Should voting be compulsory? This question has recently gained the attention of political scientists, politicians and philosophers, many of whom believe that countries, like Britain, which have never had compulsion, ought to adopt it. The arguments are a mixture of principle and political calculation, reflecting the idea that compulsory voting is morally right and that it is will prove beneficial. This article casts a sceptical eye on the claims, by emphasizing how complex political morality and strategy can be. (...) Hence, I show, while there are good reasons to worry about voter turnout in established democracies, and to worry about inequalities of turnout as well, the case for compulsory voting is unpersuasive. (shrink)

We propose a Condorcet-consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, in contrast to other clone-independent methods, Split Cycle mitigates (...) both “spoiler effects” and “strong no show paradoxes.”. (shrink)

Through a set of CAWI surveys fielded in the context of the latest elections in Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United States, held between 2020 and 2022, we retrieve data on negative voting covering presidential, semi-presidential, Westminster parliamentary and proportional parliamentary systems. Our results show that negative voting is present across all elections, but with significant variation across the different countries.

In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet methods, (...) namely that the choice of winners depends only on the ordering of majority margins by size. (shrink)

Because you are highly unlikely to cast the deciding vote in the next elections, it is often said that you don’t have a reason to vote in order to change the outcomes. In a recent paper, however, Zach Barnett forcefully argues that this is a mistake. He shows how it follows, from rather conservative assumptions, that in many real-life cases the expected social value of voting is higher than its cost. Barnett is successful, we believe, in showing that the (...) commonly held belief – that voters do not have a reason to vote in order to change the outcomes – is way too hasty. However, Barnett is – we argue in this paper – too quick on one key premise, and once this is noticed, it becomes unclear how often Barnett’s reasoning can point to a justification of voting to change the outcomes. Barnett’s reasoning, we conclude, may apply to significantly less real-life scenarios than he suggests. (shrink)

Several prominent, contemporary theories of actual causation maintain that in order for something to count as an actual cause (in the circumstances) of some known effect, the potential cause must be a difference-maker with respect to the effect in some restricted range of circumstances. Although the theories disagree about how to restrict the range of circumstances that must be considered in deciding whether something counts as an actual cause of a known effect, the theories agree that at least some counterfactual (...) circumstances must be considered. I argue that the theories are still too permissive in the range of counterfactual circumstances they admit for consideration, and I present simple counter-examples that make use of this overpermissiveness. (shrink)

We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate A' who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between such candidates). (...) We call this principle Stability for Winners (with Tiebreaking). Stable Voting satisfies this principle while also having a remarkable ability to avoid tied outcomes in elections even with small numbers of voters. (shrink)

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are interactive online tools designed to assist voters by improving the basis on which they decide how to vote. In recent years, they have been widely adopted, but their design is the subject of ongoing and often heated criticism. Most of these debates focus on whether VAAs accurately measure the standpoints of political parties and the preferences of users and on whether they report valid results while avoiding political bias. It is generally assumed that if (...) their methodology is sound, then VAAs can be seen as strengthening the democratic process. But as we argue in this chapter, the setup of VAAs raises basic questions of normative democratic theory as well. Insofar as VAAs are supposed to improve the functioning of the democratic process, it must be clarified in what sense they aim to make a contribution, before it even makes sense to discuss their effectiveness at doing so. VAAs are often intended to enhance the democratic process by one or all of the following: (I) informing voters about the policy standpoints of political parties (or individual candidates), (2) increasing voter turnout, and (3) ensuring that the composition of parliaments more accurately reflects the political attitudes of the electorate. In the next three sections, we discuss three central bones of contention in current democratic theory that are crucial to these ways in which VAAs typically take themselves to contribute to strengthening the democratic process: 1. Questions about citizen competence: What forms of competence do citizens need to have, and to what extent, for a democracy to function properly? 2. Questions about political participation: What forms and extent of participation are vital to democracy? 3. Questions about democratic representation: How should the relation between the elected and the electorate be understood? For each issue we aim to show, first, how the design and setup of mainstream VAAs are tacitly structured by a specific conception of the democratic aim at issue and, second, what some alternative positions on these questions are within contemporary political theory. In the final section, we will discuss some of the implications of this analysis for the responsibilities of VAA developers, and particularly for the procedural neutrality to which they are typically committed. Our conclusion will be that once these issues are identified, developers of VAAs should either argue in favour of their views on democratic competence, participation and representation, or they should rethink the design of VA As in ways that move beyond their current assumptions, or both. (shrink)

