In this study, we extend the additively generated triangular norms from the framework of the unit interval to that of partially ordered sets. We present several conditions under which this formula yields a t‐norm, where are partially ordered sets, and are monotone functions and is a t‐norm/t‐conorm on. The partially ordered semigroups induced by are order‐preserving/order‐reversing homomorphic to semigroup deformations of the semigroup induced by.

For each continuous t-norm &, a class of fuzzy topological spaces, called &-topological spaces, is introduced. The motivation stems from the idea that to each many-valued logic there may correspond a theory of many-valued topology, in particular, each continuous t-norm may lead to a theory of fuzzy topology. It is shown that for each continuous t-norm &, the subcategory consisting of &-topological spaces is simultaneously reflective and coreflective in the category of fuzzy topological spaces, hence gives rise (...) to an autonomous theory of fuzzy topology. Topologizing a fuzzy pre-ordered set with the fuzzy Scott topology yields a functor from the category of fuzzy pre-ordered sets and maps that preserve suprema of flat ideals to the category of &-topological spaces. It is proved that this functor is a full one if and only if the t-norm & is Archimedean. (shrink)

In this paper we carry out an algebraic investigation of the weak nilpotent minimum logic and its t-norm based axiomatic extensions. We consider the algebraic counterpart of WNM, the variety of WNM-algebras and prove that it is locally finite, so all its subvarieties are generated by finite chains. We give criteria to compare varieties generated by finite families of WNM-chains, in particular varieties generated by standard WNM-chains, or equivalently t-norm based axiomatic extensions of WNM, and we study their (...) standard completeness properties. We also characterize the generic WNM-chains, i. e. those that generate the variety [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL W]ℕ[MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M], and we give finite axiomatizations for some t-norm based extensions of WNM. (shrink)

Monoidal triangular norm logic MTL is the logic of left-continuous triangular norms. In the paper we present a relational formalization of the logic MTL and then we introduce relational dual tableau that can be used for verification of validity of MTL-formulas. We prove soundness and completeness of the system.

This paper is the continuation of [11] where the rotation construction of left-continuous triangular norms was presented. Here the class of triangular subnorms and a second construction, called rotation-annihilation, are introduced: Let T1 be a left-continuous triangular norm. If T1 has no zero divisors then let T2 be a left-continuous rotation invariant t-subnorm. If T1 has zero divisors then let T2 be a left-continuous rotation invariant triangular norm. From each such pair the rotation-annihilation construction (...) produces a left-continuous triangular norm with strong induced negation. An infinite number of new families of such triangular norms can be constructed in this way, and this further extends our spectrum of choice for the proper triangular norm e.g. in probabilistic metric spaces, or for logical and set theoretical connectives in non-classical logic, or e.g. in fuzzy sets theory and its applications. On the other hand, the introduced construction brings us closer to the understanding of the structure of these operations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A new algebraic construction -called rotation- is introduced in this paper which from any left-continuous triangular norm which has no zero divisors produces a left-continuous but not continuous triangular norm with strong induced negation. An infinite number of new families of such triangular norms can be constructed in this way which provides a huge spectrum of choice for e.g. logical and set theoretical connectives in non-classical logic and in fuzzy theory. On the other hand, (...) the introduced construction brings us closer to the understanding the structure of these connectives and the corresponding logics. From the application point of view, results of this paper can be especially useful in the field of non-classical logic, fuzzy sets, and fuzzy preference modeling. (shrink)

In many-valued logics with the unit interval as the set of truth values, from the standard negation and the product (or, more generally, from any strict Frank t-norm) all measurable logical functions can be derived, provided that also operations with countable arity are allowed. The question remained open whether there are other t-norms with this property or whether all strict t-norms possess this property. We give a full solution to this problem (in the case of strict t-norms), together with (...) convenient sufficient conditions. We list several families of strict t-norms having this property and provide also counterexamples (the Hamacher product is one of them). Finally, we discuss the consequences of these results for the characterization of tribes based on strict t-norms. (shrink)

In general, there is only one fuzzy logic in which the standard interpretation of the strong conjunction is a strict triangular norm, namely, the product logic. We study several equations which are satisfied by some strict t-norms and their dual t-conorms. Adding an involutive negation, these equations allow us to generate countably many logics based on strict t-norms which are different from the product logic.

The rearrangement inequality states that the sum of products of permutations of 2 sequences of real numbers are maximized when the terms are similarly ordered and minimized when the terms are ordered in opposite order. We show that similar inequalities exist in algebras of multi-valued logic when the multiplication and addition operations are replaced with various T-norms and T-conorms respectively. For instance, we show that the rearrangement inequality holds when the T-norms and T-conorms are derived from Archimedean copulas.

