This article examines the idea of creation in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, situating it as the central axis of their thought. It analyzes how both the philosophical creation of concepts and the artistic creation of affects and percepts constitute processes that begin chaotically, giving rise to the need to establish, respectively, a plane of immanence and composition. It then identifies readings that neutralize its critical power in order to argue that the Deleuze-Guattarian act of creation (...) is, in fact, a genetic process of active resistance against the prevailing figurations of common sense. Finally, it describes the configuration of the innovation paradigm, which empties creation of its disruptive power by transforming it into mere competition or into an attitude subsumed within entrepreneurial and business logic. Creation, thus, reveals itself as a critical act of rupture and political resistance. (shrink)

"Sing, O Goddess, the anger of Achilles son of Peleus, that brought countless ills upon the Achaeans." In these opening lines of the Iliad, Homer invokes the Muse. For Homer the act of creating poetry is a divine gift, one that derives from an otherworldly source and is not ultimately reducible to this world. This conception of human creativity as a divine gift pervaded the ancient world, and was also evident among the Hebrews. In Exodus, for instance, we read that (...) God filled the two artisans Bezaleel and Aholiab with wisdom so that they might complete the work of the tabernacle. (shrink)

An attempt to give a comprehensive scientific account of the creative process. Humor, scientific discovery and art are all understood as dependent upon the act of "bisociation," the spontaneous intersecting of two or more previously unrelated frames of reference or "matrices." The first half of the book propounds this theory; the second half attempts to give its physical and psychological underpinnings. Though he fails to give any definite answer to how and why the bisociative act takes place, Koestler's erudition, insights (...) and considerable skill as a writer are impressive.—S. C. H. (shrink)

The ‘messianic’ is one of philosophy’s most appropriated religious terms, yet one apparently now bereft of its historical religious particularity. This essay thus explores a genealogical approach to the ‘messianic’ which might prove helpful in uncovering the reasons for this transformation from the theological to the philosophical, and what role, if any, theology still has in determining the meaning and usage of this term. Accordingly, this essay traces the term through the work of Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben. (...) This development is made against the backdrop of another religious term which indirectly pervades the work of all three authors: the canon. The canonical is a term which lingers on the margins of these messianic discourses and needs to be explored further in the context of this work in order to provide a fitting foil to these otherwise ‘purely philosophical’ developments of the messianic. The necessity for invoking the canonical form will become clear as this analysis is extended to the work of Agamben in order to determine how canons remain an unstated factor in his attempt to eradicate all representation from a just ethical paradigm. In this attempt to articulate a model of understanding that goes beyond the universal/particular divide, he will in fact advance a movement from particularity to particularity which can be profoundly read as a genuine paradigm for articulating a theological principle of creation. Thus, this essay intends to point toward two related conclusions: first, that the triad of canon-creation-representation might be understood as a necessity for cultural intelligibility, yet one that must also be seen in relation to its messianic-redemptive-unrepresented elements; and, second, that even this epistemological framework can be undone through a bid to end all representations which nonetheless allows us to return to a more profound realization of creation. (shrink)

The first issue concerns what can be meant by the "newness" or "originality" which Koestler attributes to the products of creative acts. One of the purposes of this paper will be to discriminate several distinct but incompatible meanings which Koestler associates with the newness in created objects. The second issue concerns whether Koestler's thesis commits him to a form of determinism or indeterminism with respect to human creative activity. The third issue raises the question whether his thesis is intended as (...) an explanatory hypothesis or as an elaborate description of common features in creative activities. This question, of course, relates directly to the initial query about the standards of understanding which are appropriate to creative acts. And it points to the last issue which concerns the metaphysical implications of the thesis. It will be my aim to argue that a development of the metaphysics implicit in the thesis would provide a more comprehensive theory that could meet at least some of the difficulties the theory raises. (shrink)

Csikszentmihalyi (1999: 314) argues that 'creativity is a process that can be observed only at the intersection where individuals, domains, and fields intersect'. This article discusses the relationship between creativity and interdisciplinarity in science. It is specifically concerned with interdisciplinary collaboration, interrogating the processes that contribute to the collaborative creation of original ideas and the practices that enable creative integration of diverse domains. It draws on results from a novel real-world experiment in which small interdisciplinary groups of graduate students (...) were tasked with producing an innovative scientific research problem and an integrative research proposal. Results show that while bisociative thinking assists in the creation of original research problems, both disciplinary skills and an interdisciplinary disposition are core to the integration of creative research proposals. Extrapolating from the results of this experiment, the article discusses the feasibility of preparing students for such work and the implications for universities and other intellectual centers. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This discussion considers a literary genealogy that examines Zora Neale Hurston as a predecessor to Joseph Beam and Essex Hemphill, prefiguring their need for a process through which multiply-marginalized communities might create images that more accurately reflect their existence, and considers contemporary poets Danez Smith and Timothy DuWhite as inhabitants of the legacy that they left behind. Focusing primarily on how these artists invoke—and often revise and subvert—the biblical creation narrative within their own narratives of self-creation and (...) image- making, this discussion is also concerned with these writers' articulation of love that is deemed unnatural due to its defiance of heteropatriarchal and cultural norms. These works, when read alongside and in dialogue with one another, collectively assert that love, defined as natural and divinely approved, functions as a challenge to restrictive ideologies and a tool of affirmation for themselves and their communities. (shrink)

