Action description language C+ is more expressive than ADL in many ways; for instance, it addresses the ramification problem. On the other hand, ADL is based on first-order logic, while C+ is only propositional; expressions with variables, which are frequently used when action domains are described in C+, are merely..

“Toy worlds” involving actions, such as the blocks world and the Missionaries and Cannibals puzzle, are often used by researchers in the areas of commonsense reasoning and planning to illustrate and test their ideas. We would like to create a database of generalpurpose knowledge about actions that encodes common features of many action domains of this kind, in the same way as abstract algebra and topology represent common features of specific number systems. This paper is a report on the (...) first stage of this project—the design of an action description language in which this database will be written. The new language is an extension of the action language C+. Its main distinctive feature is the possibility of referring to other action descriptions in the definition of a new action domain. (shrink)

This paper considers insoluble difficulties for the supposition that intentions, “acts of will”, and reasons for acting, construed as mental events, could be the special ingredient that would render bodily movements into voluntary or intentional actions. Yet, the distinction between mere bodily movements and actions is often made by introducing intentions, acts of will, and reasons for acting. How is this to be reconciled? Criticising the tendency to view the “thick descriptions” of everyday discourse through a metaphysical scheme that relies (...) on the topic-neutral lens of an extensional calculus, the paper proposes a different solution that rejects the original supposition that a mental cause of some sort is required to accommodate the differences. (shrink)

structures, or interpretations, in the sense of first-order logic. In C+, on the other hand, a state is an interpreta-.

To describe simultaneous knowledge updates for different subgroups we propose anepistemic language with dynamic operators for actions. The language is interpreted onequivalence states (S5 states). The actions are interpreted as state transformers. Two crucial action constructors are learning and local choice. Learning isthe dynamic equivalent of common knowledge. Local choice aids in constraining theinterpretation of an action to a functional interpretation (state transformer).Bisimilarity is preserved under execution of actions. The language is applied todescribe various actions in card games.

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first one focuses on generalized descriptive set theory, and the second one on combinatorics, model theory, and Ramsey theory. Generalized descriptive set theory (GDST) is a natural extension of (classical) descriptive set theory (DST) where countable is replaced by uncountable. But the framework of GDST is narrow if compared to that of DST, as so far GDST has mostly concentrated on the study of the generalized Baire space, rather than considering arbitrary “Polish-like” (...) spaces or standard $\kappa $ -Borel spaces. Also, GDST is usually developed for cardinals satisfying $\kappa ^{ \omega $. All the proposed classes give rise to the same class of spaces up to $ \kappa $ -Borel isomorphism, providing a natural setup to work with. Then, various results from classical DST about Polish, Borel, and standard Borel spaces are extended to this context. Chapter 2 extends the previous analysis to embrace singular cardinals too. In particular, it contains an in-depth study of the generalizations and characterizations of metrizability necessary in the singular case. The main result on this topic is a new metrization theorem in terms of topological games that holds for both classical metrizability and $\mathbb {G}$ -metrizability. Chapter 3 features various examples of spaces in the classes considered above, and a study of linearly ordered topological spaces (LOTS) and generalized ordered spaces (GO-spaces) in the context of GDST. The second part of the thesis deals with a recently discovered notion in combinatorics. In 2019, Solecki introduced the classes of Ramsey monoids and $\mathbb {Y}$ -controllable monoids to collect and extend different theorems in combinatorics, like Hindman’s Finite Sum Theorem, Carlson’s Theorem, Gowers’ FIN $_\kappa $ Theorem, and Furstenberg–Katznelson’s Ramsey Theorem. Then, he provided a necessary condition and some sufficient conditions for a finite monoid to be Ramsey or $\mathbb {Y}$ -controllable. Chapters 4 and 5 aim to continue the work started by Solecki on these and other related classes of monoids. We improve the necessary conditions and the sufficient conditions provided by Solecki, reaching in particular a full characterization of Ramsey monoids. This further extends results like Carlson’s Theorem and Gowers’ FIN $_\kappa $ Theorem, but it also sets a precise limit on when it is possible to obtain similar statements. We also give examples of classes of $\mathbb {Y}$ -controllable monoids that do not satisfy some of the sufficient conditions, suggesting possible strategies to improve the results we provided. Then, we show that in certain particular classes of $\mathbb {Y}$ -controllable monoids with stronger properties, the remaining sufficient conditions become necessary as well. In Chapter 5, we also study local versions of the classes of Ramsey and $\mathbb {Y}$ -controllable monoids that are better suited for infinite monoids. The thesis contains material from joint works with Luca Motto Ros, Philipp Schlicht, and Eugenio Colla. Abstract prepared by Claudio Agostini E-mail: [email protected] Current affiliation: HUN-REN ALFRÉD RÉNYI INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICS REÁLTANODA UTCA 13-15 H-1053, BUDAPEST. (shrink)

