Inclusion of youth (10–24 years) living with HIV (YLWH) in clinical research is critical to addressing their unique vulnerabilities and improving care outcomes. Examining the role of trust and relationship building in research decision-making is critical to designing ethical recruitment and engagement strategies. We conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with YLWH (10–24 years, enrolled in HIV care at Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare (AMPATH) in western Kenya), caregivers (parents and guardians) of YLWH, and other subject matter experts (SMEs). Interviews focused (...) on barriers, facilitators, and strategies to improve participant-researcher trust and relationship building, with a particular focus on recruitment and engagement strategies. Interviews were conducted with 99 participants (53% male): 40 YLWH [median age 17.5, (range 11–24), 50% female], 20 caregivers of enrolled YLWH (70% female), and 39 SMEs (33% female; 46% community leaders, 26% healthcare providers, 15% clinical researchers, 8% social scientists, 3% international research experts, 2% laboratory experts). All groups indicated trust could be built and broken through research processes. YLWH and SMEs viewed participant identification and study recruitment through medical records as a violation of trust, indicating that their HIV status and health information should remain confidential between themselves and their clinical team. All groups preferred recruitment through existing clinician-YLWH relationships, emphasizing the importance of privacy and confidentially; this strategy was viewed as stronger and more ethical. Losses of confidentiality and mistakes in sample collection that require participants to attend additional, unnecessary research visits or provide additional samples were identified by all groups as additional barriers to relationship-building. YLWH and caregivers discussed researcher characteristics that support relationship-building, emphasizing the importance of positive demeanors and non-stigmatizing behaviors by research personnel. YLWH and SMEs discussed operational needs that foster relationship-building, including proper communication about study procedures, reliably reporting results to participants, and receiving future benefits. Trusting participant-researcher relationships plays an important role in YLWH research decision making and greatly influence the development of ethical recruitment strategies. Study participants highlighted more appropriate and ethical recruitment strategies, stemming from strong participant-researcher relationships. (shrink)

I argue that there is an affective injustice in gendered and racialized oppression. To account for this, we must deny the opposition of affect and intentionality often assumed in the philosophy of emotion and the affective turn: while affect and intentionality are not opposed in principle, affective intentionality may be refused uptake in oppressive practices. In section 1, I read Merleau‐Ponty’s theory of the body schema as a theory of affect that accommodates my account of affective injustice and aligns with (...) accounts of affect transmission and circulation in feminist philosophies of the affective turn. This is crucial for understanding Fanon’s contribution to the theory of the body schema, in which it is susceptible to historical‐racial “affective disorders.” In sections 2–4, I distinguish three types of affective injustice: affective marginalization, exploitation, and violence. In section 2 I develop an intersectional feminist account of this distinction drawing on Lorde and Lugones and raise questions about the limits of framing the issue of affective injustice in terms of intentionality as opposed to a more psychoanalytic conceptual vocabulary that accommodates the displacement of affective force. In sections 3 and 4, I explore these affective injustices through an analysis of Fanonian concepts, showing how the theory of the body schema can accommodate not only affective intentionality but also the oppressive disjunction of affect and intentionality, as well as forms of affective injustice that exceed the oppressive disabling of sense‐making and involve the exploitative and violent displacement of affective force. (shrink)

Anger gaslighting is behavior that tends to make someone doubt herself about her anger. In this paper, I analyze the case of anger gaslighting, using it as a paradigm case to argue that gaslighting can be an affective injustice (not only an epistemic one). Drawing on Marilyn Frye, I introduce the concept of “uptake” as a tool for identifying anger gaslighting behavior (persistent, pervasive uptake refusal for apt anger). But I also demonstrate the larger significance of uptake in the study (...) of affective injustice: just as the concept of credibility names the epistemic behavior whereby we take someone seriously as an epistemic being, the concept of uptake names the uniquely affective cooperative behavior whereby we take someone seriously as an affective being. I answer Miranda Fricker’s epistemic notion of a prejudicial credibility economy with the affective notion of prejudicial uptake economies: uptake, like credibility, can be produced in a deficit for one social group relative to a surplus for another. Deviating from the parallels with Fricker, for whom the injustice of epistemic injustice is due to prejudice in the motives or character of individuals, as well as from accounts that ground it in aptness or affective goods, I suggest that the injustice of anger gaslighting behavior can be located at the structural scale of power relationships between social groups, in the tradition of Iris Marion Young. Anger gaslighting behavior counts as unjust wherever it (re)produces prejudicial uptake economies. Adapting sociological concepts of feeling rules and the emotion work they demand, I introduce the concepts of “uptake rules” and “uptake work” to further enable analysis of uptake economies as affective social structures, and to suggest a site for resistant or reparative affective agency. (shrink)

abstract: The kataleptic impression—an impression that is, in some special way, “true and such as could not be false”—is at the core of Stoic epistemology. Since Gisela Striker’s groundbreaking work on the criterion of truth, the dominant view among scholars is that the Stoics restricted kataleptic impressions to certain perceptual impressions. I argue that the Stoics in fact countenanced nonperceptual kataleptic impressions and explain how they thought nonperceptual impressions can meet the definition of the kataleptic impression.