We introduce an explicit definition for “hidden correlations” on individual entities in a compound system: when one individual entity is measured, this induces a well-defined transition of the “proper state” of the other individual entities. We prove that every compound quantum system described in the tensor product of a finite number of Hilbert spaces can be uniquely represented as a collection of individual entities between which there exist such hidden correlations. We investigate the significance of these hidden correlation representations within (...) Aerts' creation-discovery approach and in particular their compatibility with the hidden measurement formalism. This leads us to the introduction of the notions of “soft” and “hard” “acts of creation” and to the observation that our approach can be seen as a theory of individuals when it is compared to the standard quantum theory. (shrink)

This Brief focuses on Nietzsche’s aesthetics not merely as an artistic field but as a way of understanding life itself. Unlike his predecessors, Nietzsche rather saw aesthetics as a fundamental principle aim of human existence. This volume demonstrates how Nietzsche’s aesthetic thinking is not simply an analysis of art but rather a comprehensive worldview shaping his approach to morality, truth, and the meaning of life. It traces the development of aesthetics beginning with Nietzsche’s first major work, The Birth of Tragedy. (...) Machter appeals to the "death of God," one of Nietzsche’s central claims, as not just a theological statement but a cultural-aesthetic one; and also reflects on the Overman as a response to nihilism. This volume appeals to students and researchers and presents Nietzsche’s aesthetics as not an escape into the world of art but rather a call for individuals toward a meaningful life. (shrink)

This book explores the phenomenon of creativity and creation from a psychoanalytic point of view, focusing on understanding the psycho-emotional dynamics underlying the artistic creative activities, such as theatre, literature, and painting. Throughout, Delgado considers these works of art through a Bionian, Kleinian and Freudian lens. He uses three major psychoanalytic models of the creative process, two of them classic: the first, Freudian, based on the theory of conflict between impulse and defense, the result of the effort to manage (...) an excessive drive activity, and in which the concept of sublimation is central; the second, Kleinian, based on the attachment theory, in which creative effort corresponds to an attempt to repair the damage done to the object or to the self; and the third, more recent, affiliated with the more expanded attachment relationship theory, based on W. Bion's theory of thinking, and emphasising the continent's capacity for psyche and the oscillation between schizo-paranoid and depressive positions. With illustrations throughout, this book will be vital reading for anyone interested in the intersection of creativity, the Arts, and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

The starting point of this article is the observation that the emergence of the Anthropocene rehabilitates the need for philosophical reflections on the ontology of technology. In particular, if technological innovations on an ontic level of beings in the world are created, but these innovations at the same time _create_ the Anthropocene World at an ontological level, this raises the question how World creation has to be understood. We first identify four problems with the traditional concept of creation: (...) the anthropocentric, ontic and outcome orientation of traditional concepts of creation, as well as its orientation of material fabrication. We subsequently develop a progressive concept of World creation with four characteristics that move beyond the traditional conceptuality: (1) a materialistic concept of creation that accounts for (2) the ontogenetic process and (3) the ontic and ontological nature of creation, and (4) is conceptualized as semantic creation of the World in which we live and act. (shrink)

Aquinas argues that the relation established by the act of creation is mixed, with the creature enjoying a real relation ( relatio realis )—possessing both the relational mode of being and its relational notion ( esse et ratio relationis )—while the Creator accommodates only a corresponding relation of reason ( relatio rationis )—possessing the relational notion ( ratio relationis ) without any relational mode of being ( esse relationis ). This position is frequently the source of misunderstanding, for theologians, (...) both natural and revealed, and for ordinary persons of biblical faith. By clarifying Aquinas’s position, I show how such disquiet flows from a twofold interconnected failure: lack of appreciation for Aquinas’s conception of relation as a categorial mode of being; and inadequate consideration of the compelling theological reasons he has for holding such an ostensibly disconcerting position. By way of response, I argue that the position of Aquinas possesses a balanced tension that is necessary to secure the crucial duality of divine transcendence and divine immanence, while concomitantly safeguarding the corresponding radicality of creaturely dependence upon the Creator. Finally, I conclude by noting several existential implications of Aquinas’s position, all of which are centered around the unmediated presence of the Creator to the creature, and the correlative unmediated dependence of the creature upon the Creator. (shrink)

