Verificationism has had a bad press for many years. The view that the meaning of our words is bound up with the discernible difference it would make if what we say, think or write were true or false, nowadays is scorned as “positivist” though it was shared by eminent empiricists and pragmatists. This paper seeks to sort through some of the complexities of what is often portrayed as an unduly simplistic conception. I begin with an overview of its main (...) logical empiricist varieties before considering which aspects of it fall victim to which of the three major types of objection that have been raised against it. I will conclude that what is left standing is a modest proposal that seems worth further investigation. (shrink)

This article attempts to explore Hilary Putnam's understanding of pragmatic verificationism, which plays a significant role in his philosophy, within the context of his critiques of metaphysical realism. Although Putnam, who presents a new perspective on the concept of truth, does not explicitly state that he has constructed it within the framework of pragmatic principles, we argue in this study. Upon examining his thoughts, it can be seen that his later ideas, in particular, are consistent with a pragmatic philosophical (...) understanding. Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism, along with logical positivism's critiques of verificationism and Popper's critiques of induction, shape his approach to truth and verificationism. Based on this, after presenting these critiques, we attempt to present the Putnamian version of pragmatic verificationism. In short, our study argues that Putnam is a pragmatic verificationist when it is recognized that he has introduced a new dimension to the concept of truth within the framework of his critiques of metaphysical realism. (shrink)

The term verificationism is used in two different ways: the first is in relation to the verification principle of meaning, which we usually and rightly associate with the logical empiricists, although, as we now know, it derives in reality from Wittgenstein, and the second is in relation to the theory of meaning for intuitionistic logic that has been developed, beginning of course with Brouwer, Heyting and Kolmogorov in the twenties and early thirties, but in much more detail lately, particularly (...) in connection with intuitionistic type theory. It is therefore very natural to ask how these two forms of verificationism are related to one another: was the verificationism that we had in the thirties a kind of forerunner of what we have now, or was it something entirely different? I would like to discuss this question by considering a very particular problem, which was at the heart of Schlick’s interests, namely, the problem whether there might exist undecidable propositions or, if you prefer, unsolvable problems or unanswerable questions: it is merely a matter of wording which of these terms you choose. As I said, it is a problem which was at the heart of Schlick’s interests: it is explicitly discussed already in his early, programmatic paper Die Wende in der Philosophie in the first volume of Erkenntnis from 1930, and there is a short late paper, which has precisely Unanswerable Questions? as its title, from 1935, and he discussed it on several occasions in between also. (shrink)

_Verificationism_ is the first comprehensive history of a concept that dominated philosophy and scientific methodology between the 1930s and the 1960s. The verificationist principle - the concept that a belief with no connection to experience is spurious - is the most sophisticated version of empiricism. More flexible ideas of verification are now being rehabilitated by a number of philosophers. C.J. Misak surveys the precursors, the main proponents and the rehabilitators. Unlike traditional studies, she follows verificationist theory beyond the demise of (...) positivism to examine its reappearance in the work of modern philosophers. Most interestingly, she argues that despite feminism's strenuous opposition to positivism, verificationist thought is at the heart of much of contemporary feminist philosophy. _Verificationism_ is an excellent assessment of a major and influential system of thought. (shrink)

Verificationism has often seemed attractive to philosophers because of its apparent abilityto deliver us from scepticism. However, I argue that purely epistemological considerationsprovide insufficient reason for embracing verificationism over realism. I distinguish twotypes of sceptical problem: those that stem from underdetermination by the actual data,and those that stem from underdetermination by all possible data. Verificationismevades problems of the second sort, but is powerless in the face of problems of the firstsort. But problems of the first sort are equally (...) pressing. Furthermore, there is some reasonto think that the two types of problem have a common origin. Thus the desire to avoidscepticism provides insufficient reason for adopting verificationism. (shrink)

Verificationism has been a hallmark of logical empiricism. According to this principle, a sentence is insignificant in a certain sense if its truth value cannot be determined. Although logical empiricists strove for decades to develop an adequate principle of verification, they failed to resolve its problems. This led to a general abandonment of the verificationist project in the early 1960s. In the last 50 years, this view has received tremendously bad press. Today it is mostly regarded as an outdated (...) historical concept. Theories that have evolved since the abandonment of verificationism can, however, help overcome some of its key problems. More specifically, an adequate criterion of significance can be derived from a combination of modern theories of justification and belief revision, along with a formal semantics for counterfactuals. In view of these potential improvements, the abandonment of verificationism appears premature. Half a century following its decline, it might be about time to revisit this disreputable view. The author argues in favor of a weak form of verificationism. This approach could be referred to as minimal verificationism, as it involves a weakening of traditional verificationist principles in various respects while maintaining their core idea. (shrink)

I aim to stand the received view about verificationism on its head. It is commonly thought that verificationism is a powerful philosophical tool, which we could deploy very effectively if only it weren’t so hopelessly implausible. On the contrary, I argue. Verificationism - if properly construed - may well be true. But its philosophical applications are chimerical.

