CONTENTS: SEZIONE I IL TUTTO E' UNO? IL RISVEGLIO DI UN PROBLEMA TRA SCOLASTICA E RINASCIMENTO Il principio omne causatum est compositum fra Tommaso e Cajetano Igor Agostini, p. 25 Parti e tutto in Montaigne. La natura e l'individuo tra frammentazione e integrazione Raffaele Carbone 45 Le minuzzarie e il tutto. Giordano bruno e la conoscenza universale Maurizio Cambi 75 SEZIONE II A PARTIRE DA CARTESIO. COME PUO' ESSERE UN TUTTO L'UOMO? Mente/Corpo in Cartesio. Spunti per un'interpretazione mereologica Stefano (...) Di Bella 93 Nos sumus ex Deo et pertinemus ad Deum. Appartenenza, dipendenza e relazione nel pensiero e nel lessico di Arnold Guelincx Cristina Santinelli 115 L'integrità di corpo e mente nell'"invenire" terapeutico di E. W. von Tschirnhaus Manuela Sanna 133 L'indivisibilità della natura umana e della società in Francesco Longano. Un episodio della ricezione di Locke in Italia Roberto Evangelista 147 SEZIONE III L'IRROMPERE DELL'ORGANICO. LA BIOLOGIA FILOSOFICA TRA SEI E SETTECENTO Convenienza e discrepanza. Parti e tutto nella Lettera 32 di Baruch Spinoza Francesco Toto 169 Mereologia della sostanza e mereologia del vivente in Leibniz Enrico Pasini 197 Teleologia e mereologia dell’organismo da Leibniz a Bonnet Francesco Piro 209 Il nesso delle parti: mereologia e scienza secondo Christian Wolff Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero 239 Il problema del tutto e delle parti. il caso del vitalismo di Montpellier Charles T. Wolfe 257 SEZIONE 4 TOTALITA' CRITICHE: DALLA CRISI DEL NATURALISMO ILLUMINISTICO ALLA FILOSOFIA DELLE CULTURE La logica del tutto (e delle parti di tutto, vale a dire niente) in Dom Deschamps Jean-Claude Bourdin 273 l’(in)afferabile forma. Totalità e contingenza nel pensiero di Kant tra Critica della ragion pura e Critica del giudizio Luigi Imperato 303 la relazione Parte-Tutto nel primo Schelling Giuseppe D’Anna 327 Hegel o della totalizzazione dello spazio di interiorità Vittorio Morfino 343 A partire da Kant: Begriffsbiìldung teleologica e relazione Parti-Tutto nelle indagini di Rickert sulla logica delle scienze storiche della cultura Edoardo Massimilla 359. (shrink)

La Monadologie est au même temps une oeuvre du philosophe allemand G.W. Leibniz entitulée ainsi par un éditeur qui inventa le mot, et une théorie. Les essais réunis ici en concernent l'origine, l'histoire et l'enjeu philosophique. F. Piro analyse le développements de la conception de l'individuation chez le jeune Leibniz. M. Fichant étudie en détail la constitution du concept de monade. La nature limitée des monades créées est ramenée par G. Mormino à la doctrine leibnizienne de la contingence et de (...) la création. E. Pasini reconstitue la genèse de la Monadologie, prototype du traité monadologique, pour montrer que sa nature n'est pas dans son origine. La monadologie va même inviter les détournements matérialistes du jeune Feuerbach - l'essai de V. Morfino porte sur les insuffisances de sa reformulation purement transcendantale chez Husserl, face à la théorie du transindividuel. (shrink)

The Author attempts to reconstruct Leibniz’s philosophy through the physiology of the processes of perception, inner sense, and general cognition, and their metaphysical implications, using both Leibniz’s published and unpublished works. The volume contains four chapters ("The Young Leibniz", "Thought Mechanisms", "The Means of Perception", "The Functions of Imagination"), and a number of hitherto unpublished texts by Leibniz.

During the 19th and the 20th century the concept of system undergoes significant transformations. The interplay of biology and sociology gives rise to an olistic definition of the concept, in order to understand society by means of schemes developed in the field of theoris of organisms. It is possible to follow this development from Pareto and Henderson, to Parsons, and finally to Luhmann, by examining the various biological models to which they refer.

The article presents the various phases in which one of the most eminent journals of the history of philosophy, the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1888–), dealt with Leibniz’s philosophy and his intellectual legacy. In particular, this study compares the main moments of historiographical interest and disinterest for this subject to the specific attitudes of the journal during the long 20th century.

Appeared in 2012. It was presented in conference form in the concluding session of the 2011 Leibniz-Kongress. Complete concepts, a key notion of Leibniz’s philosophy, are analysed in their metaphysical genesis in Leibniz’s theory of creation. Both forms they are supposed to have (collections of predicates, individual histories) are discussed in the framework of Leibniz’s metaphysics of individual essences.