The construction industry is usually characterized as a fragmented system of multiple-organizational entities in which members from different technical backgrounds and moral values join together to develop a particular business or project. The greatest challenge in the construction process for the achievement of a successful practice is the development of an outstanding reputation, which is built on identifying and applying an ethical framework. This framework should reflect a common ethical ground for myriad people involved in this process to survive and (...) compete ethically in today’s turbulent construction market. This study establishes a framework for ethical judgment of behavior and actions conducted in the construction process. The framework was primarily developed based on the essential attributes of business management identified in the literature review and subsequently incorporates additional attributes identified to prevent breaches in the construction industry and common ethical values related to professional engineering. The proposed judgment framework is based primarily on the ethical dimension of professional responsibility. The Ethical Judgment Framework consists of descriptive approaches involving technical, professional, administrative, and miscellaneous terms. The framework provides the basis for judging actions as either ethical or unethical. Furthermore, the framework can be implemented as a form of preventive ethics, which would help avoid ethical dilemmas and moral allegations. The framework can be considered a decision-making model to guide actions and improve the ethical reasoning process that would help individuals think through possible implications and consequences of ethical dilemmas in the construction industry. (shrink)

CDA studies on out-groups, i.e. immigrants, within Wodak's Discourse-Historical and van Dijk's Socio-cognitive approaches along other approaches, have suggested methods and analytical categories through which discursive representations of social groups are investigated. Consequently, several listings of relevant analytical categories have been proposed and applied to many subsequent studies. However, the variety of the proposed methods in representation of social groups by various scholars and the often unclear accounts for the links among various levels of discourse analysis seem to have created (...) a multitude of discursive strategies that can be overwhelming if not confusing. This paper is an attempt to make explicit various levels of discourse analysis on representation of social groups from detailed textual analysis to discourse topics and tries to show how micro-level analytical categories are related to macro-structure within various levels of contexts. Specifically, a three-level analytical framework is suggested for textual analysis of the representation of social groups which divides the text analysis into three domains of social actors, social actions and argumentation. It is suggested that the analysis should look at what is in the text in terms of the three domains mentioned, and investigate how these domains are linguistically realized through a set of linguistic processes/mechanisms. (shrink)

My main purpose is to suggest that H. L. A. Hart's infamous “ascriptivism”1 may be of considerable pertinence to the assessment of the nature of justificatory claims in the criminal law; in passing, I argue that ascriptivism gives no cause for infamy. My suggestion is developed in Part III: As it depends on some reformulation and endorsement of Hart's ideas, I discuss the “ascriptive” and “defeasible” character of the concept of action in Part II, and therein try to dismiss (...) some of the severe criticism that ascriptivism has given rise to since its proposal. This criticism, I shall argue, often relies upon a poor or uncharitable interpretation of Hart's instrumental characterization of the “defeasibility” of legal concepts; for this reason, Part I is dedicated to a reconstructive elucidation of Hart's account of “conceptual defeasibility.”2. (shrink)

A given but otherwise random environmental time series impinging on the input of a certain biological processor passes through with overwhelming probability practically undetected. A very small percentage of environmental stimuli, though, is ‘captured’ by the processor's nonlinear dissipative operator as initial conditions, and is ‘processed’ as solutions of its dynamics. The processor, then, is in such cases instrumental in compressing or abstracting those stimuli, thereby making the external world to collapse from a previous regime of a ‘pure state’ of (...) suspended animation into a set of stable complementary and mutually exclusive eigenfunctions or ‘categories'. The characteristics of this cognitive set depend on the operator involved and the hierarchical level where the abstraction takes place. Depending on the context, the transition from one state to another occurs in such a cognitive operator. The chaotic itinerancy may play a crucial role for this process. In this paper we model the dynamics which may underlie such a cognitive process and the role of the thalamo-cortical pacemaker of the brain. In order to model them, conceptualization by the notion of ‘attractor ruin’ in high-dimensional dynamical systems is necessary. (shrink)