The pioneering work of Johann Winckelmann (1717-1768) identified a homoerotic appreciation of male beauty in classical Greek sculpture, a fascination that had endured in Western art since the Greeks. Yet after Winckelmann, the value (even the possibility) of art's queer beauty was often denied. Several theorists, notably the philosopher Immanuel Kant, broke sexual attraction and aesthetic appreciation into separate or dueling domains. In turn, sexual desire and aesthetic pleasure had to be profoundly rethought by later writers. Whitney Davis follows (...) how such innovative thinkers as John Addington Symonds, Michel Foucault, and Richard Wollheim rejoined these two domains, reclaiming earlier insights about the mutual implication of sexuality and aesthetics. Addressing texts by Arthur Schopenhauer, Charles Darwin, Oscar Wilde, Vernon Lee, and Sigmund Freud, among many others, Davis criticizes modern approaches, such as Kantian idealism, Darwinism, psychoanalysis, and analytic aesthetics, for either reducing aesthetics to a question of sexuality or for removing sexuality from the aesthetic field altogether. Despite these schematic reductions, sexuality always returns to aesthetics, and aesthetic considerations always recur in sexuality. Davis particularly emphasizes the way in which philosophies of art since the late eighteenth century have responded to nonstandard sexuality, especially homoeroticism, and how theories of nonstandard sexuality have drawn on aesthetics in significant ways. Many imaginative and penetrating critics have wrestled productively, though often inconclusively and "against themselves," with the aesthetic making of sexual life and new forms of art made from reconstituted sexualities. Through a critique that confronts history, philosophy, science, psychology, and dominant theories of art and sexuality, Davis challenges privileged types of sexual and aesthetic creation imagined in modern culture-and assumed today. (shrink)

Moving beyond identity politics while continuing to respect diverse entities and concerns, Whitney A. Bauman builds a planetary politics that better responds to the realities of a pluralistic world. Calling attention to the historical, political, and ecological influences shaping our understanding of nature, religion, humanity, and identity, Bauman collapses the boundaries separating male from female, biology from machine, human from more than human, and religion from science, encouraging readers to embrace hybridity and the inherent fluctuations of an open, evolving (...) global community. As he outlines his planetary ethic, Bauman concurrently develops an environmental ethic of movement that relies not on place but on the daily connections we make across the planet. He shows how both identity politics and environmental ethics fail to realize planetary politics and action, limited as they are by foundational modes of thought that create entire worlds out of their own logic. Introducing a postfoundational vision not rooted in the formal principles of "nature" or "God" and not based in the idea of human exceptionalism, Bauman draws on cutting-edge insights from queer, poststructural, and deconstructive theory and makes a major contribution to the study of religion, science, politics, and ecology. (shrink)

One of the narratives of anger as a pandemic emotion is not diagnostic, but celebratory: anger at racial injustice made a social and political breakthrough during the pandemic. What this breakthrough narrative celebrates is that people who had previously been moved only to alarmed scrutiny of the anger itself and the project of quelling it began instead, not merely to approve of this anger, but to to be oriented and instructed by it, permitting the anti-racist anger of others to sensitize (...) them to the insults and injuries that provoked it. The breakthrough narrative implies that anger is a moral sentiment that can be instructive, not only for the angry person herself, but also for others. This suggests a phenomenonological puzzle: under what description of affective intentionality and its interpersonal and social triangulation would the breakthrough be possible? I draw on Marilyn Frye’s account of anger uptake and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body schema to give an account of the conditions of possibility for the breakthrough narrative. Along the way, I offer an account of uniquely affective hermeneutical injustices, the uniquely affective variety of power at stake in them, and the reparative gesture required to remedy them. (shrink)

