According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph Jäger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer an alternative account grounded in the (...) abilities that different kinds of authorities are required to possess. (shrink)

A conception of recognitional abilities and perceptual-discriminative abilities is deployed to make sense of how perceptual experiences enable us to make cognitive contact with objects and facts. It is argued that accepting the emerging view does not commit us to thinking that perceptual experiences are essentially relational, as they are conceived to be in disjunctivist theories. The discussion explores some implications for the theory of knowledge in general and, in particular, for the issue of how we can shed (...) light on the nature of knowledge is if we do not aim to provide conceptual analyses of knowledge in terms of true belief plus something else. Consideration is also given how we can best make sense of the practical value that knowledge has for us. (shrink)

This paper explores the prospects for dispositional accounts of abilities. According to so-called new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to Φ iff they have a disposition to Φ when trying to Φ. We show that the new dispositionalism is beset by some problems that also beset its predecessor, the conditional analysis of abilities, and bring up some further problems. We then turn to a different approach, which links abilities not to motivational states but to the notion (...) of success, and consider ways of implementing that approach. Our results suggest that there are principled disanalogies between abilities and disposition which prevent any dispositional account of abilities from succeeding. (shrink)

Though everyday life accords a great deal of significance to practical abilities—such as the ability to walk, to speak French, to play the piano—philosophers of action pay surprisingly little attention to them. By contrast, abilities are discussed in various other philosophical projects. From these discussions, a partial theory of abilities emerges. If the partial theory—which is at best adequate only to a few examples of practical abilities—were correct, then philosophers of action would be right to ignore (...) practical abilities, because they could play no fundamental role in an account of human agency. For the idea that practical abilities *do* play a fundamental role in human agency to be worth considering, an alternative conception of them is needed. As a first step, I attempt some of the necessary ground-clearing work. (shrink)

Human language is a salient example of a neurocognitive system that is specialized to process complex dependencies between sensory events distributed in time, yet how this system evolved and specialized remains unclear. Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) studies have generated a wealth of insights into how human adults and infants process different types of sequencing dependencies of varying complexity. The AGL paradigm has also been adopted to examine the sequence processing abilities of nonhuman animals. We critically evaluate this growing literature (...) in species ranging from mammals (primates and rats) to birds (pigeons, songbirds, and parrots) considering also cross‐species comparisons. The findings are contrasted with seminal studies in human infants that motivated the work in nonhuman animals. This synopsis identifies advances in knowledge and where uncertainty remains regarding the various strategies that nonhuman animals can adopt for processing sequencing dependencies. The paucity of evidence in the few species studied to date and the need for follow‐up experiments indicate that we do not yet understand the limits of animal sequence processing capacities and thereby the evolutionary pattern. This vibrant, yet still budding, field of research carries substantial promise for advancing knowledge on animal abilities, cognitive substrates, and language evolution. (shrink)

I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants' social cognitive abilities manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds that SCAs already reflect the possession of an “implicit” and “rudimentary” capacity to attribute representational states. Against it, I note that SCAs are significantly limited, and have likely evolved to respond to contextual information in situated interaction with others. I challenge the argument from parsimony by (...) claiming that parsimony per se favors neither a mentalist nor a behavior-reading account. Finally, I argue that early SCAs do not develop continuously into four-year-olds' belief attribution abilities. Accordingly, the argument from developmental continuity is empirically inadequate. Careful analysis of both the empirical data and the theoretical assumptions leading to the epistemic mentalist view is needed in order to improve our understanding of SCAs in earl.. (shrink)