As part of recent epistemic challenges to democracy, some have endorsed the implementation of epistemic constraints on voting, institutional mechanisms that bar incompetent voters from participating in public decision-making procedures. This proposal is often considered incompatible with a commitment to political equality. In this paper, I aim to dispute the strength of this latter claim by offering a theoretical justification for epistemic constraints on voting that does not rest on antiegalitarian commitments. Call this the civic accountability justification for (...) epistemic constraints on voting. On this view, voters stand to one another in a normative relation of reciprocal accountability that requires them to uphold an epistemically responsible conduct. Modest epistemic constraints on voting are justifiable because they secure that participation in voting is conforming to this normative requirement. Thanks to its distinctive features, the civic accountability justification can overcome two problems that egalitarians commonly associate with the idea of epistemic constraints on voting: the disrespect problem and the hierarchy problem. (shrink)

In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a candidate x would be among the winners, adding another voter to the election who ranks x first does not cause x to lose. Surprisingly, a number of standard voting methods violate this natural property. In this paper, we (...) investigate different ways of measuring the extent to which a voting method violates PI, using computer simulations. We consider the probability (under different probability models for preferences) of PI violations in randomly drawn profiles vs. profile-coalition pairs (involving coalitions of different sizes). We argue that in order to choose between a voting method that satisfies PI and one that does not, we should consider the probability of PI violation conditional on the voting methods choosing different winners. We should also relativize the probability of PI violation to what we call voter potency, the probability that a voter causes a candidate to lose. Although absolute frequencies of PI violations may be low, after this conditioning and relativization, we see that under certain voting methods that violate PI, much of a voter's potency is turned against them - in particular, against their desire to see their favorite candidate elected. (shrink)

This paper argues for the legalization of vote markets. I contend that the state should not prohibit the sale of votes under certain institutional conditions. Jason Brennan has recently argued for the moral permissibility of vote selling; yet, thus far, no philosopher has argued for the legal permissibility of vote selling. I begin by giving four prima facie reasons in favour of legalizing vote markets. First, vote markets benefit both buyers and sellers. Second, citizens already enjoy significant discretion in their (...) use of their vote, including the ability to use their vote in ways antithetical to justice and the public interest. Third, vote markets are relevantly similar to other democratic practices that are legally permissible. Fourth, vote markets enable elections to better reflect the intensity of citizens’ preferences. Next, I reply to two counter-arguments. The first contends that vote markets will increase the political power of the wealthy; the second contends that votes must be used in the serv.. (shrink)

If we break an instant runoff voting (IRV) election into stages or rounds by tallying votes, identifying the plurality winner, eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes and redistributing their votes, then repeating this process, we obtain a series of plurality winners (i.e. so-called transient winners), one for each stage. This process models the situation that arises in several real-life scenarios such as the Tour de France cycling race and in some political leadership contests. But how many different transient (...) winners could be obtained in this way? Here we explore upper bounds for the number of different transient winners that could be obtained in single peaked models of IRV elections, and show that these bounds can be met. Through simulation we demonstrate that the number of possible profiles that meet the bound is likely very small. (shrink)

The issue of voting rights for older children has been high on the political and philosophical agenda for quite some time now, and not without reason. Aside from principled moral and philosophical reasons why it is an important matter, many economic, environmental, and political issues are currently being decided—sometimes through indecision—that greatly impact the future of today’s children. Past and current generations of adults have, arguably, mortgaged their children’s future, and this makes the question whether (some) children should be (...) granted the right to vote all the more pressing. Should (some) children be given the right to vote? Moreover, does the answer to this question depend on civic education, on whether children have been deliberately prepared for the exercise of that right? These are the questions that will occupy us in this article. Our answer to the first will be that older children—children roughly between 14 and 16 years of age1—ought to be given the right to vote. (shrink)