This chapter explores premodern Christianity’s two primary interpretive traditions concerning the challenge of creational violence and suffering. These approaches, known as the major and minor traditions, draw upon themes from Holy Scripture that bear witness to the divine act of creation. Both traditions adapt essential scriptural themes, such as God’s creative sovereignty and the world’s fallenness, to narrate the violent and destructive aspects of the natural world. Each tradition presents a distinctive portrait of nature’s form in view of God’s (...) creative purpose. The major tradition, historically the most dominant, upholds a vision of creational violence as directly aligned with God’s creative will. The minor tradition, by contrast, perceives nature’s state as shaped by some fundamental disorder, both moral and cosmic. By examining exemplary representatives of each tradition—Thomas Aquinas for the major tradition and a group of second-century theologians, including Theophilus of Antioch, Athenagoras of Athens, and Irenaeus of Lyon for the minor tradition—we examine how these interpretive traditions engage Scripture to address nature’s violence. Despite their premodern character, these interpretive traditions remain the broadest heuristic approaches to the problem of animal suffering in the Christian tradition. (shrink)

How important is the first sentence of an article or book? We all know it is very important, at least when it comes to the level of interest a piece of writing will generate in the reader. A dull, lifeless first paragraph sets a boring tone for the whole piece—a tone that is difficult to change later on, no matter how interesting the topic may be. But why should the first sentence or paragraph be any more signif­icant than the others? (...) Is there anything about what comes first in life that makes it somehow more meaningful—or perhaps, meaningful in a different way—than other , subsequent events? This, in its broadest sense, is the question of initia­tion. (shrink)

I defend the claim that Avicenna explains the creation of the universe in terms of emanation modeled on Neoplatonic emanation by exploring Avicenna’s account of creation by emanation in detail. I address what appears to be an obvious problem for the application of this model to creation—namely, that creation as emanation seems to be non-voluntary and has been understood to be non-voluntary by several prominent interpreters. I explore how Avicenna contends that God emanates voluntarily and non-necessarily. (...) Avicenna is able to make this claim because of his distinction between an action done of natural necessity, done voluntarily, and done with an intention. I then address whether this means that God creates freely—without any constraint whatsoever—and I conclude that God is not free not to create because God has an immutable will and has already acted to create. While God is not under any initial compulsion to create, from the fact that the universe now exists, God cannot act otherwise than to create. (shrink)

Summary Verbs of creation (create, make, paint) are not transparent. The object created does not exist during the event time but only thereafter. We may call this type of opacity temporal opacity. I is to be distinguished from modal opacity, which is found in verbs like owe or seek. (Dowty, 1979) offers two analyses of creation verbs. One analysis predicts that no object of the sort created exists before the time of the creation. The other analysis says (...) that the object exists throughout the act of creation. I investigate three theories: Theory I says that no object of the sort created and which is caused by the very act of creation exists before the creation. In this theory, verbs of creation must embed a property. Theory II can regard the indefinite object of a creation verb as a quantifier and gives it wide scope with respect to the verb. The theory has to make sure that the objects quantified over exist only after the event. While Theory I and II start from the assumption that the extension of all nouns depend on time, Theory III says that Individual Level predicates do not depend on time. This ontology will enable us to treat verbs of creation as first order relations. The theory will entail that a picture does not mean the same as there is a picture. The paper discusses various approaches to the problem: Krifka, Parsons, Landman, Kratzer and Zucchi. (shrink)

One of the central ideas of Slavoj Žižek’s recent work is that liberation never occurs without some form of sacrifice. As he puts it, “liberation hurts.” Through its account of the intertwined lives of two magicians competing to outdo each other, Christopher Nolan’s The Prestige explores this idea by emphasizing the necessary role that sacrifice and loss play in the act of artistic creation and in all production of the new. By doing so, it points toward an alternative form (...) of temporality that takes the repetition of loss rather than the idea of the future as its organizing principle. While cinema as an art form tends to prioritize the forward movement of time with a focus on the future, Nolan’s film undermines this idea of time by showing how the focus on the future inevitably leads back to sacrifice and loss rather than escaping it. (shrink)

It is well known that Leibniz's advances metaphysical, logical and moral reasons why monads possess their own force of action; but what is not well known is that he also advances an account of the divine creative act in explicit support of force-endowed monads. This paper's goal is to highlight and critically examine this doctrine of creation, and to contrast it with the doctrine of creation underlying the occasionalist denial that substances possess their own force of action.

Science has demonstrated that the universe creates itself through its own history. This history is the result of a probabilistic process, not a deterministic execution of a plan. Science has also documented that human beings are a result of this universal, probabilistic process of general evolution. At first sight, these results seem to contradict Christian teaching. According to the Bible, history is essentially the history of salvation. Human beings therefore are not an “accident of nature” but special creations to be (...) saved. With deeper theological probing, it becomes clearer, however, that creation must create itself. The Christian God is the loving God who enters into a loving relationship with human beings if they desire to reciprocate. If creation could not create itself, human beings could not be free. Without freedom to ignore or reject God's love, the central act of the Christian God, the drama of salvation, would become a parody played by marionettes in the hands of a supernatural manipulator. Christians should welcome the fundamental insight brought forth by science that the universe, including human beings, created itself through its own history. This article will try to show that this scientific insistence is required and confirmed by the intrinsic character of the orthodox, Judeo‐Christian concept of God. That nature has to create itself, including human beings, secures human freedom and with it, the responsibility for human actions. From this perspective one might better understand the Bible in the light of God's revelation through the book of nature. (shrink)