In this paper, we address critical thinking skill assessment in the context of management education. This paper uses Ennis' well-known list of critical thinking abilities to identify assessable critical thinking components present in student work. A sample of 152 graduate written assignments designed to assess critical thinking is used as a basis for analysis. These were taken from a business analysis subject in a large Australian business school over a 6-year period. A methodological framework is proposed and applied to (...) this data set, offering a way of assessing evidence of five representative categories pertaining to critical thinking in a business context. The framework includes a basic clarification (BC), bases for inferences (BI), inferences (IN), advanced clarification (AC) and auxiliary abilities (AA). Results indicate that the essays rank highly on AA and AC but low on BC, BI and IN. While critical thinking is partially evidenced in the study corpus, attention is needed in terms of refining the measurement framework dedicated to eliciting specific critical thinking components. We provide the initial elements of such a framework in this paper and make suggestions for how it can be improved. Implications for the theory and practice of management education are outlined. (shrink)

I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn't entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in virtue of pertaining to a wide range of circumstances. I argue that these two types of generality – I refer to them with the terms ‘general’ and ‘generic’, respectively – produce two orthogonal distinctions among abilities. I show that the two types of generality are sometimes run (...) together by those writing on free will and argue that both types of generality are relevant to understanding the modality of abilities. (shrink)

The medial temporal lobe supports both navigation and declarative memory. On this basis, a theory of phylogenetic continuity has been proposed according to which episodic and semantic memories have evolved from egocentric and allocentric navigation in the physical world, respectively. Here, we explored the behavioral significance of this neurophysiological model by investigating the relationship between the performance of healthy individuals on a path integration and an episodic memory task. We investigated the path integration performance through a proprioceptive Triangle Completion Task (...) and assessed episodic memory through a picture recognition task. We evaluated the specificity of the association between performance in these two tasks by including in the study design a verbal semantic memory task. We also controlled for the effect of attention and working memory and tested the robustness of the results by including alternative versions of the path integration and semantic memory tasks. We found a significant positive correlation between the performance on the path integration the episodic, but not semantic, memory tasks. This pattern of correlation was not explained by general cognitive abilities and persisted also when considering a visual path integration task and a non-verbal semantic memory task. Importantly, a cross-validation analysis showed that participants' egocentric navigation abilities reliably predicted episodic memory performance. Altogether, our findings support the hypothesis of a phylogenetic continuity between egocentric navigation and episodic memory and pave the way for future research on the potential causal role of egocentric navigation on multiple forms of episodic memory. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to help winnow out some ideas about the role of formal logic in human doings at large. I start by discussing some metaphysical presuppositions of logical theory; specifically, I attempt to work towards a clearer understanding of the role of modalities, together with the notions of meaning and truth, in mainstream logical theory. I then appeal to a modal formal semantics (Brandom, 2007a) in order to outline the cognitive role of logical constants in general. From these (...) discussions I conclude that any view of formal logic, and its core concepts, which does not involve a grasp of what we do with them will be found to be distorted. (shrink)

This chapter explores how perceived misfit influences the performance of self-regulatory processes in the workplace. The authors integrate person–environment fit theory with research on self-regulation to show how misfit impairs goal setting, monitoring, and adjustment. They argue that misfit disrupts individuals’ capacity to align effort with goals, leading to resource depletion, reduced persistence, and impaired performance. The chapter develops a conceptual model in which misfit triggers negative affect and cognitive interference that weaken self-control and hinder adaptive goal pursuit. It also (...) considers the moderating roles of individual and contextual factors such as resilience, self-efficacy, autonomy, and organisational support in shaping how employees respond to misfit. The authors propose that some individuals can use misfit experiences as feedback to recalibrate goals or craft their jobs, thereby restoring functional regulation. The framework therefore positions misfit not only as a stressor but also as a potential stimulus for learning and adaptation. By linking misfit to fundamental self-regulatory mechanisms, the chapter provides a psychological account of why misfit sometimes leads to exhaustion and failure, yet in other circumstances promotes development and renewed engagement. This integration advances understanding of the motivational consequences of misfit and its implications for individual effectiveness at work. (shrink)

Recent claims that artificial intelligence (AI) systems demonstrate “emergent abilities” have fueled excitement but also fear grounded in the prospect that such systems may enable a wider range of parties to make unprecedented advances in areas that include the development of chemical or biological weapons. Ambiguity surrounding the term “emergent abilities” has added avoidable uncertainty to a topic that has the potential to destabilize the strategic landscape, including the perception of key parties about the viability of nonproliferation efforts. (...) To avert these problems in the future, scientists, developers, policymakers, and other parties should take credible steps to strengthen the health of the scientific ecosystem around AI. (shrink)