The first issue of Hume Studies appeared in April, 1975, edited by my father, John Whitney Davis (1922–96), a professor of philosophy (with special interests in phenomenalism and British empiricism) at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario. In the late 1950s, he'd come to Canada from Boston, where he'd been raised, educated before and after the Second World War, and held his first teaching jobs. Readers of the journal on its fiftieth anniversary might be interested in the (...) recollections of his son. When the first issue appeared, I was seventeen years old and in my final year of high school, already accepted to Harvard College and anxiously looking forward to relocating to Boston—my father's hometown... Read More. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Medical research saves lives--yet all too often, it is thwarted by a review system supposed to safeguard patients that instead creates needless delays and expense. Institutional Review Boards, which exist at every hospital and medical school that conducts medical research, have ended up imposing such complex, draconian conditions that research is frequently damaged, delayed, and distorted. This is why medical miracles like the COVID-19 vaccines, which were developed at warp speed, are far too rare. Instead, medical research in countless areas (...) is kept at a horse-and-buggy pace. The result: unnecessary suffering and avoidable deaths. From Oversight to Overkill vividly recounts the story behind this crisis, one that remains unknown to the general public. Family physician and ethicist Simon Whitney shows how the IRB system was launched in response to scandals like the notorious Tuskegee syphilis study--and how, in recent decades, this well-intentioned program has become increasingly bureaucratic, convoluted, and stifling. Readers will learn how vital breakthroughs in treating conditions from kidney stones to heart attacks and premature birth have been delayed by IRB red tape, forcing doctors and patients to settle for less-effective treatments. They'll see how ill-informed demands from Congressional leaders that regulators "get tough" on scientists have caused respected research institutions to be shut down-with no benefit to the public. And they'll learn about a balanced, common-sense approach to reforming the system that can free scientists from pointless wheel-spinning while still protecting the public from the risks of unethical or careless experimentation. Until now, the debate about the IRB system's failures has been confined to specialty journals in medicine, law, and ethics. From Oversight to Overkill will finally alert citizens about this little-known crisis with America's medical research system-and what can be done about it. (shrink)

Although corporate social responsibility appears to be mutually beneficial for companies and consumers, the modern marketplace has left both parties in vulnerable positions. Consumers are increasingly subjected to incongruent CSR messages such as greenwashing, while companies are trapped in a strategic positioning dilemma with regard to how to most effectively and ethically approach CSR communication. This has led some companies to instead adopt a strategically silent approach, such as greenhushing. To capture this CSR positioning dilemma and test the positioning effects (...) on consumers’ attributions, this study applies attribution theory to conceptualize four distinct CSR positions which reflect varying combinations of congruence or incongruence between a company’s external CSR communication and its actual internal CSR actions. Using an online experiment, the effects of the CSR positions on consumer attributions for intrinsic and extrinsic CSR motivations and purchase intentions were tested across three CSR domains: environmental; labor; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender inclusion. Overall, the findings attest to the significant effect of internal–external congruence-based CSR positioning on how consumers respond to CSR communication. Importantly, the results indicate that discreet positioning is perceived similarly to uniform positioning, while misleading and unethical tactics such as CSR-washing are sure to backfire. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the temporal openness of perceptual experience provides insight into the basic structure of learning. I draw on Husserl's account of the mutability of the retained past inAnalyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, and Merleau‐Ponty's account of the perceptual field, as well as his remarks on habit, inPhenomenology of Perception, in order to elucidate the relation between the perceptual past and the future it portends. More specifically, I argue that retention and habituation in perceptual experience (...) open dimensions of meaning that transform the initial, initiating, experiences in which meaning is first established. As a result, our experience of meaning is always subject to further development that we cannot anticipate. This temporal openness has consequences for our learning to navigate a perceptual field, but also, I argue, for our developing more complex ways of engaging with the world. Specifically, I show how learning requires that we commit ourselves to an object or task before we are in a position to recognize the implications or significance of our commitment. I further consider the role that others play in the inherent openness of learning to the development of new meaning. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to introduce a theory of affective labor as byproductive, a concept I develop through analysis of the phenomenology of various affective labor practices in dialog with feminist scholarship, both on gendered and racialized labor, and on affect and emotion. I motivate my theory in the context of literature on affective and emotional labor in philosophy and the social sciences, engaging the post-Marxist literature on affective and immaterial labor and emphasizing feminist critiques. I argue that (...) affective labor is not only the work of producing affects for others to consume or the reproductive work that rejuvenates and sustains labor power and social life, but also the work of metabolizing waste affects and affective byproducts. Thus, byproductive labor is a neologism I develop to bring into view an affective economy and indeed a political economy of affects to the side of the distinction between productive and reproductive labor in its paid and unpaid variants. I make three central c... (shrink)