All the medical and bioethical questions, ranging from stem cell research to converging technologies and synthetic biology, touch on the question regarding the image of human beings and their position in the cosmos, by which we are able to orient ourselves. This article argues that the biblical belief in creation and the discourse about humans as created beings by and in the image of God can still be proclaimed as a viable form of human self-interpretation in the present. The (...) distinction between practical knowledge and knowledge of orientation may be of help here. Guidance for how to live and act is not best found in abstract principles, but rather in meaningful stories, in metaphors and symbols. On this level, too, is also where faith in creation and the certainty of our own creatureliness is located. Contribution: This article interprets the doctrine of creation by a hermeneutical theology. It analyses the interdependence between hermeneutics and criticism in the process of reinterpreting the classical propositions about the human being and the world as God’s creation and the relation of anthropology and ethics. The aim is to show what might be the contribution of Christian faith in creation to the approach of an ethics of responsibility in the field of bioethics and ecology. The specific contribution of this article to current debates on an ethics of creation is the thesis that the key to a well-balanced theological approach to all this is the Pauline doctrine of justification as interpreted by the protestant reformers. (shrink)

In the criminal law, there is no general duty to rescue others from peril. Rather, duties to rescue are triggered in specific ways, including by having created the victim’s peril. This trigger of the duty is the concern in this chapter. Some cases of creation of the victim’s peril are easy because one has taken an act that will cause harm in a way unmediated by the victim’s or others’ beliefs in the absence of a “rescue.” There are other (...) cases, such as those of belief-mediated imperiling, that are not easy and indeed are quite puzzling. The other group of puzzling cases of imperiling are those in which one is a link in the causal chain that results in the victim’s peril but not the proximate physical cause of that peril. Duties to rescue are complex because the omitter’s culpability turns on his beliefs about several distinct facts. (shrink)

Through the analysis of modes, man and the concept of intellectus in Spinoza's philosophy, the author shows that creation is reduced to the concept of cognitive activity of intellectus. The essence of intellectus is to bridge the gap between the modality and substance of reality, and a specific, given modal possibility, expressed in desire, which signals the gap, manifested through affects. For Spinoza, creation shifts from the sphere of the will to the sphere of the action of intellectus. (...) Thus, creation is a creative act that combines what should be and what is in reality. Therefore, every action of the intellect is presented as a modusof God. The author concludes that in Spinoza's philosophy, God is an eternal creation of himself, an eternal self-modification through his modal states. (shrink)

Does the act of creation show itself anywhere within the creation? A common contemporary ontology tends to see two possibilities for those who want to defend a notion of creation. The first is to argue that an original set of materials was brought into existence out of nothing by divine action a long time ago. The second, in the tradition of Paley, posits a specific divine action that oversees the development of some of the materials into entities (...) with an end-directedness. Much contemporary energy focuses on the second possibility. The argument of the paper is that the ontology behind both of these possibilities, which limits itself to the notions of a creation of materials and the building of some of the materials into end-directed entities, conceals rather than reveals the idea of creation. The paper tries to show how an Aristotelian sense of nature, with its recognition of internal teleology and original spontaneity, offers a better starting point for coming up against the mystery of divine creative activity. (shrink)

This chapter moves from the most fundamental parts of Aquinas’s metaphysics to Aquinas’s thought about the created world, and especially the way in which things in the created world are able to act as beings in their own right, without altering their dependence on the creator. The result is an account of the causality of creatures that does not impugn their connection to the more basic causality of the Deity and that allows this part of Aquinas’s account to be compatible (...) with accounts of causality in modern science. (shrink)

The meaning of the noun 'creation', and the verb 'to create', range from the traditional theological idea of God creating ex nihilo to a more recent sense of the process of artistic conception. This collection of thirteen essays, written by scholars of music, literature, the visual arts, and theology, explores the complicated relationship between medieval rituals and theology, and the development of an idea of human artistic creation, which came to the fore in the sixteenth century. The volume (...) concentrates on the period from the Carolingians to the Counter-Reformation but also includes some twentieth-century musicians. Each essay is dedicated to a particular topic concerned with ritual or artistic beginnings, inventions, harmony and disharmony, as well as representations or celebrations of creation. Central themes include the interplay of the ideas of God as creator, of God acting and recreating in medieval liturgy, of God as artist - the deus artifex of the Pythagorean cosmology, which was occasionally referred to as recently as the early nineteenth century -and, finally, of the homo creator, a concept in which man reflected (and eventually replaced) God in his artistic creativity. This book therefore features new, significant, individual contributions from a range of scholarly disciplines, but, taken as a whole, it also constitutes a complex interdisciplinary study, with large-scale historical constructions. (shrink)

