The von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility criterion is a particular case of a more general utility space structure. The general utility function can take care of the intrinsic utility or disutility of risk.An approximation to this general utility function is the proposed Constant Elasticities of Value and Risk (CEVR) function, which is easily applied in specific cases, for instance in psychometric studies of behaviors in the presence of certain or uncertain gains or (...) losses. (shrink)

In Machina's approach to generalised expected utility theory, decision makers maximise a choice functional which is smooth but not linear in the probabilities. When evaluating small changes, the choice functional can be approximated by the expectation of a local utility function. This local utility function is not however invariant under large changes in risk. This paper gives a simple explicit formula which can be used to write down the local utility functions of some common (...) decision rules. (shrink)

We analyze the expressivity, succinctness, and complexity of a family of languages based on weighted propositional formulas for the representation of utility functions. The central idea underlying this form of preference modeling is to associate numerical weights with goals specified in terms of propositional formulas, and to compute the utility value of an alternative as the sum of the weights of the goals it satisfies. We define a large number of representation languages based on this idea, each characterized (...) by a set of restrictions on the syntax of formulas and the range of weights. Our aims are threefold. First, for each language we try to identify the class of utility functions it can express. Second, when different languages can express the same class of utility functions, one may allow for a more succinct representation than another. Therefore, we analyze the relative succinctness of languages. Third, for each language we study the computational complexity of the problem of finding the most preferred alternative given a utility function expressed in that language. (shrink)

We present here a direct elementary construction of continuous utility functions on perfectly separable totally preordered sets that does not make use of the well-known Debreu’s open gap lemma. This new construction leans on the concept of a separating countable decreasing scale. Starting from a perfectly separable totally ordered structure, we give an explicit construction of a separating countable decreasing scale, from which we show how to get a continuous utility map.

Numerous studies show that humans tend to be more cooperative than expected given the assumption that they are rational maximizers of personal gain. As a result, theoreticians have proposed elaborated formal representations of human decision-making, in which utility functions including “altruistic” or “moral” preferences replace the purely self-oriented "Homo economicus" function. Here we review mathematical approaches that provide insights into the mathematical stability of alternative ways of representing human decision-making in social contexts. Candidate utility functions may be (...) evaluated with help of game theory, classical modeling of social evolution that focuses on behavioral strategies, and modeling of social evolution that focuses directly on utility functions. We present the advantages of the latter form of investigation and discuss one surprisingly precise result: “Homo economicus” as well as “altruistic” utility functions are less stable than a function containing a preference for the golden rule or for the common welfare that is only expressed in social contexts composed of individuals with similar preferences. We discuss the contribution of mathematical models to our understanding of human other-oriented behavior, with a focus on the classical debate over psychological altruism. We conclude that human can be psychologically altruistic, but that psychological altruism evolved because it was generally expressed towards individuals that contributed to the actor’s fitness, such as own children, romantic partners and long term reciprocators. (shrink)

In this essay I dispute the widely held view that utility theory and decision theory are formalizations of instrumental rationality. I show that the decision theoretic framework has no deep problems accommodating the ?reasonable? qua a preference to engage in fair cooperation as such. All evaluative criteria relevant to choice can be built into a von Neumann?Morgenstern utility function. I focus on the claim that, while rational choice?driven agents are caught in the Pareto?inferior outcome, reasonable agents could (...) ?solve? the PD and cooperate. Not so, I argue. If reasonable people find themselves in PD situations they too would follow the dominant ?defect? strategy. The difference between instrumentally rational agents and those who are also reasonable is not that they would behave differently in Prisoner?s Dilemmas, but that reasonable people are more successful at avoiding the Prisoner?s Dilemma and tend to play more cooperative games. (shrink)