Astrology is seen as a dubious discipline in many contemporary discussions. However, all critiques of astrology treat it as a contending scientific discipline in the same way that mainstream sciences such as physics, statistics, or biology is a scientific discipline. The current paper shows that there is an alternative description possible, based on ideas of action theory, which both protects the integrity of the practice of astrology, and renders it a reasonable discipline, without making superfluous claims about its (...) predictive efficacy. The argument hinges on discovering form concepts which best capture situation-types which are encountered in daily life. The three central aspects of astrology, viz., (a) planetary influence at a distance on our lives, (b) the determination of such influence based on the calendaring of birth, and (c) the salutary effects of rituals to propitiate the planets or suitably alter their influence are all redescribed to show that as effective material causes they distort the nature of the astrological activity but as form-concepts have a central role in generating practical knowledge. (shrink)

Dr. Cody (Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 2) argues that since we cannot say how a person could learn that different descriptions are of the same action, therefore each action has only one true description. But precisely the same reasoning could lead to the conclusion that each material object has only one true description. The falsity of this conclusion indicates the unsoundness of the argument, which probably goes wrong where Cody requires us to see actions ‘stripped of (...) their descriptive rags altogether’. (shrink)

To say that a single human action can be given different descriptions is to imply that the contrast between action and description is intelligible. There are several ways in which such a contrast is easily understood, but those ways do not meet philosophers’ needs. They have said that the descriptions are all true, thereby excluding that interpretation in which no more than one description could be true. They have emphasized the word ‘different’, therefore that interpretation in (...) which the descriptions are partial and consequently combinable into one larger description is excluded. The descriptions must be different and true while remaining descriptions of the same single action. How can we conceive of this sort of contrast between description and action? It is not a familiar one. Several attempts are made in this paper to provide a way of conceiving of the contrast. All fail. The conclusion is hesitantly drawn that we have no other way to conceive of different human actions than by descriptions which are different from one another and true. (shrink)

Nous appelons «thèse des descriptions multiples» l'opinion qui veut qu'une seule et même action peut etre decrite de plusieurs façons différentes selon que Ton prend en considération ou non les différentes conséquences, plus ou moins lointaines, de cette action. Cette thèse joue chez certains penseurs un rôle essentiel dans la solution du problème de l'individuation des actions. Chez D. Davidson notamment, elle intervient de façon décisive dans la démonstration de sa fameuse thèse que toute action se réduit (...) à des mouvements corporels. Nous entendons montrer, premièrement, que la thèse des descriptions multiples, à supposer même qu'elle soit vraie, ne saurait remplir le rôle que lui assigne Davidson dans le contexte de l'individuation des actions; deuxièmement, que cette thèse est fondée en fait sur l'ignorance de certaines distinctions importantes concernant l'action et le langage de l'action. (shrink)

Naturalistic Descriptions and Normative-Intentional Interpretations Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", "action", (...) "sanction", "belief", "desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow. (shrink)

This work offers a challenge to the orthodox view that descriptive rules are non-normative and passive in their role and usage. It does so by arguing that, although lacking in normativity themselves, descriptive rules can be sources of normativity by way of the normative attitudes that can develop around them. That is, although descriptive rules typically depict how things are, they can also play a role in how things ought to be. In this way, the limited role that this type (...) of rule can play as either a basis for the development of normative reasons, or as explanatory reasons for action is identified and clarified. One desirable outcome of the analysis is a more complete view of what descriptive rules are and how they are utilized by agents. (shrink)

This chapter identifies a novel family of metaethical theories that are non-descriptive and that aim to explain the action-guiding qualities of normative thought and language. The general strategy is to consider different relations language might bear to a given content, where we locate descriptivity (or lack of it) in these relations, rather than locating it in a theory that begins with the expression of states of mind, or locating it in a special kind of content that is not way-things-might-be (...) content. One such view is sketched, which posits two different content-fixing cognitive roles for bits of language. One role fixes a descriptive relation to content and another role fixes a non-descriptive relation to content. In addition to non-descriptivity and action guidance, the chapter briefly considers the appearance of mind-independent authoritative force, disagreement, and Frege–Geach concerns. (shrink)

Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) vaccine trials are needed in efforts to prevent infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Like other types of research, HIV vaccine trials present benefits and risks that may or may not be anticipated by participants. Perceptions of risks and benefits often vary with contextual factors, such as sociocultural and economic variables, which are important in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). This integrative review aimed to determine the risks and benefits of HIV vaccine trial participation reported in (...) the LMICs from 1995 to 2024. The risks and benefits were reported by participants and potential participants during trial preparations, recruitment, actual trial participation or after trial participation. In this review we assessed on how the risks and benefits were described by the authors of the reviewed studies. We also sought to categorize these risks and benefits, consider ethical implications, identify gaps for further research, and recommend actions for policy improvement. The integrative review screened studies from four databases (CINAHL, Embase, MEDLINE and Web of Science). Studies were eligible if they involved interactions with human subjects and were written in English. Covidence software was used to organize the search outcomes. Twenty-five studies met inclusion criteria. Identified benefits included a sense of altruism, free healthcare, financial incentives and HIV education. Risks included stigma and discrimination associated with vaccine-induced seropositivity, perceived racism and fear of delayed harms. Important descriptions of risks and benefits (e.g., magnitude and likelihood) were missing. Free healthcare and financial incentives may render participants too influenced to enter consent, which is an important ethical concern in LMICs. The literature was scant, highlighting a need for research on how participants in LMICs are informed about weighing risks and benefits of HIV vaccine trial participation. More in-depth description of risks and benefits is warranted. Standardized risk/benefit assessment frameworks tailored to the context of these trials in LMICs are needed. (shrink)

This chapter identifies a novel family of metaethical theories that are non-descriptive and that aim to explain the action-guiding qualities of normative thought and language. The general strategy is to consider different relations language might bear to a given content, where we locate descriptivity (or lack of it) in these relations, rather than locating it in a theory that begins with the expression of states of mind, or locating it in a special kind of content that is not way-things-might-be (...) content. One such view is sketched, which posits two different content-fixing cognitive roles for bits of language. One role fixes a descriptive relation to content and another role fixes a non-descriptive relation to content. In addition to non-descriptivity and action guidance, the chapter briefly considers the appearance of mind-independent authoritative force, disagreement, and Frege–Geach concerns. (shrink)

I use a distinction between single-minded and indifferent choice attitudes, modeled across maximally determinate plans of action, as a basis for interpreting deontic claims – about what ought, ought not, and may be done – as expressing a mode of relation between mind and world that gives voice to the exercise of practical rationality. At the same time, I use maximally determinate possible worlds to model descriptive claims in order to understand them as involving a mode of relation between (...) mind and world that manifests our theoretical rationality. The result is of interest to both linguists looking for a formal treatment of deontic modality that captures the role prescriptive mental states play in our lives, and philosophers interested in substantive questions about action-guiding and representational mental states as exercises of practical and theoretical rationality. (shrink)

Introductory survey -- Atomic theory and mechanics -- The quantum postulate and the recent development of atomic theory -- The quantum of action and the description of nature -- The atomic theory and the fundamental principles underlying the description of nature.

We propose a descriptive version of the classical multi-attribute utility model; to that end, we add a new parameter, momentary salience, to the customary formulation. The addition of this parameter allows the theory to accommodate changes in the decision maker’s mood and circumstances, as the saliencies of anticipated consequences are driven by concerns of the moment. By allowing for the number of consequences given attention at the moment of decision to vary, the new model mutes the criticism that SEU models (...) call for an omniscient decision maker. Use of the model is illustrated with a large-scale longitudinal study showing that adolescent smokers have higher utility for smoking than nonsmokers. We also propose to use the model hierarchically to describe everyday decisions that people deal with repeatedly. Big decisions, which set policy, guide a host of nested little decisions, which in turn lead to action. For a little decision, one of the options will be consistent with the policy, and will inherit its high utility. Accordingly, most little decisions will be made quickly and will follow the policy. However, people do sometimes decide to violate their own policies, and we describe how these lapses can lead to collapse of the policy. (shrink)

According to Millian Descriptivism, while the semantic content of a linguistically simple proper name is just its referent, we often use sentences containing such expressions “to make assertions…that are, in part, descriptive” (Soames 2008). Against this view, I show, following Ted Sider and David Braun (2006), that simple sentences containing names are never used to assert descriptively enriched propositions. In addition, I offer a diagnosis as to where the argument for Millian Descriptivism goes wrong. Once we appreciate the distinctive way (...) in which this account fails, we can better appreciate the very modest role that associated descriptive information plays in the pragmatics of proper names. (shrink)