As evidence of the unintended consequences of industrial farm animal production continues to mount, it is becoming increasingly clear that, far from being a trivial matter of personal preference, eating is an activity that has deep moral and spiritual significance. Surprising as it may sound, the simple question of what to eat can prompt Christians daily to live out their spiritual vision of Shalom for all creatures--to bear witness to the marginalization of the poor, the exploitation of the oppressed, the (...) suffering of the innocent, and the degradation of the natural world, and to participate in the reconciliation of these ills through intentional acts of love, justice, mercy, and good stewardship. The aim of this work is to understand the cultivation of more intentional "compassionate eating" habits as a form of engaged Christian discipleship that responds to a wide array of practical, moral, and spiritual problems affecting all aspects of creation--human, animal, and environmental. The guiding suggestion is that compassionate eating is a spiritual discipline that offers a symbolically significant and practically effective way to live in faithful anticipation of the "peaceable kingdom" described in Judeo-Christian creation and redemption narratives. (shrink)

The article distinguishes several theses about divine action (the conservation thesis, the same-action thesis, the sole-source thesis, and occasionalism). It then surveys a number of arguments that divine conservation (the act of maintaining the existence of created things over time) is to be regarded as a continued act of creation. Finally, it considers a variety of arguments that creation and conservation are to be distinguished from each other.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logics and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception by Dorothea E. OlkowskiElodie BoublilOLKOWSKI, Dorothea E. Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logics and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2021. 180 pp. Cloth, $63.00; paper, $28.00[End Page 152]Dorothea E. Olkowski's latest book carefully examines "the relationship between the creation of ideas and their actualization in relation to (...) semiology, logic and the cosmos in the philosophies of Deleuze, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty." However, this work is neither an extensive or historical account of Deleuze's, Bergson's, and Merleau-Ponty's philosophies, nor an attempt to homogenize their views on space, time, or perception. Instead, it subtly compares their differences and similarities to move beyond metaphysical dualism, and fruitfully rethinks the relations between formal logic and ontology. Indeed, the author aims to draw a "theory of form," based on the logic of sensation, ultimately designed "to take the place of a theory of the real, of material physical forces."Chapter 1 retraces the history of postmodernist claims and their philosophical legacy. Olkowski explains that postmodernism is not first and foremost a political worldview or a debunking of objectivity in natural sciences. Instead, "it begins as a formal system or series of formal systems." Olkowski explores how Deleuze draws on the knowledge of modern science and logic (Bolzano, Cavaillès) and on Bergson's critical analysis of it to elaborate his logic of sensation. Bergson's conception of affectivity impacted Deleuze's and Merleau-Ponty's theories of corporeality and sensation, and their understanding of perception. Bergson's concept of "body image" specifically influenced Deleuze's elaboration of the concept of "movement-image," through which he tried to overcome the dichotomy set up by mind–body dualism.Chapter 2 focuses on Deleuze and Guattari's critique of logic as an attempt to find a third way between idealism and materialism and to overcome the disconnection between formal logic and lived experience. It reviews their critique of Euclidean geometry, their objections to formal logic as set out by Frege and Russell, and their assessment of phenomenology in order to eventually show Deleuze's affinity with Peirce's pragmatist approach. Then, the author aims to determine if Deleuze's attempt could be compatible with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Bergson's understanding of quality and multiplicity.Chapter 3 focuses on Bergson. Recalling the controversy with Russell, Einstein, and Langevin, Olkowski refers to Merleau-Ponty's defense of Bergson's concept of intuition to prove the accuracy of his reflection on creative forces and pure duration. As she explains, "[T]he intent here is to clarify the relations between these different aspects of Bergson's thought and draw out how Deleuze makes use of these structures derived from Bergson's philosophy." This leads her to explore, more specifically, how Deleuze reworks the concept of "multiplicity" along the lines of Bergson's analysis of the élan vital.In chapter 4 the author focuses on Deleuze's work on cinema to deepen the philosophical correlation between Bergson's concepts, Deleuze's analysis, and the influences of Merleau-Ponty and Pierce. It aims to rethink the relation between movement and time, notably through the notions of time-image and movement-image. Olkowski notably showcases Deleuze's concept of destiny, "which is the pure power of time that [End Page 153] overflows all possible reaction. It defeats, immobilizes, and petrifies figures in their own affectivity; it sends them to their fate, destroying conventions along the way. For Merleau-Ponty, as for Bergson, acts are still possible in a network of temporal relations so that motion and time are destiny but differently than for Deleuze."Chapter 5 addresses the Phenomenology of Perception and how Merleau-Ponty provides an opportunity to rethink perception. In this book and his Courses on Nature, Merleau-Ponty "does not dismiss either position—that of objective science or that of the natural attitude—but argues that although each contains an element of truth, it is perception and only perception that allows us to bridge the gap between physical reality and behavior/comportment." Deleuze will depart from... (shrink)