Small family businesses have generally been shown to exhibit significant concern for social responsibility, especially at the community level. Despite the reported heterogeneity of family firms in their preferences for and participation in social responsibility, the drivers of such differences are not agreed upon in the literature. We draw from enlightened self-interest and social capital theories by exploring their complementary and competing implications for the effect of duration and community satisfaction on participation in community-oriented social responsibility. Additionally, drawing on the (...) association between gender and self-construal and evidence that gender shapes helping and giving behaviors, we assess the moderating role of the gender of the firm manager in these relationships. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 279 family businesses and find support that gender moderates the relationship between community duration and satisfaction and measures of CSR. (shrink)

I begin by reviewing recent research by Merleau-Ponty scholars opposing aspects of the critique of Merleau-Ponty made by Meltzoff and colleagues based on their studies of neonate imitation. I conclude the need for reopening the case for infant self-other indistinction, starting with a re-examination of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of indistinction in the Sorbonne lectures, and attending especially to the role of affect and to the non-exclusivity of self-other distinction and indistinction. In undertaking that study, I discover the importance of understanding self-other (...) distinction and indistinction in terms of their affective significance. For Merleau-Ponty, self-other indistinction is a virtual or imaginary participation in others’ orientations that he defines as an affective phenomenon. Further, Merleau-Ponty’s account of the advent of the body proper—the aspect of the body image that circumscribes the body as a distinct and private space—theorizes it as an affective innovation. Rather than being a fact of which we at first are ignorant and gradually grow to recognize, distinction from others in the sense that is important to Merleau-Ponty is a situation that must be cultivated and maintained through the negotiation of affective intimacy. Understanding indistinction and distinction in terms of the affective forces that sustain them explains how it is possible for them to coexist. (shrink)

What resources does Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema offer to the Fanonian one? First I show that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body schema is already a theory of affect: one that does not oppose affects to intentionality, positioning them not only as sense but as force, cultivating affective agencies rather than constituting static sense content. Then I argue that by foregrounding the role of affect in both thinkers, we can understand the way in which the historical-racial schema innovates, anticipating (...) and influencing feminist theories of the affective turn – especially Sara Ahmed’s theory of affective economies. The historical-racial schema posits the constitution of affective agencies on a sociogenic scale, and these affective economies in turn account for the possibility of the collapse of the body schema into a racial epidermal schema, a disjunction of affective intentionality Fanon calls “affective tetanization.” Quelles ressources l’analyse du schéma corporel faite par Merleau-Ponty fournit-elle au schéma historico-racial proposé par Fanon? En premier lieu, je vise à montrer que la théorie du schéma corporel de Merleau-Ponty est déjà une théorie de l’affect : une théorie qui n’oppose pas les affects à l’intentionnalité, qui ne les considère pas seulement comme un sens, mais comme une force, en cultivant des agentivités affectives plutôt qu’en constituant des contenus de sens statiques. Ensuite, j’affirmerai qu’en mettant en premier plan le rôle de l’affect chez ces deux penseurs, nous pouvons comprendre les innovations qu’apporte le schéma historico-racial, en anticipant et en influençant les théories féministes du tournant affectif – surtout la théorie de Sara Ahmed au sujet des économies affectives. Le schéma historico-racial établit la constitution d’agentivités affectives sur une échelle sociogénique, et ces économies affectives expliquent à leur tour la possibilité d’une dégradation du schéma corporel en schéma épidermique racial, une disjonction de l’intentionnalité affective que Fanon appelle « tétanisation affective ».Quali risorse può offrire la nozione merleau-pontiana di schema corporeo a quella di Fanon? In primo luogo, mi propongo di mostrare che la teoria dello schema corporeo elaborata da Merleau-Ponty è allo stesso tempo una teoria dell’affetto: una teoria che non oppone la dimensione degli affetti all’intenzionalità, poiché li considera non solo come senso ma come forze, in quanto implicano delle agentività affettive piuttosto che costituire meri contenuti statici di senso. Intendo quindi sostenere che mettendo in evidenza il ruolo dell’affetto in questi due autori sia possibile comprendere il portato innovativo dello schema storico-razziale, che anticipa e influenza le teorie femministe legate all’affective turn – e in particolare la teoria delle economie affettive elaborata da Sara Ahmed. Lo schema storico-razziale afferma la costituzione di agentività affettive a un livello sociogenetico, mentre le economie affettive rendono conto della possibilità del collasso dello schema corporeo in uno schema razziale epidermico, una disgiunzione dell’intenzionalità affettiva che Fanon definisce “tetanizzazione affettiva”. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the conception of _epistēmē_ advanced in Plato’s _Republic_ and defends the claim that _epistēmē_ of perceptibles is impossible from two long-standing objections: that it is philosophically implausible and that it undermines Socrates’ argument that philosophers should rule. The paper argues that _epistēmē_ consists in grasping how a fact either is a fact about or is grounded in facts about natures. It was thus natural for Socrates to rule out _epistēmē_ of perceptibles, since the fact (as he sees (...) it) that predicates apply to perceptibles only in certain circumstances plausibly entails that facts about perceptibles are not appropriately grounded in facts about natures. Nevertheless, philosophers’ opinions (_doxai_) concerning perceptibles are authoritative because they are informed by their _epistēmē_ of intelligibles (in an analogous way, it is here suggested, to how doctors’ medical _opinions_ concerning particular matters of health are authoritative because they are informed by their understanding of health). (shrink)