Background On a daily basis, healthcare professionals deal with various ethical issues and it can be difficult to determine how to act best. Clinical ethics support (CES) has been developed to provide support for healthcare professionals dealing with complex ethical issues. A long-term perspective of participating in inter-professional dialogue and reflective-based CES sessions is seemingly sparse in the literature. Research aim The aim was to describe experiences of impact of Inter-professional Ethics Communication in groups (IEC) based on Habermas’ theory of (...) communicative actions, after 6 months from the perspective of an inter-professional team. Research design A qualitative inductive approach was chosen, and individual interviews ( n = 13) were conducted. Interview data were analysed using qualitative content analysis. Participants The participants, 10 females and two males, represented assistant nurses, registered nurses, physicians, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, welfare officers and psychologists. Each had attended at least four IEC sessions. Ethical considerations The study was approved by the Regional Ethical Review Board in Umeå, Sweden, and it has been undertaken in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration. Findings Overall, the descriptions expressed a perceived achievement of a deepened and integrated ethical awareness that increased the participants’ awareness of ethically difficult situations as well as their own ethical thinking, actions and approaches in daily work. Perspectives were shared and the team become more welded. They carried the memories of the reflections within them, which was perceived as supportive when encountered new ethically situations. Discussion Putting words to unarticulated thoughts may stimulate repeated reflections, leading to new insights and alternative thoughts. Conclusion The outcome of IEC sessions 6 months following the last session can be described as an incorporated knowledge that enables actions in ethically difficult situations based on an ethical awareness both at a ‘We-level’ and an ‘I-level’. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that descriptive content associated with a proper name can serve as a truth-conditionally relevant adjunct and be an additional contribution of the name to the truth-conditions. Definite descriptions the so-and-so associated by speakers with a proper name can be used as qualifying prepositional phrases as so-and-so, so sentences containing a proper name NN is doing something could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which means as so-and-so). Used as an adjunct, the descriptive (...) content of a proper name expresses the additional circumstances of an action (a manner, reason, goal, time or purpose) and constitute a part of a predicate. I argue that qualifying prepositional phrases should be analyzed as predicate modifiers and propose a formal representation of modified predicates. The additional truth-conditional relevance of the descriptive content of a proper name helps to explain the phenomenon of the substitution failure of coreferential names in simple sentences. (shrink)

In the dissertation I provide an account of action descriptions which emphasizes their role as explanations of consequences. By showing that consequences are ascribed to an action under a description, and only when that description can explain the consequence, I undermine the view that consequences are brute events. Roughly, I reason as follows. If consequences were brute events, then their ascription to an action wouldn't hinge on how we understand the action. We could, for (...) instance, say in ordinary circumstances "John tensed his finger" and as a consequence "Mary became a widow" without any untowardness at all. I show both that we do not do this and that we cannot do it. That we do not do it is supported primarily by linguistic intuitions; mainly I show that there is an infelicity in ascribing to an action a consequence which is not explained by that action. To support the claim that we cannot do this I argue that if there were no "fit" between action and consequence that would make communication difficult. ;I then use this characterization of action descriptions and consequences to serve as a criterion for identifying the privileged description of an action. Any one action may have several action descriptions. In light of this, there is a question raised about which, if any, of these descriptions is privileged. I show that within the wider social context there is a description of the action which is dominant. Then I argue that this description is and should be chosen in virtue of the explanatory power of action descriptions with respect to consequences. (shrink)

Belief-revision models of knowledge describe how to update one’s degrees of belief associated with hypotheses as one considers new evidence, but they typically do not say how probabilities become associated with meaningful hypotheses in the first place. Here we consider a variety of Skyrms–Lewis signaling game (Lewis in Convention. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms in Signals evolution, learning, & information. Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) where simple descriptive language and predictive practice and associated basic expectations coevolve. Rather than (...) assigning prior probabilities to hypotheses in a fixed language then conditioning on new evidence, the agents begin with no meaningful language or expectations then evolve to have expectations conditional on their descriptions as they evolve to have meaningful descriptions for the purpose of successful prediction. The model, then, provides a simple but concrete example of how the process of evolving a descriptive language suitable for inquiry might also provide agents with conditional expectations that reflect the type and degree of predictive success in fact afforded by their evolved predictive practice. This illustrates one way in which the traditional problem of priors may simply fail to apply to one’s model of evolving inquiry. (shrink)