Francis’ view of nature has been seen as positive in an ecological sense even by those who are for the most part critical of Christianity’s attitude to nature, such as Lynn White, Jr. I argue that one element of Francis’ uniqueness was that he saw the diversity of life as an expression of God’s creativity and benevolence and attempted to carry out that vision in ethical behavior. Much of what has been written about him has precedents in traditional hagiography, but (...) there remains an unmistakable impression of originality. It has been noted that Francis insisted on the goodness of creation, used terms of family relationship to refer to creatures other than human, and preached to them. However, another element has escaped notice: his emphasis on the presence of God in the diversity of created entities and his desire that humans should rejoice in this diversity and glorify God for it and with it. His devotion did not immediately dissolve multiplicity into oneness, but glorified God in each created being and delighted in their individuality. He advocated that praise be expressed by acting in ways consistent with respect for created diversity, not only by observing a strict rule of abstaining from harm to living beings, but also in positive treatment of all creatures. Nature took its meaning not from its serviceability to mankind, but from its expression of the multiple forms of God’s benevolent presence. (shrink)

This account is on the connection between the quest of meaning and the Christian belief from the perspective of Creation. First the most important notions are discussed. Meaning is related to the experience of the conditions of existence: time and space. The question of meaning is summarized by: Who am I within the contours of the existence which forces itself upon me in the shape of time and space? This question belongs to human beings and is as old as (...) human consciousness. It becomes more manifest when we find ourselves in borderline situations. The meaning we attach to such situations is partly determined by the frame of reference one has at its disposal, the perspective, the system of cognitions and feelings which causes us to view reality in a certain way. We talk about a religious perspective when the discrepancies and even absurdities of everything we experience find a point of connection in the end. It is characterized by the conviction that the life the individual leads is a fragment in a larger connection which has its roots in Creation. When we want to sum up the Christian meaning of our existence, we have to look for that meaning within the notion of Creation. Belief in Creation is the very core of all kinds of validation activity emanating from the Christian spatio-temporal orientation. From the perspective of Creation, the world presents itself as a fabric in which separate creatures are connected. According to this viewpoint there are two acting alternatives which make the faithful experience of space and time concrete and communicative: the experience of hospitality and the experience of being fellow-travellers. Christian faith has a rich tradition in both fields, as much in the practical as formal dimensions of its creed. In this account the belief in Creation is used as the point of departure to indicate how meaning may be given concrete form. Exercising hospitality is related to the ordering of space; the experience of being fellow-travellers is related to the ordering of time. (shrink)

I would like to present the memory question in the context of the phenomenological grasp of time and in the context of language (interpretation).Our considerations are at first concerned with the phenomenological way of consciousness, and with constitutes in the same way the intentionality of retention as the source of memory.We also consider Husserlian category of in-feeling (to enter into one’s spirit) (Einfülung) as describing an experience of the essence of an indirectness – so just directness in an access to (...) the spiritual sphere of someone who is not mine. It presents the responsibility as the essential characteristic of a meditating (interpreting) transcendental “I”, in the inter-subjective context of other people.With regard to our interest it will be worth to investigate how phenomenology develops into an ontology of corporality (la chair) (M. Merleau-Ponty) and into philosophical hermeneutics (M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer, P. Ricoeur). In both developments, it a language matter has been described and the question of the status of the reason – generating an attempt (a hard work) to interpret the world – as the acting reason. (shrink)

The standard form of act-consequentialism requires us to perform the action with the best consequences; it allows choice between moral options only on those rare occasions when several actions produce equally good results. This paper argues for moral options and thus against act-consequentialism. The argument turns on the insight that some valuable things cannot exist unless our moral system allows options. One such thing is the opportunity for individuals to enact plans for their life from among alternatives. Because planning one’s (...) life has value, and because it requires moral options, a world governed by a moral system that admits of options is better than one governed by act-consequentialism. The paper argues that these facts entail that morality admits of a significant number of moral options; act-consequentialism is false. (shrink)

The most widely accepted kind of realism about fictional characters takes them to be abstract artefacts created through the act of fiction-making (creationism). And perhaps the best, and most widely accepted, way of arguing for creationism involves the kind of argument described by van Inwagen: arguments that begin with uncontentious premises about fictional characters and end up with existential conclusions affirming the existence of fictional characters of various kinds. This chapter argues that if such arguments establish their conclusion, they also (...) license the conclusion that there are indiscernible fictional objects, indeed an indeterminate number of them. To the extent that such a conclusion is metaphysically intolerable we should reject this kind of argument for creationism. (shrink)

Why was Eve created? In De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine notoriously gives the answer that it was only causa pariendi, “for the sake of childbearing.” Other late antique interpreters of Genesis emphasize the purpose of conjugal union and domesticity. But a fuller reading of Augustine’s thoughts on the subject reveals the moment between the creation of Eve and the fall as pregnant with extraordinary possibility. This moment, of indeterminate length—for humans had not yet fallen into time—provides an opportunity for (...) Augustine to unleash his theological imagination. This lecture is about paradise. It eschews the customary focus on Adam’s paradisal desire to think about Eve’s beginning. Augustine uses this beginning to emphasize the importance of sociality, and of marriage as its most perfect realization. He takes the quotidian miracle of childbirth as our closest intimation of God’s act of creation. And he imagines new meanings for the trinity of Villanova’s motto: ueritas, unitas, and caritas. (shrink)

