In this paper, we propose a new approach to absurdity in the context of natural deduction for intuitionistic and classical logic. It combines the aspects of both the logical approach, which treats absurdity as a propositional constant, and the structural approach, which treats absurdity as a structural punctuation mark signalling the dead end of derivations. In particular, we will treat absurdity as an impossible command, that is, a speech act composed of an imperative force indicator, and (...) the false propositional constant, that is, a proposition that cannot be true by definition. In return, we obtain a framework that constitutes a middle ground between the logical and structural approaches. For example, it allows us to consider the ex falso quodlibet rule as a kind of structural rule, specifically, a semi‐structural rule, and at the same time also maintain that negation can be reduced to implication of absurdity, specifically, to its propositional content. (shrink)

Many of us experience the activities which fill our everyday lives as meaningful, and to do so we must (and do) hold them to be important. However, reflection undercuts this confidence: our activities are aimed at ends which are arbitrary, in that we have reason to regard our taking them so seriously as lacking justification; they are comparatively insignificant; and they leave little of any real permanence. Even though we take our activities seriously, and our everyday lives to be important, (...) on reflection they seem less meaningful than we suppose. Thomas Nagel claims that this discrepancy is inevitable, and thus that our lives are absurd and to be approached with irony. The aim of this paper is to explore whether it is inevitable, and in particular to examine recent formulations (of Peter Singer, Robert Nozick, and others) of the old idea that we can transcend this absurdity by forming attachments less susceptible to being undercut. (shrink)

Camus’ early philosophy has been subject to various kinds of criticism. In this paper I address a problem that has not been noticed so far, namely that it appears to be essentially inconsistent. On the one hand, Camus explicitly denies the existence of moral values, and construes his central notion of the absurd in a way that presupposes this denial. On the other hand, he is also committed to the existence of certain values. Both in his literary and philosophical works (...) Camus is not so much interested in the absurd per se, but rather in how we ought to respond to it. In justifying his supposed normative conclusions, he tacitly, but crucially, relies on evaluative judgements. If all this is true, then prospects for defenders of absurdism seem bleak. In whichever way the inconsistency is resolved, they will have to give up or significantly modify central parts of Camus’ early philosophy. But things may not stand quite as bad. As I try to show, there is a route to consistency that preserves much of Camus’ early philosophy, and leaves it prima facie plausible. The key is to re-interpret its normative aspects. Stated a bit provocatively, we need to put Camus in the self-help genre. (shrink)

Since 2019, Northeastern post-industrial culture has been a popular topic of discussion; the general public refers to it as the Northeastern Renaissance. Crises of identity, honor, and faith have been recurring themes in several Northeastern films released in recent years. Furthermore, these cinematic narratives frequently generate somber humor by presenting an enormous contrast between ideals and actuality. The article examines how the post-industrial narrative context of Northeast China has influenced audio-visual cultural products and contemporary Chinese popular culture. To elucidate the (...) fundamental aspect of the Northeast narrative, the article’s author employs the absurd theory of Albert Camus. The main structure and viewpoints of the article are as follows: The first is after presenting individuals’ contemplations on the Northeastern Renaissance-instigated post-industrial narrative of the Northeast. In the following sections, the article explores the narrative context of post-industrial audio-visual works in Northeast China, focusing on the absurdity depicted in the documentary Tie Xi Qu: West of the Tracks (2002). The authors’ analysis reveals how the documentary captures the socio-economic decline and the resulting human experiences of absurdity and dislocation. Key findings indicate that the narrative structure and visual style effectively convey the bleak realities of post-industrial life, offering critical insights into the region’s socio-cultural transformation. These findings suggest that future research should explore the intersection of visual media and social change in other post-industrial contexts. -/- . (shrink)

At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination as a seemingly (...) rational tool to reinforce and protect ideologies. (shrink)