The connection between sense, verification, and mode of verification never entirely disappeared from Wittgenstein’s philosophy. However, there was a time – the years 1929– 1932 – when Wittgenstein upheld explicitly verificationist views: he identified a proposition’s meaning with the mode or method of its verification, and he said that to understand a proposition is to know how the proposition is verified. This has been regarded as puzzling, in view of the fact that the Tractatus is usually considered not to be (...) committed to verificationism; indeed, it is usually regarded as incompatible with verificationism. Several people have proposed to revise such a received view: Michael Wrigley (1989) has claimed that verificationism must be implicit in the Tractatus; and P. M.S. Hacker (1986) has argued that the Tractatus, though not verificationist, is not as distant from verificationism as it has been taken to be. In another paper (Marconi, forthcoming) I discuss their views. Here I will just notice that, even if one regards the Tractatus as implicitly verificationist, the problem remains of explaining why and how did Wittgenstein reach the explicitly – indeed, blatantly – verificationist outlook of the early Thirties. This is the first question I would like to try to answer in this paper. The second question is, why was such rampant verificationism short-lived? Or in other words, why was verificationism de-emphasized so that, although verificationist themes are undoubtedly present in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, the extreme formulations of the early Thirties tend to disappear after 1933? (shrink)

Papineau has suggested that the Principle of Non-Contradiction is a logical law that ‘verificationists’ are not entitled to claim as a prioritrue. The Principle, like that of Excluded Middle, is not sufficiently grounded in the ‘miserly’ epistemology of verificationism to be proven in ‘verificationist logic’. We examine who might be challenged by this claim: who are the ‘verificationists’? We defend our candidates against Papineau's criticisms and other attacks, but this leaves the verificationist open to a different criticism.

In the following, I will mean by ‘verificationism’ the doctrine according to which understanding a sentence entails that one knows how to verify it, i.e. how to determine its truth value. It is not the only possible meaning of ‘verificationism’, nor perhaps the most common. However, it is with reference to this sense of ‘verificationism’ that I am going to ask the question whether the Tractatus is committed to verificationism.

As a consequence of his attack on the verification criterion which was employed by the Vienna Circle, Popper proposed an alternative through his idea of falsificationism. Popper did not only see falsificationism as an improved demarcation criterion, he was also convinced that falsificationism attests to the fallible nature of all knowledge systems. Falsificationism embeds Popper’s demarcation of science from pseudo-science. In this study, I draw parallels between falsificationism and traditional Yorùbá epistemology. I disinter the inner kernel of Yorùbá indigenous thought (...) system, which frowns at knowledge demarcation, and yet employs fallibilism. I therefore submit that Yorùbá indigenous knowledge system has an outlook that acknowledges the main thesis of both verificationism and falsificationism. This position therefore validates the Yorùbá meta-epistemic domain of complementarity against the demarcation criterion that deems knowledge as scientific and others non-genuine. (shrink)

I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection (...) on the knower paradox provides strong support for the second. Whether verificationists want to go the route I've suggested is not for me todecide. As in the previous section my aim has been that of defending the mere viability of verificationism in the face of what many, many philosophers have taken to be its death-knell, namely Fitch's Proof. But, as the final objection makes clear, showing that verificationism can live in the face of Fitch's Proof is one thing; showing that it should live is another project. If nothing else, I hope that this papershows that verificationists still have a project to pursue; Fitch's Proof, contrary to popular opinion, need not bury verificationism.13. (shrink)

According to strong verificationism, all truths are known. According to weak verificationism, all truths are knowable. That strong verificationism entails weak verificationism is unsurprising – if all truths are known, then all truths are knowable. That weak verificationism entails strong verificationism, however, is surprising – how could it be that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are in fact known? The collapse of weak verificationism into strong verificationism is at the (...) core of Fitch’s Paradox. Typically, this paradox is taken to suggest that all forms of verificationism must be rejected. But abstractly, the lesson seems to be more general: Given certain properties of a modal operator, the modally qualified weakened form of a principle is not always more defensible than its corresponding strengthened form. The aim of this paper is to apply this lesson and show that Fitch’s Paradox bears on a range of epistemological principles, with a particular focus on closure. (shrink)

The original version of the Principle of Verifiabüity (PV), formulated as "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification" (Schlick, quoting Wittgenstein), can be criticised as ungrammatical. Schlick's claim that it was a "truism" reflecting commonsense and scientific practice is refuted by PV's paradoxical consequences. Its users faüed to distinguish between operational and situational readings, the latter of which invokes a mythology of comparison with "facts". Wittgenstein rightly described PV as a "rule of thumb" of limited usefulness.