A normative power is the authority to effect a normative change through a declaration of will. This paper uncovers a fundamental asymmetry between potestative concepts (related to normative powers) and deontic concepts (related to duties). The deontic conceptual network consists of three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive positions: obligatory, forbidden, and optional. Similarly, the modal network encompasses: necessary, impossible, and contingent. While the potestative network appears to follow a similar pattern – an impression reinforced by the Hohfeldian scheme – it (...) lacks this triangular structure. Overlooking this asymmetry has led several philosophers to adopt unintelligible positions such as the notion of a necessary normative power, where an agent can effect a normative change by exercising their normative power but lacks the power not to do so. I show that this is conceptually flawed. Unlike the deontic may and the possibility can, the normative power can lacks a dual (A and B are duals of each other iff ¬A(¬x) = B(x)). This asymmetry exists because deontic and modal terms are bipartite – relating to action or omission – whereas normative power pertains solely to changing a normative situation, not to refraining from doing so. The extended Hohfeldian framework I propose makes this structural difference explicit. (shrink)

The choice of connectives for many valued propositional logics suitable for theoretical and applicational interests in most cases is an open problem up to now. We will not offer a general solution here, but support the point of view of some recent developments in fuzzy set theory that the triangular norms – t-norms for short – of Schweizer/Sklar [3] and the ϕ-operators of Pedrycz [2] represent quite general classes of connectives at least for many valued logics with truth value (...) set the real interval [0,1] . Special classes of t-norms and general properties of them have been discussed in some papers just recently, e.g. by Dombi [1], Weber [4], Yager [5] to mention only a few of them. (shrink)

The paper presents a novel view of social norms that reflects the importance of different agent types, their specific motivations and roles. How one identifies with a role and behavioral options available to the agent is crucial for the sustainability of the social norms. The analysis of a simple case of social norm is suggested as a default model for analysis, and then the classification of subjects, enforcers, and audience is introduced. This triangular typology of agents is extended (...) by introducing a network of interlocking patterns underlying social behavior. Lastly, the paper describes two categories of transgressions based on misidentification. (shrink)

The two challenging questions of the article are: (a) Where does the normativity of our speaking, thinking, and acting come from? (b) How does bounded normativity function as an antidote against cognitive and epistemic vulnerability and relativism? The article is divided into three sections: (i) It is specified what challenges and vulnerabilities a non-foundationalist justification and normativity has to meet. (ii) A three-dimensional conception of normativity and of responsibility is developed based on our human triangular relations to other persons, (...) to the world, and to ourselves. (iii) The Principle of Reflective Equilibrium is introduced as a principle of rationality, and it is shown how this principle generates reasonable justifications under the conditions of a variety of vulnerabilities. (shrink)

Design is concerned with the ways in which we deliberately seek to arrange, organize, or structure things. From a philosophy of design perspective, the practice of design raises fundamental questions about the basic ways in which things can and should be organized. I advance a tripartite schema of the basic ways in which things (anything at all) can be organized and offer a triangular model of the “organization space” or “design space” they define. I refer to these three basic (...) forms of organization as “responsive cohesion,” “fixed cohesion,” and “discohesion,” and offer three reasons why responsively cohesive forms of organization are more valuable than the other two; indeed, the other two forms of organization are typically disvaluable. Beyond focusing on the value of individual instances of responsive cohesion, I further consider the fact that every responsively cohesive item exists within a wider context(s), which may itself tend more towards fixed cohesion, responsive cohesion, or discohesion. This raises a number of further issues; for example, what should we do if a responsively cohesive item clashes with – is discohesive with – its responsively cohesive context? I advance a normative theory of contexts to sort out these kinds of issues. In the context of this discussion, I briefly consider a range of other ideas that bear a family resemblance to the idea of responsive cohesion and indicate, equally briefly, why the theory of responsive cohesion approach is superior to these other approaches. I conclude with some guidance on how we can implement the ideas advanced here (“we” because we all design things in our own way) and then, more specifically, on the implications of these ideas for the professional designer-client relationship. (shrink)

A model of judgment aggregation is presented in which judgments on propositions are not binary but come in degrees. The primitives are a set of propositions, an entailment relation, and a “triangular norm” which establishes a lower bound on the degree to which a proposition is true whenever it is entailed by a set of propositions. Under standard assumptions, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the collective judgments to be both deductively closed and free from veto (...) power. This condition says that the triangular norm used to establish the lower bound must contain a zero divisor. (shrink)

A t-tautology is a propositional formula which is a tautology in all fuzzy logics defined by continuous triangular norms. In this paper we show that the problem of recognizing t-tautologies is coNP complete, and thus decidable.