We show a prototype of a system that uses multiwinner voting to suggest resources (such as movies) related to a given query set (such as a movie that one enjoys). Depending on the voting rule used, the system can either provide resources very closely related to the query set or a broader spectrum of options. We show how this ability can be interpreted as a way of controlling the diversity of the results. We test our system both on (...) synthetic data and on the real-life collection of movie ratings from the MovieLens dataset. We also present a visual comparison of the search results corresponding to selected diversity levels. (shrink)

What limits should there be on the areas of life that are governed by market forces? For many years, no one seriously defended the buying and selling votes for political elections. In recent years, however, this situation has changed, with a number of authors defending the permissibility of vote markets. One popular objection to such markets is that they would lead to a tyranny of wealth, where the poor are politically dominated by the rich. In a recent paper, Taylor :313–328, (...) 2017. doi: 10.1007/s11158-016-9327-0) has argued that this objection can be avoided if certain restrictions are placed on vote markets. In this paper we will argue that this attempt to rebut an argument against vote markets is unsuccessful. Either vote markets secure their purported benefits but then they inevitably lead to a tyranny of wealth, or they are restricted so heavily that they lack the features that have been claimed to make vote markets attractive in the first place. Using Taylor’s proposal as a test case, we make the more general claim that vote markets cannot avoid the tyranny of wealth objection and bring about their supposed benefits at the same time. (shrink)

In voting theory, monotonicity is the axiom that an improvement in the ranking of a candidate by voters cannot cause a candidate who would otherwise win to lose. The participation axiom states that the sincere report of a voter’s preferences cannot cause an outcome that the voter regards as less attractive than the one that would result from the voter’s non-participation. This article identifies three binary distinctions in the types of circumstances in which failures of monotonicity or participation can (...) occur. Two of the three distinctions apply to monotonicity, while one of those and the third apply to participation. The distinction that is unique to monotonicity is whether the voters whose changed rankings demonstrate non-monotonicity are better off or worse off. The distinction that is unique to participation is whether the marginally participating voter causes his first choice to lose or his last choice to win. The overlapping distinction is whether the profile of voters’ rankings has a Condorcet winner or a cycle at the top. This article traces the occurrence of all of the resulting combination of characteristics in the voting methods that can exhibit failures of monotonicity. (shrink)

This paper explains alternative views about the nature and value of childhood, and how particular conceptions of childhood matter to a practical issue relevant to the topic of the book: children's voting rights. I don't defend any particular view on this matter; rather, I explain how recent accounts of what is uniquely good or bad about being a child bear on arguments for and against enfranchising children. I also explain why children who live in a society in which many (...) adults fail to comply with their duties of intergenerational justice have a weightier interest in voting, and hence why the case for children's enfranchisement is stronger in such cases. (shrink)

This paper builds upon the work of Dougherty and Heckelman (J Polit Econ 65:101936, 2020) by determining the frequency that 13 voting systems violate Arrow’s social choice criteria with up to six alternatives. These results determine which of the 13 voting systems, is the fairest based on their probabilistic likelihood of violating Arrow’s social choice criteria. The voting systems considered are: Plurality, Borda, Dowdall, Top Two, Hare, Coombs, Baldwin, Copeland, Anti-Plurality, Nanson, Ranked Pairs, Pairwise Majority, and Minimax. (...) Elections with up to 10,000 voters and between three and six alternatives are simulated using both Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous Culture. These simulations show that Pairwise Majority is the least likely to jointly violate Arrow’s criteria. As the number of alternatives increases, the joint-violation frequencies increase for each voting method. For all systems except Pairwise Majority, the joint-violation frequencies in elections with at least 30 voters and four alternatives are greater than 98%. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper provides an overview of the ethical challenges facing voters in democratic elections. It starts by examining the assumptions that underpin contemporary claims about the moral and epistemic advantages of lotteries as compared to elections and shows their similarities to arguments for ‘unveiling the vote’, as Brennan and Pettit put it. (G. Brennan & Pettit, 1990) It looks at the empirical and normative difficulties of these claims and highlights the risk of confusing morally misguided voting with injustice, and (...) of supposing that it must be politically consequential. Finally, the paper casts doubt on the claim that democracy implies that voters should be publicly accountable to each other for their vote and that the secret ballot is, therefore, a regrettable, if necessary, concession of principle to sad reality. It concludes by drawing out the implications of its analysis for the ethics of voting in ideal, non-ideal and highly non-ideal situations. (shrink)