In “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy,” Robert Gooding-Williams offers an insight. He writes: “Our sense of ourselves and of the possibilities existing for us is, to a significant degree, a function of the descriptions we have available to us to conceptualize our intended actions and prospective lives. . . . ‘Hence if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities of action come into being in consequence.’” In this article, I discuss the philosopher’s role in the articulation of (...) new descriptions and thus new possibilities. I argue that potential modes of bold and assertive comportment are conjured when new insurrectionist descriptions are articulated within oppressed populations. To bring this to a higher resolution, I discuss the pervasiveness of dialectical conflict, the need to creatively reorient the descriptions of oppressed groups toward liberation, and the need for more than one prescriptive mode of social amelioration. (shrink)

In “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy,” Robert Gooding-Williams offers an insight. He writes: “Our sense of ourselves and of the possibilities existing for us is, to a significant degree, a function of the descriptions we have available to us to conceptualize our intended actions and prospective lives…. ‘Hence if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities of action come into being in consequence.’” In this article, I discuss the philosopher's role in the articulation of new descriptions and (...) thus new possibilities. I argue that potential modes of bold and assertive comportment are conjured when new insurrectionist descriptions are articulated within oppressed populations. To bring this to a higher resolution, I discuss the pervasiveness of dialectical conflict, the need to creatively reorient the descriptions of oppressed groups toward liberation, and the need for more than one prescriptive mode of social amelioration. (shrink)

La formation de mots qui contiennent plus d’un lexème, en portugais, comprend la composition morphologique (p. ex., toxicodependente ‘toxicomane’, agridoce ‘aigre-doux’), la composition morphosyntaxique (p. ex., barco-casa ‘péniche’, guarda-roupa ‘garde-robe’, cantora-atriz ‘chanteuse et actrice’), et la formation de mots-valises (p. ex., cartomente ‘diseuse de bonne aventure qui ment’ < cartomante ‘diseuse de bonne aventure’ + mente ‘il/elle ment’, tristemunho ‘triste témoignage’ < triste ‘triste’ + testemunho ‘témoignage’, cantautor ‘chanteur et compositeur’ < cantor ‘chanteur’ + autor ‘compositeur’). Les structures composées du (...) portugais sont décrites en détail par plusieurs auteurs (p. ex., Villalva et Gonçalves 2015), tandis que la formation de mots-valises a reçu des analyses controversées et même contradictoires : certains auteurs affirment que la structure des mots-valises et des composés est similaire, tandis que d’autres considèrent qu’elles sont très différentes (p. ex., Gries 2004b, Minussi et Nóbrega 2014). Cet article se concentre sur la description et l’analyse d’un corpus annoté de mots-valises, en portugais, et la présentation de quelques preuves expérimentales qui visent à évaluer la connaissance de ces mots par les jeunes adultes natifs lusophones, portugais et brésiliens. La première section est consacrée à la présentation des mots-valises du portugais, notamment en ce qui concerne le statut de leurs constituants et leurs relations linéaires, leur structure grammaticale et la relation phonétique/prosodique entre les mots-valises et les mots-base. La deuxième section se concentre sur la description du corpus de mots-valises du portugais. Bien qu’il s’agisse d’un travail sans fin, le corpus est, à présent, formé de (environ) 300 mots-valises, recueillis dans une variété de sources, des textes littéraires aux commentaires politiques et sociaux, à la publicité ou même aux contributions individuelles ad hoc. Les informations recueillies dans le corpus comprennent toutes les propriétés prises en compte dans l’analyse présentée à la section 1 et fournissent également des données sur attestations et fréquence. La troisième section présente une analyse d’un sous-groupe du corpus (184 formes), qui considère la structure linéaire et les relations grammaticales et prosodiques. Une analyse croisée suggère qu’il y a un fort lien entre la tête du mot-valise et le constituant-fragment. Enfin, la quatrième section offre une brève présentation de travaux expérimentaux antérieurs, qui suggèrent que les mots tronqués facilitent la compréhension des mots-valises, puisque le mot tronqué est plus fréquemment utilisé dans les réponses à un test de familiarité. Il en va de même avec les valeurs de temps de réaction obtenues dans un test de décision lexicale. (shrink)

