensive actualization and deification. Tollefsen describes the philosophical system of Maximus the Confessor in the following topics: epistemology, the doctrine of creation, the doctrine of logoi, divine activity (energy), the problem of universals, and the question of Incarnation and deification. In addition, the scholar makes an attempt to apply the metaphysics of St. Maximus to the philosophical problems of our time. (shrink)

If we take humans or other living beings as an example (it can be generalized to other cases), it is clear that on the one hand the actual form does not exhaust the actualization (and the more complex the individual, the bigger this discrepancy is), but that there always remains, as long as the system endures, a certain reserve for further actualizations. On the other hand, it is also clear that no actualized form is eternal (and again, the more (...) complex the individual, the more vulnerable it is) and that it is prone to encounter a situation that drastically changes its way of actualization (and that in the case of a living being results in its death). This brings us to the topic of counter-actualization, self-cultivation as countering the actualized forms and enlarging the reserve for further actualizations. (shrink)

Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that this view is false. In short, there are properties like the property of nonexistence, and it is metaphysically possible that some entity both exemplifies such a property and does not exist. I argue that such arguments are indeed successful against the standard formulation of serious actualism. However, I (...) also argue that we should distinguish a weaker formulation of serious actualism using the actualist distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world. This weaker formulation is then shown to be consistent with the existence and possible exemplification of properties like the property of nonexistence. I end with a novel argument for the truth of the weaker formulation. (shrink)

Conceptual and empirical evidence for a relationship between self‐actualization and moral development is reviewed. Possible interpretations of such a relationship are considered. Implications for (a) the theory of self‐actualization, and (b) the psychological study of moral development, are briefly discussed.

Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it for insight into the (...) modal structure of reality. For possible world semantics, it is supposed, commits one to possibilism. In this paper I take issue with this view. To the contrary, I argue that one can take possible world semantics seriously without any commitment to possible worlds or possibilism and hence remain in full compliance with actualist scruples. Moreover, one can do so without without invoking either "ersatz" worlds or haecceities. (shrink)

본 글은 분석심리학자인 칼 융(Carl Gustav Jung)의 원형의 개념과 진정한 자기(Self)가 되기 위한 개성화 과정을 통한 ‘자기실현’과 철학적 의미를 알아본다. 융의 분석심리학은 인간과 인간의 정신이 세계 안에 포함되어 있는 동시에 외부세계가 어느 정도 우리 정신안에 포함되어 있다는 것을 다루려는 시도에서 발전하였다. 분석심리학은 심혼의 구조와 역동을 포함하고 있으며 이는 의식과 무의식, 즉 존재의 전체를 말한다. 이러한 개념은 융의 기본 사상으로서 우리의 전체로서의 정신은 하나라는 것을 지지해준다.BR 우리는 각자 자신에 대해 잘 안다고 생각한다. 그러나 자아는 오직 의식 안의 내용물만을 알 뿐이며 무의식과 (...) 그 내용에 대해서는 알지 못한다. 이렇듯 자신에 대해 알고 있는 것은 극히 일부에 대한 제한적인 지식일 수밖에 없으며 이조차도 대부분은 사회적 요인들에 의해 좌우된다. 자기 자신에 대해 알고 있다는 지식들은 이론적 가설에 근거하기 때문에 절대적이지 못하다. 각각의 자기란 각각의 그 자신을 말하며 ‘그 사람 전체’를 가리키는 의미에서 진정한 의미의 개성과 같은 말이다.BR 진정한 자기(Self)가 되기 위한 개성화 과정이란 단일적 존재가 된다는 의미로서 ‘본래의 자기로 돌아가는 것’이 되는 것이고 이를 ‘자기실현’이라 한다. 자기가 진정한 자기가 되어야 하는 목적은 뚜렷하다. 왜냐하면 자기 스스로를 자각하게 됨으로써 자기에 대한 이해를 돕고 보다 나은 인생을 살도록 도와주는 역할을 할 것이기 때문이다. 개성화 즉 자기실현은 어떻게 이루어지는가? 이것은 오로지 개개인의 자기인식을 통해서만 가능하며, 다른 말로 자기가 모르는 자기의 내면을 깨달아 가는 무의식의 의식화 작업이라 할 수 있다.BR 이를 위해 원형 개념에서의 자기실현이 무엇인지, 어떠한 역할을 수행하는지 철학적으로 모색하고자 한다. 여기에서 철학적 모색이란 본질적인 부분을 분석하고 종합하는 방식을 말한다. 특히 철학은 당면하는 문제들을 더욱 명료하게 인지하고 실천할 수 있도록 돕기 때문이다. 그러나 현재의 철학은 삶의 방식을 논의하기보다 지식을 위한 학문으로 바뀌어 가는 현실이다. 그럼에도 철학은 인간 정신에 대한 문제와 해결점을 제공하며 실천적관점을 통해 설명함으로써 자기실현을 목표로 하는 방법에 대한 기준을 제시해줄 것이다. (shrink)