Recollection is central to the epistemology of Plato’sMeno. After all, the character Socrates claims that recollection is the process whereby embodied human souls bind down true opinions (doxai) and acquire knowledge (epistêmê). This paper examines the exchange between Socrates and Meno’s slave to determine (1) what steps on the path to acquiring knowledge are part of the process of recollection and (2) what is required for a subject to count as having recollected something. I argue that the key to answering (...) these questions is to get clear on the kind of process recollection is supposed to be. In particular, I argue that recollection is a process akin to the kind of process Aristotle calls “changes” (kinêseisor incompleteenergeiai). The key feature of such processes is that they aim at an end beyond themselves and are not complete until that end comes about. In the case of recollection, the end is knowledge, but inferior mental states, such as false opinion, puzzlement (aporia), and true opinion can come about because of a process of recollection without making it the case that the subject has recollected anything. I argue that this interpretation provides a textually supported and philosophically coherent understanding of Socrates’ conception of recollection. (shrink)

Physicians make some medical decisions without disclosure to their patients. Nondisclosure is possible because these are silent decisions to refrain from screening, diagnostic or therapeutic interventions. Nondisclosure is ethically permissible when the usual presumption that the patient should be involved in decisions is defeated by considerations of clinical utility or patient emotional and physical well-being. Some silent decisions - not all - are ethically justified by this standard. Justified silent decisions are typically dependent on the physician's professional judgment, experience and (...) knowledge, and are not likely to be changed by patient preferences. We condemn the inappropriate exclusion of the patient from the decision-making process. However, if a test or treatment is unlikely to yield a net benefit, disclosure and discussion are at times unnecessary. Appropriate silent decisions are ethically justified by such considerations as patient benefit or economy of time. (shrink)

We suggest that the theory of dynamical systems provides a revealing general framework for modeling the representations and mechanism underlying syntactic processing. We show how a particular dynamical model, the Visitation Set Gravitation model of Tabor, Juliano, and Tanenhaus (1997), develops syntactic representations and models a set of contingent frequency effects in parsing that are problematic for other models. We also present new simulations showing how the model accounts for semantic effects in parsing, and propose a new account of the (...) distinction between syntactic and semantic incongruity. The results show how symbolic structures useful in parsing arise as emergent properties of connectionist dynamical systems. (shrink)

Theories of the liberal tradition have relied on independence as a norm of personhood. Feminist theorists such as Eva Kittay in Love's Labor have been instrumental in critiquing normative independence. I explore the role of corporeal vulnerability in Kittay's account of personhood, developing a comparison to the role it plays in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan. Kittay's crucial contribution in Love's Labor is that once we acknowledge the facts of corporeal vulnerability, we must not only acknowledge but also affirm dependency in a (...) genuinely inclusive affirmation of personhood. While endorsing Kittay's “dependency critique,” I discover difficulties that beleaguer Kittay's development of new norms of personhood. I trace these to a dependency of Kittay's account on a crucial premise of the liberal model it resists. I argue that in order to affirm dependency in a manner that departs more thoroughly from the criticized aspects of liberal personhood, we must cease to position it in a dichotomy of power and vulnerability. I suggest that attending to the corporeality of vulnerability can aid us in developing the terms of a discourse affirming relational personhood while undermining that dichotomy. (shrink)

The U.S. agricultural sector relies heavily on agricultural migrant workers, and Florida has a history of (im)migrant labor. However, this system is historically rooted in colonization, and its systems of oppression remain. Currently, migrant workers operate in various systems of oppression, including social, health, and environmental inequities, all of which have been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic. The literature regarding decoloniality, muted group theory, and decolonial intersectionality has a strong history of uncovering how multiple oppressions overlap for vulnerable and marginalized (...) groups in the US. We draw on this literature to ask: 1) how can examining participants’ stories through decolonial intersectionality help explore structural and institutional racism and the dominance of muting? and 2) how can participants recount how they resist oppression and/or unmute in telling their stories? To answer these questions, literary portraits were co-created with farmworkers and community liaisons about participants’ experiences. The authors used decoloniality, muted group theory, and decolonial intersectionality to analyze participants’ creative non-fiction stories. Farmworkers recounted through their stories that they were often devalued, had their humanity questioned, and negotiated their survival, especially during COVID-19. However, they were able to resist the oppressions of coloniality through their families, faith, pride, and love. Recommendations include using storytelling techniques to align with farmworkers’ wants in research as well as assist in communicating about issues regarding health and safety. Non-profit organizations, centers of faith, and universities can assist in serving the needs of agricultural migrant workers related to childcare, food security, and worksite and home safety issues. (shrink)