Frege-Geach worries about embedding and composition have plagued metaethical theories like emotivism, prescriptivism and expressivism. The sharpened point of such criticism has come to focus on whether negation and inconsistency have to be understood in descriptivist terms. Because they reject descriptivism, these theories must offer a non-standard account of the meanings of ethical and normative sentences as well as related semantic facts, such as why certain sentences are inconsistent with each other. This paper fills out such a solution to the (...) negation problems, following some of the original emotivist ideas about the interplay of interests in conversation. We communicate both to share information and coordinate our actions, and we use distinctively normative language like deontic ‘must’ and ‘may’ to negotiate what people are to do. The kinds of disagreement involved in such negotiation can illuminate the issues with negation and inconsistency. This paper outlines a dynamic semantic system in which these ideas can bear fruit, developing the scorekeeping model of conversation. The result is clarification about what Frege-Geach worries can mean for nondescriptive semantics. (shrink)

Describing actions entails that relations between objects are discovered. A pervasively neural account of this process requires that fundamental problems are solved: the neural pointer problem, the binding problem, and the problem of generating discrete processing steps from time-continuous neural processes. We present a prototypical solution to these problems in a neural dynamic model that comprises dynamic neural fields holding representations close to sensorimotor surfaces as well as dynamic neural nodes holding discrete, language-like representations. Making the connection between these two (...) types of representations enables the model to describe actions as well as to perceptually ground movement phrases—all based on real visual input. We demonstrate how the dynamic neural processes autonomously generate the processing steps required to describe or ground object-oriented actions. By solving the fundamental problems of neural pointing, binding, and emergent discrete processing, the model may be a first but critical step toward a systematic neural processing account of higher cognition. (shrink)

In her seminal attack on modern moral philosophy, G. E. M. Anscombe claims that Kant's ‘rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it’. Although this so-called problem of relevant descriptions has received considerable attention in the literature, there is little agreement on how it should be understood or solved. My aim in this paper is, first, to clarify (...) the problem by clearing up several misunderstandings, and, second, to show that the problem is rooted in a standard assumption about Kant's stance on the scope of moral principles—an assumption that precludes its solution. I argue that the problem consists in the fact that Kant's formula of universal law seems to stand in need of an account of moral sensibility that does not render the formula superfluous. But, as my discussion of existing solutions reveals, there can be no such account. Instead, I propose a dissolution: we should think of the formula of universal law itself as Kant's account of moral sensibility. In order to do so, we must reject the standard assumption that a principle is universal if and only if it holds for all instances of the action type that it specifies. (shrink)

The paper discusses some properties of system descriptions in action language – a recent extension of action language by defined fluents. We give a sufficient condition guaranteeing that states of an system description are fully determined by statics and inertial fluents. In system descriptions satisfying this condition, defined fluents simply facilitate the description of dynamic domains; they are not essential and can be eliminated. We use our sufficient condition to identify a common core of action (...) languages and. This is an expansion of the work of, who identified a common core of languages and. The results presented in this paper are based on the close relationship between action languages and the theory of logic programs under the answer set semantics. (shrink)

While much discussion in bioethics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of medicine concerns the proper handling and uses of value considerations, there has been little discussion about how to identify or recognize values in medical/scientific discourse. This article presents a heuristic method for identifying values in such discourses. Values are defined as descriptions or conditions that guide human action and are praise- or blameworthy. Values manifest themselves in discourses in one or more of three dimensions: linguistic, causal, and descriptive; (...) each with distinctive “subtypes”. By recognizing the various ways that values manifest in discourses, a “values scholar” can ask relevant questions of the discourse and thereby come to recognize potential evaluative meanings in the discourse. Numerous examples are provided from the author's own research program. Strengths, limitations, and paths to developing the model are briefly discussed. (shrink)

This article seeks to answer the following questions: is Quentin Skinner right to claim that actions in the past should not be described by means of concepts not available at the time those actions occurred? And is Ian Hacking right to claim that such descriptions do not merely describe but actually change the past? The author begins by arguing that it is not clear precisely what Skinner is claiming and shows how, under the pressure of criticism, his methodological strictures collapse (...) into trivialities. The author then argues that, although Hacking has given us no reason to accept his claim, we can make sense of it by appealing to the idea of a "Cambridge change." The author concludes by suggesting that as long as we are exercising the right kind of concepts, a suitably modified version of Hacking 's conclusion can be retained. Key Words: action • history • changes in the past • Quentin Skinner • Ian Hacking. (shrink)