Recent advances in neutrosophic lattice theory have highlighted its potential to model uncertainty, indeterminacy, and inconsistency more effectively than classical and intuitionistic fuzzy approaches. Building upon foundational studies that introduced neutrosophic lattices and their extensions through soft structures, concept lattices, triangular norms, and lattice-valued neutrosophic sets, this study contributes to the growing body of research on neutrosophic ideals. We introduce and investigate several key notions in the context of lattices, including neutrosophic prime ideals, prime neutrosophic ideals, neutrosophic 2-absorbing ideals, (...) 2-absorbing neutrosophic ideals, neutrosophic primary ideals, and primary neutrosophic ideals. A special focus is placed on the characterization of neutrosophic 2-absorbing primary ideals, accompanied by an analysis of the transitions among these concepts and their interrelationships with traditional lattice ideals. Furthermore, these structures are examined within lattices formed by Cartesian products, offering new perspectives on their behavior in complex settings. (shrink)

The last decade has seen an enormous development in infinite-valued systems and in particular in such systems which have become known as mathematical fuzzy logics. The paper discusses the mathematical background for the interest in such systems of mathematical fuzzy logics, as well as the most important ones of them. It concentrates on the propositional cases, and mentions the first-order systems more superficially. The main ideas, however, become clear already in this restricted setting.

Cognitivist approaches to joint attention conceptualize it as a form of triangular interaction, between two agents and one object. When describing the interpersonal dimension of this triangle they frame it as a form of simulation, theorizing or both, involving representations of the other agent’s mental states - representation of representations - and inferences. In this paper, we advocate a different framework for understanding shared attention, the ecological psychology framework that understands attention through the notion of ‘affordance’. Affordances are relational (...) and not representational. They are direct relationships between agents and their environments. While some authors have pointed to the notion of ‘social affordance’ (Heft 2007, 2017; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Moreira de Carvalho 2020) for understanding phenomena related to shared attention, the notion remains general and imprecise. The problem is that the notion is used indistinctively to refer to a number of different phenomena that involve social attention in very different ways. To address this issue, we offer an initial classification of different kinds of social affordances, from dyadic relations between agents, and different forms of triangular interactions, reciprocal and non-reciprocal, that provide direct and indirect information about common environments to one or both agents, all the way to collective affordances that lie at the basis of socio-cultural forms of life. We argue that this account is better placed than the standard cognitivist alternative to account for both shared attention and joint action in a non-cognitively demanding way. In addition, we show how these forms of shared activity are, in turn, fundamental for the acquisition of the sociocultural norms that come to permeate human perception. (shrink)

Despite the burgeoning literature on right-wing populism, there is still considerable uncertainty about its causes, its impact on liberal democracies and about promising counter-strategies. Inspired by recent suggestions that (1) the emancipatory left has made a significant contribution to the proliferation of the populist right; and (2) populist movements, rather than challenging the established socio-political order, in fact stabilize and further entrench its logic, this article argues that an adequate understanding of the populist phenomenon necessitates a radical shift of perspective: (...) beyond the democratic and emancipatory norms, which still govern most of the relevant literature. Approaching its subject matter via democratic theory and modernization theory, it undertakes a reassessment of the triangular relationship between modernity, democracy and populism. It finds that the latter is not helpfully conceptualized as anti-modernist or anti-democratic but should, instead, be regarded as a predictable feature of the form of politics distinctive of today’s third modernity. (shrink)

Gender is one of the most common perspectives through which the relation between beauty and inequality is studied. Recently, as our academic understanding of gender and gender systems in society shifts, academics are rethinking the triangular relation between beauty, inequality, and gender. Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses how beauty and appearance are gendered, and how this is related to inequalities of gender and beyond. We examine the gendered nature of beauty, highlighting beauty standards, beauty practices, and the social (...) norms surrounding them. After, we discuss unequal gender outcomes of beauty/appearance, and the mechanisms suggested to explain them. Finally, we ask what might be lost or overlooked in current approaches that often take on a binary gender perspective. We suggest that future research can break new ground by paying more explicit and critical attention to the shifting gender systems (and the resistance this sparks), by analyzing beauty and gender in intersectional terms, and by going beyond the gender binary. (shrink)