Ludovico Geymonat was the most important philosopher of science in 20th-century Italy, but he also engaged in the Liberation War and in political activity. Here the first part of his career, when his activity was mostly based in Turin, is aketched, and an overall balance is suggested.

To avoid the mystical rapture that seizes interpreters put before the theme of unitas oppositorum in Cusanus and Leibniz, this contribution shall move from the prosaic question: what does ensue from such opposites or from their conjunction? 2) interweave the analysis with some external point of view, notably that of Erasmus. This question will be investigated on the background of two antitethical traditions in dealing philosophically with opposition and contradiction, although in the end we shall try and find out other (...) ways and reasons for connecting the two thinkers on the ground of the various possible unitates oppositorum, than those of the metaphysical doctrine of the opposites. (shrink)

Leibniz participates in a quite important thought tradition of christian Europe, that of concordia between Christians, or between religions. With him this heritage is universalised: the globalization of concordia gives birth to Leibniz’s harmony of universal truth, that the whole of humankind can access.

It is well known that Peano had a reluctant attitude towards philosophy, including philosophy of mathematics. Some scholars have suggested the existence of an 'implicit' philosophy, without being able to describe it. In this paper a first attempt is done to reconstruct, if not a general philosophy of mathematics, at least Peano' epistemology of mathematics and its relation to contemporary positions.

Between Giuseppe Peano and Camillo Berneri, a foremost protagonist of the Italian anarchist movement, an interesting correspondence was exchanged in the years 1925-1929. Along with a presentation of the correspondence, Peano's political attitude and the role of his international language projects in early 20th century Italian left are discussed.

The paper (an ample reworking of a 2005 Italian paper) tries to evaluate Leibniz’s enduring fascination with Spinoza and presents an overview in five stages of the development of his complex relationship to his thought, beginning with the time of Mainz, when Leibniz shows a strange urgency to get in epistolary contact with the author of the Theologico-Political Treatise, despite his public rejection of both the work and the author; then Leibniz’s stay in Paris, especially in the year 1675, when (...) he seeks information through Tschirnhaus on Spinoza’s clandestine doctrines; their personal meeting in the Hague, towards the end of the year 1676, and the subsequent distancing of Leibniz from Spinozism; the reading by Leibniz of Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma and the extension of his arguments against Spinozism to discredit Cartesian philosophy in general, and, finally, Leibniz’s retrospective evaluation of Spinoza’s thought in the Theodicy. (shrink)

As one of the most logically and analytically oriented among European Leibniz scholars, Heinrich Schepers is a tough candidate for topicalizing the role of history in his approach to the study of Leibniz’s philosophical contributions. Yet, when Leibniz became his main and finally unique concern, Schepers understood his task as that of an editor, plainly, and on top of that, of a historian. There is, in Schepers’ works, a role for genealogy and continuity, as well as a need to delineate, (...) together with the theoretic scaffolding, a proper story of Leibniz’s philosophy as the unfolding of a broad project with a strategic plan. This interest in Leibniz’s history – much less, as it is easy to see, in the role of history in Leibniz’s own intellectual enterprise – brings along some relation to history and historiography. Historicity requires contextualization. But it first and foremost – as Schepers himself once wrote – requires precision. How did this precise historian, then, conceive of historiography as an understanding, organizing, and telling of history? (shrink)

The paper discusses problems related to historical change in the field of technology applied to the preservation and communication of knowledge. Debates of the years 1990s about the possible decadence of (printed) books in favour of other technologies, are evaluated with the help of a historical analogy. The art of memory was a widespread non-material technique for managing information in a world of prevalent oral communication, which was set aside by the new technologies of printed communication. In the first part, (...) the Author discusses the final phase in the history of the art of memory, sketching Lambert Schenckel’s biography as a good example of utmost individual success in the teaching of the art. Schenckel’s time sees the maximum demand for teaching in the art of memory; nevertheless those are the years when the printed book has already completely won its battle. The second part regards the possibility of a survival of the book as a technological model (i.e. as a model to build applications in new technologies for knowledge communication), notwithstanding the technologies involved in its production, just as the art of memory has been recently used as a model for constructing hypermedia, and just as the book itself survived technological revolutions in past ages. The issue is discussed carefully avoiding to engage in prophecy. (shrink)

In the Aristotelian tradition, the relationship with Aristotle’s treatment of infinity has always been ambiguous for reasons connected to theology, creation, and natural philosophy. Scholastic philosophy generally rejects the existence of real infinities in the created world, while recognising potential infinities in the doctrine of the continuum, in line with Aristotle’s views on this matter. According to this view, there is no infinite power or greatness in the world. Nevertheless, notable developments emerge in which this orthodoxy is questioned, and the (...) possibility that God could produce an actual infinity in terms of quantity, number, or intensity becomes widespread among later scholastics – such infinist approaches sometimes drawing on highly interpretative readings of Aristotle’s own thinking. Alongside these examples of internal development, the concept of the natural infinite – the presence of infinity in nature – becomes a source of tension between the new philosophy and Aristotelianism at the beginning of the modern era, even when a general framework or vocabulary of Aristotelian descent is maintained. Such a multifaceted subject could not be exhausted in a few pages, so we will only discuss two emblematic examples: a 16th-century literary celebrity and a 17th-century mathematician and philosopher. Despite being as different as possible, they are both signs of an interesting dependence on Aristotelian concepts and terminology, even while moving away from and fundamentally distorting the framework they were cast in. (shrink)