My argument here is two-fold. I agree with Nagel that folk experience of absurdity and the way this experience is conceptually articulated (“the standard arguments for absurdity”) is distorted and confused. However, I argue that his proposed philosophical articulation of the absurd is not coherent and deprives the folk experience of the absurd from its true and original crux hidden behind its confused expressions. Here, firstly, I review the main argument of Nagel’s paper and compare his liberal “ironic (...) view” of absurdity to Camus’s “heroic view.’ (Sect 1). Then, I highlight some inconsistencies in his argument and some difficulties in his account (Sect. 2). Finally, I will propose a eudemonic approach to absurdity. Here, I contrast socialist humor with liberal ironic or heroic attitudes to absurdity (Sect. 3). (shrink)

When The Absurd Hero in American Fiction was first released in 1966, Granville Hicks praised it in a lead article for the Saturday Review as a sensitive and definitive study of a new trend in postwar American literature. In the years that followed, David Galloway’s analysis of the writings of John Updike, William Styron, Saul Bellow, and J. D. Salinger became a standard critical work, an indispensable tool for readers concerned with contemporary American literature. The New York Times described the (...) book as “a seminal study of the modern literary imagination." David Galloway, himself an established novelist, later extensively revised The Absurd Hero to include authoritative discussions of more than a dozen novels which had appeared since the first revised edition was released in 1970. Among them are John Updike’s Couples, Rabbit Redux, and The Coup; William Styron’s The Confessions of Nat Turner and Sophie’s Choice; and Saul Bellow’s Mr. Sammler’s Planet and Humboldt’s Gift. Through detailed analyses of these works, Galloway demonstrates the continuing relevance of his own provocative concept of the absurd hero and provides important insights into the literary achievements of four of America’s most influential postwar novelists. (shrink)

Why do well‐functioning psychological systems sometimes give rise to absurd beliefs that are radically misaligned with reality? Drawing on signalling theory, I develop and explore the hypothesis that groups often embrace beliefs that are viewed as absurd by outsiders as a means of signalling ingroup commitment. I clarify the game‐theoretic and psychological underpinnings of this hypothesis, I contrast it with similar proposals about the signalling functions of beliefs, and I motivate several psychological and sociological predictions that could be used to (...) distinguish it from alternative explanations of irrational group beliefs. (shrink)

The absurdity of (i) and (ii) arises because asserting 'p' normally expresses a belief that p. Normally, when (i) is asserted, what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a lack of belief that p, is logically impossible, whereas normally, when (ii) is asserted, it is differently absurd, since what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a belief that -p, is logically possible, but inconsistent. A possible source of confusion between (...) 'impossible' and 'inconsistent' is the fact that a proposition which is inconsistent tout court is always self-contradictory and hence necessarily false, unlike one which is inconsistent with other propositions. Whereas the proposition Ibp&-Ibp is inconsistent, the proposition IBp &IB-p is not. I cannot hold a belief which I lack, but I can.. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that on a structural view of absurdity within natural deduction frameworks for both classical and intuitionistic logic, absurdity cannot be identified with the empty set; that is, with something that contains nothing. Instead, absurdity should be seen as representing nothing; that is, as the empty space below the inference line, as Neil Tennant originally suggested. However, diverging from Tennant’s view that absurdity should be purely a structural notion, I consider an approach (...) that incorporates both structural and logical features. Specifically, this version of absurdity cannot be embedded into other propositions (just like absurdity in the structural approach) yet it is not merely a punctuation mark in the metalanguage but a proper part of the object language of the logic (just like absurdity in the logical approach). This will allow us to show that accepting the structural approach does not require adopting inferences with no conclusion, as was previously thought. Formally, I treat absurdity as a limit case of a signed proposition and, informally, it may be interpreted as a degenerate form of denial that lacks any propositional content. (shrink)