Introduction : points of departure -- A genealogy of the Christian colonial mindset : ex nihilo from disputed beginnings to orthodox origins -- Ex nihilo and the origin of an empire -- Ex nihilo, erasure and discovery? -- The cogito, ex nihilo, and the legacy of John Locke -- The creation ex nihilo of terra nullius lands : omnipotent nations and the logic of global-colonization -- From epistemologies of domination to grounded thinking -- Opening words about God onto creatio continua (...) -- Creatio continua "all the way down": a post-colonial, planetary understanding of continuing creation -- Conclusion : a brief thought after. (shrink)

Institutional Review Boards and their federal overseers protect human subjects, but this vital work is often dysfunctional despite their conscientious efforts. A cardinal, but unrecognized, explanation is that IRBs are performing a specific function – the management of risk – using a flawed theoretical and practical approach. At the time of the IRB system’s creation, risk management theory emphasized the suppression of risk. Since then, scholars of governance, studying the experience of business and government, have learned that we must distinguish (...) pure from opportunity risks. Pure risks should be suppressed. Some opportunity risks, in contrast, must be accepted if the institution is to meet its goals. Contemporary theory shows how institutions may make these decisions wisely. It also shows how a sound organizational understanding of risk, a proper locus of responsibility, and appropriate institutional oversight all contribute to effective risk management. We can apply this general theory, developed in other contexts, to the problems of the IRB system. Doing so provides a unifying explanation for IRBs’ disparate dysfunctions by spotlighting five related deficiencies in IRB theory and structure. These deficiencies are inability to focus on greater risks, loss of balanced theory, inaccessibility to guidance from senior leadership, unbalanced federal oversight, and inflexibility. These flaws are deeply rooted in the system, and superficial reform cannot resolve them. Congress should overhaul the system to meet contemporary standards of risk management; this would benefit subjects, scientists, and the public that needs the fruits of research. (shrink)

Two collaborators in the Deathworld to Lifeworlds research project explored the intersection between their respective phenomena: unraveling and grief. If life and love provide the opportunity to bind together intricate strands from one’s stocks of knowledge, typifications, and Lifeworlds to form a coherent tapestry of meaning, what experiences face the individual suddenly unraveling from the loss of that love and sense of meaning? Whitney explored the phenomenon of unraveling from a toxic relationship. David explored the grief that ensued from (...) the sudden withdrawal of a romantic partner. Descriptions of unraveling and grief appear separately before a description of the authors’ collaborative meaning-making that occurred when they negotiated the significance their phenomena assumed in light of each other. In grief, where does unraveling locate? Does unraveling happen to the individual with the loss of the object of love? Does the individual unravel from grief, or does grief cause an individual to unravel? We conclude that grief results from and catalyzes unraveling. Moreover, we discovered ironies: that grief and unraveling often work as rivel forces and our collaborative work represented raveling and unraveling as we attempted to discover the whatness of unraveling and grief. (shrink)

Cet article relève une impasse qui apparaît quand les travaux récents sur la suspension du jugement sont intégrés aux solutions évidentialistes au problème de la «mauvaise sorte de raison» : il semble qu’il n’existe aucune raison pour suspendre le jugement. Deux réponses possibles à cette impasse sont considérées ici : l’une redéfinit la suspension du jugement comme une action mentale, l’autre la redéfinit comme une attitude de second ordre. L’article fait valoir que ces réponses n’évitent l’impasse qu’en compromettant de manière (...) inacceptable la notion de suspension du jugement. (shrink)