In the book, I provide an account of what it is for an agent to have an ability. According to the Success View, abilities are all about success across possible situations. In developing and applying the view, the book elucidates the relation between abilities on the one hand and possibility, counterfactuals, and dispositions on the other; it sheds light on the distinction between general and specific abilities; it offers an understanding of degrees of abilities; it explains (...) which role intentions and performances play for the having of an ability, how abilities relate to success and failure, and gives an outlook at how the view might be applied to the free will debate and time travel. (shrink)

Mele develops a view of paradigmatically free actions--including decisions--as indeterministically caused by their proximal causes. He mounts a masterful defense of this thesis that includes solutions to problems about luck and control widely discussed in the literature on free will and moral responsibility.

In Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility Dana Nelkin defends the “rational abilities view.” According to this view, agents are responsible for their behavior if and only if they act with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. It follows that agents who act well are open to praise regardless of whether they could have acted differently, but agents who act badly are open to blame only if they could have acted on the moral reasons (...) that counted against their behavior. I summarize the main themes of Nelkin’s theory of responsibility and offer reasons for rejecting the claim that agents are blameworthy only if they could have responded to moral considerations. It is true that wrongdoers who could not have responded appropriately to moral considerations are often excused from blame, but I argue that not all the forms that such incapacity can take will furnish grounds for excuse. In other words, some circumstances that entail that a wrongdoer cannot respond to moral considerations are compatible with that agent fulfilling conditions that are sufficient for moral responsibility. (shrink)

Hume Regards it as a mere “Verbal Dispute” whether or not various “natural abilities” should be regarded as moral virtues. In his Treatise he complains that “good sense and judgment”, “parts and understanding” are classed in all systems of ethics of the day with bodily endowments and ascribed no “merit or moral worth”. Yet if compared with the received virtues, they fell short in no material respect, both sets being “mental qualities” and each equally tending to procure “the love (...) and esteem of mankind’. (shrink)

Andrew Davis; 6. Transfer, Abilities and Rules, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 75–106, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467.

We examined the role of verbal mediation in planning performance of English–Spanish-speaking bilingual children and monolingual English-speaking children, between the ages of 9 and 12 years. To measure planning, children were administered the Tower of London (ToL) task. In a dual-task paradigm, children completed ToL problems under three conditions: with no secondary task (baseline), with articulatory suppression, and with non-verbal motor suppression. Analyses revealed generally shorter planning times for bilinguals than monolinguals but both groups performed similarly on number of moves (...) and execution times. Additionally, bilingual children were more efficient at planning throughout the duration of the task while monolingual children showed significant gains with more practice. Children’s planning times under articulatory suppression were significantly shorter than under motor suppression as well as the baseline condition, and there was no difference in planning times between monolingual and bilingual children during articulatory suppression. These results demonstrate that bilingualism influences performance on a complex EF measure like planning, and that these effects are not related to verbal mediation. (shrink)

The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how (...) is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. (shrink)

Early in his Essays on Intellectual Powers, Reid draws a distinction between mental power, mental operation, and mental capacity (EIP 21). To the untrained eye, these terms could probably be used interchangeably, and Reid believes this is correct, up to a point. He argues that, if we are interested in understanding exactly how the human mind works, we must use these terms with more precise meanings. This is part of his more general strategy of trying to always use the words (...) with their common meanings, as much as possible, but also pointing out that certain philosophical distinctions are needed to carry out the project of laying out the foundations of the science of the mind. This paper explains what the distinction between power, operation, and capacity is, according to Reid, with the goal of understanding why it is important to draw such a distinction, not only for the Reidian project, but for action theory, more generally. (shrink)

This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main (...) points of dispute concerning free will. (shrink)