This article introduces a Special Issue entitled Beyond the Eco-emancipatory Project: Socio-ecological Crisis and the Metamorphosis of Modernity. As a preliminary exercise, we look at the triangular relationship between eco-activist thinking, critical social theory and the difficult task to make sense of the current transformation of Western societies. We first sketch the late-modern coincidence of eco-activist despair about the anticipated ecological collapse – prospectively further accelerated by populist problem denial – and far-right promises to take back control and reopen (...) the future beyond the green diagnoses and policy agendas. Next, we point to the limits of the activist, eco-emancipatory perspective on this paradoxical constellation and to the reasons why social theory is essential for understanding this constellation. Yet, social theory has its own limitations, as it finds itself trapped between a backward-looking normativity increasingly turning into wishful thinking and a fatalist view of the present as the endpoint of a trajectory of decline and regression. Hence, we argue for a renewed approach to social theory that makes the eco-emancipatory project itself the object of critical sociological investigation and might help to defuse rather than further reinforce societal polarization and conflict. (shrink)

On 9 March 2015 the protest movement Rhodes Must Fall, that requested the removal of the statue commemorating the British imperialist Cecil Rhodes from the Cape Town University’s campus, started a global call to “decolonize the university” and education at large. As Grant and Price (2020: 9) recognize, this was part of an “overdue acknowledgement that unspoken colonial legacies had for too long upheld and promulgated white privilege” and highlighted the long tradition that recognizes “the role of public sculpture as (...) a catalyst for political debate […] within art’s histories”. Drawing on these premises and on a theoretical approach mainly inspired by Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (Ravelli 2006; O’Toole 2011; Machin and Mayr 2012; Machin 2013), the aim of this chapter is to explore the way in which Kara Walker’s monumental installation Fons Americanus not only highlights the contemporary legacies of Western colonialism but enables the emergence of alternative and marginalized narratives through a decolonial process that makes the artist an “unreliable narrator” (in her own words). Inspired by the Victoria Memorial in London (UK), the African American artist’s monumental fountain—that was exhibited in the Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall from late 2019 to early 2020 before its removal and destruction—substitutes the symbols of Western colonial power with figures representing the legacies of the history of slavery all the way up to contemporary forms of racism and of intellectual and material colonization, all held together by the use of water as the quintessential symbol of the triangular slave trade across the Atlantic (Wardi 2011; Amideo 2021). As a matter of fact, if the large-scale sculpture appears to be at least partly inspired by a monumental and power-saturated Western grammar of visual representation (Kress and van Leeuwen 2021; Abasnnouga and Machin 2013), a closer look reveals the cracks in this idealized iconography in the form of an infinite amount of symbolic and material layers operating as a counter-discourse. Similarly, both Walker’s use of recyclable materials for the installation and its subsequent dismantling reject the colonial logic of permanence and invasiveness that is often typical of a politically saturated Western art. While the sculptures that are part of monuments tend to normalize and legitimize certain discourses (e.g., war monuments portray and celebrate certain values and ideals of masculinity and heroicness rather than the actual destruction or killing caused by the war, see Abasnnouga and Machin 2013: 2) thus portraying elements that pose no threat to the “overall set of values dominated by nation, industry and capitalism” (3), Walker’s installation follows a different logic. The artist poses herself as an “unreliable narrator” in the sense that her visual and material narrativization does not follow the normativity of a necessarily selective historiographic account but enables the emergence of otherwise silenced narratives through a process of critical fabulation (Hartman 2008: 11-12). This process is the result of a decolonial pedagogy (Alexander 2005; Borghi 2020) that draws on the Black feminist tradition to shed light of the political imbrication of history, race, and gender in contemporary forms of ongoing colonialism as a way of opening up the way to a multiversal and global-centric perspective. (shrink)

In Thai Buddhism, a high number of examples show that during the last 20 years or so the triangular interrelationship between hermeneutics, canonical authenticity and authority has been—more or less consciously—the subject of numerous, often very fervent debates. This has made clear the importance of the Pāli canon as a centre of reference for normative and formative authority in Thai society. Also, during these debates the conservatism of Thai Theravāda, and thereby its identity, has been challenged in various ways, (...) e.g. by Western influenced text-critical or intertextual approaches, by reference to superior religious insight and by requests for feminist interpretations of the Pāli canon. At the same time, however, and in response to these challenges, the rationale for Thai Theravāda's conservatism and identity have become very clearly articulated, to an extent that has arguably never happened before in Thai history. By looking at some of the debates in which the foremost Thai Buddhist thinker and scholar monk P. A. Payutto (1939– ) has been involved, I seek to gain a deeper understanding of what these debates can teach us about the specific context and state of Thai Buddhist studies. (shrink)