The intellectual climate in which Aquinas matured was one of conflict. On the one hand, he inherited a philosophical tradition from the Greeks which held that "nothing comes from nothing." On the other, a strong theological tradition held that, since the world was created from nothing, it tends toward nothing and will, in fact, finally return to nothing. ;Aquinas counters that both traditions are mistaken in considering all making as change. Besides the making that is of this particular thing, besides (...) even the universal cause or causes of all generation, there is a more radical making which is of the totality of being. This doctrine we find implicit in the Five Ways, essentially established in the doctrine of essence and existence, and openly explicit in Aquinas's discussions of creation itself. ;That the universe is necessary in itself is no less firmly held by Aquinas. There are two kinds of being that are incorruptible: those whose form completely dominates their matter, and those whose form exists without matter. In addition, the universe of material things itself cannot be corrupted since it has no substratum which could underlie the change. Only by misconceiving the act of creation as change does it make sense to speak of a tendency or possibility to corruption in the created universe. ;The upshot of the marriage of these two positions is that the universe is at once absolutely necessary in itself and totally dependent for its existence on God. Rather than proving to be antagonists, these two positions are actually mutually supportive. Studying the natural world for its own sake reveals the power and perfection of its Creator. Since the world depends on a cause unexplained by the order within it, there is no limit to its ultimate intelligibility, nor, therefore, to the scientific quest. Endless awe at the Creator of such a universe, and an endless field of enquiry--these are the results of Aquinas's option for both and rather than either a created world or the integral, permanent world which science investigates. (shrink)

The difference between Hermann Cohen’s systematic philosophy and his philosophy of religion can be determined via the logical “Judgment of Contradiction,” viewed as an “Authority of Annihilation.” In Cohen’s Logic of Pure Knowledge the “Judgment of Contradiction” acts as a “means of protection” against “falsifications” that may have arisen on the pathway through the previous judgments of “origin” and “identity.” Cohen thematizes these operations in his Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism, too. However, there they do not (...) form the grounding for natural science but rather for the knowledge of nature as creation in a strict correlation to God’s uniqueness. Any admixture between God and nature is the falseness that must be excluded via the “Authority of Annihilation.” The Being of God places the world over against the possibility of its own radical Non-Being. Yet at the same time, a second mode of Negation, a relative Nothing providing continuity for the world’s being-there, grounded in the “Logic of Origin,” retains its validity. In Cohen’s view a Creation “in the beginning” stands side by side with a continuous “renewal of the world”. (shrink)

One might naturally suppose that philosophers of art would take a strong interest in the idea of creation in the context of art. In fact, this has often not been the case. In analytic aesthetics, the issue tends to dwell on the sidelines and in continental aesthetics a shadow has sometimes been cast over the topic by the notion of the “death of the author” and by the claim, as Roland Barthes put it, that the author is only ever (...) able to “imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original”. This paper explains the understanding of artistic creation developed by the French art theorist André Malraux in his well-known book The Voices of Silence. Malraux argues that the true artist is involved in a creative act in the full sense of the term – creation ex nihilo – despite the debt he or she often owes to other artists. The paper also comments briefly on possible reasons why traditional post-Enlightenment aesthetics has said so little about the topic in question. (shrink)

This youtube video presents the talk I gave at the Center for Ethics, Law and Applied Philosophy in Belgrade, Serbia at the conference "Rosenzweig für Anfänger / Rosenzweig for Beginners" and that took place June 4-5, 2012 The first paragraph of my talk: "Rosenzweig begins Book One of Part Two in a familiar yet strange way. It is familiar in how he immediately takes up an already established narrative from the Bible through simply repeating the statement that “God spoke.” It (...) is strange, however, because the first thing he draws our attention to in the phrase “God spoke” is how it expresses a temporal condition. It occurs in the form of the grammatical past tense whose content refers us to a previously silent and invisible—because interior—act of the will. That act is one of the strangest and most mysterious of all acts, namely, the act of creation. To create something new—for example, something literally out of nothing—entails putting into motion a powerful expression of spontaneous willfulness. As Rosenzweig notes, this spontaneous expression is what constitutes something totally new, that is, that something could be created out of nothing is understandable as the apparently miraculous prophecy of a process that has become a visible actuality. And that process is the process of our experiencing anything at all. Moreover, the very fact of communicating an understanding of our experiencing anything at all and having that be understood by another is a novelty of human community only able to be enacted through speech because how we talk to each other refers us to our experience of things in the world. To better understand this point, Rosenzweig distinguishes between a creator, in this case, the creator from the biblical story called god, and whatever it is that a creator creates. In order to do that, however, Rosenzweig says that we have to better understand what speaking itself is all about." My talk was one in a series of talks that will be published as a chapter in the forthcoming book, Rosenzweig for Beginners. (shrink)