I address the question of whether non-agential groups can have agential powers, or abilities and propose a new analysis of group agential powers. In this paper I provide a plausible counter-example to the claim that the only groups of agents that can have agential powers are collective agents, and discuss other, weaker conditions which a groups of agents must satisfy in order to have agential powers. In particular, I introduce a notion which I call ‘co-agential attunement’ and provide an (...) analysis of group agential powers on which a group’s members must be capable of becoming co-agentially attuned in order to have agential powers. Some non-agential groups meet this condition: a group’s members having the mere capacity for co-agential attunement does not make the group a collective agent. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo examine subjective and objective socioeconomic status as predictors, cognitive abilities as confounders, and personal control perceptions as mediators of health behaviours.DesignA cross-sectional study including 197 participants aged 30–50 years, recruited from the crowd-working platform, Prolific.Main Outcome MeasureThe Good Health Practices Scale, a 16-item inventory of health behaviours.ResultsSSES was the most important predictor of health behaviours. Among the OSES indicators, education, but not income, predicted health behaviours. Intelligence and memory were negatively correlated with health-promoting behaviours, and the effect of (...) memory was upheld in the multivariate model. Personal control perceptions did not act as mediators.ConclusionSSES predicted health behaviours beyond OSES. The effect of socioeconomic indicators was not confounded by cognitive abilities. Surprisingly, cognitive abilities were negatively associated with health-promoting behaviours. Future research should emphasise SSES as a predictor of health behaviours. Delineating the psychological mechanisms linking SSES with health behaviours would be a valuable contribution toward improved understanding of socioeconomic disparities in health behaviours. (shrink)

In a 2007 paper, we argued that speakers with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) exhibit pragmatic abilities which are surprising given the usual understanding of communication in that group. That is, it is commonly reported that people diagnosed with an ASD have trouble with metaphor, irony, conversational implicature and other non-literal language. This is not a matter of trouble with knowledge and application of rules of grammar. The difficulties lie, rather, in successful communicative interaction. Though we did find pragmatic errors (...) within literal talk, the transcribed conversations we studied showed many, many successes. A second paper reinforced our finding of a general level of success (de Villiers, Myers, and Stainton 2012). It considered differences within the class of pragmatically-inflected yet literal speech acts. The present paper carries our project forward. It overcomes some of the methodological limitations of the second paper, by increasing sample size, and looking at frequency of use rather than just seeming errors. It also includes a control sample. The emerging results are two-fold. On the one hand, there was a slight, statistically significant difference in frequency of use between our participants and the controls in four sub-categories: indexicals, possessives, polysemy and degree on a scale. In all four, the participants diagnosed with ASDs had fewer occurrences overall, relative to controls. On the other hand, there was no significant difference in error rates between ASDs and controls — not in any of the eight categories of pragmatic determinants of literal content that we coded for. The upshot is that, though there were less-preferred forms for participants with ASDs, they do very well indeed with pragmatic determinants of literal content. (shrink)

Abilities are in many ways central to what being an agent means, and they are appealed to in philosophical accounts of a great many different phenomena. It is often assumed that abilities are some kind of dispositional property, but it is rarely made explicit exactly which dispositional properties are our abilities. Two recent debates provide two different answers to that question: the new dispositionalism in the debate about free will, and virtue reliabilism in epistemology. This paper argues (...) that both answers fail as general accounts of abilities, and discusses the ramifications of this result. (shrink)

Accounts of ability in the philosophical literature have tended to be modal ones: claims about an agent’s abilities are understood in terms of what she does in certain non-actual scenarios. In contrast, a prominent account of ability ascriptions in the recent semantics literature appeals to genericity: claims about an agent’s abilities are understood in terms of what she generally manages to do. The latter account resolves some long-standing problems for modal accounts, but encounters problems of its own. I (...) propose a hybrid view, on which ability involves both a modal and a generic element. (shrink)