Arguments for the inherent value, equality of interests,or rights of non-human animals have presented a strong challenge for the anthropocentric worldview. However, they have been met with criticism.One form of criticism maintains that,regardless of their theoretical consistency,these 'pro-animal arguments' cannot be accepted due to their absurdity. Often, particularly inter-species interest conflicts are brought to the fore: if pro-animal arguments were followed,we could not solve interest conflicts between species,which is absurd. Because of this absurdity, the arguments need to be (...) abandoned. The paper analyses the strength, background and relevance of this 'argument from absurdity'. It is claimed that in all of the three areas mentioned above, the argument faces severe difficulties. (shrink)

Absurdist accounts of life’s meaning posit that life is absurd because our pretensions regarding its meaning conflict with the actual or perceived reality of the situation. Relationary accounts posit that contingent things gain their meaning only from their relationship to other meaningful things. I take a detailed look at the two types of account, and, proceeding under the assumption that they are correct, combine them to see what the implications of such a combination might be. I conclude that another way (...) of looking at the absurdity of life is to see it as a conflict between our dual beliefs that there exist intrinsically meaningful contingent things, and that contingent things may only gain their meaning extrinsically through their relationships to other meaningful things. In this way, I provide another lens through which feelings of life’s absurdity may be interpreted and analysed: as the conflict between the simultaneous beliefs in both intrinsically and relationally meaningful contingent things. Looking through this lens gives us an entirely different framework for analysing life’s absurdity than that which Nagel described in 1971, providing opportunity for more potential avenues of analysis and discussion. (shrink)

In this article, I make an attempt to define terms such as: tragedy, absurdity, and paradox as conceived of by the German essayist Walter Hilsbecher. This is a task which is both difficult and interesting, mainly because of the fact that concepts from within speculative philosophy are relatively rarely subject to scrupulous definitions. The reason for this state of affairs lies in the difficulty to capture the meaning of these concepts within a rigid framework. These problems also appear in (...) Hilsbecher’s 1972 work titled Tragizm, absurd, paradoks [Tragedy, Absurd, Paradox]. The philosophy of the absurd – the methodological separation of which I propose – has the absurd for its central concept, but it is a concept which eludes sharp definitions, too. This article aims to reconstruct Hilsbecher’s vocabulary of concepts crucial to the philosophy of absurdity in reference to the tradition of contemporary speculative philosophy. By locating the German writer’s thought in the context of other authors working in a similar thematic and stylistic context, I will outline this specific strand of philosophy. (shrink)

A l'énigme proposée par l'expérience de la vie, il y a deux réponses possibles : "tout est absurde" ou "c'est un mystère".... Jean Guitton constate : "Pour chacun, absurde et mystère sont les deux pôles inverses entre lesquels oscille la pensée humaine. Quand chacun s'examine en profondeur, il écoute cette double voix. Mais, l'oscillation étant rejetée, pour moi l'absurdité de l'absurde me conduit vers le mystère.".

Ce livre que je présente à nouveau aujourd'hui, dans une édition qui évoque publiquement ses origines, n'a pas une histoire comme les autres. Jamais il n'aurait vu le jour sans une étonnante rencontre avec François Mitterrand, dans la Creuse, au début des années quatre-vingt, qui fut suivie d'autres entretiens. Une rencontre sur le ton de la confession, inhabituelle et directe, une conversation surprenante. Une sorte de dialogue contemporain entre celui qui penche vers l'absurde et celui qui croit au mystère. Ensemble, (...) nous reprenions l'éternel débat sur le sens de la vie et la destinée de l'homme. Mais, tous deux, nous mettions Dieu au centre de nos réflexions. J'ai pris conscience du mystère Mitterrand, des secrets de cet homme obsédé par la mort, l'au-delà, les fins dernières, la vie éternelle. Ce texte n'a pas vieilli, garde sa saveur de testament spirituel et dévoile une part de la personnalité de mon visiteur. Fruit du dialogue entre un philosophe et un politique, cet ouvrage reparaît donc plus d'un an après la mort de ce président qui continue d'habiter la mémoire des Français. A un moment où les Français eux-mêmes se posent des questions sur l'avenir et la religion. Puissent-ils trouver des réponses dans ce que j'ai dit au premier d'entre eux : François Mitterrand. (shrink)