Often the preferences of decision-makers are sufficiently inconsistent so as to preclude the existence of a utility function in the classical sense. Several alternatives for dealing with this situation are discussed. One alternative, that of modifying classical demands on utility functions, is emphasized and described in the context of the theory of measurement developed in recent years by behavioral scientists. The measurement theory approach is illustrated by discussing the concept of the dimension of a partial order. Even (...) if we cannot assign numerical utility or worth values which reflect preferences in the classical utility function sense, from the measurement theory point of view we can still learn a lot about the preferences by finding several measures of worth so that a given alternative x is preferred to an alternative y if and only if x is ranked higher than y on each of the worth scales. If such measures can be found, it follows that the preferences define a partial order, and the smallest number of such scales needed is called the dimension of the partial order. If one-dimensional preferences (those amenable to classical utility assignments) cannot be found, then the next best thing is to search for partially ordered preferences with as small a dimension as possible. Several conditions under which a partial order is two-dimensional are described. (shrink)

We provide an economic interpretation of the practice consisting in incorporating risk measures as constraints in an expected prospect maximization problem. For what we call the infimum of expectations class of risk measures, we show that if the decision maker (DM) maximizes the expectation of a random prospect under constraint that the risk measure is bounded above, he then behaves as a “generalized expected utility maximizer” in the following sense. The DM exhibits ambiguity with respect to a family of (...) utility functions defined on a larger set of decisions than the original one; he adopts pessimism and performs first a minimization of expected utility over this family, then performs a maximization over a new decisions set. This economic behaviour is called “maxmin under risk” and studied by Maccheroni (Econ Theory 19:823–831, 2002). As an application, we make the link between an expected prospect maximization problem, subject to conditional value-at-risk being less than a threshold value, and a non-expected utility economic formulation involving “loss aversion”-type utility functions. (shrink)

In this article we explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this (...) is empirically true: i.e. that a given function allows us to predict the choices of that particular class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in accordance with this pattern in the 18th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when Allais made his case against the neo-Bernoullians. (shrink)

An artificial general intelligence (AGI) might have an instrumental drive to modify its utility function to improve its ability to cooperate, bargain, promise, threaten, and resist and engage in blackmail. Such an AGI would necessarily have a utility function that was at least partially observable and that was influenced by how other agents chose to interact with it. This instrumental drive would conflict with the strong orthogonality thesis since the modifications would be influenced by the AGI’s (...) intelligence. AGIs in highly competitive environments might converge to having nearly the same utility function, one optimized to favorably influencing other agents through game theory. Nothing in our analysis weakens arguments concerning the risks of AGI. (shrink)

The classical theory of preference among monetary bets represents people as expected utility maximizers with concave utility functions. Critics of this account often rely on assumptions about preferences over wide ranges of total wealth. We derive a prediction of the theory that bears on bets at any fixed level of wealth, and test the prediction behaviorally. Our results are discrepant with the classical account. Competing theories are also examined in light of our data.

In spite of the thousands of articles on stakeholder theory, research on value creation has had a shorter history and narrower breadth. Only a few studies have researched value creation from stakeholder perspective looking at how stakeholders appropiate value or the processes or activities by which stakeholders create value. Consequently to date, certain questions still remain unanswered regarding how a firm should treat stakeholders in order to create value. Several questions arise specifically from the stakeholder's side: What does "value" mean (...) for a particular group of stakeholders and how do firms create these different types of value? How do we measure the value created by stakeholders? The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions from Amartya Sen's Capability Approach, identifying and measuring stakeholders' capabilities in the value creation process. Stakeholder Capability is the adequate concept for understanding stakeholder welfare rather than the utility function concept. The empirical evidence comes from an in-depth case study of the company The Grobo Group and its stakeholders. According to the results, the following stakeholder capabilities are relevant to value creation: being employable, being autonomus, being innovative, being entreprenurial, being responsive, being socially integrated, being emphatic, being "green" and being healthy. (shrink)

In this paper a surrogate to traditional utility optimization is presented. This approach is based on multiple criteria decision making techniques through a theorem which connects utility function optimization with compromise programming. Apart from common assumptions in the literature the only specific assumption underlying the approach seems realistic, and is markedly related to traditional analysis.