Most refugees residing in the European Union (EU) do not retain their voting rights in states of origin or lack the means to exercise them effectively. Most member states of the EU do not extend voting rights to refugees. This leaves a large population of refugees residing within the borders of the EU in a unique state of disenfranchisement. In this article, I consider this problem from a democratic perspective. Should refugees in the EU have voting rights? (...) My answer turns on three aspects characterizing the circumstances of refugees: First, refugees reside in member states for an indeterminate, and typically protracted, amount of time without any exit options. Second, the political governance of the EU and its member states significantly shapes the lives of refugees. And third, refugees lack effective voting rights, and consequently, a meaningful political membership, in any political community across the world. In turn, based on an all-subjected principle of democratic inclusion, I argue that refugees should be secured state-level voting rights in member states, albeit with a condition of the period of residency. Moreover, they should have immediate voting rights at the supranational institutions of the EU such as the European Parliament. (shrink)

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition gen- eralizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove (...) a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results provide new support for the robustness of majority rule. (shrink)

Can it be rational for someone to vote in a democratic election on the grounds that she intends to make a difference to the outcome? Standard rational choice theory gives a negative answer. But this negative answer hinges on an assumption about causal efficacy that has been effectively challenged by Alvin Goldman and Richard Tuck. The assumption is that causal efficacy requires that, if one had voted differently, the outcome would have been different. Against this, Goldman and Tuck contend that (...) a vote is causally efficacious just in case it is among the votes that are, in a suitable way, sufficient for the outcome. This chapter critically examines the Goldman/Tuck account. It finds reason to doubt both its explanatory and normative ambitions. (shrink)

Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce an equal impact power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on (...) equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players. (shrink)

In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters’ preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (Group Decision and Negotiation 10:287–316, 2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, and Weak (...) Separability. In a similar way, we obtain a characterization for the Maximax SWF by using Bottom Invariance instead of Top Invariance. Then, these results are compared to the axiomatic characterizations of two famous scoring rules, the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule. (shrink)

In this provocative book, Jason Brennan challenges our fundamental assumptions about voting, revealing why it is not a duty for most citizens--in fact, he...

The secrecy of the ballot, a crucial basic element of representative democracy, is under threat. Attempts to make voting more convenient in the face of declining turnout – and the rise of the “ballot selfie” – are making it harder to guarantee secrecy. Leading scholars James Johnson and Susan Orr go back to basics to analyze the fundamental issues surrounding the secret ballot, showing how secrecy works to protect voters from coercion and bribery. They argue, however, that this protection (...) was always incomplete: faced with effective ballot secrecy, powerful actors turned to manipulating turnout – buying presence or absence at the polls – to obtain their electoral goals. The authors proceed to show how making both voting and voting in secret mandatory would foreclose both undue influence and turnout manipulation. This would enhance freedom for voters by liberating them from coercion or bribery in their choice of both whether and how to vote. This thought-provoking and insightful text will be invaluable for students and scholars of democratic theory, elections and voting, and political behavior. (shrink)

“Almost everyone,” Ronald Dworkin wrote in Sovereign Virtue, “assumes that democracy means equal voting power.” What, then, is voting power? The standard view defines it as the probability that a vote changes the outcome assuming that each possible combination of votes is equiprobable. This has significant implications: institutions like the US Electoral College give disproportionate voting power to voters in large states. But the standard view cannot be true. As an a priori account, it rests on the (...) principle of indifference, and thus faces the problem of multiple partitions: we could assign an equal probability to each possible combination of votes or to each possible vote share. The choice to partition in terms of combinations of votes is arbitrary, and makes the standard view objectionably overconfident. These problems of arbitrariness and overconfidence undermine the standard view’s main implications. And they call into question whether equal voting power should play a central role in democratic theory. (shrink)