PENULTIMATE DRAFT. At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination as (...) a seemingly rational tool to reinforce and protect beliefs. (shrink)

Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some intuitive pull, and so appear to aid in answering the question of what it is rational to do, we argue that their respective positions are not compelling. Newcomb problems are structured such that whichever way one chooses, one (...) might be led by one’s preferred decision theory to miss out on some riches (riches which others obtain whilst employing their preferred decision theory). According to the novel aesthetic diagnosis we shall offer of the Newcomb dialectic, missing out in this way does not render one irrational but, rather, subject to being seen as absurd. This is a different kind of cost but not one that undermines one’s rationality. (shrink)

The price for morality as the meaning of existence is the entrance of another kind of absurdity, a moral absurdity. Clearly, there is something absurd about life on The Good Place. Moral worth, both on The Good Place and in our real‐life existence, comes in degrees. Deontological views, most famously associated with Immanuel Kant, hold that the morality of an action is determined based on whether or not it adheres to a moral rule. Care requires being flexible in (...) different situations so as to best foster caring relationships with others. A care ethics approach would give some support to Eleanor's claims in The Good Place, insofar as a caring home life is essential to the development of the child in a variety of ways. The power of caring relationships is perhaps nowhere more salient than in the show's final few episodes. (shrink)

Belliotti unravels the paradoxes of human existence to reveal paths for crafting meaningful, significant, valuable, even important lives. He argues that human life is not inherently absurd; examines the implications of mortality; contrasts subjective and objective meaning, and evaluates contemporary renderings of meaningful human lives.

Many arguments in the popular discourse around climate change seem intended to give the impression that climate action is an absurd endeavor. These ‘climate absurdist’ arguments are reflected in the question: ‘if the climate is going to change anyway, why should we care about anthropogenic climate change?’ Classic absurdist philosophy suggests that absurdity (also called ‘the absurd’) arises due to a conflict between our desire for meaning and a universe that seems devoid of meaning. Others argue the absurd is (...) not a consequence of specific facts about the universe but is rather a matter of perspective – we live our lives with a seriousness that can always be undercut by ‘stepping back’ and viewing our goals and aspirations with indifference. Although climate absurdist claims are structured similarly to classic absurdist claims (positing a conflict between our climate stabilizing efforts and specific physical facts like a constantly changing climate), I argue that climate absurdist arguments are primarily rhetorical claims intended to encourage the listener to ‘step back’ and view our climate stabilizing efforts on a geologic or cosmic scale, where they can appear insignificant. I show that this approach results in a self-defeating argument that cannot justify climate inaction. (shrink)

The year 2020 began with the world being controlled by a then-unknown force. This unknown force would later be called a coronavirus or Covid-19. Not a single country would be free from infection by this virus. We are petrified with astonishment when confronted with this disease. Initially, after admitting the reality, we started struggling with and revolting against this virus. Time has led us to the consideration of our existence. This pandemic inclines us to revisit the major themes in existential (...) philosophy discussed by Sartre in the Nausea and the philosophy of the absurd by Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus, The Plague, and The Stranger. The study addresses the concepts of anxiety, suffering, freedom, self-deception, absurdity, and choices. When confronted with the reality of the disease, we are shocked by an odd sensation like what Roquentin felt in his experience of nausea. This bizarre feeling brought an initial rejection, a self-deception followed by suffering, and a reflection of one's freedom. The concept of freedom leads us to certain decisions we make and the choices we are offered. The absurdity brought about by the pandemic is a reality that we must accept as it is. How would Sisyphus feel if he were living in the present? The struggle by Sisyphus can be our struggle now against a coronavirus. We feel condemned to roll a rock to the top of a mountain, a punishment that seems like 'futile and hopeless labor.' However, we are stronger than our rock. The paper presents a parallelism between our suffering during the pandemic and the sufferings of Sisyphus and Roquentin. (shrink)