This paper explores the roles of the heart-mind (xin) and the hand (shou) in Chinese calligraphy, proposing that calligraphic creation is a psychosomatic process in which the artist’s psychological states and bodily movements unify through the flow of qi. The dynamic interplay between xin and shou is examined through the lens of Chinese philosophical aesthetics, which rejects mind-body dualism in favor of a holistic approach to human experience. The paper positions the calligrapher as the focal point from which both (...) the aesthetic and moral dimensions of the calligraphic work emerge. (shrink)

According to many philosophical theologians, God is metaphysically simple: there is no real distinction among His attributes or even between attribute and existence itself. Here, I consider only one argument against the simplicity thesis. Its proponents claim that simplicity is incompatible with God’s having created another world, since simplicity entails that God is unchanging across possible worlds. For, they argue, different acts of creation involve different willings, which are distinct intrinsic states. I show that this is mistaken, by sketching (...) an adequate account of reasons-guided activity that does not require distinct intrinsic states of willing corresponding to each possible act of creation. (shrink)

In Africa, the twenty-first century began with new challenges surrounding and regarding philosophical discourses. Questions of economic and political liberation, the displacement of populations and the process of urbanization present ongoing challenges, linked to problems such as endemic diseases and famine, the restructure of the traditional family, gender and the position of women, the transmission of culture from past to future generations. Changes in labor relations resulting from introduction of financial speculation, cutting edge technologies, and differential access to digital and (...) older cultural forms have placed real demands on Africans and Africanists working in philosophy. This volume explores the ways in which African philosophies express “transitional acts,” those acts by which thought interacts with history as it is being made and by which it assures its own renewal in proposing provisional solutions to historical problems. A transitional act combines both the audacity of confrontation and the novelty of creation, prudence in the face of risks and anticipation in the face of the unexpected. Influential and emerging thinkers from both sides of the Atlantic consider this dual activity in the realm of criticism and imagination, public spaces in Africa, and the relationship between historical politics and historical poetics. (shrink)

Inspiring and empowering, this journey behind the scenes of humanity's greatest creations reveals the surprising way we make something new. What do Thomas Jefferson's ice cream recipe, Coca Cola, and Chanel No. 5 have in common? They all depended on a nineteenth-century African boy who, with a single pinch, solved one of nature's great riddles and gave birth to the multimillion-dollar vanilla industry. Kevin Ashton opens his book with the fascinating story of the young slave who launched a flavor revolution (...) to show that invention and creation come in unexpected shapes and sizes. From the crystallographer's laboratory where the secrets of DNA were first revealed by a long-forgotten woman, to the electromagnetic chamber where the stealth bomber was born on a 25-cent bet, Ashton weaves tales of humanity's greatest creations to unpack the surprising true process of discovery. Drawing on the Amish and the iPhone, Kandinsky and cans of Coke, Lockheed, South Park, and the Wright brothers--who set out to "fly a horse"--he showcases the seemingly unremarkable individuals, gradual steps, multiple failures, and countless ordinary--and usually uncredited--acts that led to our most astounding breakthroughs. Creators, he shows, apply everyday, ordinary thinking that we are all capable of in particular ways, taking thousands of small steps, working in an endless loop of problem and solution. He explores why innovators meet resistance and how they overcome it, why most organizations stifle creative people, and how the most creative organizations work. In a passionate and profound narrative that amazes and inspires, Ashton's book sheds new light on how "new" comes to be. (shrink)

Aquinas held that the metaphysical consideration of beings as being consists in the consideration of being as created, i.e., the consideration of things in their complete reality, and the reduction of this complete reality to its complete cause. When existence displaces form as the primary sense of being, the thing’s act of existing is conceived of as ‘formal’ with respect to its essence. Consequently, the primary object of metaphysical consideration becomes the complete entity, a composite of essence and existence, and (...) the primary sense of being becomes the subsistence of the complete entity. In Aquinas’s creationist discourse, the term supposit denotes the concept of the entitative whole or complete entity. What this concept of the supposit adds to the Aristotelian conception of the concrete individual derives from the contingency of existence in every being beyond the first being. The subject of a nature and of categorical accidents is now also conceived of as the subject of a received act of existing. Aquinas reduces the distinctions of finite entities to their possession of acts of existing that are diverse absolutely, in virtue of a ‘privation’ of the fullness of existence, just as Aristotle reduces formal contrariety to the possession or ‘privation’ of differences that are diverse absolutely. And as Plato traced the negations constitutive of formal contrariety to a correlative participation between being and otherness, Aquinas analogously traced the distinctions of finite entities to a transcendental duality between participated existence and receiving essence. The necessary participation of each of these principles of finite being in divine and infinite existence constitutes the ultimate metaphysical reduction and horizon of a creationist metaphysics. (shrink)