A necessary and sufficient condition for linear aggregation of SSB utility functionals is presented. Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem for von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions is shown to be a corollary to this result. Two generalizations of Fishburn and Gehrlein's conditional linear aggregation theorem for SSB utility functionals are also established.

We present a method to characterize the preferences of a decision maker in decisions with multiple attributes. The approach modifies the outcomes of a multivariate lottery with a multivariate transformation and observes the change in the decision maker’s certain equivalent. If the certain equivalent follows this multivariate transformation, we refer to this situation as multiattribute transformation invariance, and we derive the functional form of the utility function. We then show that any additive or multiplicative utility function (...) that is formed of continuous and strictly monotonic utility functions of the individual attributes must satisfy transformation invariance with a multivariate transformation. This result provides a new interpretation for multiattribute utility functions with mutual utility independence as well as a necessary and sufficient condition that must be satisfied when assuming these widely used functional forms. We work through several examples to illustrate the approach. (shrink)

The results generated by experimentalists in psychology and economics haveled to numerous advances in the study of human decision making under risk.Camerer (1995) and Rabin (1998) provide excellent reviews of the relevantliterature. These results clearly display the gap between normative theoriesof ideal behavior and descriptive theories of observed behavior. The mostprominent result is loss aversion – the observation that a loss is given greatervalue than a gain of an equal size – and the resulting S-shaped utility function.Rabin puts (...) the key point as follows: ``Researchers have identified a pervasive feature of reference dependence: In a wide variety of domains, people are significantly more averse to losses than they are attracted to same size gains''(Rabin 1998, 13–14). In what follows, I will show that the ``wide variety of domains'' is wide indeed. In particular, I will review the effects of the S-shaped utility function on the resolution of the decision to commit a crime, to decision to violate professional ethics, and the decision to participate in a rebellion. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper presents a unified axiomatic treatment of the existence of ordinal and cardinal utility functions. The contribution of the paper is mainly pedagogical.

The Expected Shortfall or Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) has been playing the role of main risk measure in the recent years and paving the way for an enormous number of applications in risk management due to its very intuitive form and important coherence properties. This work aims to explore this measure as a probability-dependent utility functional, introducing an alternative view point for its Choquet Expected Utility representation. Within this point of view, its main preference properties will be characterized and (...) its utility representation provided through local utilities with an explicit dependence on the assessed revenue’s distribution (quantile) function. Then, an intuitive interpretation for the related probability dependence and the piecewise form of such utility will be introduced on an investment pricing context, in which a CVaR maximizer agent will behave in a relativistic way based on his previous estimates of the probability function. Finally, such functional will be extended to incorporate a larger range of risk-averse attitudes and its main properties and implications will be illustrated through examples, such as the so-called Allais Paradox. (shrink)

This paper proposes an exploration of the methodology of utility functions that distinguishes interpretation from representation. While representation univocally assigns numbers to the entities of the domain of utility functions, interpretation relates these entities with empirically observable objects of choice. This allows us to make explicit the standard interpretation of utility functions which assumes that two objects have the same utility if and only if the individual is indifferent among them. We explore the underlying assumptions of (...) such an hypothesis and propose a non-standard interpretation according to which objects of choice have a well-defined utility although individuals may vary in the way they treat these objects in a specific context. We provide examples of such a methodological approach that may explain some reversal of preferences and suggest possible mathematical formulations for further research. (shrink)

We introduce a general approach to learn an additively decomposable multiattribute utility function from preference information provided by a Decision Maker. The decompositions under considerations here involve several non-necessarily disjoint factors grouping subsets of attributes in interaction. Such decompositions known as Generalized Additive Independence (GAI) utility functions allow interactions between attributes while preserving some additive decomposability of the evaluation model. More precisely, we focus in this paper on the determination of sparse ANOVA-like decompositions of the utility (...) function that best fit preference data and have good generalizing performance. Our learning approach aims to identify the factors of interacting attributes and the utility functions defined on these factors. The proposed approach applies both to continuous and discrete attributes. We present the computational models of this learning approach and then perform numerical tests on both synthetic and real data to demonstrate its practical effectiveness. (shrink)