Albert Camus is most famous for his engagement with the absurd. Both in his philosophical and literary works his main focus was on the nature and normative consequences of this idea. However, Camus was also concerned with what he referred to as the “feeling of the absurd”. Philosophers have so far paid little attention to Camus’ thoughts about the feeling of the absurd. In this paper I provide a detailed analysis of this feeling. It turns out that the feeling of (...) the absurd is not, strictly speaking, a feeling. It is rather a conjunction of a mood (feeling of the absurd in the narrow sense) and of emotions that this mood tends to give rise to (appearances of the feeling of the absurd). Moreover, both moods and emotions qualify as absurd in virtue of their promoting the discovery of the absurd; that is, the discovery that humans search for meaning, but the world does not answer this search. (shrink)

Guy Kahane holds that theism has unattractive consequences, since it threatens both privacy and autonomy. Here, I suggest that Kahane’s position echoes that of Dostoevsky’s famous Underground Man. But the Underground Man is ensnared in difficulties that resemble the problem of absurdity as developed by Thomas Nagel. Dostoevsky’s own solution to that problem involves love—but love naturally invites compromises with respect to privacy and autonomy. Perhaps the best way to solve the problem of absurdity is to make precisely (...) the opposite of Kahane’s axiological judgment— which would recommend pro-theism over anti-theism. (shrink)

The paper investigates Hobbes’s arguments that injustice is a kind of absurdity involving a “contradiction properly so called,” concluding that although those arguments are undermined by their reliance on a mistaken temporality assumption, Hobbes’s philosophy provides other means for establishing his desired conclusion.

Analogues of Scott's isomorphism theorem, Karp's theorem as well as results on lack of compactness and strong completeness are established for infinitary propositional relevant logics. An "interpolation theorem" for the infinitary quantificational boolean logic L-infinity omega. holds. This yields a preservation result characterizing the expressive power of infinitary relevant languages with absurdity using the model-theoretic relation of relevant directed bisimulation as well as a Beth definability property.

Following a result by De Rijke for modal logic, it is shown that the basic weak entailment model-theoretic language with absurdity is the maximal model-theoretic language having the finite occurrence property, preservation under relevant directed bisimulations and the finite depth property. This can be seen as a generalized preservation theorem characterizing propositional weak entailment formulas among formulas of other model-theoretic languages.

This article examines the significance of Friedrich Nietzsche to Albert Camus’ concepts of absurdity and revolt. It rests on three related claims. First, that Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is the point of departure for Camus’ absurdist inquiries. Second, that Camus’ philosophy of revolt is informed in crucial ways by Nietzsche’s views on the sources of moral and intellectual authority in the modern world. Finally, that Camusian revolt is an attempt to deal with the political crisis of foundationalism in a (...) way that preserves Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism while also avoiding the excesses of absolutist politics. Ultimately, I suggest that the origins and implications of Camus’ project cannot be grasped apart from an account of its engagement with Nietzsche. (shrink)

This article summarizes the history of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church after 1989 in the context of the post-communist situation. It highlights some of the changes that have taken place in the religious consciousness of Bulgarian people. Absurdity is the key concept. A string of absurd events are discussed; they are viewed as representative of the ambiguous mentality characteristic of the transitional period that is under way in the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe.

A partir da perspectiva intelectualista grega, na qual o dualismo entre corpo e alma requer o primado do discurso racional [lógos] em detrimento do páthos filosófico, busca-se com este artigo associar a noção de "desmedida" [hybris] com a noção de melancolia. Essa associação ganha ainda mais relevo, quando a aproximamos da interpretação de Simone Weil para o poema épico de Homero, a Ilíada. Se essa aproximação se justifica, então é patente a aproximação entre o caráter trágico que o destino adquire, (...) na perspectiva clássica, e a noção de contingência enquanto fundamento do absurdo existencial, no pensamento existencialista. We seek to associate the notion of "excess" [hubris] with the notion of melancholy from the intellectualist Greek perspective, in which the dualism between body and soul requires the rule of rational discourse [logos] at the expense of philosophical pathos. This association becomes more relevant when understood in light of Simone Weil's interpretation of Homer's epic poem, the Iliad. If this approach is justified, then a rapprochement becomes evident between the tragic character takes on destiny in the classical view, and the notion of contingency as the basis of existential absurdity in existentialist thought. (shrink)