Assisted reproduction (ART), particularly that performed using donated gametes, increases the prospect of healthy babies being delivered to increasing numbers of people striving for parenthood. The psychosocial, ethical and legislative issues related both to the donation and receipt of gametes are perceived as extraordinarily complicated. In 2009, a research project aimed at mapping the issues was drawn up and implemented in the Czech Republic. The project should have provided material for consultation purposes, for the work of ethical and legislative bodies, (...) and for better interdisciplinary and international communication in reproductive medicine. Work on the project was affected by several unforeseen events, particularly by the drafting and adoption of a new law on ART (to which the project was initially to have contributed material once concluded). The article describes the dynamic and structural changes occurring within the project due to drafting of the bill as well as the changes and consequences resulting from other circumstances related to the topic researched. (shrink)

Although we agree with Hommel et al. that perception and action refer to one another, we disagree that they do so via a code. Gibson (1966; 1979) attempted to frame perception-action as a field phenomenon rather than as a particle phenomenon. From such a perspective, perception and action are adjoint, mutually interacting through an information field, and codes are unnecessary.

We generalize two concepts from special cases of Polish group actions to the general case. The two concepts are elementary embeddability, from model theory, and analytic sets, from the usual descriptive set theory.

I argue that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative is best interpreted as a test or decision procedure of moral rightness and not as a criterion intended to explain the deontic status of actions. Rather, the Humanity formulation is best interpreted as a moral criterion. I also argue that because the role of a moral criterion is to explain, and thus specify what makes an action right or wrong, Kant's Humanity formulation yields a theory of relevant descriptions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 343-347 [Access article in PDF] Mysticism and Psychosis:Descriptions and Distinctions Michael McGhee IT IS REFRESHING to read a paper that manages at once to be interdisciplinary and intercultural in its range of reference, and that also confronts a difficult and controversial question about how we are to assess the similarities and differences between psychotic and mystical experiences. Many psychiatrists have been skeptical about (...) whether there are any genuine differences, and not, mostly, because they thought that psychotics were in reality mystics. But mystical is pretty vague, as is spiritual, and that does not bode well for the enterprise of making comparisons, unless we can tie these latter terms down with some precision. How vague psychosis is I must leave others to judge, but one of the conclusions I have drawn from reading this paper is that the crucial questions turn not on agreed definitions, but on agreed judgments about what are to count as the examples or cases that fall under the definitions. I have some doubts about Caroline Brett's approach to these questions, in the first half hesitant doubts, in the second part less so. Her leading claim appears first in the Introduction:... spiritual or mystical experiences are those states in which the form of experience is altered from normal consciousness, resulting in a new understanding of the basic nature of reality, life, and the individual. Psychotic experiences are those states that also flow from alterations of the form of experience, but result in a pathological interaction between the individual and the world. Therefore, according to these definitions, phenomena occurring in a spiritual context may be identical to those traditionally viewed as symptoms of psychosis, but cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves. (Brett 2002, 322) What I was struck by in reading this passage was not so much the claim that "phenomena occurring in a spiritual context may be identical to those traditionally viewed as symptoms of psychosis, but cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves." What struck me was its implication: that psychotic experiences cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves, either. In other words, the claim is that there is a neutral core of common experience shared by psychotic and mystic alike. I do not know how controversial this is in the psychiatric literature that deals with delusion and hallucination, but I should like to explore the claim a little in what follows. Brett expands on it near the end of her paper: The pathology that differentiates the psychotic from the benign mystical state lies not in the content of beliefs, or even in the broad form of experience, but in a few interrelated commonsense factors. It consists of an inability to return to the ontological framework of consensus reality; in psychological isolation, and inability [End Page 343] to accommodate to the subjectivity of others; in a focus of interest in the mental realm and loss of practical concerns that leads to paucity of action and neglect of self-care. (Brett 2002, 336) This pushes the pathology away from the experience that might have been thought to constitute the psychosis. I wonder whether there are problems with this. The fact, if it is one, that both mystic and psychotic alike undergo "an altered state" clearly does not imply that there is a (common) altered state that they both undergo, so what are the grounds for the claim that the core or central experience is the same? What kind of experiences are claimed to be common? How are we to conceive delusion on this scenario?What makes psychotic experiences psychotic on the present pushed back view seems to be that they "result in a pathological interaction between individual and world" (my italics), which thus exonerates the experience itself of pathology, pushing it back to one possible set of consequences for someone who reacts badly to the experiential phenomena (e.g., their inability to return from it). It seems to suggest that someone can be comfortable or well adapted to their voices and visions (and surely there are such people around, for whom the boundaries... (shrink)