The leading question of this paper is: Where does the normativity of the ethics of science and technology come from? This is a challenging question given that the traditional reservoirs of convenience (like metaphysical universalism) are no longer at our disposal the way they used to be. The paper is divided into eight sections: (1) It is specified what challenges a non-foundationalist justification and normativity has to meet. (2) A three-dimensional conception of responsibility is developed based on the human (...) class='Hi'>triangular I–We–World relations. (3) The concepts of bounded responsibility and bounded ethics of science and technology are formulated. (4) The principle of reflective equilibrium is introduced as a principle of rationality, and it is shown how this principle generates rational and reasonable justifications in the ethics of science and technology. (5) Against this background, a reconception of internal and external responsibilities of science is given. (6) The type of responsibility demanded is exemplified by today’s climate research. (7) The paper argues for a hand-in-hand model of uncertainties in the sciences and for ethical obligations to preserve the conditions of human life on earth. The ethical argument is spelled out in terms of ethical care, preservation, and precaution. (8) Additionally, some arguments are developed to answer the question of why it is reasonable at all to preserve human life on earth. (shrink)

In this paper, we utilized triangular conorms. The essence of using S-norm is that the similarity order does not change using different norms. In fact, we are investigating for a new conception for calculating the similarity of two Fermatean fuzzy sets. For this purpose, utilizing an S-norm, we first present a formula for calculating the similarity of two Fermatean fuzzy values, so that they are truthful in similarity properties. Following that, we generalize a formula for calculating the (...) similarity of the two Fermatean fuzzy sets which prove truthful in similarity conditions. Finally, various numerical examples have been presented to elaborate this method. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reasons CountJohn Z. Sadler (bio)Keywordscriminality, mental disorder, responsibilityAs a fourth-year psychiatry resident many years ago, I encountered a patient on the psychiatric emergency service whom I have never forgotten, because my experience with him jelled a distinction about the importance of explaining violence. Brought in involuntarily by the police for being “dangerous,” he was a fearsome visage: six feet four, shaven head, angular jaw, the triangular build of (...) an athlete, a history of paranoid schizophrenia and violence. I’ll call him Mr. Big. His court order papers explained that he had threatened to kill his brother-in-law.Mr. Big’s story, in brief, was that he was a veteran on disability, and that he had purchased, some years ago, a small home using his wits and savings from his pension. Although he admitted that he could be, and had been, violent off his medications, he explained that he had been taking his medicines reliably for two years and had never had any trouble over that period—until now. His brother-in-law, according to Mr. Big, had moved in and appropriated his home while the patient was away on a trip to see a friend, and now refused to leave, to the chagrin of both the patient and his sister. Mr. Big had threatened to kill the brother-in-law in indignation with the in-law’s behavior. The brother-in-law never called or appeared. The sister, it turns out, corroborated the story, and after an examination revealed only minimal idiosyncrasies of thought and affect, the patient was referred for legal counseling, released, and the family was warned. We all hoped that justice could be found peacefully.Wilson and Adshead emphasize in their thoughtful discussion of violence and psychiatric symptoms that the explanation for the violent act is crucial to assessing its pertinence to mental disorder. What was elegant in Mr. Big’s case was that the motivation for threats of violence was proximate, morally comprehensible, corroborated by at least one other, insightful, and most of all, clear-cut. Although these features for distinguishing violence due to normative motivation versus violence due to mental disorder are addressed by Wilson and Adshead, they would agree that, unfortunately, these tools of proximity, comprehensibility, ordinariness of motivation, insight, and corroboration are often absent, unobtainable, or inadequate.But these considerations are helpful in ruling out violence as symptom, which is the lesson Mr. Big taught me—reasons count. Wilson and Adshead go on to critically consider the features that may be positive identifications for violence as symptom. With “deplorability,” they identify a feature of the violence that exceeds what I have termed “normative motivation,” which defies our empathic ability to understand the perpetrator’s point of view. However, deplorable events are perpetrated by soldiers and police in their socially approved work, so even deplorability has limits in its utility. Indeed, social psychologists’ research has shown, as Susan Fiske and colleagues put it, “Virtually anyone can be aggressive if sufficiently [End Page 73] provoked, stressed, disgruntled, or hot” (Fiske et al. 2004, 1482). Also, like “normative” motivation, deplorability is culture—and politically—relative, another limit to its utility.Even with complex causality, the INUS approach of Mackie’s offers a way to link symptoms to a more complex causal network while admitting that the social components of the causal network may exhibit particular moral and pragmatic interests. For medicine, the INUS approach is sensible and coherent with biomedicine’s intellectual culture of multifactorial causation of disease. However, criminal culpability in law is usually a dichotomous decision; any taint of choice links the offender to the whole culpability package (Sadler 2002).The conclusion one is left with is that no failsafe tools permit us to distinguish violence provoked by mental disorder versus normatively motivated violence. I tend to agree that, for some cases, we will never be able to broker the distinction between disordered violence versus nondisordered violence. My pessimism is based on the technical limitations of parsing mental life retrospectively in a way that will always allow for the kind of clear-cut distinction described in the case of Mr. Big (Sadler 2002). That is, how, after the... (shrink)

Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such they are at the heart of our linguistic and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one should only assert (...) that p if p is true (the truth account). In a series of four experiments, this question is addressed empirically. Contrary to previous findings, knowledge turns out to be a poor predictor of assertability, and the norm of assertion is not factive either. The studies here presented provide empirical evidence in favour of the view that a speaker is warranted to assert that p only if her belief that p is justified. (shrink)

John Gibbons presents an original account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms. One task is to say where these standards come from. But the more basic task is to say what those standards are. In some sense, beliefs are supposed to be true. Perhaps they’re supposed to constitute knowledge. And in some sense, they really ought to be reasonable. Which, if any of these is the fundamental norm of belief? The (...) book argues against the teleological or instrumentalist conception of rationality that sees being reasonable as a means to our more objective aims, either knowledge or truth. And it tries to explain both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable. The importance of being reasonable is not explained in terms of what it will get you, or what you think it will get you, or what it would get you if only things were different. The requirement to be reasonable comes from the very idea of what a genuine requirement is. That’s where the built-in standards governing belief come from, and that’s what they are. (shrink)

I argue that the debates over which norm constitutes assertion can be abandoned by challenging the three main motivations for a constitutive norm. The first motivation is the alleged analogy between language and games. The second motivation is the intuition that some assertions are worthy of criticism. The third is the discursive responsibilities incurred by asserting. I demonstrate that none of these offer good reasons to believe in a constitutive norm of assertion, as such a norm (...) is understood in the literature. Others who have made similar arguments conclude that assertion does not exist at all—that there is no such thing as assertion. I disagree: we do not have to relinquish the category of assertion just because it is not normatively constituted. There are alternative ways to understand and individuate assertion that do not rely on a constitutive norm. (shrink)

Mona Simion has recently argued for a function-first norm of moral assertion. According to function-first accounts, the norm of any kind of assertion is determined by the function of that kind of assertion. She argues that, on the assumption that moral understanding is the goal of moral inquiry, the function of moral assertion is reliably generating moral understanding in others and that the norm of moral assertion should fall out of that function. In particular, she thinks the (...) norm should be such that satisfying it is the most reliable way for one’s moral assertions to generate moral understanding in others—at least when all else goes well. With this in mind, she proposes The Explanation Proffering Account of Moral Assertion. First, I argue that satisfying EPNMA is not the only or most reliable way for one’s moral assertion to generate moral understanding in one’s audience. I propose an alternative norm on which one must accompany one’s moral assertions with a maieutic speech act, i.e., an utterance in the form of a question or assertion that aims to elicit knowledge or other epistemic states from an audience. Second, I present counterexamples to EPNMA wherein speakers make moral assertions that violate EPNMA and yet they are not intuitively epistemically criticizable for their assertion. I conclude by briefly sketching an alternative account that avoids the pitfalls of EPNMA. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper proposes that the distinctive features of aesthetic assertion are due to a special norm governing such assertion rather than any semantic features of aesthetic predication. The norm is elaborated as a (more or less faithful) reading of Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment. Apart from the proposed norm capturing various features of aesthetic assertion, it is supported by various linguistic considerations that point to the semantic profile of predicates of personal taste and aesthetic predicates being (...) in fact alike with respect to the role of a judge or experiencer in the interpretation of the respective kinds of assertions. The difference between the two, therefore, must have a different source than the understood role of an agent, viz. the advertised norm. In particular, it is argued that the role of an explicit agent in both predicates acts to signal a presupposition of another agent having a different experience or judgment from the speaker rather than an articulation of the content of the predicate itself or a determination of its truth value. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a distinctive norm of assertion. A plausible idea is that there is an analogous, perhaps weaker, norm for indirect communication via implicatures. I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that the norm of assertion is a social norm governing public updates to the conversational record. Off the record implicatures are not subject to social norms of this type. I grant that, as happens in general with intentional (...) actions, off the record communicative acts may be subject to normative assessments on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness). However, such assessments do not generate distinctive norms that apply to all cases of implicature. (shrink)