Rational addiction theories illustrate how absurd choice theories in economics get taken seriously as possibly true explanations and tools for welfare analysis despite being poorly interpreted, empirically unfalsifiable, and based on wildly inaccurate assumptions selectively justified by ad-hoc stories. The lack of transparency introduced by poorly anchored mathematical models, the psychological persuasiveness of stories, and the way the profession neglects relevant issues are suggested as explanations for how what we perhaps should see as displays of technical skill and ingenuity are (...) allowed to blur the lines between science and games. (shrink)

Philosophers have long used vignettes—symbolic images such as Sisyphus or the foraging ant—to convey the absurdity of human existence. Traditionally, these scenes are thought to reveal a metaphysical conflict between human striving and an indifferent universe. This paper argues, however, that their power stems not from cosmic insignificance but from a structural and affective clash between the first-person perspective, from which our actions appear meaningful, and the third-person perspective, from which they seem trivial. I contend that absurdity arises (...) within this oscillation, amplified by an absurd vignette, which produces bodily and emotional disturbances later appraised as despair or futility. However, these vignettes obscure a crucial “second-person” perspective, as Stephen Darwall describes it—one grounded in dialogue, reciprocity, and moral agency. I propose restoring this relational stance through a therapeutic “philosophical hygiene,” exemplified by Socrates’ final myth in the Phaedo, to recover meaning beyond the absurd. (shrink)

A popular view on existential absurdity holds that if life is absurd, it must be inescapably so. In opposition to this view, I argue that the concept of existential absurdity allows for life to be contingently absurd. In Nausea (1938) and Being and Nothingness (1943), Jean-Paul Sartre puts forward two distinct conceptions of an absurd life, both of which entail an absurdity that is contingent rather than inescapable. Given the internal coherence of these accounts of existential (...) class='Hi'>absurdity, we have reasons to reject the view that existential absurdity is necessarily inescapable. A challenge arises, however, for radically contingent versions of absurdity: if life is absurd in a radically contingent way, it seems that no rational agent will live under absurd conditions for a significant portion of their life. This seems to run counter to the intuition that an absurdity can only be genuinely existential if it is a fundamental feature of human life. In response to this ‘problem of triviality’, I argue that there can be pro-absurdity reasons that outweigh the pro tanto reasons for escaping absurdity. Thus, it would not necessarily be irrational to continue to live under the yoke of absurdity. (shrink)

In various passages, Kant makes some version of the claim that it would be absurd for there to be appearances without something that appears (Absurdity Claim). This may be read — and indeed Kant would seem at times to present it as — an argument for the existence of non-sensible reality. I assess the relevant passages and argue that the Absurdity Claim is per se metaphysically sterile. While some passages where it appears are indicative of some commitment on (...) Kant’s part to the existence of non-sensible reality, this commitment is not argued for through the Absurdity Claim. It is rather already entailed in Kant’s choice of the word ‘appearance’ to refer to empirical objects. I thus attempt to bring to light the reasons that lead Kant to this choice, reasons which involve Kant’s views on affection and the origin of experience. (shrink)

Coming Back to the Absurd is a celebration of the enduring significance and impact of Albert Camus's first philosophical essay The Myth of Sisyphus. This collection of essays, from some of the world's leading Camus scholars, examines Camus's unique contribution to philosophy through The Myth since its publication.