The original version of the Principle of Verifiabüity (PV), formulated as "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification" (Schlick, quoting Wittgenstein), can be criticised as ungrammatical. Schlick's claim that it was a "truism" reflecting commonsense and scientific practice is refuted by PV's paradoxical consequences. Its users faüed to distinguish between operational and situational readings, the latter of which invokes a mythology of comparison with "facts". Wittgenstein rightly described PV as a "rule of thumb" of limited usefulness.

(2005). The Continental Origins of Verificationism. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 129-143.

The theme of these notes is the relation between verificationism and Quine's approach to philosophy of language. The main thesis is that a tenable theory of meaning along verificationist lines must distinguish between canonical and indirect verification and that this distinction is related to observable features of language use. It is argued that a theory of meaning along such lines is not vulnerable to Quine's arguments against verificationism, and suggested that, on the whole, a verificationism of this (...) kind is compatible with Quine's basic approach to philosophy of language. (shrink)

(1987). Einstein's brand of verificationism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 33-54. doi: 10.1080/02698598708573301.

Wittgenstein is accused by Dummett of radical conventionalism, the view that the necessity of any statement is a matter of express linguistic convention, i.e., a decision. This conventionalism is alleged to follow, in Wittgenstein's middle period, from his 'concept modification thesis', that a proof significantly changes the sense of the proposition it aims to prove. I argue for the assimilation of this thesis to Wittgenstein's 'no-conjecture thesis' concerning mathematical statements. Both flow from a strong verificationist view of mathematics held by (...) Wittgenstein in his middle period, and this also explains his views on the law of excluded middle and consistency. Strong verificationism is central to making sense of Wittgenstein's middle-period philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

A form of context-appropriate verificationism is proposed that distinguishes between scientific theories as evolving systems of ideas and operationally-specified, testable formal-empirical models. Theories undergo three stages (modes): a formative, exploratory, heuristic phase of theory conception, a developmental phase of theory-pruning and refinement, and a mature, rigorous phase of testing specific, explicit models. The first phase depends on Feyerabendian open possibility, the second on theoretical plausibility and internal coherence, and the third on testability (falsifiability, predictive efficacy). Multiple perspectives produce variety (...) necessary for theory formation, whereas explicit agreement on evaluative criteria is essential for testing. Hertzian observer-mechanics of empirical-deductive scientific models are outlined that use semiotic operations of measurement/evaluation, computation, and physical action/construction. If models can be fully operationalized, then they can be intersubjectively verified (tested) irrespective of metaphysical, theoretical, value-, or culture-based disagreements. Verificationism can be expanded beyond simple predictive efficacy to incorporate testing for pragmatic, functional efficacy in engineering, medicine, and design contexts. Such a more open, pragmatist, operationalist, epistemically-constructivist perspective is suggested in which verification is contingent on the type of assertion (e.g., heuristic, analytic, empirical, pragmatic), its intended purpose, degree and reliability of model-based evidence, and existence of alternate, competing predictive models. Suggestions for epistemological hygiene amidst the world-wide pandemic of misinformation and propaganda are offered. (shrink)

I compare and contrast BonJour’s account of empirical foundationalism with Carnap’s and Schlick’s accounts of verificationism, the debate over which was a hallmark of the logical empiricist movement. I argue that the essential aspects of BonJour’s account bear a close resemblance to different aspects of Carnap’s and Schlick’s accounts, while there are important differences among these accounts. As I show, these aspects concern the kind of relation that exists between a basic empirical belief and the corresponding sensory experience, and (...) the way in which the former is justified by appeal to the latter. The present paper thus illustrates how the debates that took place within the logical empiricist movement are still relevant to contemporary issues in epistemology. (shrink)

The question is raised of the source of the extreme verificationist views which Wittgenstein put forward immediately after his return to philosophy in 1929. Since these views appear to be radically different from the ideas put forward in theTractatus some explanation of this dramatic new turn in Wittgenstein''s thought certainly seems to be called for. Wittgenstein''s very low level of interest in philosophy between 1918 and shortly before his return to philosophy is documented. Attention then focuses on the crucial period (...) immediately before Wittgenstein''s return to Cambridge, and it is shown that in this period he encountered only two new philosophical influences. These were the ideas of Brouwer and the ideas of the Vienna Circle. Each of these is examined and neither is found capable of providing an explanation of the source of Wittgenstein''s verificationism. This leads to a reconsideration of the underlying assumption that Wittgenstein''s verificationism does represent the radical departure from the ideas of theTractatus which it appears to. It is argued that the only way we can account for Wittgenstein''s evident approval of the reading of theTractatus which he must have encountered in his meetings with members of the Vienna Circle is by concluding that, far from being incompatible with his earlier ideas, some form of verificationism must always have been implicit in theTractatus. (shrink)