Panels, boards, and committees throughout society evaluate all manner of things by grading them, first individually and then collectively. Thus risks are prioritized, research proposals are funded, and candidates are shortlisted for jobs. It is not usual to pick winners in political elections by grading the candidates, but there are examples in history. This article takes up a question about the quality of judgments and decisions made by grading: under which conditions are they likely to be right? An answer comes (...) in the form of a jury theorem for median grading. Here, the collective grade for a thing is the median of its individually assigned grades—the one in the middle, when all of them are listed from "top" to "bottom." A second objective of this article is to suggest a solution to problems of voter ignorance in democracies. The idea is for democratic assemblies to use voting methods that make more of people's limited knowledge than do commonly used methods, such as majority voting. It turns out that in theory anyway, and perhaps also in practice, median grading can enable unenlightened assemblies to “track the truth”—even as majority voting would run them off the rails. (shrink)

There are various ways to reach a group decision on a factual yes–no question. One way is to vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses—a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy, it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. (...) Besides, the resulting consensus may be far away from the truth. And so we ask: Is deliberation truth-conducive in the sense that majority voting is? To address this question, we construct a highly idealized model of a particular deliberation process, inspired by the movie Twelve Angry Men, and show that the answer is ‘yes’. Deliberation procedures can be truth-conducive just as the voting procedure is. We then explore, again on the basis of our model and using agent-based simulations, under which conditions it is better epistemically to deliberate than to vote. Our analysis shows that there are contexts in which deliberation is epistemically preferable and we will provide reasons for why this is so. (shrink)

Recent political developments cast doubt on the wisdom of democratic decision-making. Brexit, the Colombian people's (initial) rejection of peace with the FARC, and the election of Donald Trump suggest that the time is right to explore alternatives to democracy. In this essay, I describe and defend the epistocratic system of government which is, given current theoretical and empirical knowledge, most likely to produce optimal political outcomes—or at least better outcomes than democracy produces. To wit, we should expand the suffrage as (...) wide as possible and weight citizens’ votes in accordance with their competence. As it turns out, the optimal system is closely related to J. S. Mill's plural voting proposal. I also explain how voters’ competences can be precisely determined, without reference to an objective standard of correctness and without generating invidious comparisons between voters. (shrink)

The democratic egalitarian ideal requires that everyone should enjoy equal power over the world through voting. If it is improper to vote twice in the same election, why should it be permissible for dual citizens to vote in two different places? Several possible excuses are considered and rejected.

In recent years, democrats both inside and outside the academy have begun to reconsider the merits of the age-old practice of sortition, the random selection of political officials. Despite this fact, however, the comparative assessment of the merits of voting and sortition remains in its infancy. This paper will advance this project by treating the problem of assigning public responsibilities as a problem of allocative justice. To treat the problem in this manner is to treat public office as a (...) type of good to which citizens might have various claims. Random selection is the appropriate method for distributing public office when all citizens have equal claims to that office and there is not enough to go around. Universal distribution is more appropriate when all claimants have equal claims to the office and there is enough to go around (as with universal suffrage, for example). Election (or possibly other procedures, such as appointment) makes sense when citizens do not enjoy equal claims to the office and that office is in scarce supply. This approach captures a crucial component of democratic equality. Different understandings of democratic equality lay behind sortition and election. Each might be appropriate under different circumstances, but both place rights-based constraints on the design of a democratic political system. (shrink)

Jason Brennan argues that people are morally obligated not to vote badly, where voting badly is voting “without sufficient reason” for harmful or unjust policies or candidates. His argument is: (1) One has an obligation not to engage in collectively harmful activities when refraining from such activities does not impose significant personal costs. (2) Voting badly is to engage in a collectively harmful activity, while abstaining imposes low personal costs. (3) Therefore, one should not vote badly. This (...) paper shows that Brennan never adequately clarifies (1) and that, on every plausible clarification, (2) is false. (shrink)

The ethics of voting is a new field of academic research, uniting debates in ethics and public policy, democratic theory and more empirical studies of politics. A central question in this emerging field is whether or not voters should be legally required to vote. This chapter examines different arguments on behalf of compulsory voting, arguing that these do not generally succeed, although compulsory voting might be justified in certain special cases. However, adequately specifying the forms of voluntary (...) voting that are consistent with democratic norms is likely to be philosophically complex and politically controversial. (shrink)