This essay examines whether or not absurdity is intrinsic to human life. It takes Camus’ interpretation of ‘The Absurd’ as its conceptual starting point. It traces such thought back to Schopenhauer, whose work is then critically analysed. This analysis focuses primarily on happiness and meaning. This essay accepts some of Schopenhauer’s premises, but rejects his conclusions. Instead, it considers Nietzsche’s alternatives and the role of suffering in life. It posits that suffering may help people acquire meaning and escape (...) class='Hi'>absurdity. It then analyses the role of compassion in absurdity, in reference to Nietzsche’s work and Buddhist teachings. Lastly, it examines absurdity in relation to death, rejecting the notion that death exacerbates absurdity. This paper understands absurdity to be a natural part of the human condition, as characterised by suffering, death and an absence of meaning. It concludes that although human life is absurd by nature, it need not remain so. (shrink)

This manuscript investigates the philosophical friction between the radical agency proposed by Jean-Paul Sartre, the defiant, Sisyphean revolt championed by Albert Camus, and the profound ontological paralysis dramatized in Samuel Beckett’s Theatre of the Absurd. While early critics like Martin Esslin frequently conflated these perspectives under the broad umbrella of "meaning-making" in a godless universe, contemporary scholarship increasingly isolates their divergent architectures of human agency. By contrasting Sartrean existential optimism; which demands that humans are "condemned to be free" and must (...) define their essence through action; with Camusian absurdism, this study identifies a critical theoretical rupture. Samuel Beckett’s dramatic corpus serves as the focal point of this rupture. By physically restricting his subjects to demonstrate that action is structurally impossible, Beckett illustrates a fatalistic landscape where both Sartrean choice and Camusian rebellion categorically fail. Drawing on recent critical frameworks (2019–2024) encompassing spatial confinement, Agamben's biopolitics, and linguistic failure, this paper argues that Beckett does not merely explore the absurd. Rather, he actively dismantles the foundational premises of existential agency, positing a timeless topography of inaction that continues to challenge modern understandings of deterministic fatalism. (shrink)

Some think normative properties like being good are basic: they cannot be explained in only non-normative terms. Moreover, some think these properties are instantiated—things are good. Others have argued the instantiation of basic normativity (with some plausible assumptions about grounding) implies pannormism, roughly the view that some atoms (and sub-atoms, and sub-sub…) and their behavior is also either good or bad. All the way down the levels of reality, normativity lurks. For example, if a seizure is bad, then the atomic (...) behavior (and sub-atomic behavior, and so on) explaining it is also bad. These same philosophers believe pannormism could be taken as a reductio against basic normativity and normative realism. I’ll argue that with plausible additional premises, the argument for pannormism implies all atomic (and sub-atomic, and so on) behavior (and every atom, sub-atom, and so on) is normative. I’ll then explore whether this stronger pannormism, along with the weaker one, should be thought of as a reductio. My conclusion is that it isn’t clear what is absurd about pannormism, partly because the intuitions supporting the alleged reductio are surprisingly similar to those supporting basic normativity. This means believers in basic normativity and normative realism shouldn’t be as worried about their view implying pannormism as some suggest they should, and in fact, it might be antipannormism that’s absurd. (shrink)

L'emploi du raisonnement par l'absurde a été source de contestations au cours de l'histoire des sciences. L'auteur en propose une définition, puis montre comment un tel raisonnement indirect peut se retourner en un raisonnement direct qui lui soit logiquement équivalent, ce dont Aristote avait pressenti la possibilité...

Camus’ notions of absurdity and revolt remain relevant today, especially with respect to very recent developments in the growing role of electronic and digital mass media. Cormac McCarthy’s 2006 novel The Road , describing a father and child’s journey after the world as we know it has been destroyed, is used to highlight the nature of absurdity and revolt in their updated early 21 st century version.

This chapter contains sections titled: “In the beginning” … there was Festivus Festivus and Pragmatism Elements of Festivus Festivus Declining Festivus Enduring A Philosophical Airing of Grievances.