A large number of studies, including single case and case series studies, have shown that patients with different types of frontotemporal dementia are characterized by the emergence of artistic abilities. This led to the hypothesis of enhanced creative thinking skills as a function of these pathological conditions. However, in the last years, it has been argued that these brain pathologies lead only to an augmented “drive to produce” rather than to the emergence of creativity. Moreover, only a few studies (...) analyzed specific creative skills, such as divergent thinking, by standardized tests. This Mini-Review aimed to examine the extent to which DT abilities are preserved in patients affected by FTD. Results showed that DT abilities are altered in different ways according to the specific anatomical and functional changes associated with the diverse forms of FTD. On the one hand, patients affected by the behavioral form of FTD can produce many ideas because of unimpaired access to memory stores, but are not able to recombine flexibly the information to produce original ideas because of damages in the pre-frontal cortex. On the other hand, patients affected by the semantic variant are impaired also in terms of fluency because of the degradation of their semantic memory store. Potential implications, limitations, and future research directions are discussed. (shrink)

This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about (...) knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis. (shrink)

Over the decades, creativity and imagination research developed in parallel, but they surprisingly rarely intersected. This paper introduces a new theoretical model of creative imagination, which bridges creativity and imagination research, as well as presents a new psychometric instrument, called the Test of Creative Imagery Abilities (TCIA), developed to measure creative imagery abilities understood in accordance with this model. Creative imagination is understood as constituted by three interrelated components: vividness (the ability to create images characterized by a high (...) level of complexity and detail), originality (the ability to produce unique imagery), and transformativeness (the ability to control imagery). TCIA enables valid and reliable measurement of these three groups of abilities, yielding the general score of imagery abilities and at the same time making profile analysis possible. We present the results of eight studies on a total sample of more than 1,700 participants, showing the factor structure of TCIA using confirmatory factor analysis, as well as provide data confirming this instrument’s validity and reliability. The availability of TCIA for interested researchers may result in new insights and possibilities of integrating the fields of creativity and imagination science. (shrink)

Lucy O'Brien has argued that defenders of the object-dependence of singular thought should attend to mental agency. A recent trend in action theory, towards what John Maier calls ‘agentive modality’, suggests that we conceive agency in terms of the exercise of abilities, and this is how I propose to approach O'Brien's challenge. For Gareth Evans, an early defender of object-dependence, maintained that thinking is the exercise of a complex of abilities. The debate about object-dependence gives way to the (...) question whether we have what I call dedicated singular mental abilities. In arguing that we do, I defend the thesis of object-dependence. (shrink)

Classification is one of the distinctive features of Paralympic sport. Despite the existence of classification rules and a well-defined classification process, some Paralympic athletes intentionally misrepresent their abilities to classifiers in order to be allocated to a lower performing competition class, in which they secure an unfair advantage over other athletes. Such deception undermines the integrity of the competition by exploiting a vulnerability in the classification process. Such manipulation is hard to mitigate and harder still to prove that an (...) athlete had; intentionally misrepresented their abilities or; failed for innocent reasons to make maximum efforts during the classification or; had acted under coercive pressure from others in their entourage or environment. These challenges are compounded in the case of Paralympic athletes that have an intellectual impairment or who are accompanied by a parent/guardian who acts as a proxy, rendering evaluations as to responsibility even more complex. This article presents a conceptual analyses of intentional misrepresentation of abilities in Paralympic sport, and the differentiation of responsibility for offence thereupon, as stipulated in the draft of the International Standard for Intentional Misrepresentation, accompanying the new 2025 Athlete Classification Code (IPC, Citation2024). Drawing on philosophical and legal analysis we (i) set out existing shortcomings associated with Paralympic classification; (ii) articulate the range of potential intentional misrepresentational acts with respect to classification manipulation; and (iii) articulate the range of negative effects on the integrity of Paralympic sport. (shrink)

A kind of intellectual project characteristic of Ernest Sosa is to resolve an apparently flat-out dispute by showing that it is not after all a zero-sum game. His irenic goal is to do justice to both sides and give each of them most of what it wants. In his subtle paper ‘Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism’ he applies this strategy to the dispute between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. It is a pleasure to engage in discussion with (...) a philosopher of Sosa’s fair-mindedness and analytical skills. (shrink)