Withholding or withdrawing life-saving ventilators can become necessary when resources are insufficient. With rising cases in many countries, and likely further peaks in the coming colder seasons, ventilator triage guidance remains a central part of the COVID-19 policy response. The dominant model in ventilator triage guidelines prioritises the ethical principles of saving the most lives and saving the most life-years. We sought to ascertain to what extent this focus aligns, or conflicts, with the preferences of disadvantaged minority populations. We conducted (...) a bibliographical search of PubMed and Google Scholar and reviewed all ventilator rationing guidelines included in major recent systematic reviews, yielding 589 studies before screening. Post screening, we found six studies comprising a total of 10 591 participants, with 1247 from disadvantaged populations. Three studies reported findings stratified by race and age, two of which stratified by income. Studies included two to seven principles; all included ‘save the most lives’. Involvement of disadvantaged minority populations in eliciting preferences is very limited; few studies capture race and income. This is concerning, as despite relatively small numbers and framing effects there is an observable and plausible trend suggesting that disadvantaged groups worry that dominant principles reduce their chances of receiving a ventilator. To avoid compounding prior historical and structural disadvantage, policy makers need to engage more fully with these populations in designing and justifying ventilator rationing guidance and review their adequacy. Likewise, clinicians need to be aware that their implementation of dominant triage guidelines is viewed with higher levels of concern by minority populations. (shrink)

Scholars and practitioners addressing the global food crisis have rarely incorporated perspectives from the world's religious traditions. This lacuna appears in multiple dimensions: until recently, environmentalists have tended to ignore food and agriculture; food justice advocates have focused on food quantities, rather than its method of production; and few scholars of religion have considered agriculture. Faith-based perspectives typically emphasize the dignity and sanctity of creation and offer holistic frameworks that integrate equity, economic, and environmental concerns, often called the three legs (...) of sustainability. Faith-based perspectives can provide new paradigms through which to assess food, consumption, and production and the attendant social relations; assess our scientific, economic, and social approaches; and acknowledge the moral and religious dimensions of the world food crisis. (shrink)

By placing the theories of Jung and Patañjali in dialogue with one another, Consciousness in Jung and Patañjali illuminates significant differences between dual and nondual psychological theory and teases apart the essential discernments that theoreticians must make between epistemic states and ontic beliefs.

What goods are produced by affective labor? And at what cost—are there uniquely affective costs to this sort of production? If we assume that, like any variety of labor, affective labor has the potential for exploitation, we should ask what risks of exploitation are unique to it. Are these dangers of paid, commodified affective labor only? How should we understand the political economy organized around the production and circulation of affects and the racialization and gendering of affective labor?In this article, (...) I suggest that in order to understand the risks of exploitation indigenous to affective labor, we must consider the way in which the production of affects functions according to a logic of transmission... (shrink)

In this paper I examine, and reject, one of the chief philosophical arguments that purports to show that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is incompatible with possessing any beliefs. That argument, first put forward by Jonathan Barnes and since accepted by many philosophers, focuses on the skeptic's resolute suspension of judgment concerning one philosophical issue, namely whether criteria of truth exist. In short, the argument holds that, because skeptics suspend judgment whether criteria of truth exist, they have no basis on which to discriminate (...) between their impressions, which is a necessary condition for belief formation. I show that this argument fails because it misunderstands both the nature of criteria of truth and the epistemic consequences of suspending judgment concerning their existence. Thus, I clear the main philosophical obstacle preventing an interpretation of Pyrrhonism as consistent with possessing beliefs (associated most famously with Michael Frede). (shrink)

The rapid industrialization of the nineteenth century transformed conditions of life in the Western world. It made possible an unprecedented scale of production that demanded new forms of labor and continuous innovation and populated the landscape with evidence of technological prowess. These dramatic changes affected how individuals conceived of themselves and their capabilities. On the one hand, they augmented the power of the individual in relation to the world: scientific discoveries and technological innovations brought natural forces under human control and (...) increased individual productivity. On the other hand, however, they diminished the significance of particular individuals within the world: with the use... (shrink)

In The Search for Freedom, Whitney Pope is interested in how the behavior of people in different times and in different circumstances, acting with and against one another in pursuit of a myriad of both durable and changing goals, has perpetuated freedom or undermined it. Part I addresses Tocqueville's use of such concepts as authority, community, and decentralization in his analysis of freedom and order in Jacksonian democracy and during the French Revolution. Part 2 examines freedom in contemporary context (...) by looking at large organizations: specifically, an American labor union and a large Japanese company. Part 3 turns to Sweden to assess the relationship between freedom and the modern welfare state. Pope's conclusion uses the insights gained from these case studies to flesh out a theory of freedom. An original and timely text, The Search for Freedom will be welcomed by both teachers and students. (shrink)

An introduction to Kant's critical philosophy by George Tapley Whitney. This book is a reproduction of the original book published in 1914 and may have some imperfections such as marks or hand-written notes.