In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi :59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence (...) of this argument, namely, that they should not believe their own brand of scientific antirealism. (shrink)

In "The Myth of Sisyphus", Camus recommends scornful defiance in the face of our absurd, meaningless existence. Although Nagel agrees that human life possesses an absurd dimension, he objects to Camus' existentialist 'dramatics'. For Nagel, absurdity arises from the irreducible tension between our subjective and objective perspectives on life. In this paper I do two things: (i) critically reconstruct Camus' and Nagel's positions, and (ii) develop Nagel's critique of Camus in order to argue that humour is an appropriate response (...) to absurdity. (shrink)

This article evaluates the political implications of Thomas Hobbes’s extensive treatment of religion by taking up the motif of the Eucharist (and accompanying doctrine of transubstantiation) in Leviathan. Hobbes holds out transubstantiation as an exemplar of absurdity and an historical outgrowth of Christianity’s inauspicious meeting with pagan practices. At the same time, Leviathan contains allusions to eucharistic imagery in its narration of the generation of the “Mortal God,” the commonwealth, as the incorporation of a civil body. These conflicting sentiments (...) are illustrative of a wider tension running through Hobbes’s thought. Although Hobbes’s repudiation of superstition is well-known, it stands in stark contrast to Leviathan’s treatment of Christianity as an exemplar of “true” religion. The varied allusions to eucharistic doctrine illustrate how proper use might be made of a persistent “natural religiosity.” Both in its consonance with reason and its political logic, Christianity remains a politically constructive expression of “power invisible.”. (shrink)

What are we to make of works of art whose apparent point is to convince us of the meaninglessness and absurdity of human existence? I examine, in this paper, the attempt of Albert Camus to provide philosophical justification of art in the face of the supposed fact of absurdity and note its failure as such with specific reference to Sartre’s criticism. Despite other superficial similarities, I contrast Camus’s concept of the absurd with that of his ‘existentialist’ colleagues, including (...) Sartre, and suggest that the latter concept is more philosophically viable. I conclude that existential phenomenology consequently provides a more promising philosophical justification for artistic creation in the light of the more viable conception of absurdity. (shrink)

This article discusses how Magnus Eiriksson, a forgotten contemporary of Kierkegaard, introduced and developed the influential reading of Kierkegaard as an irrationalist concerning religious faith. It also shows how Kierkegaard responded to Eiriksson by clearly denying that he is an irrationalist and by suggesting that faith is above reason, not against it.

In A Confession, a memoir of his philosophical midlife crisis, Tolstoy recounts falling into despair after coming to believe that his life, and for that matter all human life, is meaningless and absurd. Although Tolstoy's account of the origin and phenomenology of his crisis is widely regarded as illuminating, his response to the crisis, namely, embracing a religious tradition that he had previously dismissed as “irrational,” “incomprehensible,” and “mingled with falsehood” seems unpromising, at best. Nevertheless, I argue, Tolstoy's account of (...) his response makes a valuable contribution to contemporary thought about the meaning and absurdity of life. I begin by drawing on classic discussions in the philosophical literature, and on Tolstoy's memoir, in order to characterize the problem of meaning and the problem of the absurd, and to clarify the relation between these problems. I then draw on Tolstoy's account of his response to his crisis in order to characterize a form of faith in our deepest values. I argue that such faith supplies one important part of the story concerning how we might respond to the problem of the absurd — a part that has been overlooked by more recent discussions of these issues. (shrink)

Albert Camus, a prominent philosopher in existentialism, offered a groundbreaking perspective on human existence through his concept of the absurd. In his works, particularly The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), Camus defines the absurd as the conflict between humanity's intrinsic desire for meaning and the universe's indifference. This paper explores Camus’ rejection of hope, examining his belief that traditional notions of hope deny life's absurdity. Rather than succumbing to despair, Camus advocates for living authentically by embracing the absurd and creating (...) meaning through personal experiences. This paper also analyzes the relevance of Camus’ ideas in contemporary discussions on meaning and critiques of his rejection of hope. Ultimately, this exploration reveals that Camus’ philosophy offers a liberating perspective on navigating an inherently meaningless world. (shrink)