This paper1 defines the concept of a mean utility preserving spread across states (MUPSAS) for state dependent utility functions and analyzes the behavioural impact of shifts in the probability distribution of wealth across states such that overall mean utility is preserved. The main result provides an alternative way of ranking state dependent utility functions according to their degree of risk aversion (thus extending Kami's theorem of comparative risk aversion) and establishes a link between increases in risk (...) and risk aversion for state dependent preferences. In a portfolio problem where preferences and the rate of return of the risky venture are state dependent, we find sufficient conditions to determine the impact of a MUPSAS on the optimal share of the portfolio invested in the risky asset. (shrink)

Altruism is a popular economic explanation for a wide range of pro-social decisions and actions. It has been applied frequently in several different streams of literature, and is a descriptively compelling model of behavior. This paper provides a theoretical framework for the existence of ordinal and cardinal altruistic value functions, as well as altruistic utility functions, based on an altruistic preference relation. Representation theorems are developed to specify relatively weak conditions under which altruistic value and utility functions can (...) be shown to exist. In addition, conditions that lead to additive forms of these functions are provided. (shrink)

When a risk is exchanged, the exact value for the minimum price (positive or negative) that the purchaser (investor, or insurer) is willing to pay is given by the certainty equivalent wealth level, which in turn depends on his specific utility function. When this utility function is unknown, then only a sufficient condition on the price can ever be found. This paper provides methods for calculating such a sufficient condition, when only limited information on the (...) class='Hi'>utility function is known. (shrink)

The term ‘communitarianism’ is often identified with ‘altruism’: an individual is taken to be communitarian-minded if he or she is concerned with the well-being of others, and not only with his or her own well-being. While communitarianism may embrace altruism, it is most appositely viewed as having a broader connotation. Consider, for example, the puzzle of voting behaviour, discussed by Amitai Etzioni and many others ). Casting one's vote entails a cost, albeit usually a small one: however, if there are (...) large numbers voting, then one's own vote has a negligible effect on the outcome. An altruist might therefore rationally refrain from voting, since he incurs a cost, and neither he nor anybody else receives a benefit. And yet, millions of people the world over regularly vote in elections. Other examples could also be given. ‘Group-oriented’ behaviour has been the focus of a number of recent studies. C. Clague, for example, examines the roles of guilt and shame in discouraging tax evasion, and informally discusses how social influences may affect the strength of these sentiments. R. Naylor and M. Cripps examine the influence of social custom on individuals' propensity to join trade unions, while P. Nelson argues that in choosing which party to vote for people assign some weight to the preferences of persons they associate with. (shrink)

If the currently available theories of semantic information and utility-expectation are to be applied in a satisfactory way, they must be combined with a message-processing procedure. This paper presents a model of communication within which such a procedure can be defined. In this model the sender's messages arrive over a period of time, the receiver can reject some messages and retain others, the receiver can change his mind in various ways, and the receiver can apply various evaluation functions to (...) a "usable message total". As one example of message-evaluation, a system for evaluating news-value is presented. (shrink)

This chapter of the Handbook of Utility Theory aims at covering the connections between utility theory and social ethics. The chapter first discusses the philosophical interpretations of utility functions, then explains how social choice theory uses them to represent interpersonal comparisons of welfare in either utilitarian or non-utilitarian representations of social preferences. The chapter also contains an extensive account of John Harsanyi's formal reconstruction of utilitarianism and its developments in the later literature, especially when society faces uncertainty (...) rather than probabilistic risk. (shrink)

One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: why was artifact x produced?, why does artifact x not have the expected capacity (...) to ϕ?, how does artifact x realize its capacity to ϕ? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-à-vis functional explanations. (shrink)