The focus of this paper will be, on the one hand, on a prime example of the historical issues and practices related to the teaching of the habits involved in the art of artificial memory: on Lambert Schenckel, a didactic genius, possibly the most important teacher that the tradition of the art of memory ever saw; on Martin Sommer, his follower and betrayer; on the true history of the Gazophylacium artis memoriae. This, on the other hand, will allow us to (...) highlight relevant aspects of the seventeenth-century reshaping of certain habits of the human mind, setting them on a background where the habit-forming practices on which the art of memory is based, and their teaching, can be seen not so much as a merely instrumental component, but rather as a relevant social phenomenon in themselves, that accompanies a seemingly contradictory transformation of individual and social needs. (shrink)

Did it all begin with Tschirnhaus? This paper discusses the exemplary role that Tschirnhaus could play in the reconstruction of an empirically oriented, scientific, somewhat radical and variously unorthodox current in 18th-century German philosophy, starting from 18th-century characterizations of his intellectual image.

The scattered and pervasive variability of material objects, being a conspicuous part of the very experience of early-modern and modern science, challenges its purely theoretic character in many ways. Problems of this kind turn out in such different scientific contexts as Galilean physics, chemistry, and physiology. Practical answers are offered on the basis of different approaches, among which, in particular, two can be singled out. One is made out by what is often called an ‘art’ of experiments. From the Renaissance (...) until J. H. Lambert’s writings of the 1750–1760s, we can follow a train of reflections on the art of making experiments that deal precisely with the persistence of contingency in the material objects of pure science. The other is the analysis of contingency in probabilistic terms. They develop subsequently and eventually meet, as it can be seen precisely in Lambert’s work: among the first to pursue this path are Jakob Bernoulli and Leibniz. (shrink)

Popkin set Erasmus as the beginner of modern skepticism, and made of him an apologetic sort of sceptic, that uses doubt to make acceptable the tradition and authority of the church. The pivotal moment is the debate concerning free will. Luther is particularly upset by Erasmus’ professions of skepticism in his De libero arbitrio, although it was meant by him as an appeal to moderation: the key to Erasmus’ skepticism isn’t religious incredulity, but putting doubt to good use, in suspending (...) judgements that are not necessary and might be dangerous to peace and concord among christians. Doubt isn’t endorsed by the christian tradition, nor by the literary one, and technical treatments (in logic or rhetorics) are not favored by Erasmus. Moreover skepticism receives the same ambiguous consideration that Erasmus has for philosophy in general. But he practices doubt nevertheless, in both forms of dubitare and ambigere. The latter is particularly important, since this practice of skepticism is particularly useful in avoiding the common error of doing what one had better omit. These ideas of Erasmus play a role in his cultural, theolocial, and ecclesiastical program, developed by him along many years, and specifically in the years of the crudest confrontation among emerging religious factions. In the works of the greats catholic skeptics, such as Huet, skepticism and fideism will be tightly connected, Erasmus supports skepticism as a means to gain for all contending parties a right to doubt and ask for suspension of judgement in matter of warlike controversy, aiming instead to concile intellectual freedom and irenic perspectives. (shrink)

The paper (of which an ample Spanish reworking has appeared in 2012, see <http://philpapers.org/rec/PASLTL>) tries to evaluate Leibniz’s enduring fascination with Spinoza and presents an overview in five stages of the development of his complex relationship to his thought, beginning with the time of Mainz, when Leibniz shows a strange urgency to get in epistolary contact with the author of the Theologico-Political Treatise, despite his public rejection of both the work and the author; then Leibniz’s stay in Paris, especially in (...) the year 1675, when he seeks information through Tschirnhaus on Spinoza’s clandestine doctrines; their personal meeting in the Hague, towards the end of the year 1676, and the subsequent distancing of Leibniz from Spinozism; the reading by Leibniz of Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma and the extension of his arguments against Spinozism to discredit Cartesian philosophy in general, and, finally, Leibniz’s retrospective evaluation of Spinoza’s thought in the Theodicy. (shrink)

Detlev Clüver (1645-1708) was among the first to criticize Leibniz's new infinitesimal analysis. Although his criticisms were vague and his methods inconsistent, Leibniz had always for him a friendly sort of consideration. The article presents Clüver's biography, writings, and thought, together with a detailed description of Leibniz's relations to him and of their correspondence, and contains a bibliography of Clüver's writings.