A series of sub-chapters summarising the subjective abilities necessary for expression in music: 3.1. A Musical Ear. “Inner hearing” vs. acoustic hearing; perfect pitch. Hearing and understanding (G. Colombero, B. Asaf’ev; C.P.E. Bach, R. Schumann). 3.2. Sound Creation. The method developed by C. Martienssen. “Wunderkind complex”. The author’s recording of the Andante from the Cassation in B flat major (KV 63a) by the 13-year-old W. A. Mozart. Six elements of sound creation: pitch volition (Tonwille); timbre volition (Klangwille) (cf. A. (...) Losev: “the otherness of tone“); line volition (Linienwille) (cf. B. Asaf’ev: “melos“); rhythm volition (Rhythmuswille); form volition (Gestaltwille); forming volition (Gestaltungswille). 3.3. The Psychology of Tone. Physical sound vs. musical tone (G. Hegel, E. Kurth; B. Asaf’ev, Y. Nezaykinskiy; G. Scelsi). 3.4. Modulation. Not only as a change of tonality (Aristoxenus, St. Augustine, Heraclitus, the Venerable Bede; A. Šliogeris; B. Asaf’ev). The beauty of music is revealed through the modulations of sound dictated by intonation. 3.5. Intuition. Intuitivist philosophy of art (H. Bergson; A. Andrijauskas). Intuition as cognition which is unconsciously realised (K. Wojtyla). Intuitive vs. mental cognition. Listening to music is important for the development of intuition, like learning a language which requires one to hear it and accumulate (intonational) vocabulary. 3.6. Becoming. The interpreter must release the potential of the being of the work. Becoming is the basis of temporal art, such as music (A. Losev). Transformation of the visual form of the work into its actualisation in sound through intonation (H. Gadamer: Verwandlung; E. Husserl; H. Bergson; Vydūnas, A. Mickevičius, A. Sverdiolas, A. Šliogeris; S. Kowalczyk). 3.7. Imagination. Creative and recreative imagination. Relation of imagination to expression and understanding (L. Wittgenstein, R. Barthes, A. Schopenhauer). Idea and imagination (I. Kant, J. Maritain, F. Schiller; G. Colombero, G. Gachev, V. Nalimov). The goal in musical performance is beauty, while the means is the education of the imagination (V. Daujotytė). 3.8. Intentionality. Intention and intonation (E. Husserl; J. Stolnitz, R. May). Intentionality as a feature of aesthetic experience, with three phases: aesthetic attitude (introductory emotion), aesthetic process and contemplation. 3.9. Emotions. The psychological truth of the fact in artistic consciousness. What you feel is the precursor to understanding it (Aristotle; E. B. de Condillac, R. Wagner). Art as organised emotion attached to experience. Music as a tonal analogue of emotive life (S. Langer). Emotions and feelings. Three kinds of feelings: intellectual, aesthetic and moral (cf. kalokagathia). Music as the art of emotional intelligence (“sensuous showing of the idea”—G. Hegel; art as a central emotion—L. Vygotsky). Action and emotions (K. Wojtyla). Importance of emotions in author’s recordings of the Lithuanian folk song Tu, paukštuke (“You little bird”) and the music for the drama Caligula (J. Andrejevas). Emotions and values. Intuition of duration and vital impetus (élan vital) (H. Bergson; Ž. Jackūnas, A. Andrijauskas). 3.10. Spirituality. One of the qualities which condition the sense of meaning. Cultural activity as the decoding of the spirit (idea) of the work (P. Mantvydas, J. Kubilius, B. Bitinas). Spirituality and technology (G. Steiner: the fatality of technicity lies in the broken links between techne and poiesis). Inner beauty (W. Kandinsky). Expression influenced by the idea: Syrinx by C. Debussy, with the author as oboe soloist. 3.11. Intonation. The understanding of intonation as the grasp of the work’s idea. It is not the tone that makes music, but music that makes the tone. The work has potential intonational meaning. Actualising of the potentiality depends upon the interpreter. Form as a process and as a scheme (B. Asaf’ev). Structure and form (J. Cage). The freedom of interpretation (freedom as the recognition of necessity—G. Hegel; the artist loves their limitations—G. K. Chesterton). Phonetic and syntactical intonation. Intonation vs. form, tone, rhythm, dynamics, tempo, timbre and articulation. 3.12. Values. Value orientation does not exist within the subject in itself (V. Sesemann): a person is “the measure of all things” (Protagoras). The music of every nation does not lose its distinctive characteristics (M. K. Čiurlionis); the author’s recording of a work by R. Šerkšnytė, inspired by The Little Prince of A. de Saint-Exupéry, which is nevertheless imbued with Lithuanian lyricism. Interpretation presupposes a degree of understanding (“thought was supposed to rule over action”—H. Arendt). Discontent with one’s present self is the first step towards values (T. Sodeika, N. Hartmann). Consciousness, by relating to values, becomes cultural (M. Bakhtin). Avoidance of a hedonistic approach to values (“organic mendacity”—M. Scheler; B. de Spinoza; Ž. Jackūnas). The value of the aesthetic (N. Hartmann; Plato, G. Hegel). Values are the basis of meaningful expression. (shrink)