It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an ordinal point of view. These properties would be, in a nutshell, (...) the hallmark of cardinal utility. While much is obviously true in these two tenets, this note explains why, as stated, they should be abandoned. Any ordinal utility function induces a rich quaternary relation. There is such a thing as ordinal utility differences. Furthermore, this induced quaternary relation respects, apart from completeness, the most standard structural properties of quaternary relations. These properties are, from an ordinal point of view, anything but arbitrary; from a quaternary perspective only completeness should be considered the hallmark—if any—of cardinal utility. These facts are explained to be especially relevant to the critical appreciation of the ordinalist methodology. (shrink)

From time to time it has been proposed to use just noticeable preference intervals as standard intervals upon which to base interpersonal utility comparisons. Such proposals have met with a number of difficulties due especially to the discovery that such intervals are difficult to take as representing equal differences in utility even for one individual.In this paper I suggest conditions upon individual utility functions which, if satisfied, would make such ‘bare preference’ intervals useful as a basis for (...) interpersonal utility comparisons even if the intervals are not interpreted as representing equal utility differences for any single individual. (shrink)

In a previous article (see [3]) a system of axioms is proposed stating conditions which are necessary and sufficient to determine a cardinal utility function on any set, finite or infinite, of outcomes X. The present paper discusses and interprets the meaning of those axioms, and compares this new approach to cardinal utility with the utility differences approach proposed by Alt and Frisch, among others, and with the expected utility approach of von-Neuman and Morgenstern. The (...) notion of repetition of the same choice situation is presented and its interpretation discussed. It is then argued that this notion leads naturally to the system of axioms presented in ‘On Cardinal Utility’. It is also argued that this notion must be used if we want to have a more clear understanding of the meaning of the axioms proposed by Alt and Frisch. Finally, it is remarked that since uncertainty is not present in the new approach, it is free of the paradoxes that have plagued the expected utility hypothesis. (shrink)

Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a cardinal utility function on a set X are presented.

Several advances in multiattribute expected utility theory have emerged recently. Much of the existing theory deals with independence axioms on whole attributes and the corresponding utility decompositions. This paper reviews three alternate approaches for obtaining representations of multiattribute utility functions: (1) multi-valent preference analysis, (2) approximation methods, and (3) indifference spanning analysis. Unlike some utility decompositions, these approaches require the assessment of only single-attribute functions which makes implementation relatively simple. Only multivalent preference analysis and indifference spanning (...) analysis, however, provide axioms that can be empirically tested to justify a particular utility representation. (shrink)

Luce and Krantz (1971) presented an axiom system for conditional expected utility. In this theory a conditional decision is a function whose domain is a non-null subevent and whose range is a subset of a set of consequences. Given a family of conditional decisions that is closed under unions of decisions whose domains are disjoint and under restrictions to non-null subevents, the second major primitive is an ordering of the family. Axioms were given that are adequate to construct (...) a numerical utility function over decisions and a probability function over events for which the conditional expectation of the utility is order preserving. Several of the axioms are quite complex and seem a bit artificial, and the proof is very long. Here the structure is modified by adding to the set of outcomes a concatenation operation, and the representation theorem is modified by requiring that the utility function be additive over this binary operation as well as exhibiting the expected utility property. The advantages of this pair of changes are, first, it exploits the obvious fact that the union of consequences is itself a consequence; second, it reduces the mathematical burden carried by the set theoretic structure of conditional decisions and, as a result, the axioms can be made much easier to understand; and third, it permits a considerably shorter proof because one can draw more readily on known results. The major drawback of this approach is, of course, that it is inconsistent with the evidence that utility is not additive over consequences - at least, not over increasing amounts of a single good (diminishing marginal utility). (shrink)

This commentary considers Merker's mesodiencephalic proposal in relation to quantitative measures of neural dynamics suggested to be relevant to consciousness. I suggest that even if critical neural mechanisms turn out to be subcortical, the functional utility of consciousness will depend on the rich conscious contents generated by continuous interaction of such mechanisms with a thalamocortical envelope. (Published Online May 1 2007).