Language is a human universal reflecting our deeply social nature. Among its essential functions, language enables us to quickly and efficiently share information. We tell each other that many things are true—that is, we routinely make assertions. Information shared this way plays a critical role in the decisions and plans we make. In Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion, a distinguished philosopher and cognitive scientist investigates the rules or norms that structure our social practice of assertion. Combining evidence from (...) philosophy, psychology, and biology, John Turri shows that knowledge is the central norm of assertion and explains why knowledge plays this role. -/- Concise, comprehensive, non-technical, and thoroughly accessible, this volume quickly brings readers to the cutting edge of a major research program at the intersection of philosophy and science. It presupposes no philosophical or scientific training. It will be of interest to philosophers and scientists, is suitable for use in graduate and undergraduate courses, and will appeal to general readers interested in human nature, social cognition, and communication. (shrink)

Sometimes subjects have sufficient internal and external resources to retrieve information stored in memory, in particular information that carries socially charged content. Yet, they fail to do so: they forget it. These cases pose an explanatory challenge to common explanations of forgetting in cognitive science. In this paper, I take this challenge and develop a new explanation of these cases. According to this explanation, these cases are best explained as cases of norm-induced forgetting: cases in which forgetting is caused (...) by social norms in a relevant sense. These cases draw attention to the normative aspects of the mechanisms of forgetting. This is an important but neglected aspect of cases of everyday forgetting, in particular of those characterized by a social dimension. By investigating some ways in which the psychology of social norms is causally relevant in the mechanisms of retrieval failure, I begin to fill this gap. (shrink)

Assertion is governed by an epistemic norm requiring knowledge. This idea has been hotly debated in recent years, garnering attention in epistemology, philosophy of language, and linguistics. This chapter presents and extends the main arguments in favor of the knowledge norm, from faulty conjunctions, several conversational patterns, judgments of permission, excuse, and blame, and from showing how. (Paired with a chapter by Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, "Knowledge is Not Our Norm of Assertion".).

Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether (...) to believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'. (shrink)

We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that ‘I believe’ is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion.

In a recent article, Kyle Stanford gives an account of what he terms “externalisation”, understood as our tendency to objectify or externalise moral demands and obligations. According to Stanford, externalisation is a distinctive feature of our moral psychology which is adaptive since it enables and preserves cooperation. I claim that the main issue with this account is that it assumes an overly psychological and individualist, inward-to-outward looking perspective. I advocate taking an alternative perspective that turns the spotlight to social practices (...) and the social reality they create. I show how, seen in this light, norm externalisation becomes a side-effect instead of an adaptation deserving of a special explanation. (shrink)

According to an influential hypothesis, the speech act of assertion is subject to a single 'constitutive' rule, that takes the form: "One must: assert that p only if p has C". Scholars working on assertion interpret the assumption that this rule is 'constitutive' in different ways. This disagreement, often unacknowledged, threatens the foundations of the philosophical debate on assertion. This paper reviews different interpretations of the claim that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule. It argues that once we understand (...) the full import of assuming that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule, it becomes clear that some fundamental assumptions of the current debate are mistaken, and others unwarranted. (shrink)

Living agency is subject to a normative dimension (good-bad, adaptive-maladaptive) that is absent from other types of interaction. We review current and historical attempts to naturalize normativity from an organism-centered perspective, identifying two central problems and their solution: (1) How to define the topology of the viability space so as to include a sense of gradation that permits reversible failure, and (2) how to relate both the processes that establish norms and those that result in norm-following behavior. We present (...) a minimal metabolic system that is coupled to a gradient-climbing chemotactic mechanism. Studying the relationship between metabolic dynamics and environmental resource conditions, we identify an emergent viable region and a precarious region where the system tends to die unless environmental conditions change. We introduce the concept of normative field as the change of environmental conditions required to bring the system back to its viable region. Norm-following, or normative action, is defined as the course of behavior whose effect is positively correlated with the normative field. We close with a discussion of the limitations and extensions of our model and some final reflections on the nature of norms and teleology in agency. (shrink)

Epistemic constitutivists seek to ground the authority of epistemic norms in the nature of belief, claiming that belief is a fundamentally normative attitude and that epistemic norms are constitutive norm of it. A objection to this view holds that constitutive norms, by themselves, lack inherent authority. In response, Horst argues that violations of constitutive epistemic norms necessarily manifest defects in epistemic competence. In this paper, I argue that Horst’s defense fails, as there is no appropriate answer to what constitutes (...) a “defect in epistemic competence.” As an alternative, I propose a role-based form of constitutivism. On this view, epistemic norms are constitutive of the role of the believer, and it is this role that secures their normative authority. (shrink)