Emotional intelligence (EI) is conceptualized as a personality trait or an ability. Most of conducted studies on EI-coping association referred to trait emotional intelligence. Therefore, the role of ability emotional intelligence is less clear and need to be further studied. The present study examined the relationship between two EI abilities (emotion recognizing and emotion understanding) and stress coping strategies in adolescent men and women. The data were collected from 1033 Polish high school students (520 men and 512 women) aged (...) 18-20 years (Mage = 18.46 years). Coping strategies were assessed using the COPE inventory and emotional abilities were measured using the Emotional Intelligence Scale – Faces (SIE-T) and the Emotion Understanding Test (TRE). The results supported the existence of an association between EI abilities and coping strategies. The analyses of the interaction effects revealed the moderating role of gender on some of the relationships between EI abilities and coping strategies. (shrink)

Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of (...) the Past with a principle that does not generate this difficulty. I develop such an account and defend it from objections. I also explore some of the account's implications, including whether the account is consistent with presentism. (shrink)

Pinyin is a phonological encoding system used to spell modern Chinese Mandarin due to the phonological opacity of Chinese characters. The present study examined the role of Pinyin spelling in the reading abilities of adolescents learning Chinese as a foreign language. A total of 158 Indonesian senior primary students were tested on Pinyin spelling, character production, listening comprehension, depth of vocabulary knowledge, and reading comprehension. Pinyin spelling skills were assessed by two measures, Pinyin Dictation and Pinyin Tagging. Path analysis (...) revealed that even after controlling for the effect of character production, Pinyin dictation performance influenced reading comprehension through the mediating effect of listening comprehension and the depth of vocabulary knowledge, and Pinyin tagging performance also influenced reading comprehension through the mediating effect of the depth of vocabulary knowledge. The results highlight the importance of Pinyin skills for Chinese reading abilities of CFL learners. As a reliable and explicit indicator of specifying Chinese phonological representations and processing, Pinyin spelling has a long-term and multifaceted influence on higher-level CFL abilities. (shrink)

According to the classical quantificational analysis of modals, an agent has the ability to perform an act iff relevant facts about the agent and her environment are compatible with her performing the act. The analysis faces a number of problems, many of which can be traced to the fact that it takes even accidental performance of an act as proof of the relevant ability. I argue that ability statements are systematically ambiguous: on one reading, accidental performance really is enough; on (...) another, more is required. The stronger notion of ability plays a central role in normative contexts. Both readings, I argue, can be captured within the classical quantificational framework, provided we allow conversational context to impose restrictions not just on the “accessible worlds”, but also on what counts as a performance of the relevant act among these worlds. (shrink)