Functional information means an encoded network of functions in living organisms from molecular signaling pathways to an organism’s behavior. It is represented by two components: code and an interpretation system, which together form a self-sustaining semantic closure. Semantic closure allows some freedom between components because small variations of the code are still interpretable. The interpretation system consists of inference rules that control the correspondence between the code and the function (phenotype) and determines the shape of the fitness landscape. The (...) utility factor operates at multiple time scales: short-term selection drives evolution towards higher survival and reproduction rate within a given fitness landscape, and long-term selection favors those fitness landscapes that support adaptability and lead to evolutionary expansion of certain lineages. Inference rules make short-term selection possible by shaping the fitness landscape and defining possible directions of evolution, but they are under control of the long-term selection of lineages. Communication normally occurs within a set of agents with compatible interpretation systems, which I call communication system. Functional information cannot be directly transferred between communication systems with incompatible inference rules. Each biological species is a genetic communication system that carries unique functional information together with inference rules that determine evolutionary directions and constraints. This view of the relation between utility and inference can resolve the conflict between realism/positivism and pragmatism. Realism overemphasizes the role of inference in evolution of human knowledge because it assumes that logic is embedded in reality. Pragmatism substitutes usefulness for truth and therefore ignores the advantage of inference. The proposed concept of evolutionary pragmatism rejects the idea that logic is embedded in reality; instead, inference rules are constructed within each communication system to represent reality, and they evolve towards higher adaptability on a long time scale. (shrink)

Beliefs come in different strengths. An agent's credence in a proposition is a measure of the strength of her belief in that proposition. Various norms for credences have been proposed. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to argue for these norms by showing that any agent who violates them will be lead by her credences to make bad decisions. In this article, we survey a new strategy for justifying these norms. The strategy begins by identifying an epistemic utility function and (...) a decision-theoretic norm; we then show that the decision-theoretic norm applied to the epistemic utility function yields the norm for credences that we wish to justify. We survey results already obtained using this strategy, and we suggest directions for future research. (shrink)

The conventional expected utility of a lottery establishes a tight myopic lower bound on the probability of indefinitely avoiding economic ruin, the probability of survival. The analysis presented assumes that the decision maker is able to decline lotteries that are unacceptable in the expected utility sense. Application of the result to the assessment of utility functions is discussed.

In searching for an appropriate utility function in the expected utility framework, we formulate four properties that we want the utility function to satisfy. We conduct a search for such a function, and we identify Pareto utility as a function satisfying all four desired properties. Pareto utility is a flexible yet simple and parsimonious two-parameter family. It exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing but bounded relative risk aversion. It is applicable (...) irrespective of the probability distribution relevant to the prospect to be evaluated. Pareto utility is therefore particularly suited for catastrophic risk analysis. A new and related class of generalized exponential (gexpo) utility functions is also studied. This class is particularly relevant in situations where absolute risk tolerance is thought to be concave rather than linear. (shrink)

Suppose that it is rational to choose or intend a course of action if and only if the course of action maximizes some sort of expectation of some sort of value. What sort of value should this definition appeal to? According to an influential neo-Humean view, the answer is “Utility”, where utility is defined as a measure of subjective preference. According to a rival neo-Aristotelian view, the answer is “Choiceworthiness”, where choiceworthiness is an irreducibly normative notion of a (...) course of action that is good in a certain way. The neo-Humean view requires preferences to be measurable by means of a utility function. Various interpretations of what exactly a “preference” is are explored, to see if there is any interpretation that supports the claim that a rational agent’s “preferences” must satisfy the “axioms” that are necessary for them to be measurable in this way. It is argued that the only interpretation that supports the idea that the rational agent’s preferences must meet these axioms interprets “preferences” as a kind of value-judgment. But this turns out to be version of the neo-Aristotelian view, rather than the neo-Humean view. Rational intentions maximize expected choiceworthiness, not expected utility. (shrink)