Is voting a duty of democratic citizenship? This article advances a new argument for the existence of a duty to vote. It argues that every normative account of electoral representation requires universal turnout to function in line with its own internal normative logic. This generates a special obligation for citizens to vote in electoral representative contexts as a function of the role morality of democratic citizenship. Because voting uniquely authorizes office holding in representative democracies, and because universal turnout (...) contributes powerfully to representation being fair, to be a good citizen of such democracies requires one to vote. Whereas previous arguments for a duty to vote have invoked basic moral principles like fairness or a Samaritan duty of rescue, this account is based on citizens occupying a vital functional role within electoral representative institutions. This institutional duty solves the “specificity problem” of justifying a duty to vote better than competing accounts and also immunizes the duty to objections that there is no duty to vote when there are only bad choices and that there is a no duty to vote but rather duty to vote well. By emphasizing the tight connection between institutions and individual conduct, the role morality approach used here supplies a less abstract and more realistic framework than much previous research on the ethics of democratic citizenship and brings the debate closer to constitutive features of democratic politics. (shrink)

Recent attempts to provide a viable account of decision making under normative uncertainty through the use of voting procedures seem promising, but incomparable options pose a challenge. This paper focuses on the so-called Borda approach to decision making under normative uncertainty (MacAskill, Mind 125(500):967–1004, 2016 ; MacAskill et al., Moral uncertainty, Oxford University Press, 2020 ) and illustrates how an extended version of it aimed at accommodating incomplete preference orderings associated with normative theories fails. I propose a different account (...) for proponents fond of the voter-theoretic approach that is grounded by _approval voting_, which sufficiently addresses the problem of option incomparability and is pragmatically compelling due to its simpler structure. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel single-winner voting system. After a brief review of existing systems, a variation of range voting is described, in which the winner is the candidate minimizing the total square dislike expressed by the voters. I argue that this method chooses the candidate who is, in a sense made precise, the most representative of the views of the electorate.

Voting is a collective activity: it requires more than one person to win a vote. In a corporation, voting allows the winning idea to become an intention of the corporate group once the vote is concluded. In this paper, argue that unlike in corporate boards, in a democratic election, the voting process does not create a group intention. The difference between the two processes is an oft-overlooked moment directly after the corporate vote in which members on the (...) losing side ratify the decision of the group and move on with the group into the future. In state elections, because of the high cost of renouncing membership, there is typically no ratification moment. While different groups do have collective intentions prior to an electoral vote, the vote itself does not manifest the intention of a group agent such as ‘the People.’ This conclusion has implications for minority rights. (shrink)

A clearer pattern stands out regarding the political profile of negative voters. The findings from the analysis of the magnitude and direction of negative voting in the different countries confirm the intuition that negative voting is largely motivated by a reaction to incumbency performance. Negative voters hold more negative views of the country’s economic performance and therefore engage more frequently in anti-incumbency voting.

We discuss issues related with the measurement of negative voting in multi-party democracies. Using proxies of negative voting questions from pre-existent data sources, we are able to get a rough sense of the relevance of negative voting in different elections. Nonetheless, the limited availability of these items across countries hinders comparative analyses. Most importantly, concerns regarding measurement equivalence across elections make these suboptimal instruments for the purposes of this study.

In this chapter, we explore the relationship between exposure to political information in old and new media, and negative voting in the five elections analyzed. The results suggest that consumers of political information on newspapers and television generally tend to vote for, rather than against. Contrary to our original expectation, negative voters do not seem to be avid political news’ consumers whose attitudes are largely contaminated by the degree of negativity in political communication. Across most countries, the results generally (...) challenge our assumption that a higher exposure to political content on the news media is conductive to negative voting. Congruent with this pattern of political disengagement, negative voters seem to consume less political information than positive voters, be it on television, newspapers, or social media platforms. (shrink)

The analyses presented in this chapter show quite clearly that negative voting is inversely related to the strength of partisanship. The largest share of negative voters in each country is to be found among independents and leaners. The results also show that negative voters are less aligned ideologically with the party they voted for than positive voters. In other words, much like observed with partisanship, feelings of ideological closeness to the in-party tend to depress negative voting and foster (...) positive voting. (shrink)