This work explores the complex relationship between science and politics. More specifically, it focuses on the problem of scientism. Scientism is a deformation of science, which unnecessarily restricts the scope of scientific inquiry by placing a dogmatic faith in the method of the natural sciences. Its adherents call for nothing less than a complete transformation of society. Science becomes the idol that can magically cure the perpetual maladies of modern society and of human nature itself. Whitney demonstrates that scientism (...) is intellectually impoverishing and politically dangerous. Whitney surveys the development of scientism from early modernity to the present day, beginning with Francis Bacon, arguing that Bacon stands as the founder, not only of the experimental method, but also of scientism. This is most evident in his presentation of a scientific utopia in New Atlantis. After briefly noting the impact of Isaac Newton and the French Encylopedists, Whitney then moves on to the other great representative figure of scientism: Auguste Comte, who demonstrates the religious fervor that accompanies the scientistic attitude. Continuing on the path set forth by Bacon, Comte argues for a reorganization of society based on the precepts of positive science. The solution to scientism, Whitney advances, lies in a new (or revised) science of politics; the foundation of which is based on the Classical sources that were either discredited or banned outright by the proposals of Bacon and Comte. He concludes the work with contemporary examples of scientism, including the climate change debates, genetic engineering, and the New Atheism movement. (shrink)

While people in the U.S. hold research in high regard, recent years have seen a decline in the confidence attributed to researchers—that is, a decreasing confidence in those doing the work. Critiques from research participants have noted that some researchers abscond knowledge, expose participants or contort them into legibility, and misconstrue representations of participants’ contributions. We raise the question of what methodology and practices might suit the objectives of both researchers and participants. To investigate the question of suitability, this article (...) explores how feminist theorists, disability scholars, and feminist disability researchers have wielded phenomenology to reconstitute research praxis. We consider principles of phenomenology broadly, and feminist phenomenology specifically, that foster more conducive researcher-participant interactions. We conclude by noting supplementary practices that might magnify the methodology’s inclusion-building capacity. It is our hope that this critique will support researcher practices, grounded in relationality and mutuality, that lead to greater inclusivity and empowerment, culminating in improved public trust. (shrink)

This chapter investigates whether search engines and other new modes of online communication should be covered by free speech principles. It criticizes the analogical reasoning that contemporary American courts and scholars have used to liken search engines to newspapers, and to extend free speech coverage to them based on that likeness. There are dissimilarities between search engines and newspapers that undermine the key analogy, and also rival analogies that can be drawn which do not recommend free speech protection for search (...) engines. Partly on these bases, we argue that an analogical approach to questions of free speech coverage is of limited use in this context. Credible verdicts about how free speech principles should apply to new modes of online communication require us to re-excavate the normative foundations of free speech. This method for deciding free speech coverage suggests that only a subset of search engine outputs and similar online communication should receive special protection against government regulation. (shrink)

This paper examines the affiliation and position of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics within the phenomenological tradition. The first part analyzes Gadamer’s objections to the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. Particular attention is given to Gadamer’s critique of the claim to ultimate grounding (_Letztbegründung_) and its relation to the concept of the _Lebenswelt_. The second part reconstructs Gadamer’s phenomenological appropriation of the concept of _play_, understood as an attitude of openness free from foundationalist commitments. Drawing on Heidegger’s reinterpretation of the phenomenological (...) project, Gadamer conceives philosophical hermeneutics as a non-dogmatic reformulation of phenomenology’s program and its original philosophical impulse. His relation to phenomenology may thus be described as one of _critical affiliation._. (shrink)

This article follows shorebirds—migratory animals that have gone from game to nongame animals over the course of the past century in North America—as a way to track modern field biology, bureaucratic institutions, and the valuation of wildlife. Doing so allows me to make interrelated arguments about the history of wildlife management and science. The first is to note the endurance of observation-based natural history methods in field biology over the long twentieth century and the importance of these methods for the (...) persistent contribution of amateurs. The second major line of argument advances the historical significance of scientific, government bureaucracies as sites of natural knowledge production. Historians of biology and ecology have tended to stress scientists with institutional homes in universities, museums, and at land-grant field stations—particularly as various forms of field biology became professionalized over the twentieth century. In contrast, migratory animals like shorebirds, whether under the auspices of the US Biological Survey or the contemporary Fish and Wildlife Service, were primarily studied and conserved by biologists in bureaucratic agencies. Mid- to low-level bureaucrats, along with avocational birders, have mainly been responsible for developing what we know about shorebird migration, behavior, and life history. And third, shorebirds foreground the importance of bureaucratic context for the valuation of nature, from their economic value to agriculture in the early twentieth century to their value as rare, endangered species in the twentyfirst. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in the context of a shareholder risk model. We first differentiate shareholders and nonshareholders with regard to the nature of their risks, their awareness of risks, their abilities to avoid risk, and their abilities to ensure compensation for risk. We then develop a model of measuring the risks facing stakeholders that addresses human risk magnitude and environmental risk magnitude. We conclude with implications for theory and practice.