The norm of assertion, to be in force, is a social norm. What is the content of our social norm of assertion? Various linguistic arguments purport to show that to assert is to represent oneself as knowing. But to represent oneself as knowing does not entail that assertion is governed by a knowledge norm. At best these linguistic arguments provide indirect support for a knowledge norm. Furthermore, there are alternative, non-normative explanations for the linguistic data (...) (as in recent work from Van Elswyk). Direct arguments would rely on normative judgments about the permissibility or impermissibility of assertions with and without the speaker knowing the content asserted. John Turri's work experimental results purport to show that our norm of assertion is factive, and probably knowledge. But as a number of recent experimentalists (Kneer, Reuter and Broessel, Marsili and Wiegmann) have shown, Turri's results rely on the problemmatic use of 'should' as in 'Maria should assert that she owns a 1990 watch.' Correcting for this, these experimentalists provide strong evidence that our norm of assertion is not factive. The standard reply to evidence like this from the assertion of unlucky falsehoods is the excuse maneuver. But Marsili and Wiegmann, following Turri's protocol for testing for excuse validation, show that participants who judge that assertions unlucky falsehoods are permissible are not guilty of excuse validation. Given our current understanding of the experimental evidence, knowledge is not our norm of assertion. (shrink)

Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., “by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control”) are common expressions of epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, previous published findings (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo & Phillips, 2018) on the opposition between Contextualism and Relativism for epistemic modals are re-examined. It is found that these findings contain a substantial degree of individual variation. To investigate whether participants differ in their interpretation of epistemic modals, an experiment with multiple phases and sessions (...) is used to classify participants according to the three semantic theories of Relativism, Contextualism, and Objectivism. Through this study, some of the first empirical evidence for the kind of truth-value shifts postulated by semantic Relativism is presented. It is furthermore found that participants’ disagreement judgments match their truth evaluations and that participants are capable of distinguishing between truth and justification. In a second experimental session, it is investigated whether participants thus classified follow the norm of retraction which Relativism uses to account for argumentation with epistemic modals. Here the results are less favorable for Relativism. In a second experiment, these results are replicated and the normative beliefs of participants concerning the norm of retraction are investigated following work on measuring norms by Bicchieri (2017). Again, it is found that on average participants show no strong preferences concerning the norm of retraction for epistemic modals. Yet, it was found that participants who had committed to Objectivism and had training in logics applied the norm of retraction to might-statements. These results present a substantial challenge to the account of argumentation with epistemic modals presented in MacFarlane (2014), as discussed. Keywords: Epistemic Modals, Relativism, Norm Conflicts, Retraction, Semantics, Truth Conditions, Argumentation. (shrink)

To speak of “networked learning” (e.g., NLEC, 2021a) is to subsume a wide range of educational questions under two overdetermined rubrics. “Learning” and “networked” are words that already carry a heavy semantic burden in both educational and technological discourses. First, the word “learning”—as used in networked learning and in educational discourse generally—tends to conflate the roles and responsibilities of student and teacher. Second, and again as in educational discourse broadly, the definitions provided for networked learning fail to clearly distinguish between (...) “is” and “ought,” between description and prescription. The task of carefully defining networked learning is justified as providing “a concise description of a field of research and practice” but relies on normative criteria that have no unambiguous descriptive corollaries. Third and finally, to speak of experiences as “networked” is to direct attention to structured, interconnected, or entangled manifestations of learning. This is incompatible with the ontological presuppositions of phenomenology and with phenomenological accounts of learning as “non-disponible:” inaccessible, non-available, and non-controllable. (shrink)

In contemporary epistemology, it is commonly accepted that belief aims at truth. For Plato, the relationship between belief and truth is more complicated. In the Republic, I argue, Plato maintains that our beliefs are not simply true or false, and correspondence with the world cannot be our standard for which beliefs to accept. The norm of belief is instead whether it turns our soul towards the highest realities. Though beliefs by their nature cannot be directly about these realities, they (...) can bring our souls closer to or further from them, and this feature provides the standard for the guardians of the just city to impart beliefs to their citizens. (shrink)

One central debate in recent literature on epistemic normativity concerns the epistemic norm for action. This paper argues that this debate is afflicted by a category mistake: strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an epistemic norm for action. To this effect, I introduce a distinction between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content; I argue that while it is plausible that norms of the latter type will govern action in general, epistemic norms will only govern actions (...) characteristically associated with delivering epistemic goods. (shrink)