This chapter describes the design, implementation, and execution of the i-voting pilot of the mGov4EU project. The pilot has integrated some of the main building blocks of the project into an i-voting software and has demonstrated their functionality applied to a real use case. The chapter also describes the experience and lessons learned while passing from a laboratory proof of concept to the deployments to be used by real users both at the University of Tartu in a first (...) stage and at the University of Stuttgart in a second stage. During the first stage, the identification with eIDAS has been tested, and during the second stage, validation of documents retrieved via single digital gateway (SDG) components and authorizing users to vote in the election have been tested. Also, some insights obtained from the final users of the pilots have been presented. (shrink)

The relative desirability of a voting procedure is assessed, inter alia, by verifying which axioms, or postulates, it satisfies or violates. One of these axioms is the subset choice condition (SCC). This axiom requires that if a candidate, x, is elected under a given voting procedure, f, in a profile consisting of n voters and k competing candidates (n, k > 1), then x ought to be elected by f also in such profiles over any proper subset of (...) candidates that contain x and that preserve the pairwise preference relations of the original profile. Most known voting procedures violate, in general, this axiom. However, we were interested to find out which voting procedures satisfy or violate this axiom under a restricted domain assumption where a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile by the investigated voting procedure. It turns out that, obviously, all conceivable Condorcet-consistent voting procedures satisfy SCC under this restricted domain assumption. However, most known non-Condorcet-consistent procedures continue to violate SCC even under the restricted domain assumption. (shrink)

Prevailing opinion—defended by Jason Brennan and others—is that voting to change the outcome is irrational, since although the payoffs of tipping an election can be quite large, the probability of doing so is extraordinarily small. This paper argues that prevailing opinion is incorrect. Voting is shown to be rational so long as two conditions are satisfied: First, the average social benefit of electing the better candidate must be at least twice as great as the individual cost of (...) class='Hi'>voting, and second, the chance of casting the decisive vote must be at least 1/N, where N stands for the number of citizens. It is argued that both of these conditions are often true in the real world. (shrink)

Political discourse is saturated with metaphor, but evidence for the persuasive power of this language has been hard to come by. We addressed this issue by investigating whether voting intentions were affected by implicit mappings suggested by a metaphorically framed message, drawing on a real-world example of political rhetoric about the federal budget. In the first experiment, the federal budget was framed as similar to or different from a household budget, though the information participants received was identical in both (...) conditions. When the federal budget was described as similar to a household's, people considered the personal finances of a presidential candidate more relevant—a finding we replicated in a larger, pre-registered study. In a follow-up experiment, we presented participants with a more explicit rhetorical argument and found a similar effect, moderated by political affiliation. These studies illuminate how metaphorical comparison affects cognition for important real-world issues, sometimes in unintended ways. (shrink)

What is wrong with participating in a democratic decision-making process, and then doing something other than the outcome of the decision? It is often thought that collective decision-making entails being prima facie bound to the outcome of that decision, although little analysis has been done on why that is the case. Conventional perspectives are inadequate to explain its wrongness. I offer a new and more robust analysis on the nature of voting: voting when you will accept the outcome (...) only if the decision goes your way is an act of bad faith: you are not taking part in a ‘process that decides what we will do’. This analysis sheds light on understanding the intrinsic nature of voting and what we are doing when we make decisions collectively. (shrink)

Self-interest voting is irrational when it has even a small cost, but it can be rational for those who care about others; its expected utility (EU) may exceed its cost. For cosmopolitan voters (those who care about outsiders), the EU of voting increases with the number of affected others. The EU of voting for the good of the world now and in the future can thus be large. In some cases, the EU of parochial voting (e.g., (...) considering only one's nation) may not cross the cost threshold, but cosmopolitan voting can cross it. I apply these principles to various kinds of voting. And I compare voting to charity. Voting has the advantage of enlisting the coercive power of the state, but charity can be more focused on effective policies. I discuss campaign contributions, and I conclude with a discussion of the existence of utilitarian voters. (shrink)